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Abstract 
Health care systems are set up to fulfill the same functions but differ largely in their organizational 
design. Moreover, in recent years health care systems are confronted with a range of similar 
problems to which they respond in different ways. It turns out that they are able to cope with these 
problems with different degrees of success. This put much focus on how institutional structures in 
health care systems affect the system’s performance, adaptability and resource consumption. 
Comparative research is the appropriate research design to obtain answers on these questions. But 
in practice, empirical comparative research on the effects of institutional structures of health care 
systems is limited by the lack of comparable, detailed institutional information on the organization 
of health care systems. This data handbook is intended as a contribution to close this gap. 
Health care systems are layered networks of delegation relationships: the citizens, in their role as 
patients as well as voters, delegate the provision of health services, the administration and the 
overall control of the health care system to agents: medical providers, health insurance funds, health 
authorities and the state. These agents usually have interests, which diverge from those of the 
citizen and also have substantial leeway to pursue these interests, at expense of the citizen as the 
principal. On the conceptual level, the delegation-approach proved to be able to explain differences 
in performance and achievement at the system level by rational individual behavior. Further, the 
delegation-approach offers a template on which a comparative analysis and the description of 
complex systems, like health systems, can be based.  
This data handbook describes the health care systems of 22 OECD countries for two points in time, 
1995 and 2004, on the basis of the institutional economics perspective. In particular from the 
perspective of the delegation of medical as well as administrative tasks and the control mechanisms 
implemented in these delegation relationships, which shall avoid opportunistic behavior. The data 
compiled in this data handbook shall enable researchers to study the impact of institutional 
structures on aspects of health system performance, like achievements in health levels, 
responsiveness and productive efficiency. 
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A. Motivation of the Data-Handbook 
1. Introduction 
Health care systems, henceforth abbreviated HCS, are set up to fulfill the same functions but 
differ largely in their organizational design. While they are confronted with a range of similar 
problems, they respond to these in different ways and are able to cope with them with 
different degrees of success; see Saltman et al. (1998), OECD (2002) and Johnston (2004). 
Among the most discussed problems in health policy and health system research is the issue 
of increasing costs and the financial sustainability of the HCS in the long run. Expenditure 
levels are perceived to be driven by an aging population1, increasing levels of expectations 
and demands, see Blendon et al. (1990), Kersnik (2001), Murray et al. (2001), and 
Kohl/Wendt (2004), as well as technological developments, see Newhouse/Friedlander 
(1980); Weisbrod (1991), Okunade/Murthy (2002), and Moise (2003), which make more 
treatment options available for more medical conditions, but do so at high costs; see 
Gerdtham/Jönsson (2000) for estimations of the impact on health expenditure. Projecting the 
trajectories of resource demand into the future seriously poses the question, how the demand 
of financial resources can be met; Kanavos/McKee (1998), and Bains (2003).  
But even in the short run, HCS seem to respond to these drivers with levels of resource 
consumption, which are colliding with other political aims; Guillén (1999), Freeman/Moran 
(2000), Docteur/Oxley (2003), and OECD (2002).  
A second issue which is debated is how the quality of the medical services provided can be 
measured and assured. Preliminary evaluations of quality indicators seem to show that quality 
of treatment differs substantially, even among industrialized countries; Evans (2002), Sharma 
(1998), Shapiro et al. (1999), Sari (2002), Simonet (2003), Harteloh (2003), Wild/Gibis 
(2003), Walshe (2003) and Mattke (2004). 
A third and more recent issue is how the HCS can be made responsive to the patients. Patients 
do no longer want to be the passive object of medical attention, but want to be informed and 
want a say, Murray et al. (2001). They also expect higher standards in the way health care is 
delivered, ranging from access to care to accommodation standards in hospitals. The terms 
“responsiveness” and “customer orientation” are referring to the process by which health is 
produced and medical decisions are made. They also refer to intangible aspects like patient 
                                                 
1 See Zweifel et al. (1999), Seshamani/Gray (2004), Bains/Oxley (2004), Brigitte Dormont et al. (2006), and 
Werblow et al. (2007) for critical discussions of the existence and magnitude of demographic effects on health 
expenditure. 
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autonomy, and dignity; see for approaches and experiences in this area the issue of 
Eurohealth; autumn 2003 and the discussions of the meaning of “responsiveness” and its role 
for satisfaction in Darby et al. (2000), Schoen et al. (2004) and Kohl/Wendt (2004).  
 
To summarize the background, the debate in health politics puts much focus on the issue of 
how to improve the HCS’ performance. More specifically: how to redesign and to change the 
institutional setup of the HCS in order to make it producing health more efficient, providing 
better quality of care and to make it more responsive to the citizens? Comparative health 
policy and health system research can contribute to answering these questions.  
 
Comparative Health Policy 
HCS tackle the issues mentioned in different ways and are able to cope with these issues to 
different degrees of success; see Abel-Smith/Mossialos (1994), Saltman/Figueras (1998), 
Docteur/Oxley (2003), Oliver et al. (2005), and Saltman et al. (2006). So, if one is looking for 
answers to the above questions and strategies to cope with the problems, a straightforward 
strategy offers itself: Given that health care is organized in so many different ways in 
different countries, the method of choice for finding answers on how to improve a given HCS 
is to look at how other HCS tackle the problems and learn from them, be it from their success 
or their failure. Institutional learning is implemented either by adapting isolated institutional 
features, e.g. remuneration modes, or more general properties, e.g. the degree of 
decentralization of the decision making.  
These political efforts of systematic policy learning are no longer national level undertakings, 
but are conducted at the international level: the WHO, the OECD and the EU are engaged in 
developing benchmarks for what a HCS should achieve and in providing support for national 
health policy making.  
a) The WHO stimulated the emulation among HCS by its 2000 World Health Report, which 
explicitly compared achievement and efficiency of the HCS of all WHO members and yielded 
an explicit ranking. While methods and results are highly debated, see Navarro (2001), 
Williams (2001), and Gravelle et al. (2003), the impact of the study was nevertheless 
significant. In particular in those countries, which HCS were revealed to be underperforming.   
b) The OECD engaged in several benchmarking efforts, e.g. the volumes OECD (2002), 
OECD (2003), OECD (2004a) and OECD (2004b). The aim is to identify common problems 
and challenges and to analyze the results and effects of the various approaches by which 
different HCS tackled these problems.  
 2
c) The EU established a process using the open method of coordination, where member states 
jointly formulate standards and targets and try to achieve them; see Busse (2002), Schulte 
(2005), and the report of the EU Health Policy Forum (2003); see also the Health Policy 
Monitor Network’s website, which is tracking and evaluating specific health policy measures.  
 
Such benchmarking demonstrates what different HCS can achieve and are actually achieving. 
Contrary to purely theoretical exercises2, benchmarking in the form done by the OECD and 
the EU puts more pressure on health policy makers. The resulting rankings are often 
published to a wider audience, e.g. in the press, and are much more concrete. The 
achievement of these aims and standards is much more realistic, since there are actual HCS 
which meet these targets. Comparative health system research on health system efficiency, in 
its empirical strain as well as its theoretical strain, has spent considerable effort to provide 
information for an “evidence based” health-policy making; Murray/Frenk (2001). The aim is 
to provide empirical evidence appropriate to give health policy makers concrete hints on what 
features to copy under what circumstances, see Pawson et al. (2005) and Lavis et al. (2005).  
However, despite an extensive body of comparative research on health systems there are 
several problems and open questions: The first is that while efficiency is a term often used in 
the public and academic debate, it is not entirely clear what HCS efficiency actually is and 
how can it be measured. Second, while it is clear from a theoretical point of view, what the 
effects of a certain regulation are, it is empirically not that easy to tell that this particular 
institutional feature has this particular effect, e.g. on efficiency. Moreover, the question is 
also, whether efficiency can be increased by copying certain institutional features, and if so, 
which ones? Or, is copying isolated features useless, because features only work, when 
combined in a certain way? I will shortly elaborate on both of these problems. 
 
Measurements of Health System Efficiency 
Before looking at results of existing research on the determinants of HCS performance and 
efficiency, I will shortly elaborate what HCS efficiency and performance is.  
Performance is often understood as what the HCS is achieving, often but not always taking at 
what costs. Efficiency is always based on the ratio of inputs to outputs. Even before 
                                                 
2 There is a long tradition of studies looking at the provision of health care from an industrial organization 
perspective, see e.g. Diamond (1992) and López-Casasnovas (1991). However, while they deliver arguments for 
certain institutional solutions, their impact on health policy remained limited. 
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comparative studies of HCS efficiency became a major field of research, the input side as well 
as the output side of the HCS was studied.  
a) For the input side, i.e. the determinants of health expenditure in absolute as well as relative 
terms, an overview of the encompassing research can be found by Gerdtham/Jönsson (2000). 
While institutional settings are found to have an effect, the most important role is usually 
assigned to GDP. Here, the issue of whether there is any causality in the correlation between 
GDP and health expenditure is still unsolved. The mechanisms underlying this relationship 
are also debated. Some argue that it is purely an effect of preferences, implying that health 
care is a luxury for which more money is spent as people get richer; see in particular 
Newhouse (1977). The institutional settings in HCS are in this view mere epi-phenomena, 
chosen for their effects on satisfying societal preferences, which are the real determinants3. 
Other authors see health expenditure as an investment in the society’s productive capacities. 
GDP is seen as an indicator of the financial value of a certain period of life which is produced 
by the HCS. It makes economically sense to spend more money for additional health, if this 
period of life gets more valuable in terms of produced GDP. In the frame of this argument, 
some countries are underinvesting in health, either by spending to little or by not covering a 
significant proportion of the population - with negative effects on economic development, see 
Hall/Jones (2004), López-Casasnovas et al. (2005), Suhrcke et al. (2005), WHO (2001), 
Bhargava et al. (2001) and Kotzian (2006). Expenditure is a highly visible “feature” of a 
HCS, and much reform activity is aiming at limiting this figure. However, health spending per 
se is no indicator of performance, because it is also influenced by preferences, see Evans 
(1985) and McGuire et al. (1993) for the usage of economic models to questions which are 
basically normative by nature.  
b) For the output side the relative importance of the HCS compared to other factors 
influencing health status is limited. Good overviews on the impact of non-HCS factors on 
health status can be found in Auster et al. (1969), Babazono/Hillman (1994), 
Cutler/Deaton/Lleras-Muney (2006) or Nixon/Ulmann (2006). The most important finding is 
that the overall development – economical as well as societal – is a major factor for health 
status. If overall living conditions improve, health status improves too, since people get ill 
                                                 
3 For instance one might argue that a NHS is chosen by a society as organizational form of the HCS because it is 
the best method to ration health services. This rationing is an expression of the societal preferences, and the real 
reason why expenditure is lower in this country is this societal preference. This HCS remains in place as long as 
the societal preferences and the societal acceptance of rationing remain unchanged. The implication is first, that 
certain models of HCS cannot be transplanted from one country to another one because they will not be 
accepted. The second implication is that a society always has the HCS it wants and spends as much money for it 
as it wants.  
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less often and are living longer by default. Health expenditure increases parallel to societal 
development but seems to have no direct impact on the bulk of life years gained. In particular 
in developed countries, there is no longer a relationship between health expenditure and 
health status. The role of lifestyles for differences in health status, e.g. life expectancy, gets 
more important as the overall development proceeds and other causes for illness become less 
relevant. After having created a functioning HCS delivering basic care, the relationship 
between increases in health expenditure and increases health status seems to dissolve, see 
WHO (2000) and Self/Grabowski (2003).  
 
The empirical research on HCS performance usually measures “performance” in terms of 
input-output-ratios, i.e. combines information on input (expenditure) and output (health 
status). The concept of HCS performance is approximated by measuring productive efficiency 
of the HCS: how much input is used to produce a certain level of output?  
Empirical analyses looking at HCS performance – understood as productive efficiency and 
proxied by the ratio of resource consumption to output levels – are using the econometric 
techniques of Data Envelop Analysis or Productivity Frontier Analyses developed in 
econometrics for productivity measurement, see Farrell (1957), Charnes/Cooper/Lewin 
(1994), and Kumbhakar/Lovell (2000) for the methodological foundations of efficiency 
measurement. As such, they require quantitative data on the HCS’ input, output and other 
outcome relevant factors. Such quantitative data is nowadays available for the analysis of 
some research questions, in particular since the OECD Health Database is recently providing 
a wide range of variables, which were collected and compiled in a way which is usable for 
quantitative analyses.  
 
The empirical results of measurements show that HCS differ substantially with regard to their 
performance; see the performance / productive efficiency evaluations in WHO (2000), Evans 
et al. (2000b), Bhat (2005), Grubaugh/Santerre (1994), Greene (2004), and Retzlaff-Roberts 
et al. (2004). This not only concerns output in the sense of life years, but also other aspects of 
health production. Some HCS produce high quality care, leading to high levels of health 
status even after controlling for other health-relevant factors like lifestyle. Other HCS don’t. 
Either the less efficient HCS require – ceteris paribus – more resources to produce the same 
health status, or they produce – again ceteris paribus – a lower health status while consuming 
the same resources than other, more efficient HCS.  
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Table 1 gives a short impression on how the estimated efficiency and performance of the HCS 
differs within a group of comparable countries, but also how the efficiency evaluation as such 
differs among studies.  
 
Table 1: Efficiency and Performance Indicators for Health Systems in OECD Countries 
 
 WHO1 WHO2 Bhat Kotzian AM1 AM2 
Australia 0,844 0,876 ,75 0,21 60,81 88,36 
Austria 0,914 0,959 ,98 0,31 72,8 106,85 
Belgium 0,878 0,915 ,70 0,25 n.a. n.a. 
Canada 0,849 0,881 ,87 0,26 62,17 91,8 
Denmark 0,785 0,862 1,00 0,30 69,35 97,21 
Finland 0,829 0,881 ,93 0,25 66,45 109,64 
France 0,974 0,994 ,81 0,34 62,69 75,08 
Germany 0,836 0,902 ,84 0,43 64,15 95,9 
Greece 0,936 0,933 ,98 n.a. 72,34 98,53 
Ireland 0,859 0,924 ,87 0,20 81,87 129,34 
Italy 0,976 0,991 ,81 0,29 68,92 88,13 
Japan 0,945 0,957 1,00 n.a. 72,48 81,41 
Luxembourg 0,864 0,928 ,78 0,18 n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands 0,893 0,928 1,00 0,29 71,19 97,26 
New Zealand 0,766 0,827 ,87 0,25 74,29 109,03 
Norway 0,897 0,955 1,00 0,22 56,92 87,51 
Portugal 0,929 0,945 1,00 0,23 113,02 132,07 
Spain 0,968 0,972 ,999 0,22 66,14 84,11 
Sweden 0,89 0,908 1,00 0,32 50,55 79,6 
Switzerland 0,879 0,916 ,86 0,40 n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 0,883 0,925 1,00 0,14 91,1 113,62 
USA 0,774 0,838 ,83 0,25 80,66 114,65 
 
Remark: 
WHO1: Efficiency Score based on production of DALEs, i.e. health outcomes only. 
WHO2: Efficiency Score based on the Overall Achievement, health and beyond health 
outcomes, and fairness of the HCS. Both from the 2000 World Health Report, high scores 
imply high efficiency of the HCS. 
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Bhat: Efficiency Scores based on Constant Returns to Scale Efficiency; Bhat (2005: 219, 
Table 3); high scores imply high efficiency of the HCS. 
Kotzian: Average production cost per life year attributably produced by the HCS; see Kotzian 
(2006); high values imply higher production costs of life years in the HCS, and thus lower 
efficiency. 
Performance Indicators 
AM1: Amenable Mortality; standardized death rates per 100.000 ages 0-74; excluding 
ischaemic heat disease . 
AM2: Amenable Mortality; standardized death rates per 100.000 ages 0-74; including 
ischaemic heart disease; AM1 and AM2 scores are from Nolte/McKee (2003: 3); high values 
imply an underperforming HCS, in which many life years are lost due to causes the HCS 
should avoid. 
 
 
When comparing the evaluations of individual HCS presented by different studies one has to 
keep in mind that efficiency is measured by each study in a slightly different way.  
A first difference is that the share of health status attributed to the HCS differs. Some studies 
assume that the HCS is more important for health status than other studies, differing in the 
share of health status, which is actually attributable to the HCS. For instance the study of 
Nolte/McKee (2003) focuses on the HCS’ reduction in the mortality, which can be avoided by 
the HCS instead of using life expectancy, as does the WHO. The argument is that while 
people might live long for many reasons, they should not die because of medical conditions a 
functioning HCS could handle. A well performing HCS should identify medical problems, 
treating them and avoid the loss of life years due to these illnesses. If it does not, it is 
underperforming. The appropriate indicator of a HCS’ performance is hence the number of 
life years lost, which could have been avoided. The evaluations resulting from the two 
approaches, i.e. the WHO’s life years produced vs. Nolte and McKee’s avoidable mortality, 
are very different.  
A second difference is that the studies are taking into account different types of health system 
output and are assuming the same societal preferences for levels and types of output. The 
HCS also produces services without impact on health4; see Newhouse (1977), Mooney (1998) 
                                                 
4 Examples of these are improved diagnostic information, conveniences like the standard of accommodation in 
hospitals, less invasive operations, but also care which is provided in situations where it is of no measurable 
impact on biological health, but is more aiming at helping patients to cope with their situation. 
 
 7
and Donaldson/Shackley (1997) for definitions and examples of ‘beyond-health-outputs’ and 
‘process utility’. Ignoring one type of output is a potential bias in an evaluation. A good 
illustration are the two WHO scores. The first score is based only on health production: How 
good is the HCS in producing life years? Does the HCS produce as many life years as could 
be produced given the resource input? The implicit assumption is that all input is used to 
produce this one output, i.e. years of disability adjusted life expectancy; DALEs. The second 
score uses a composite index as output variable. This index is based on the production of 
health output, but also other aspects and outputs making up an ‘ideal HCS’, like 
responsiveness and fairness. The achievement of a HCS in these distinct outputs is measured. 
Then the different outputs are combined to a weighted composite index. Efficiency here 
measures, whether the input is used to produce as high a value of this composite index as 
possible. Again, the resulting scores differ. HCS which are highly efficient in producing 
health output might be not as efficient in producing other outputs. Indeed they may not 
produce other outputs at all, very much to the dissatisfaction of the citizens.  
A third difference is, how the efficiency evaluations handle differences in preferences among 
societies. While the inclusion of more than one output in the evaluation makes sense, the 
uniform construction of the composite output variable implies the same weighting of the 
different outputs for all societies. Given that preferences and demands of the citizens change 
in particular parallel to economic development, assuming the same preferences for all WHO 
members is problematic. What the ‘ideal HCS’ is, is a question of preferences and cultural 
attitudes, and what the HCS produces will reflect these preferences. As an illustration one 
might use the US: if the citizens are demanding a very high level of responsiveness, the HCS 
will produce much of this output. Since responsiveness is an expensive output, much money 
is spent for this. While being counted as health expenditure, this money is neither spend for 
producing biological health nor do the citizens want it to be spend for this. In any efficiency 
measurement based either on the gross ratio of expenditure/health status, the US will come 
out inefficient. The same is true for evaluations, which – while based on a composite measure 
of HCS output – assume identical preferences for all societies. These evaluations ignore that 
Americans are willing to spend more money for this particular output than anyone else. Here 
too, the US will show up as inefficient.  
A further way by which preferences impact on efficiency scores is the issue of how much 
health is produced. The production of health has rapidly diminishing returns. At the macro 
level, producing health in a society where citizens are already very healthy and any further 
improvement is very expensive in terms of input required, makes health expenditure soar, 
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while the resulting improvement in health status is only marginal, see Pritchett/Summers 
(1996), WHO (2000), Gandjour/Lauterbach (2005) and Self/Grabowski (2003). At the micro 
level the costs of producing a life year using a certain medical intervention differs 
substantially; see Tengs et al. (1995) for the most prominent study of the costs of a life year 
produced by an intervention. Drawing a line on what medical interventions to pay for is again 
a question of preferences and a political question, see Brown (1991), Luce/Rubenfeld (2002), 
Devlin/Parkin (2004) or Buxton (2005) on how countries handle this problem. If the HCS 
produces life years up to a very high “price per piece”, HCS efficiency measured as input-
output-ratio declines. But again, this has nothing to do with the HCS’ efficiency, but rather 
concerns what the HCS is used for. The HCS might produce a certain medical intervention at 
minimal costs, but the intervention per se is used situations, where it cannot produce many 
additional life years. The fact that the medical intervention is made in situations like these is a 
result of the societal preferences. A further aspect of preferences is the question whether a 
certain medical condition, e.g. missing teeth, is acceptable or whether is it perceived to be in 
need of treatment. This too is a question of cultural and societal preferences. So when 
comparing the efficiency of HCS, one must pay attention to the preferences of the society and 
their notion of what an ideal HCS produces.  
 
Institutional Design and HCS Efficiency 
To summarize the empirical work on this stage, the overall result of a substantial variation in 
HCS efficiency holds true, even if health relevant factors outside the HCS and different 
outputs are taken into account. Some HCS are indeed per se more efficient than others, 
producing more output per unit of input used than others. From the perspective of a health 
policy maker driven by the wish to increase HCS performance, the question arising 
immediately is: What are the reasons for these differences and what can be done about it?  
The chosen performance criteria reflect, what types and mixture of outputs a society wants, 
and what the society expect it’s HCS to achieve. There is no single efficiency, which is 
appropriate to evaluate all HCS. Efficiency concerns whether the HCS in this country is able 
to achieve the aims defined by the society at least possible costs. In one society, the 
appropriate indicator might be the WHO score based on DALEs, because the society only 
cares about life years. In another country, the appropriate efficiency score might be based on 
the production of responsiveness, because the society is concerned only with this output. 
Thus, given that one has chosen an efficiency indicators one can start to analyze the reasons 
for differences among HCS in the chosen performance indicators. In particular, one can look 
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at the role of institutional factors, because these are the features amenable to policy changes – 
contrary to life styles, which are usually beyond politically motivated changes. For instance, if 
the society wants only health output, one can estimate an efficiency indicator which is based 
only on health production and identify the HCS which is most efficient in producing health 
output. If one wants high levels of responsiveness, one bases the evaluation on a 
responsiveness indicator and looks which HCS are achieving high levels of responsiveness at 
least costs. The design of the benchmark HCS can then be used as a template for changing the 
HCS. 
 
What are the approaches and the results of health system research in this regard? There is a 
body of research analyzing the role of the institutional setting, using a variety of methods and 
approaches:  
There are studies looking at how the institutional design of relationships between actors in the 
HCS affects performance, e.g. the relationship between GPs and patients which is in the core 
of health care delivery; see Blomqvist (1991), Scott/Vick (1999), Delnoij et al. (2000), 
Croxon et al. (2001), Garcia Marinoso/Jelovac (2003) and Delattre/Dormont (2003). Sectorial 
studies compare how organizational features affect the performance of a particular sector. For 
instance how the regulation of pharmaceutical consumption affects usage of generics and 
thereby pharmaceutical expenditure; see Kamal-Bahl/Briesacher (2004) and Hassell et al. 
(2003). Or, how the efficiency of hospitals is influenced by features like ownership, non-
profit-status or remuneration modes, see Dismuke/Sena (1999), Hofmarcher et al. (2002), 
Bech (2003), Kjerstad (2003) or Biorn et al. (2003). Other studies compare prototypical 
organizational forms of health care delivery; see for instance Feachem et al. (2002) for a 
comparison of a NHS with a HMO, or Danzon (1992), for a US Canada comparison.  
 
Doing so, a fact that soon comes into view is the institutional complexity and variability of 
HCS: HCS differ in many regards, and it is difficult to attribute differences in performance 
and efficiency to how a certain institutional feature is designed. It might even be the case that 
features only have effects when combined with other features in a certain way. 
This problem gave rise to a different approach of analyzing variation in performance and 
efficiency without paying heed to the question of what the exact institutional factors and 
mechanisms are. The basic idea of how to compare the institutional setting of HCS without 
dividing the settings analytically is outlined for instance by Grubaugh and Santerre. They 
conduct a regression analysis of performance indicators, in their case health expenditure as 
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input and infant mortality as output, on exogenous features of the country, treating the 
features of the HCS as non-observable and using country dummy variables as proxies for the 
country specific institutional setting of the HCS. Using the values of a country A in the 
independent variables obtained in the regression equation plus the country dummy for country 
B, which represents unknown features of B, but also country B’s HCS, one can calculate the 
performance country A would have, if it had the HCS of country B; see Grubaugh/Santerre 
(1994).  
This method of looking at institutional effects without analytically dividing them into 
variables can also be applied at a sub-national level. For instance the study by Hauck et al. 
(2003) for the UK uses multilevel random intercept model to estimate the effects of individual 
wards, which are nested in District Health Authorities, which in turn are nested in Regional 
Health Authorities. The nesting structure of the analysis allows to capture the share in several 
outcome variables which is due to the – unspecified – features of the administrative unit 
(DHA or RHA) and the variance associated with each administrative level (district or 
regional). A noteworthy finding is that the administrative unit’s impact differ substantially 
among indicators of HCS performance. While relevant for some outcome variables, like 
mortality, the institutional setting is irrelevant for others.  
There is a range of similar studies in this strain, e.g. Bhat (2005) and Retzlaff-Roberts et al. 
(2004), both using Data Envelop Analysis, or Evans et al. (2000), Hollingsworth/Wildman 
(2003) and Gravelle et al. (2003), using productivity frontiers. All have in common that they 
use the overall setting of the HCS without going into identifying the actual features affecting 
efficiency and performance.  
 
As for the results of the studies mentioned, the role of institutional settings for health system 
efficiency is substantial. This holds true, even when the strong effect of societal preferences 
and the diminishing returns of investments in health are taken into account. But the studies do 
not give information about which features are influencing efficiency. They just find that the 
organization of the HCS affects efficiency. Obviously, this is of limited use for health policy. 
So, what the empirical comparative HCS research wants to achieve, is to get insights on the 
institutional determinants of HCS efficiency: What institutional features increase HCS 
efficiency? Here, the finding that “institutions matter” is but a first step. Copying isolated 
features usually does not work. Thus, the question is also: Under what conditions does an 
institutional feature have this effect – and why does it sometimes not work, if copied? As 
Pawson et al. (2005) put it, the question is not simply, What works? But rather: What works 
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for whom in what circumstances? HCS are complex, and the interaction among the 
institutional features in the HCS makes it difficult to achieve an effect by changing just one 
feature in isolation. In pursuing these questions empirical research is restricted by the fact that 
little comparable institutional data is available. What is needed, is data on the institutional 
setting of the HCS, which can be used in the analyses of the kind described in this section. 
 
The Lack of Comparable Institutional Data on Health Systems 
Unfortunately, the lack of comparable institutional data on HCS is a persisting problem in 
comparative research. While there is an abundance of case-based descriptions and descriptive 
analyses of HCS, there is little comparable institutional data which could be used to estimate 
the effect of an institutional setting on HCS performance and efficiency in a quantitative 
setting. While some institutional data exists, it is relatively crude, e.g. leaving much variation 
within each category of a variable5.  
 
Having a look at the literature on HCS or health policy, the predominance of the case-study 
approach is striking. For most industrialized countries, there are many case studies, covering 
current issues or the development of one particular HCS in great detail. The underlying 
assumption seems to be that each HCS is a case sui generis, which cannot be understood 
unless studied with full respect to its particularities. While achieving their declared aim, most 
of this literature stands alone. While it captures the intricacies of a HCS and is cumulative at 
the level of the individual HCS, it is of limited use for comparative work. If one tries to 
compile a database of institutional information by excerpting information from the case 
studies, one is quickly stopped by the fact, that there is little overlapping in time and themes. 
In some HCS, e.g. Spain, decentralization is the main topic, which is no theme at all in many 
other HCS. To a substantial degree, overall paradigms, like decentralization or privatization, 
or country specific issues determine the research interests, and much of the literature then 
covers this main topic from various angles, leaving aside all other issues, which are currently 
not of interest.  
 
Comparative research in its quantitative strain uses the rough institutional data available, e.g. 
dummy variables for the most important features (dummies for NHS, Fee for Service-
                                                 
5 A country may be coded as having gatekeeping, but how this is handled, and to what degree patients have a 
actual choice among providers is something different. Neither does gatekeeping preclude choice, nor does the 
absence of gatekeeping imply free choice.  
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remuneration or gatekeeping) in a regression analysis of cross sectional or panel data, see 
Newhouse (1977) or Gerdtham/Jönsson (2000) for typical examples. In its more qualitative 
strain, comparative research is limited in the number of HCS it can handle, since here too, the 
authors go in the detail, see Immergut (1992), Tuohy (1999), or Hacker (2004) as typical 
examples of qualitative approaches. 
 
Given this lack of data, there are efforts to close this gap. There is a number of international 
level efforts to compile databases; e.g. EU reporting in the MISSOC and the Health Systems 
in Transition Reports, HiT, edited by the Copenhagen based European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies, which follow a common template6. But there is still too little 
comparative institutional data available on which a comparison of a larger sample of HCS can 
be based. 
 
Gathering Institutional Data on the HCS: Accepting Limitations  
Institutional data is missing not due to a lack of interest, but because gathering institutional 
data on HCS quickly encounters practical problems. The institutional variety of the HCS is 
large. HCS differ with regard to many variables, a fact which makes it impossible to compare 
the HCS in a way which captures all aspects and institutional differences which might be 
relevant. More technically put, if one focuses on OECD or EU countries, where the 
informational basis is quite good, these about 30 HCS are likely to differ in more than 30 
aspects at any point in time. Consequentially, available comparative studies focus on selected 
issues: 
• Degree of public vs. private provision 
• Role of the state, e.g. which parameters of the HCS are set politically and at what level. 
• Decentralization vs. centralization   
• Issues of quality assurance 
• Issues of access to care; e.g. equality of access, gatekeeping vs. factual choice 
• Usage and effects of co-payments 
• Issues of coverage – be it coverage of services or coverage of citizens 
The question is then, how the design in a particular sector or a particular feature affects HCS 
performance. The results are ceteris paribus statements, based on the quasi experimental 
setting, in which the researcher assumes that if nothing else changes in the institutional setting 
                                                 
6 See the Observatory’s website for the current version of the template underlying the HiT country reports. 
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of the HCS, changes in the dependent variables, like expenditure, quality or responsiveness, 
are due to these changes.  
 
The point to be seen is, that while case studies are most appropriate in giving the functioning 
of a HCS its due attention, comparative research on HCS requires compromises. 
The first compromise is a selection of features of interest, with the explicit exclusion of other 
issues. Even focussing on institutional features leaves a wide range of issues to select from. In 
the following section, I will present the framework on which the selection of features for this 
data-handbook is based. 
The second compromise is a certain superficiality. Covering several HCS implies that no HCS 
is treated with the attention to its particularities in organization and functioning that is usually 
paid to a HCS in a case study. This data handbook is thought as a source providing 
comparative information on a larger set of HCS by giving a list of features which in the end 
can be directly compared. In the most simplest case this is, whether a feature is present or not. 
It is intended that this information can stand alone and can be used as such, irrespective of 
how the overall HCS is organized7.  
 
2. A Framework for Comparing Health Care Systems: Delegation and Control in 
Health Care 
Given the impossibility of a full scale comparison encompassing all potentially relevant 
features of HCS a selection of some issues is necessary. Such a selection in turn will be 
dependent on what one wants to explain – e.g. expenditure issues or quality issues. Further the 
selection will be based on a theoretical mechanism, assumed to be capable of explaining the 
variation in the variable of interest. 
 
The framework underlying this data handbook is the following. The central question is how 
institutional factors affect HCS performance, which is the dependent variable to be explained. 
The HCS is in my view a productive system and its institutional design will determine how 
efficient it transforms input into output, e.g. money into outputs like life years, quality and 
satisfaction. Given this question, the chosen underlying theoretical framework on which an 
                                                 
7 For instance, the feature “A purchaser provider split exists” is not dependent on the feature “NHS-system or 
non-NHS-system”. There are NHS systems with and without purchaser-provider split, and also NHS-systems 
with a partial split, where some services are integrated, i.e. provided by the financing organization, while some 
services are contracted from independent providers. 
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explanation is based, is the institutional economics / delegation approach and this approach in 
turn determines the selection of the features for which the data is collected.  
 
Institutional Economics: Delegation, Control and System Performance  
When aiming at explaining the effect of the institutional design of a HCS on its performance, 
the institutional economics framework, especially the delegation/agency-approach, is only 
one of several possible options. But there are several reasons favoring this particular choice.  
Firstly, the delegation of tasks is the central feature of the HCS. The patients delegated more 
or less every aspect of health care provision to some agent. The restoration of health is 
delegated to the physicians. The financing of health care is delegated to a third party, either 
the state or an insurance fund. The control over the HCS is delegated to the state, as the 
politically accountable “steward”.  
Secondly, this institutional economics / delegation approach is generally able to provide a 
micro-level based explanation of the effects of the organizational form of a system on the 
system’s performance, be the system a political system, a private enterprise or a HCS, see for 
instance Le Grand (2003), Dixit (2002) or Franzese (2002). A HCS’ institutional design is a 
macro level feature, which sets incentives for rational and hence understandable behavior of 
individuals at the micro level. Aggregated, this individual behavior in turn leads to effects at 
the macro level, e.g. HCS performance. While explaining (dependent) macro features with 
other, (independent) macro features, the institutional economics framework has the advantage 
of being “understandable”, since it rests on the understandable behavior of individuals: the 
situation sets certain incentives and restrictions for an actor, who behaves in a certain way, 
because it is the rational thing to do given the opportunities and constraints of a situation.  
Thirdly, with regard to comparing HCS and the construction of the HCS Inventory as the 
template by which the data is collected, the approach provides a list of institutional features 
relevant as explanatory factors for performance. It allows to look at very different HCS with 
the same question in mind, getting answers which are comparable, most often in a binary way. 
In the simplest case, the comparative description of HCS poses two questions: 1) Is a certain 
delegation relationship with a incentive problem present or not? 2) Is a certain control 
mechanism countervailing this incentive problem present or not?  
 
In this section, I will briefly outline the concepts of delegation, incentive problems and 
control mechanisms first in a general way, then with reference to health care.  
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Delegation Relationships, Incentive Problems and Control 
Basis of a delegation- or agency-relationship is an actor, the principal, who cannot perform a 
task himself, e.g. because he lacks the necessary knowledge. Therefore, the principal 
delegates the task to another actor, the agent, by way of an explicit or implicit contract. Both 
sides realize advantages due to economies of scale and specialization; see Arrow (1986), 
Eisenhardt (1989), Dixit (2002) and Furubotn/Richter (1998).  
However, as a self-interested actor the agent may not have an incentive to perform the task in 
a way, which is optimal for the principal. Their interest may diverge. The agent can be 
tempted to engage in opportunistic behavior, maximizing his own utility at the expense of the 
principal. This can take the form of extracting additional income, “rents” in addition to his 
official payment, or by reducing his effort and workload. This is particular the case if the 
principal cannot observe the agent’s skill or effort, and – as it is typically the case in health 
production – outcomes cannot be attributed deterministically to the agent’s skill and effort.  
Given that this problem is known, the principal might implement control mechanisms, which 
bring the agent back into line with the preferences of the principal. Depending on the 
properties of the delegated task and the nature of the incentive problem, the possibilities to do 
so differ. Often, they have to be tailored to the situation at hand. Either, the mechanisms 
implemented make rent extraction impossible or create incentives for the agents to abstain 
from opportunistic behavior. Institutional economics and the economic theory of contracts 
have developed a range of possible control mechanisms; see for instance Varian (1990), 
Gibbons (1998), Prendergast (1999), Sinclair-Desgagné (1999), and Schweizer (1999).  
Looking at health care various control mechanisms are available for the delegation 
relationships in the HCS. While the behavioral mechanisms and the expected effect of control 
mechanisms in health care has been discussed extensively, see Zweifel/Breyer (1997), De 
Alessi (1989), López-Casasnovas (1991), Ma (1994) or Scott/Farrar (2003), most of the 
literature remains at a theoretical level and is mostly concerned with the financial aspects. The 
quality side is often ignored, but is equally affected by incentives; see for quality related 
aspects Chalkley/Malcomson (1998), Garcia Marinoso/Jelovac (2003), and Faulkner et al. 
(2003). 
 
Comparing Systems with Regard to the Organization of Delegation 
This simple concept can be used to compare complex systems by conceptualizing them as 
networks of delegation relationships and looking at what delegation relationships exist and 
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how they are controlled; see Meurs (1993), Smith et al. (1997) and (Dixit 2002) for the usage 
of the delegation framework in comparative systems analysis.  
HCS can be seen as a network of delegation relationships, see figure 1 below, which not only 
encompass the delegation of the restoration of health, but also various organizational tasks as 
well. In health insurance systems the patient delegates the task of organizing the collection of 
individual contributions, the negotiation of the prices for medical services as well as the 
payment of medical providers to the Health Insurance Fund; HIF. The HIF as the patient’s 
agent should do this at low administrative costs and in a way, which is not too yielding vis-à-
vis the providers. However, the HIF’s interests diverge from the interests of its principals. 
First, standard bureaucratic theory predicts that the HIF has no incentive to act strictly in line 
with the principal’s preferences for an efficient administration at least possible costs; see Moe 
(1997) for the behavior of bureaucracies as agents pursuing their own interests. Second, the 
HIF can shirk from its task to negotiate reasonable prices by colluding with the providers, 
allowing them to charge higher prices and in turn raise the principal’s contributions to the HIF 
and thereby the overall volume of financial resources consumed by the HCS constantly. Part 
of this increase can be used by the HIFs for ‘on the job consumption’ or to cover high 
administrative overhead costs.  
In addition to tasks relating directly to the provision and organization of health care, the 
patient in his role as a voter delegates the control of the HCS to the government, which acts as 
a political agent. Either the government is directly in charge of organizing health, e.g. in 
National Health Services, where all parameters of the HCS, like budgets, waiting lists and 
coverage, are explicit political decisions. Or, the government is in charge of exerting an 
overall control, i.e. to bring the HCS – that is, the societal actors running the system – back 
into line with the preferences of the electorate. Either by making decisions, which set a frame 
for the societal actors, e.g. limiting the contributions going into health care, or by fundamental 
structural reforms, e.g. taking away competencies from the societal actors or abolishing 
certain actors altogether by integrating their function into the public administration.  
However, the government may shirk from these tasks because it doesn’t want to risk 
opposition by the influential and well-organized interests in the HCS and therefore constantly 
allows for HCE growth rates that are not accepted by the voters (‘collusion’ of controller and 
controlled). The mechanism by which the government, or rather the governing parties, itself is 
forced to do the job, is the electoral competition; see for control exerted by elections and its 
effects of subsystems in different settings; Feld/Kirchgässner (2000), Bartolini (1999), 
Bartolini (2000) and Lake/Baum (2001).  
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 Delegation, Control and System Performance 
How does the organization of delegation and control affect the performance of a system? As a 
baseline prediction, uncontrolled delegation will reduce the system’s performance. Given the 
lopsided distribution of information, agents have leeway for opportunistic behavior. This 
opportunistic behavior will increase those financial resources consumed by the system itself, 
without increasing the system’s output. These losses will result either from agents extracting 
rents, i.e. use resources for other means, or by agents “shirking” from their task, without being 
observed to do so, while receiving full remuneration nevertheless. 
With regard to health care it has to be remarked that delegation/agency-approach is not 
restricted to the financial aspects alone. Agency problems in health care equally concern the 
quality of the medical services provided; see Ma (1994), Chalkley/Malcomson (1998), Sari 
(2002) and Simonet (2003). Indeed, the double-edged nature of many regulations arises from 
the fact that they affect financial and quality aspects simultaneously, but in different, often 
opposite ways. While remunerating providers by salary or fee-for-services sets different 
incentives with regard to the problem of oversupplying medical services, neither guarantees 
high quality and effort. Shifting from fee-for-service to salary is likely to reduce costs, but it 
may also reduce output and in particular quality of services. If the provider receives the 
salary, s/he has a lower motivation to gain “customers” by investing effort in the medical care 
they obtain. Whether HCS performance, the bundle of input, output and quality, is actually 
improved by this change in remuneration is questionable and an empirical question. 
Introducing capitation, supplemented with free choice of providers may have an performance 
increasing effect. The provider’s income is based on the number of patients enrolled with him, 
but independent of the quantity of services provided. While the fixed fee paid per patient 
enrolled with the provider sets an incentive to reduce the effort spent for each patient and to 
attract healthy patients as clients, giving patients a free choice among providers may 
counteract the problem of low effort because patients can leave a provider who is in their 
perception doing a poor job. But even giving patients free choice of the provider is of limited 
effect since patients usually lack the information necessary for making an informed choice of 
a provider; Hay/Leahy (1982). Lacking medical knowledge, they might misinterpret their 
observations, e.g. mistake the usage of high technology for quality of care.  
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Agency Relationships in Health Care 
With application to health care, the concept of “agency” also refers to the delegation of a task 
to an independent actor in a setting of informational asymmetries. The agency relationships in 
health care are manifold. The characteristic ones are given in figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Delegation Relationships in Health Care Systems 
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Adapted from Jones/Zanola (2001) and Smith et al. (1997) 
 
In particular in health care, advantages of delegation both for agents and principals are 
obvious. Among the immediately visible advantages are:  
Specialization – medical knowledge is highly specific requiring large investments in 
education and training. 
Economics of scale in the administration of health care provision and financing, the 
centralized provision of medical infrastructure, but also the pooling of resources and risks.  
Unfortunately, the disadvantages of delegation are also strong in health care, since 
informational asymmetries are frequent and strong. Lacking information on the side of the 
patients with regard to quality of the medical providers and the performance of agents in 
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charge of administrative tasks precludes an informed choice of agents; see Culyer (1971), 
Reinhardt (1985), Arrow (1986) or Chalkley/Khalil (2005) for the problems. 
 
Since the functions to be fulfilled by a HCS are basically identical, one can look at whether a 
function is delegated to an separate actor, or is integrated in a hierarchical setting. In the later 
case, the institution itself performs a task, in the former case, the institution delegated the task 
by way of a contract to another actor. Depending on the organizational form of the HCS, 
some delegation relationships are present, while others are absent. For instance the citizens 
can delegate the financial administration – collecting contributions, negotiating prices with 
providers, paying providers – to an agent. This agent can be the state, acting through Health 
Authorities (HA) or a Health Insurance Fund (HIF). How the financing side is handled does 
not say anything about how the supply side is handled; this can in both cases be public or 
private. Indeed, while the delegation of financial administration is near omnipresent8, the 
delegation of the actual provision of services is organized differently. The provision of health 
care can be delegated to independent providers or be hierarchically integrated with the 
organization of health care financing. An example of the first case are independent GPs, 
contracted by the Health Authorities or Health Insurance Funds. An example of the later are 
health centers operated by local health authorities, with hired staff.  
HCS of different ”types”, e.g. health insurance systems or NHS systems, are in these terms 
characterized by the existence of independent actors and delegation relationships between 
them. In this conception, there are no “types”, but constellations of structural features; see 
Przeworski/Teune (1982) and Ragin (1989: chap.3). For instance, the feature “existence of a 
purchaser provider split” is not strictly associated with a corporatist system, where Health 
Insurance Funds and provider associations jointly operate the HCS. Neither is the feature 
”competition among purchasers” excluded in a HCS where regional health authorities are the 
purchasers acting on behalf of all inhabitants of an area. As can be seen in the sections of the 
data-handbook concerning purchasers, there are corporatist HCS, where competition among 
HIFs is only a pro forma affair. Similarly, there are public integrated systems, where local 
health authorities are under competitive pressure. 
 
In the following, I will briefly discuss the relationships, the delegated tasks and possible 
control mechanisms. HCS are systems of layered delegation, where a task is delegated to one 
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agent, who in turn delegates part of the task to another agent further down the line. For 
instance, the provision of health care is delegated to the providers, while the administration of 
collecting and distributing funds is delegated to another agent, usually HIFs or some public 
administration. In particular control is delegated to several actors. Given this overlapping in 
tasks and issues, there is necessarily also some overlapping and redundancy between the 
sections on the individual relationships in the Health Care System Inventory, HCSI. This 
section serves also as the derivation of the HCSI: what features and what categories to 
describe the design of a certain feature were included in the data collection. 
 
The Patient-Provider-Relationship I: Provision of Health Services 
The most visible delegation relationship in the HCS is the delegation of the task “restoring 
health” from the patient, as the principal, to medical providers, as the agents. Lacking medical 
knowledge the patient has no choice but to consult a trained expert in the case of an illness. 
The patient makes a long term or ad hoc contract with a physician to maintain his health. 
Payment can be done either by a permanent fee or by an ad-hoc-payment to the provider. 
Usually, payment is indirect, with a third party acting as an intermediate agent, which is 
pooling the risks and is in charge of the administrative aspects of the relationship; see the 
respective section below.  
While the patient is the consumer of medical services and products, the patient does not make 
the decision on what and how much medical services to consume. Instead, the agent decides 
on behalf of the principal. As an expert the medical provider has more information on what 
treatments might be necessary, what is sufficient and what is only of marginal or no effect at 
all on the health status. Because of this informational asymmetry the patient cannot evaluate 
the provider’s decisions on the spot. Nor can the patient do so ex post, since the medical 
outcomes cannot be attributed to the medical interventions alone. Further, the patient is in a 
weak position to evaluate the quality and effort of the provider. First, it is not that easy to 
recognize a capable provider. Second, the patient has usually contact to only few providers 
mostly to those close to his place of living. This unobservable quality and effort raises 
problems of opportunistic behavior on the side of the providers of medical services. The 
principals have an interest in consuming only those services, which are appropriate and an 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 The counterexample would be that the patient pays for the services directly, without an intermediary – apart 
from sectors like dental care or systems like  the US, there is usually such an intermediary for most of the 
population. 
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interest that the services provided are of sufficient quality. The provider’s interests diverge 
from these:  
First, by deciding on what services to prescribe, the provider decides on the demand for his 
own services and thus on his income. The prototypical incentive problem in the patient-
physician-relationship is the problem of supply-induced demand; see Hay/Leahy (1982), Rice 
(1984), Reinhardt (1985) or Phelps (1986). It is the physician who diagnoses the illness and 
decides on the appropriate therapy, which is often provided by the physician himself. The 
patient can neither evaluate whether the diagnosis is correct, whether the therapy is correct 
given the diagnosis, nor whether the service was actually necessary in the sense that it has a 
probable contribution to the health status.  
If his income depends on the quantity of services delivered, the supplier of medical services 
may be tempted to oversupply medical services – doing everything, whether actually 
necessary or not, providing services, even if they are of no use in this case. The ethical 
evaluation of this behavior is not as simple as it may seem. There is the notion that health is 
achieved only if “perfect health” is achieved, even if the marginal improvements come at a 
very high price. Further, quality of care is sometimes defined in terms of “everything must be 
done, which can be done”; see the WHO’s definition of health as perfect well being not the 
mere absence of illness, and Harteloh (2003). Doing everything that can possibly be done and 
has a potential positive impact on the patient’s health status, however small, and explicitly not 
evaluating the cost-effectiveness may well be in line with the professional ethics; see Mooney 
(1992: chap7).  
Second, there is the problem of quality. Quality requires substantial effort from the provider. 
During the actual treatment but also in the sense that the provider has to keep himself up to 
date with the state of the art in his profession. At the same time, the provider cannot signal his 
effort and skill to the patient in a reliable way. Because the patient might be unable to 
recognize effort and skill, but also, because, the outcome of medical treatment is not 
determined by the medical treatment alone. Neither improvements nor deterioration in health 
status can in every case be deterministically attributed to the treatment chosen. Nor is the 
relationship between the resulting health status and the physician’s skill and effort a 
deterministic one. Even when focussing on the quality of the provision independent from the 
outcome, the patient cannot evaluate whether the quality was good or bad. The patient is 
lacking the medical knowledge required to evaluate whether the provider did a good or poor 
job (Is the effort spent by the physician to interpret an x-ray or the results of a laboratory 
analysis sufficient or not? Has the physician paid attention to everything there is to see on the 
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x-ray?). Moreover, the patient’s relationship with the provider is an infrequent and bilateral 
one. The patient has no comparative information on the quality of other providers apart from 
informal sources of information like conversations with other patients. As I will elaborate 
later on, the collection and publishing of quality information, e.g. scores and rankings, is able 
to close this gap. However, quality measurement and quality assurance is among the most 
difficult issues in health policy. 
 
Both incentive problems, supply-induced demand and the problem of unobservable quality, 
can interact, sometimes countervailing, sometimes aggravating each other. For instance, if the 
provider is paid on a fee for service basis, he may be induced to produce as much service as 
possible irrespective of their appropriateness in the case at hand, minimizing time and effort 
spent on each treatment episode. The result may be both oversupply and poor quality. The 
problem posed to the policy-makers is thus, how to design the HCS in a way which 
incentivizes the providers to produce good quality and to limit the quantity of services to what 
is necessary, but on the other hand no less than this. If these problems are not solved, the 
consumption of services will constantly increase, driving up health expenditure, while quality 
of treatment is likely to remain poor. The HCS as a whole will be inefficient.  
 
The Patient-Provider-Relationship II: Provision of Medical Products 
Since much of medical care involves using or consuming products and devices, the provision 
of medical products, be it in the form of medical devices or pharmaceuticals, is closely related 
to the provision of medical services. While the decision on what medical device or medicine 
to use is part of the task delegated to the physician, the production of these is another task, 
delegated to another agent. What I will look at here is the delegated task of developing, 
producing and using of safe and appropriate medical products. For reasons of simplicity, I 
will put primary focus on pharmaceuticals. The issues for medical devices, like dentures or 
cardiac pacemakers, are equivalent.  
From the perspective of the delegation approach the pharmaceutical industry can be seen as 
an agent in charge of developing safe and effective medicines. In particular it shall improve 
existing therapies and develop new therapies, come up with products, which have a higher 
efficacy, fewer side effects or allow an effective treatment of conditions, which were 
untreatable hitherto. In exchange for the innovation per se, the pharmaceutical enterprise is 
granted a limited period of monopoly to recover its expenses for R&D and to make the profit 
necessary to make pharmaceuticals an interesting business; see Comanor (1986) and 
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Frank/Salkever (1992). The task of developing new medicines is an economically risky 
venture, with certain high expenses and uncertain chances of success; see DiMasi et al. (2003) 
and Grabowski/Vernon (2000a). In the end, it is this monopoly period and the associated 
profits, which is economically attractive for the producer and the main incentive to engage in 
developing new products. Once this period has expired, the market is open for competition 
from generic products sold basically at a price level a little above production costs. There is 
no economic legitimization to continue the monopoly position of the original inventor. 
Consequentially, prices for products which patent period expired are expected to drop, leading 
to lower pharmaceutical expenditure; see Bosanquet/Zammit-Lucia (1995) and Congressional 
Budget Office (1998). Two problems arise with regard to the pharmaceutical sector and 
pharmaceutical consumption:  
First, the pharmaceutical industry might use an informational advantage – here the knowledge 
about the actual improvement the new product represents compared to existing ones – to 
secure a higher income. It might be economically more attractive to modify an existing 
product, obtain an new patent for the modification and thereby extend the period of patent 
protection and the higher income associated with this position, than to develop an entirely 
new product. The inventor is much better informed about the new product’s real advantages 
relative to exiting products. And since market authorization procedures put most focus on 
safety issues, even marginal improvements may suffice to obtain a new patent. To counteract 
this information problem the step of market authorization or rather the decision to include the 
medicine into coverage by the HCS is the crucial point in time to address this informational 
asymmetry: Newer products may come at a substantially higher price, which can also be a 
continuation of the monopoly price level, without corresponding improvements in therapeutic 
value; see Kong/Seldon (2004). Lacking full information, the consumers and purchasers 
(HIFs, HA) of medicines cannot evaluate, whether the medicine represents a therapeutical 
improvement that is actually worth the higher costs associated with a new period of 
monopoly. In particular the patient, the actual consumer, has the least information to evaluate 
the new product. Usually patients also have the least incentive to act on such information, 
since the product is paid for by the HCS either completely or to a large share; see O'Brien 
(1989) and Hellerstein (1998). In this situation an agent – the prescriber, the agent in charge 
of financing pharmaceutical consumption or an institution in charge of evaluating 
pharmaceuticals – can be put in charge of the task to evaluate new pharmaceuticals on behalf 
of the patients. A possible mechanism to counteract these problems is to evaluate the 
therapeutic advantages of a new product relative to existing ones during phase of granting 
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coverage by the HCS, and to base coverage or the reimbursement level by the HCS on this 
evaluation. An evaluation can also be done later on, when more information on the 
therapeutical value of a new drug is available. Since most information arises decentrally at the 
level of the individual prescriber, the implementation of a systematical collection, analysis 
and distribution of information to the prescribers is advantageous. Regarding the actual usage 
of available information on the relative advantages of medicines, guidelines and 
pharmaceutical budgets for the prescribers might also serve as a mean to incentivize the usage 
of information on the improvement of a new medicine compared to existing ones: the 
prescriber, seeing how the medicine performed in all the cases he prescribed it, is usually 
better informed and in the better position to decide whether a therapeutical advantage is worth 
its price in a given case. The incentive to do so is absent, if the prescriber issuing the 
prescription is not involved in the payment; see Hellerstein (1998), Lundin (2000), and 
Hassell et al. (2003).  
 
Second, the collective financing of pharmaceutical consumption creates a common pool 
problem. While containing pharmaceutical expenditure is in the interest of “everybody”, there 
might not be an incentive for anybody to act accordingly. Patients might, out of pure habit, 
continue for favor the original brand they are used to, even if its price is higher than the 
generic alternative of equal effectiveness. This is in particular the case, if there are no co-
payments for pharmaceuticals or co-payments which are independent of the price. To 
counteract this problem there should be the possibility and the incentive to switch to the 
generic alternative. That means, the prescriber or the pharmacists should inform the patient on 
the existence of generic alternatives, and the patient should actually switch to the generic. The 
assumed consequence is that this will either cause the price of the branded original drop to the 
level of the generic, or that the sales of the branded original drop, and its effectively replaced 
by the generic alternative. Empirically, this is not the case. Generic substitution is usually not 
working perfectly, either because patients as well as prescribers and pharmacists are unaware 
of the generic alternative or have no incentive to switch; Leibovitz et al. (1985), O’Brien 
(1989) and Grabowski/Vernon (1992). 
 
The problem regarding medical devices is similar: First, there is the issue of the product’s 
quality, e.g. for implants. Second, there is the issue of the cost effectiveness of its usage: is the 
usage of this device, the usage of this type of implant, the usage of this kind of diagnostic 
procedure appropriate in this particular case?  
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The purchasing and usage of medical devices, e.g. high technology diagnostics, be it in 
hospitals or by providers of specialized services is a major driver of health care expenditure; 
see Cutler/McClellan (2001), and Okunade/Murthy (2002). Again, patients do not decide on 
the usage, nor do they have sufficient information to evaluate the appropriateness of the usage 
in their case. They cannot evaluate if there’s a real value added of a MRI to a simple x-ray in 
their case. Further, since patients at times (mis-)take high technology for high quality, they 
might be attracted by medical procedures using high-end devices, even if there is no 
substantial advantage.  
To control this problem the investment in heavy equipment and the usage of technology could 
based on an evaluation of its cost effectiveness in order to increase efficiency, e.g. by way of 
guidelines. An example is the usage of diagnostics in the case of a suspected illness: When is 
the usage of this high-end diagnostic procedure appropriate, when is a less costly one 
sufficient, because the information obtained is sufficient to recognize the condition and to 
chose a therapy? Controlling costs in this issue may also be achieved by realizing economies 
of scale. For example by focussing all procedures requiring certain equipment in one place 
one can use the capacity of equipment to its full extent and thus lower the costs per usage 
episode.   
 
The Patient-Purchaser-Relationship: Organizing and Administering Health Care  
The HCS encompasses also various organizational tasks. Among them are the collection of 
funds, payments of providers or the negotiation of the prices for medical products and 
services. Contrary to the usual market setting of a consumer who is directly buying a service 
from a provider at a price they agreed upon, these tasks are not performed by the individual 
patients. Instead they are delegated to an institutional agent, the purchaser9.  
In National Health Services, NHS, the government fulfills most of these organizational tasks 
and acts as the purchaser. Contributions are collected by way of general or earmarked 
taxation, providers and medical infrastructure are either directly employed or contracted by 
the state. This can be organized on the national, regional or local level, with or without a 
Health Authority, HA, in which the tasks are bundled.  
                                                 
9 In some HCS, the task of organizing health care is separated from the provision of services; i.e. there is a 
purchaser-provider-split. In other HCS, all functions are fully integrated, either at system level (state operated 
HCS) or at an intermediate level (Health Maintenance Organizations, which are providing the insurance function 
as well as the medical services to their clients). However, the incentive problems associated with the delegation 
of the administrative tasks are similar in all organizational forms. 
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In social health insurance systems the citizens delegate the organizational tasks to Health 
Insurance Funds; HIFs, which are the main purchaser. These HIFs collect contributions, 
negotiate prices and pay providers for services delivered to their clients. The incentive 
problems in the delegation relationship between the principal and the purchaser differ 
between HIFs and HA bureaucracies only by degree.  
It is in the principal’s interest that the purchaser, whatever it’s institutional status, operates at 
low administrative costs, enforces quality of the providers and negotiate prices in a way, 
which is not to yielding vis-à-vis the providers’ demands. However, the purchaser may not 
have an incentive to do so. Indeed, the purchaser has a preference to increase the health 
budget constantly. The motivation arises from a bureaucracy’s institutional interest in 
administrating bigger budgets, but also from the motive to consume resources as “on the job 
consumption” or ‘organizational slack’. Larger budgets can be used to hide larger absolute 
amounts consumed by the bureaucracy itself. Given that explicit profits are usually forbidden, 
larger budgets imply larger bureaucracies with more staff and hence more chances for the 
employees to raise in the growing hierarchy. The motivation to increase the overall health 
expenditure pertains equivalently to public administrations and semi-public Health Insurance 
Funds; see Niskanen (1971), Moe (1997) and Danzon (1992) for these “overhead costs”. To 
achieve this constant increase, the purchaser can collude with the providers, e.g. by accepting 
their demand for higher prices. To the same effect, the purchaser can also set incentives or 
tolerate over-consumption of medical services by the citizens. In both cases, the 
responsibility, or rather the blame, can be shifted to other actors in the HCS. 
 
Among the tasks delegated from the citizen to the purchaser is also the control of the 
provider’s quality: the original principal puts one agent in charge of controlling another agent. 
The individual patient has little possibilities to evaluated a provider’s quality. Nor can he 
enforce quality standards. The patient, who is in bilateral contact with only one or few 
providers, cannot identify providers which are overspending or delivering poor quality. What 
the patient can do, is to perform a very basic type control in the sense that if the provider 
gives a bill listing all services provided to the patient, the patient can check whether all 
services were actually delivered before passing the bill on to the purchaser.  
A purchaser, acting on behalf of a larger group of patients, can exercise types of quality 
control, which are impossible for the individual patient. Purchasers can gather information on 
quality problems, like malpractice, arising in a large number of patient-provider-interactions. 
They can identify providers, where quality problems occur more often by collecting reports 
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and complaints by patients. The purchaser then may give the patients the information 
necessary to make an informed choice among providers, by publishing of quality information, 
e.g. rankings of providers. When negotiating contracts, the purchaser can make the abidance 
to guidelines of good medical practices part of the agreement. If selective contracting is 
possible, the purchaser can exclude individual providers if they provide insufficient quality.  
Purchasers can also conduct routine auditing to preclude fraud. If the purchaser receives a 
detailed bill from the provider, giving the diagnosis and the medical measures taken, the 
purchaser can perform a check of plausibility and appropriateness. On this basis the purchaser 
can identify providers prone to oversupplying services. Again, in order to be effective this 
kind of control needs not be exercised in every case. The very existence of such control 
mechanism may limit certain problems which are reported for some HCS. 
 
Given these options to act on behalf of the patient but also the divergence in the interests 
between client and the purchaser, how can the purchaser be incentivized to act in line with the 
client’s preferences? The basic mechanism is competition, but for being effective, several 
problems must be handled. The main problem arises because there is also an informational 
asymmetry between the client and the purchaser. The patient might be unable to recognize a 
purchaser who is doing a good or a poor job.  
Installing competition among the purchasers may incentivize them to perform well, and 
competition for clients is the control mechanism used most often. Basically, the mechanism 
makes use of the bureaucracy’s motive to grow, but allows it to grow only by certain ways. 
By performing well, the purchaser attracts more clients, and more clients also imply a larger 
budget and the “spoils of office” associated with it: more resources available for on the job 
consumption and larger bureaucracies required to administrate the larger number of clients. If 
a purchaser is loosing clients, e.g. because it has to charge higher contributions to cover its 
administrative overhead costs, it might go out of business, which means that the employees of 
the purchaser loose their jobs. Competition incentives the purchasers by making a good 
performance the only way they can grow. However, to be effective, competition requires 
several preconditions. 
First of all there must be several competing purchasers. If the HCS is operated by a 
monolithic purchaser, e.g. the bureaucracy of a NHS or a single HIF, control is not exercised 
by competition, since there are no competitors. The same is to some degree true for regional 
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monopolies10. Control can be exercised by the politically elected government by means of the 
hierarchical control.  
Second, competition requires that purchasers can compete for clients. If a purchaser is doing a 
better job it is able either to extend the catalogue of services covered or to lower the 
contribution rate, thereby attracting more clients. If the purchaser is performing poorly it will 
loose clients – which might imply that the existence of the purchaser and the jobs of the 
employees are at risk. Thus, further requirements to establish a working competition among 
purchasers are: 1) There must be visible contributions. If the citizen sees the amount of money 
going into health, e.g. as an earmarked position on his wage bill or tax bill, he has a 
knowledge of what he pays for health that is absent if health care is paid for from the general 
taxation. 2) Next, citizens need to have a choice. In some HCS, citizens are assigned by 
occupational status or place of living to the purchaser, independent of its institutional status 
(public administration or an independent HIF). Since the clients cannot leave, there is no 
incentive for the purchaser to perform well. 3) Contributions must be informative about the 
purchaser’s performance. Contributions differ for reasons apart from performance. One is the 
composition of the clientele and the degree to which the purchaser can engage in “cream 
skimming”; see Pauly (1974), Neudeck/Podczeck (1996) and Beck/Zweifel (1998). Instead of 
focussing on fulfilling the administrative tasks at least operating costs, acting in line with the 
preferences of the clients when negotiating contracts with providers, the purchasers may focus 
on attracting good risks – i.e. clients with a good health and / or high incomes – and getting 
rid of bad risks, clients with low health status and low incomes. While attracting good risks, 
i.e. healthy clients, always works, the motivation to attract clients with high income only 
occurs, if the contribution is a percentage of the income. The information contained in a 
contribution rate may also may removed or watered down by regulations. In some HCS, 
Germany is a particular good example, there is a financial equalization among the HIFs, 
which covers up differences in performance among them. If a HIF performs well, it is forced 
to pay contribution to the Risk Equalization Fund, sometimes up to the limit that it goes out of 
                                                 
10 On the other hand a HCS in which public purchasers have regional monopoly positions does not exclude 
control by competition: in many Scandinavian countries the municipalities or counties organize health care, and 
sometimes they are under a competitive pressure, which is comparable (if not higher) to HCS with competing 
funds. The local (health) authorities raise local taxes, sometimes even taxes ear marked for health, and provide 
health services. Both, the level of the taxes and the services provided can be observed by the local population – 
which can for instance see, whether there are waiting times or other reasons to be dissatisfied with the way 
health is provided. The (political) responsibilities for financing and organizing health are also clear, while health 
is of course only one theme among many in local politics. Further, citizens living in the catchment area of a local 
health authority may not actually be free choose the membership, but they can nevertheless vote by feet, 
something citizens cannot do in some HCS, which pro forma have many funds. 
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business as a separate entity by being forced to merge with other funds. Thus, the equalization 
sets an incentive to concentrate on extracting transfer payments from the Risk Equalization 
Fund. 4) Purchasers must be allowed to compete by offering different catalogues or 
contributions levels. A HIF might offer a more encompassing catalogue than another HIF, 
covering some extras, even if the contribution levels have to be equal, as a signal that it is 
performing better than the competitors. 
 
If these requirements for competition are given, the purchasers, HIF or public health 
authorities, are under an effective competition and it pays for them to perform well (keep 
administrative costs low, negotiate advantageous contracts with providers etc.). If not, they 
have no incentive to perform well and can shirk from the sometimes bothersome task of being 
a good agent. Again, HCS performance will decrease in the later case.  
 
The Citizen-Government-Relationship: Controlling the Health Care System  
In democracies the elected government is the citizen’s agent in charge of setting the 
framework a society wants to live in. This also concerns health care as a crucial element of 
everyday life. HCS are very different in different countries, and it has to be kept in mind that 
all of them are results of choices and all can be changed, often enough fundamentally and 
often enough in the short run: a NHS can be introduced or abolished, see Blake/Adolino 
(2001) but also the many cases of abolishing NHS in countries in eastern Europe. A purchaser 
provider split can be established and revoked shortly after, see Ashton et al. (2004). 
 
Independent of the state’s current involvement in the provision of health care, citizens 
delegate a “meta-control” over the HCS to the government: The government is in charge of 
exerting an overall control over the HCS, controlling the societal actors or the public 
bureaucracy in charge of the HCS and keeping the HCS in line with the electorate’s 
preferences by intervening or reforming the HCS. It is the government’s job to set the “right” 
incentives for the actors in the HCS, be it a public bureaucracy or incorporated societal actors; 
see Saltman (2002). It is the government’s job to represent and enforce the interests of the 
citizens. In particular since societal actors in charge of operating the HCS and factually 
making their living from health expenditure may have interests which diverge from those of 
the citizens.  
Simplified, political control over the HCS is supposed to work as follows: if the HCS diverges 
from the preferences of the electorate, the HCS can become an issue in the electoral arena. 
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Health care is of course only one theme among others, but its a major one, which may at times 
decide an election. Political parties offer different models of how to run the HCS, often 
ideologically based, and compete for votes in the electoral arena. Parties can also gain 
electoral support by specific proposals. If citizens develop a preference for responsiveness and 
the HCS continues to be non-responsive, a party might offer changing the HCS, gain support 
in the elections and implement the program. So far the simple theory of parties and electoral 
competition working as a “transmission belt” for public preferences.  
However in practice the government may shirk, renounce the exercise of control and let the 
HCS run its course.  
A first reason to do this is because it doesn’t want to risk opposition by the influential and 
well-organized interest groups pursing well defined interests in the HCS by acting on behalf 
of the only weakly organized patients, whose interests are rather diffuse and often self-
contradicting; see Olson (1965) for the basic argument. Governments can be in collusion with 
special interests in the HCS, i.e. the providers and the purchasers (HIFs but also the 
administration of a NHS) all of whom share the interest in an ever increasing health budget.  
A second reason is that while there may be strong dissatisfaction among a majority of voters 
with the HCS in its present form, the opinions about what to change may be very different and 
opposing. The situation may be one in which everybody agrees that changes are necessary, 
but everyone has different views about which changes. Engaging in health care reform when 
the public’s preferences are unclear may be a loose-only situation for policy makers. It is 
probable that the current organizational form of a HCS persists, even when dissatisfaction 
with the HCS is high, for the very reason that there is no agreement on what to do.  
A third reason is, that because the development of the HCS is often only one theme in the 
electoral arena, it may also be a neglected one. While everyone is dissatisfied, there are many 
other issues which dominate the political agenda and decide the elections. 
To sum up, elections can be a control mechanism forcing the government to use its formal 
power to control or change the HCS, but this incentive can be quite weak in some 
circumstances.  
 
A further aspect of the government’s role as an external controller is the citizen’s view that 
health care is a responsibility of the government.  
The electoral pressure on the government is strong, if the government bears direct 
responsibility. For instance, the health budget, the catalogue of services covered, the decisions 
on capacities and waiting lists may be explicit political decisions made by a political 
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institution which is formally in charge. This political institution, often the ministry of health, 
is seen by the public as in charge of how the HCS works, and if its not working properly, the 
public has someone to hold accountable for this.  
The electoral pressure is much lower, if the government is seen by the electorate as an 
outsider to the HCS and the parameters of the HCS are set somewhere by someone as a result 
of low profile negotiations, which are basically unobservable by the public. The public might 
be dissatisfied, but be at loss about whom to hold accountable. 
A similar argument can also be applied to the impact of the level of government, which is the 
most important one for health care. Health is always just one theme among many in political 
competition, but the number of themes competing for the voter’s attention differs among 
governmental levels, and so does the relative importance of a theme. A national election may 
be decided by an issue of foreign policy, but a local election will not. One could expect that 
the relative importance of health as an issue is ceteris paribus more important in elections for 
local government than in elections for national government. This would imply that political 
control exercised in countries, where lower levels of government are responsible for health 
care, is more effective than in countries were the national government is most important11. 
 
Controlling the Common Pool: Incentives for Limiting Health Care Consumption 
Health care also creates an incentive problem at the level of the patients. Usually, health 
services are not paid for by the patients as it is the case with other consumption in the 
marketplace. Each patient consuming a medical service or product fully realizes the utility 
arising from this consumption. But s/he only pays part of the costs, which are split among all 
members of the ‘pool’, i.e. an insurance fund or the society as a whole12. The cost-benefit 
calculation at the individual level is hence biased, and the patient will over-consume services 
compared to consumption in a market setting; see Pauly (1974), Ma/McGuire (1997), 
Neudeck/Podczeck (1996), Manning et al. (1987) and Getzen (2000).  
On the one hand the weak link between consumption and costs is a desired feature. In most 
HCS the implementation of the solidarity principle makes the contribution independent from 
                                                 
11 This effect might be countervailed by the weaker position of smaller political entities in negotiations with 
providers of health care. 
12 In the simplest case, the “moral hazard” problem is as follows: If the patient has to pay for the whole costs of a 
service, s/he will consume services if their utility (measured in financial terms) is higher than or equal to the 
costs of the service. If a group of n patients contribute to a pool from which all treatment costs are paid, the 
patient has, in the short run, only to pay 1/n of the costs. The patient will consume services which utility is above 
or equal to 1/n of the costs. As a consequence, more services are consumed. While the contribution of each 
patient to the pool will have to increase in the next period, the situation remains unchanged. 
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consumption. E.g. the patient pays a certain contribution, a premium or a percentage of his 
income, or the HCS is financed from general taxation, but apart from some co-payments, 
health consumption is free. The pooling of risks, the avoidance of financial collapse if the 
individual falls ill, is in the interest each individual member of the group.  
On the other hand, pooling resources and separating contributions from consumption creates a 
common pool problem, which constantly increases the health budget and the costs for 
everybody contributing to the pool. Since the marginal costs of consumption is often zero, 
there is the incentive to consume also services of only marginal utility. Services, the patients 
would never consume if they had to pay for them by themselves, may be consumed for the 
very reason that they are provided free of charge. Indeed, the time spent consuming services is 
an important factor in setting a limit to consumption; see Torgerson et al. (1994).  
The problem is aggravated if patients are not involved in payment, and have no idea about the 
costs their consumption. Under “service in kind” forms of health care provision, patients are 
completely isolated from payments. Further, they cannot control the bill posed by the 
provider, e.g. check, whether the services billed were actually provided. Reimbursement 
systems in which the patients first pay the provider and are later on reimbursed by a third 
party make patients conscious of the costs of health care and allow them a basic control of the 
bill.  
To sum up the incentive problem, the patient as an individual has an incentive to behave in a 
way which is opposed to the interests of the group. The interests are self-contradictory and 
inconsistent: It is in everyone’s interest that HCE is limited, in order to contain the 
contributions each member has to pay into the pool. But no one has an incentive to limit his 
own consumption. Worse, even if one limits one’s own consumption, there is no guarantee 
that the others do so as well. Also the impact of one’s own consumption on the health budget 
is so marginal, that it is seen as negligible. The result at macro level is that to many health 
services are consumed. Even if they are of no impact on health status, i.e. of no actual benefits 
for the patient. Again, HCS performance will decrease because money is spent on services 
without measurable impact. 
 
To counteract this problem, one can set incentives or put an agent in charge of controlling the 
individual patient’s consumptive behavior on behalf of all other patients as a group. The idea 
is that the patients agree on constraining their consumption or hire an agent to exercise control 
over themselves in order to avoid that each individual exploits the common pool at the 
expense of the group.  
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The government or the purchaser as an agent can control consumption, at least to some 
degree. There are two options to do so.  
First by directly controlling the provider’s activities, an option difficult to implement in HCS 
where a purchaser-provider-split is established and the interaction among patient and provider 
is off limits. 
Second, by setting incentives: A first variant of this mechanism addresses the providers of 
services. The purchaser, when negotiating the contracts with the providers, may also insist on 
a remuneration mode, which limits the incentive for the provider to supply services of 
marginal use. So even if the patient as a consumer would be ready to consume more health 
services of uncertain or marginal medical and financial value to him, the provider has no 
incentive to meet this demand. If the provider limits the quantity of services consumed by the 
patients by providing only what is strictly necessary for medical reasons, he acts also as an 
agent on behalf of the patients as a group; see Blomqvist (1991). 
As a second variant of this mechanism, the HIF as purchaser may offer insurance contracts to 
the patients, which contain some incentives to limit the consumption of services. Examples 
are deductibles or the exclusion of some services from coverage (most often dental care). Co-
payments may set an incentive at least to think about consuming a service. In particular, if the 
co-payment is flexible and is giving the patient a clue about the price of the services 
consumed.    
 
Closely related to this issue is the problem of how to incentivize patients to behave in a 
healthy way, e.g. adopt healthy lifestyles. From the perspective of the purchaser, one option to 
achieve this is to set incentives to participate in preventive measures, e.g. regular medical 
checkups and screening. Examples of such incentives can most often be found in dental care. 
Instances are France and Germany, where the participation in regular dental check ups is 
rewarded by higher subsidies for dentures. A more recent trend can be seen in Germany, 
where some HIF reward efforts to reduce body weight or to quit smoking by boni, refunds or 
reduced contribution rates.  
However, implementing this control is difficult; also because the purchasers as well as the 
providers have an incentive to shirk from this task:  
From the provider’s perspective, limiting the supply of services to what is necessary is a 
voluntarily renouncement of income which often arises proportional to the quantity of 
services provided. It is usually not in the interest of the provider to refuse services demanded 
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by the patient, even if these are, to his knowledge, of no use. In doing so, the provider 
renounces income and also risks to loose a client.  
From the purchaser’s perspective, limiting consumption goes against the motive to increase 
the health budget or rather to allow it to increase constantly. The purchaser shares with the 
providers an interest in a growing health budget, and thus may not have an interest in limiting 
the size and growth of the “cake” to be divided between them. Insisting on limiting 
consumption to what is necessary might create conflicts with the clients and might result in 
clients leaving the purchaser. Indeed, by limiting consumption the purchaser might loose 
more clients than it gains by lowering the contributions it has to charge. Clients might 
complain about the contribution rate, but when confronted with the consequences of cost 
containment, they might even more complain about these. 
While being complicated in design and implementation, options to counteract the common 
pool problem exist. And in some HCS they are actually implemented, albeit their 
effectiveness is debated.  
 
Control in Health Care 
Control counteracting the incentive problems outlined in the above sections can be exercised 
by institutional mechanisms built into the HCS itself or by controlling it from the outside. 
 
Built-in Control Mechanisms for Agency Problems 
The description of the relationships in health care given above also gave a short overview on 
control mechanisms able to avoid problems. The incentive problems in health care, together 
with possible control mechanisms and their implications are widely discussed in the literature; 
see De Alessi (1989), Lopez (1991), and Scott/Farrar (2003). While theoretically 
straightforward, the factual effectiveness of the mechanisms is a debated empirical question; 
see Scheil-Adlung (1998), Faulkner et al. (2003) and Chaix-Couturier et al. (2000). Often, 
regulations have double-edged effects and their effectiveness is conditional on the wider 
setting. An incentive might work well in one HCS, but have no effect when copied into 
another; an incentive may have a positive impact on expenditure, but be a disaster for quality 
and responsiveness.  
The point I want to emphasize here is that these mechanisms are built into the HCS. They 
define a situation in which actors behave in a certain way, i.e. not engage in opportunistic 
behavior, because it does not pay to behave otherwise. They are operative, without somebody 
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actually doing something. In particular, they do not require external intervention by the 
government, the kind of control I’ll discuss next.  
 
Exercising Control over the Health Care System: Levers and Capacity of the State 
There exists also the possibility to control the HCS from the outside. Some states have the 
levers and the capacity to do so, other’s don’t.  
In a corporatist HCS like Germany, associations of medical providers and HIFs are in charge 
of operating the HCS. The idea is that by incorporating all interests, there are enough checks 
and balances to keep the HCS performing well; see Döhler/Manow (1997). Using various 
arenas, organized interests negotiate all parameters of the German HCS. While the 
government has by law a substantial role, it’s role would only be important, if the societal 
actors cannot reach an agreement. This is never the case – also because both sides share an 
institutional interest in retaining autonomy. The negotiations are very low profile, and it is not 
visible to the public, who is deciding on what. Responsibility is diffuse, and it is relatively 
easy for any party involved to blame other parties for whatever problems occur. The success 
of this self-government is questionable. One reasons is that both sides share an interest in 
increasing the overall expenditure for health care. The providers, because it directly 
determines their income. The HIFs, because they can extract an higher amount for 
organizational slack and on the job consumption. There is no actor involved representing the 
motive to contain costs. As for the degree of external control, the German government is 
currently not held directly accountable for the operation of the HCS. For instance, the HIFs 
decide on the contribution level. So it is them, not the government, announcing and charging 
higher contributions – usually justified by increased costs and “objective” reasons like 
demographic developments.  
However, the government, also in Germany, is nevertheless potentially in charge of 
controlling the HCS and in particular the long term developments in the HCS. Whatever the 
government’s current role for the HCS may be, neither health care expenditure nor the current 
institutional setting of the HCS does “just happen”. They are either created or at least 
tolerated. The government is the society’s instrument to control the HCS. As the 
superordinate steward it can intervene in the day-to-day operation of the HCS, or it may 
change the design of the HCS by reforms.  
 
As for comparing HCS with regard to the political control over the system, one can 
distinguish internal levers and external levers of control: 
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The ultimate external lever is the reform of the HCS – e.g. abolishing self-government, 
acquiring the competence to set certain parameters politically etc.  
Internal levers concern all aspects of the HCS which the government can currently influence 
under the given setting. Examples are overall budgets, contribution rates, growth rates for 
budgets, the number of hospitals or physicians in a region, catalogues of services covered etc. 
The number of levers for state control can encompass all aspects of the HCS, like it does in 
some NHS systems. In other countries, the government determines some aspects, e.g. the 
overall budget, but leaves the decision on other aspects to societal actors. In still others 
virtually all aspects are decided by societal actors. Government involvement can have the 
form of unilateral decisions, involvement in the decision making process or the ex post 
approval or disapproval of decisions made by societal actors.  
HCS differ with regard to the levers currently available for government intervention. 
However, while the question of what levers a government has at hand is a first step to study 
political control, it is not a sufficient information. On the one hand, government control might 
be effective without visible usage. The very potential to exercise control may exert an 
disciplining effect on the actors running the HCS. On the other hand, the literature on health 
system reform shows that countries differ with regard to the chances that the government can 
bring about reforms or even use the levers it has currently at hand.  
In my view, the effectiveness of both instruments of control depends on the government’s 
capability to act. An additional question, which the data handbook does not cover, is, what 
factors influence whether such a potential exists, i.e. determine whether the government or the 
political system in general is capable to exercise its potential for control.  
 
Summary: Delegation and HCS Performance 
Incentives set for individual actors by the institutional design of a HCS are a genuinely 
institutional source of variation in all aspects of HCS performance, be it resource 
consumption, quality and overall productive efficiency of HCS.  
There are typical functions necessary for running health care provision, many of which are 
delegated to actors. For each of these delegation relationships, there are potential incentive 
problems, i.e. a divergence of interests between principal – basically the citizen – and the 
agent – basically all actors in charge of providing or organizing health care.  
The general hypothesis of the institutional economics approach is that the more delegation 
relationships exist in a HCS and the less – in particular the less effective – the control 
mechanisms implemented in the HCS, the higher – ceteris paribus – the risk for opportunistic 
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behavior, which decreases the performance of the HCS. Either by increasing the resource 
consumption for a given level of health output or by decreasing the health output or the 
quality of the services provided for a given level of resource input. 
Theoretically, for each of these incentive problems, there exist control mechanisms, which 
can countervail the incentive problem. What the present data handbook does, is to make an 
inventory of the existent delegation relationships and the implemented control mechanisms in 
a selection of HCS.  
 
On the Conditionality of Effects  
This compilation of institutional information on delegation and control in HCS covers more 
issues than just delegation. The reasons is that the effectiveness of the control mechanisms is 
conditional on the wider environment in which the delegation relationship is embedded. Two 
examples may show why. 
Cream skimming, the attempt of HIFs to attract “good risks” (clients with high income, low 
likelihood of cost arising from illness) and to deter “bad risks” occurs only under certain 
constellations of circumstances: only if there are several purchasers, if citizens have free 
choice, if contributions payable by the client to the purchaser or catalogues of medical 
services covered by the purchasers are allowed to differ. The degree to which it occurs is also 
conditional on the overall setting. First, it might be limited, but also increased by some kind 
of risk equalization among the purchasers, depending on how this equalization is designed. 
Second, if the contribution going to the HIF is a percentage of income the incentive for cream 
skimming is presumably higher than in situations where the contribution is a premium 
independent from the income level. In the first case, cream skimming is motivated by health 
status and income of the clients. In the later case it is only motivated by health status, since 
the attractiveness of a client is determined only by this person’s health state and expected 
health care costs. If there is a risk equalization among the HIFs based on features of their 
clientele, it might even pay to attract bad risks. 
Co-payments shall make people sensitive to the prices arising from consuming health care: 
their payment depends on their consumption. Thus, installing co-payments may serve as a 
measure to ameliorate common pool problems. On the downside, they might also discourage 
certain groups, in particular low income groups, from getting treatment required now, causing 
substantially higher costs later on. Their effect also depends on how co-payments are 
designed: Fixed co-payments, like a fixed fee payable for the prescription of a medicine, may 
have only a very limited effect on the decision to use a generic. If the prescription fee is the 
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same independent of whether the more expensive original or a cheaper generic is used, this 
will not affect the decision for or against a generic. Overall pharmaceutical expenditure is not 
reduced, only a share of the costs is shifted to the patients. The effect of co-payments also 
depends on other regulations: If patients can turn a flexible co-payment into a fixed co-
payment by entering a supplementary insurance, the intended effect is also cancelled. While 
the amount paid by the individual for health care is higher, consisting of the basic contribution 
to the health system plus the contribution to the supplementary insurance, it is once more 
independent from the quantity of services consumed.  
To summarize, the empirical effect of certain control mechanisms on the efficiency of the 
HCS is an open question, since they affect the input side (costs) as well as the output side 
(health status) simultaneously and often in opposite ways. To allow an evaluation, data must 
be provided for several related institutional features as well, which affect, whether and if so, 
what effect an individual feature will have. 
 
3. The Health Care Systems Inventory 
Based on the theoretical framework of delegation an inventory of delegation and control was 
developed to compare HCS. The aim of this "Health Care Systems Inventory", HCSI, is it to 
describe HCS in a standardized, directly comparable way. Whatever the HCS may look like, 
whatever it’s “type”, it will be described using the identical framework and the identical list 
of possible descriptive statements, so that the resulting descriptions can be directly compared. 
 
Basically the HCSI captures the existence of actors, the delegation relationships among them, 
and in particular the allocation of tasks and control rights. The information collected concerns 
the design of the current settings, but also by whom and how these settings can be changed. 
For instance, what remuneration modes are currently in use, how are these set and by whom?  
Further, because the lack of information and informational asymmetries among agents and 
principals, is a crucial factor in the provision of health care and organizational tasks related to 
this, I asked about whether and what information is available at all and if so, to whom and 
how it is used.  
Apart from the mechanisms built into the design of the HCS, the HCSI also covers the levers 
currently available for the political actors by which these can influence the HCS from the 
outside. 
The selection of features is based on and structured by the functions each HCS has to fulfill: 
• Provision of health care – primary, specialized and in-patient care. 
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• Provision of medicines and medical products 
• Administration of collecting funds from the individual citizens and the redistribution of 
the funds to the providers 
• Decision-making on quantities and prices as the basic parameters of the health care 
provision  
• Decision-making on the way decisions are made: competencies of each of the actors on 
issues concerning the HCS as a whole (e.g. catalogue of services) or the actors 
themselves (e.g. budget for primary care). 
I have excluded the domains of mental health and social/long term care, since the 
classification – conceptually as well as organizationally – of these services as part of the HCS 
is not unanimous and identical in all HCS. In some HCS, social care belongs to the HCS and 
is financed from the health budget. In others, it’s not part of the health system, but provided 
by separate institutions and controlled by different ministries.  
 
The structure of a typical HCSI question is firstly, Does a delegation relationship exist?, 
secondly, Which of the possible control mechanisms are implemented in this relationship?  
The “answer” categories for each “question” of the HCSI were derived by looking at how an 
aspect can be designed, but also how this aspect is actually designed in real HCS. Health 
economists have developed many fine tuned instruments, but the mechanisms actually 
implemented are of a much simpler nature. 
The categories of an answer capture which of several possible control mechanisms is in place. 
According to theoretical considerations, control mechanisms are effective to different degrees. 
For instance, co-payments are a control mechanism to avoid the common pool problem. A co-
payment of a fixed amount is less effective in making the patient sensitive to the price of a 
service or product than a flexible co-payment which depends on the price, e.g. a percentage of 
a price. But given that the impact of a certain control mechanism is an empirical question, I 
did not rank the control mechanisms a priori. The effectiveness of a control mechanism also 
depends on the institutional environment. For instance, whether there is a supplementary 
insurance, which covers any co-payment, eliminating the price sensitivity once again. I will 
also abstain from discussing the positive and negative implications of each mechanisms in 
detail, but will only give a short description when discussing the items of the HCSI.  
The data handbook shall primarily serve as a source for information, which can be used for 
comparative analyses which in some way or other, use the institutional economics approach.  
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Part I: Providers and Consumers of Health Services 
Occupational Status and Remuneration of Providers of Health Services 
Section 1 of part I covers the existence of providers of health services by capturing the 
existence of the provider as an separate entity, an “agent”. If the provider exists as a self-
employed entity, it shall be treated as an “agent”. This refers both to institutions (e.g. 
independent firms conducting laboratory services) and individuals (self employed GPs). Even 
if they are contracted, they are organizationally independent from the purchaser. The task is 
explicitly delegated to them in the delegation contract, usually leaving them leeway on how to 
perform the task. They are acting on their own behalf when negotiating the contract. Most 
important, they may enter the contract or not and can exit the contract; see Gray/Harrison 
(2004) and Barros/Martinez-Giralt (2005) for the role of professional bodies in negotiations in 
HCS.  
On the other hand, if for instance primary care is provided by employed GPs working for a 
fixed salary in local health centers, they are not treated as an separate agent. The function is 
integrated into the institution operating the Health Center, which has a hierarchical control 
over the employed staff. Employed GPs for instance are not involved in deciding the 
catalogue of covered services the same way as GPs which are contracted on a cost-volume 
basis. 
The existence as an agent defined in these terms is captured for GPs/primary care providers, 
providers of specialized care, dentist, laboratory services and pharmacists. In the later case, 
just to give one more elaboration, the “agent” pharmacy is non-existent, if pharmaceuticals 
are distributed by hospitals or dispensing GPs.  
 
The set of inventory items on the remuneration modes implemented in the provision of 
medical services asks first about the predominant form, by which most of the services are 
remunerated. There is a wide range of possible remuneration modes, many of which have 
been discussed in terms of the incentives they set. However, while the mix of the modes is 
manifold, the variation in the predominant modes, i.e. the mode by which most money is paid 
to the provider, is much smaller. In many HCS, similar modes are implemented, usually either 
relying on fee for service or on a salary.  
Second, the HCSI asks also for the “incentive at the margin”, e.g. whether there is despite that 
the GPs get most of their income by a capitation the possibility – and hence the incentive – to 
increase their income by providing more services.  
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Interestingly, both the predominant mode and in particular the incentive at the margin does 
not correspond to the “type” of the HCS. In many NHS systems, usually supposed to set low 
incentives for supply-induced demand, there are contradicting incentives set at the margin. 
The provider is employed and receives a salary, but can nevertheless increase his income by 
providing more services. A typical example is that the provider refers the patient to his private 
practice where he works on his own account and delivers services on private terms. If these 
services are paid for by supplementary insurance, and are not counted as “official 
expenditure”, the HCS appear less costly. However, it is not, because costs are just shifted.  
 
Status and Autonomy of Hospitals 
Because of its relevance for overall health expenditure the inpatient sector is treated in more 
detail. The status of the hospitals as an agent, i.e. the autonomy of a hospital, is captured by 
the following questions: who would cover potential deficits (this might be done by another 
institution, for instance the government in a formal or informal way), who has the control 
over the use of a potential surplus, who has the most influence on decisions on the building of 
new hospitals or closing of existing ones, who decides on the increase /decrease of capacities 
in existing hospitals and investments in high technology.  
Because hospitals are a part of the medical infrastructure, they are often not under an 
existential competition. That is, even if they create substantial deficits, they will be kept 
operative somehow. But nevertheless, they may be incentivized by competition, e.g. by being 
allowed to re-invest a surplus in the hospital. The exposition of a hospital to competition, the 
main incentive to provide quality and to contain costs, is captured firstly by the question, 
whether several hospitals offering the same kind of services (e.g. cover the same indications, 
offering the same degree of specialization etc.), exist in the same region. The existence of 
several hospitals as a necessary condition is supplemented by the question, whether rates 
charged by the hospitals for treatments, i.e. the per diems or the price of a case, differ or are 
identical for all hospitals in a region, respectively the same degree of specialization. In some 
countries, all hospitals receive a per diem, which is identical for all hospitals in the country, 
so there is no price difference. In others, all hospitals in the country receive the same 
remuneration for a certain case, defined on a DRG, basis. Again, there is no price difference: 
a hospital might be unable to perform the intervention, but all hospitals who can receive the 
same price. Competition would be given, if the hospital can for instance offer a certain 
treatment for a certain price, which is determined by the hospital. If treatment costs vary, the 
purchaser, acting on behalf of the patients, can sent its clients to the most competitive 
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provider. To be effective as a control mechanism, the information on differences in treatment 
costs must be complemented by free choice on the side of the patients and by information on 
quality, on which this choice is based.  
 
Regulations on Pharmaceuticals and Pharmaceutical Consumption 
With regard to the pharmaceutical sector, the HCSI asks for the existence of some standard 
regulations, e.g. negative or positive lists, a pharmaceutical budget at the level of the HCS as 
a whole or at the level of the individual prescriber etc.  
Positive and negative lists serve as instrument to exclude medicines, which are of little use or 
became obsolete from coverage by the HCS. It is also a decision about which indications to 
cover, e.g. some medicines against minor ailments are excluded in several countries.  
As for the pricing of medicines the HCSI covers, whether the question of reimbursing a new 
medicine at all (coverage) and/or the price of a medicine is influenced by an evaluation of its 
(expected) medical efficacy and degree of innovation. Basically, the question is, whether the 
new medicine, which is usually introduced at a higher price than the existing ones, is actually 
worth the mark-up. As described above the main incentive problem with regard to the 
pharmaceutical industry is that it might introduce new products, which are only a marginally 
improved modification of an existing drug. This strategy allows to factually prolong the 
patent period and the monopoly profits associated with the original variant of the product 
without investing in a new innovation. A strict medical evaluation of the product might 
counteract this problem by identifying mere variants of the same product.  
With regard to the competition among branded pharmaceuticals and generic substitutes, the 
HCSI asks, whether the generic substitution is possible at all, and whether an actor – the 
patient, the prescriber or the pharmacist – actually has an incentive to substitute. For instance 
the patient has an incentive to accept a generic substitute, if he can reduce a co-payment. If 
the patient is not involved in the payment, he might, for reason of mere habit, keep on using 
the branded product, even thought there are cheaper generic substitutes. Brand loyalty to 
pharmaceuticals is a factor in retaining high revenues even after the patent has expired.  
A organizational precondition to the usage of generics and similar cost containment strategies 
is the grouping of pharmaceuticals. By putting different medicines which are used for the 
treatment of the same condition in a group, and reimbursing only the cheapest one of this 
group, the regulator sets an incentive for the patient to demand the cheapest option to avoid 
payment of the differences in price.  
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Pharmaceutical budgets at the overall level, but in particular at the level of the individual 
prescriber, set an incentive to realize possible savings, in particular by incentivizing also the 
prescriber to foster the usage of generics. If this incentive and restriction is absent, the actor 
making the decision on what medicine to use is not involved in the payment at all and 
indifferent to the differences in costs among various treatment options. 
 
Patient Involvement in Provider Payment: Co-payments and Remuneration Modes 
Compared to the consumption of other goods and services in the market place the problems 
associated with health care consumption often arise due to lacking information. This lack of 
information concerns quality, but also prices. Further, the lack of information removes the 
incentives to base the consumption of medical services on a cost-benefit calculation. This is 
an intended effect securing the individual from a financial disaster in the case of a severe 
illness. But as an unintended consequence it also generates a common pool problem by setting 
an incentive to over-consume medical services financed from the common pool. If services 
are free, the demand will encounter no limits, at least no financial ones. The patient as the 
consumer of health services can, if incentivized and provided with the necessary information, 
also adapt his behavior in order to contain costs and to exert competitive pressure on health 
care providers, while still obtaining appropriate treatment. To avoid an over-consumption of 
medical services, the patient needs to know about the prices of his consumption, and the price 
must be of some relevance for him. The patient must be incentivized to take costs and benefits 
into account when deciding on medical consumption.  
With regard to the question, whether the patient gets some information on the prices of 
medical services consumed, the HCSI asks for the involvement of the patients in the payment 
of providers. In cost-reimbursement systems, the patient receives the bill from the provider, 
which is handed in for reimbursement to the purchaser, e.g. the Health Insurance Fund. In this 
situation the patient is aware of the costs incurred by his consumption. Under service-in-kind 
provision the patient is not at all involved in the payment of providers, in particular the patient 
does not receive a bill. In this situation, the patient has neither an awareness of the costs of the 
medical services consumed, nor can he perform a basic check, whether the services billed 
were actually provided. It is argued by informal studies and media reports, that fraud in the 
sense of billing services, which were not actually provided, is a serious problem in some 
systems.  
But awareness of prices alone is not sufficient. There needs to be an incentive for the patient 
to take prices into account when deciding on what to consume. With regard to the relevance 
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of prices the inventory asks for the regulations on co-payments, which are the typical 
mechanism by which prices are made relevant in the patient’s consumption decision. The 
incentive effect is however only relevant, if the co-payment depends on the price, as opposed 
to a fixed contribution independent of the actual price of a treatment. A fixed consultation fee 
payable at the first visit in each quarter might influence how often a patient visits the GP. But 
it is irrelevant for how sophisticated and expensive the services conducted during the visit are. 
Another illustrative example are generics. To decide to use a generic the patient must be 
aware of the price differences between the generic and the branded original, i.e. the patient 
needs information on what generic substitutes exist for a certain branded original. This 
information alone is not sufficient to influence the patient’s decision for or against generic 
substitution. If there is no co-payment the information is irrelevant. If there is a co-payment, 
but a fixed one, like a fixed prescription fee, the information and price differential are also 
irrelevant. Only if the co-payment is dependent on the actual price, the price differential is 
relevant and the patient has an incentive first to ask for the possibility of substitution, second 
to actually accept a substitute. The HCSI asks for the type of co-payments as well. Another 
aspect are co-payments charged for non-standard treatments, e.g. less invasive treatments. 
Further, co-payments – fixed as well as flexible ones – might become irrelevant as an control 
mechanism, because they are completely covered by a supplementary insurance. In this 
situation the costs of consumption no longer depend on the quantity consumed. The co-
payment which depends on the consumption is transformed in the payment of a fixed 
premium to an insurance company. The HCSI covers the existence of such supplementary 
insurance.  
 
Access and Choice in Health Care 
Competition is a possible mean to incentivize providers, making them competing for clients 
by offering different prices or quality. Again, the consumers need information on prices and 
quality, but they also need formal and factual choice among providers.  
The issue of gatekeeping and choice is an element of competition among providers as well as 
a restriction on the consumption of more specialized services, which are usually more 
expensive. Studies on gatekeeping have found that it is a possibility to contain costs, since 
often appropriate treatment can be given at a lower degree of specialization; Delnoij et al. 
(2000), and Garcia Marinoso/Jelovac (2003). The inventory asks about the existence of 
formal rules on gatekeeping for hospitals and specialized services but also, whether it can be 
skipped and circumvented one way or the other. 
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Apart from formal regulations on access and gatekeeping, factual choice is crucial: if there is 
no choice of GPs, they are not under a competitive pressure to perform well. The same is true 
if there is no choice among providers of secondary care like hospitals. Gatekeeping might 
have cost containing effects by making sure that care is not provided at a more expensive 
level when it could also be provided on a lower level. But for the performance of the 
secondary levels of health care provision, gatekeeping is not relevant. In some countries, 
factual choice is limited because the number of providers for a certain service or product is for 
some reason very limited. The HCSI asks for the factual choice among different specialists 
and hospitals, which could be consulted to obtain services.  
 
Part II: Regulations and Institutions to ensure Quality in Medical Treatment 
Part II is about measures to ensure quality of medical treatment. As argued above, apart from 
the problems arising from opportunistic behavior aiming at the extraction of financial rents, 
there is also a quality issue at stake: How can one ensure that high quality is delivered in a 
setting, where there is no deterministic relationship between action and result and the 
consumer has a strong informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the provider? The main point is to 
close this informational gap. First by ensuring that only providers enter the market, which 
fulfill certain criteria. But second by providing information on a provider’s quality to patients, 
enabling them to make an informed choice on where to receive treatment. 
 
As stated above, incentives set by some remuneration modes may have advantageous effects 
on costs, but negative effects on quality. Sometimes, a remuneration mode may affect both 
aspects negatively – for instance paying providers by the number of services provided may 
induce them to produce as many as possible. This, however may cause them to perform each 
service hasty, with little care and little quality.  
While every HCS has in place formal requirements on the access to the medical market for 
providers, the way the quality assurance is handled later on, i.e. after market access was 
granted, differs substantially. The problem is how to assure that providers keep up to date 
with the scientific progress in their field. There emerge new ”best answers” for standard 
problems, conditions which are quite frequent, e.g. diabetes, and which can be treated in a 
standardized way based on an earlier trial-and-error process. It might be reasonable to induce 
providers to abide by these ”best answers” unless there is a qualified reason not to do so. 
Further, there are standards of good practice, for out-patient, in-patient treatments, and 
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pharmaceutical treatments, the enforcement of which may guarantee a certain quality of 
treatment but also cost efficiency.  
For this to be operative, there needs to be some kind of organized information gathering, 
distribution and also some kind of enforcement. Information on various treatment options, 
their medical efficacy and cost effectiveness must be gathered and aggregated from the level 
of the individual providers where it arises from practical experience. Thus the HCSI asks for 
the existence of a national/ regional level institution setting clinical or medical guidelines. If 
there is such an institution, the HCSI ask if for which sectors the information is gathered 
(pharmaceuticals, specialized care provided in hospitals, ambulatory care, usage of 
technology etc).  
The HCSI also asks for the provision of information on treatment options, i.e. whether there is 
there an institution gathering and distributing information on medical efficacy and cost 
effectiveness of different treatments for the same illness. The aggregated experiences made by 
the medical providers about which treatment is the best and most effective for a given 
indication is a valuable resource, relevant for both cost containment and quality assurance.  
Regarding the patient’s lack of information on quality – e.g. transparency about which 
provider fulfills certain quality standards – the inventory is asking, whether there is an 
institution gathering information on the quality of individual providers of medical services. 
An example of this is the star-ranking in the UK, but also reports on the occurrence of 
medical failures and maltreatment in different hospitals. Since the information is only relevant 
if known, the HCSI covers, whether this information is published one way or the other and to 
whom. In some HCS, there are institutions and associations collecting data on quality of 
treatment, but distribute it only internally – for the very reason to avoid public pressure. 
A further issue of quality is the question how the transfer of new medical knowledge to the 
providers is handled. Given that most professional organizations of physicians provide some 
kind of voluntary continual education, the HCSI asked also whether a provider, the individual 
GP/Physician has to renew his approbation or license to provide medical services from time to 
time (recertification)? 
 
Part III: Role of the Government for the Health Care System 
Part III is about the role of the government, in particular the central government, for the HCS. 
As stated earlier, the government as an agent of the electorate has the task to exert a kind of 
“meta-control” over the HCS. This refers to controlling providers of health care, but also 
controlling purchasers of health care, and in particular to avoid collusion among both at 
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expense of the citizens. The national/central government is typically the politically most 
visible actor and hence the actor primarily in charge of the institutional design of the HCS.  
A basic difference among HCS is the degree to which the HCS is political or a-political. 
“Political” refers in particular to whether the decision making on the basic parameters of 
health care provision is done by the political system in a political decision making process or 
not. The term “parameters” refers to budgets, contributions, the coverage of services and the 
coverage of population.  
The degree of political decision making on these parameters is reflected in the levers available 
for government intervention. In some countries the government has fundamental and direct 
control over all parameters of the HCS. Either by setting them by a political decision, or by 
intervening substantially by other means, like setting restrictions on the decisions made by 
societal actors. In other countries the government has no levers at hand and/or restrains itself 
much more, leaving the day-to-day operation of the HCS to societal, non-state-actors, like 
HIFs and organizations of medical providers.  
The extremes are NHS systems, like the UK, where the decision making is predominantly 
political, and corporatist HCS like Germany, where operative decision-making is basically a-
political. In the first case, the political system is seen as clearly responsible for the operation 
of the HCS. In the second case, the responsibility is much more diffuse and spread among 
political and societal actors.  
 
For exercising operative external control different levels of government – local, regional or 
national – are in charge in different countries. The HCSI asks first about the level of 
government, which is most important for control and interventions of the state in the HCS. 
National level decision making gives the government more bargaining power – be it only the 
bargaining power derived from the aggregated demand of a whole nation. On the other hand, 
health care is but one theme in the national level political debate. The effectiveness of 
elections as a control mechanism forcing the political actors to do their job in the health care 
domain might be weaker, because other issues dominate the election campaigns.  
Local level governments are to a higher degree evaluated with regard to their performance in 
this sector, because they are in charge of fewer tasks and health care is relatively more 
important. Further they are closer to the preferences of the population, which may differ 
among regions. Together, this might cause them to provide health care in a way which is 
closer to the preferences of the population they are accountable to. On the downside of 
decentralization, their standing and their bargaining power might be lower, in particular when 
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bargaining with national level organizations of providers. So, levels of government 
responsible or at least involved in health care have advantages and disadvantages. Which is 
predominant is an empirical question.  
 
Levers for External Control over Providers 
Apart from the political level most important for interventions, the HCSI covers the ‘levers’ 
available for intervention of a political actor on a sectorial basis. This section of the HCSI is 
based on the typical sectors of the HCS: primary care, specialized care, in-patient care, dental 
care, and pharmaceuticals. For each of the sectors the HCSI asks for the competencies of the 
government to set or to influence the parameters of the sector: catalogue of services covered 
by the health system, the overall budget, or a sectorial budget, questions of capacity (e.g. 
number of physicians or beds per capita or in a region), the way the providers of this type of 
health care are remunerated (e.g. fee for service or a per-capita budget etc.), the level of 
remuneration of medical services, e.g. the amount of fees or the level of budgets, the way the 
medical providers are organized, e.g. regional level or national-level organization and the 
determination of the top-level management of the provider organization. With regard to 
hospitals I have included also the question of investments in medical technology. For the 
pharmaceutical sector, there is also the question of pricing and reimbursement of 
pharmaceuticals, where the government can exert influence. To recover the R&D costs and to 
generate profits, a high price is important. To have a market for a new product, the product 
must be covered, i.e. paid for, by the health system. A pharmaceutical enterprise usually 
cannot hope to realize sufficient profits from products which are paid for by the patients 
themselves. In some countries, price and coverage are negotiated between the producer and 
the state, often officially, sometimes using “carrots and sticks procedures”. Price and 
coverage are often interdependent in the sense, that coverage of a medicine by the HCS is 
only granted, if the price is reasonable or abides to certain criteria. 
 
Levers for External Control over Purchasers  
With regard to the question how the agents in charge of organizing the HCS can be controlled 
by the government as a political accountable entity, I ask, by what means does the 
government exert a control and supervision on the activities of the purchaser, i.e. Health 
Authorities or Health Insurance Funds. The selection of mechanisms is derived by looking at 
the functions of the purchaser, in which the purchaser might be tempted to extract rents, in 
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particular by consuming more resources “on the job”. Possible mechanisms of external, 
political control are: 
The requirement of the purchaser to produce an annual report for the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs (in particular administrative costs, expenditure for 
health services purchased) are listed.  
The requirement that budget plans of the purchaser must be endorsed by the government, 
which e.g. allows the government to set priorities, e.g. for prevention or for extending 
coverage.  
The publication of the administrative costs of the purchaser as a mean to allow clients to 
identify purchasers, which consume more resources just for administrating. 
The requirement that the purchaser must apply for a formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/premiums and must deliver reasons for this.  
The criteria chosen are rather formal and by nature more auditing than steering. They are to be 
seen complementary to the control exercised by the market. Competition may incentivize 
purchasers to act in line with the client’s preferences, since the clients may shift to another 
purchaser, which is offering better conditions, i.e. a more encompassing coverage of services 
and/or lower contributions.  
 
Part IV: Administration and Operation of the Health Care System 
Part IV is about the administration and operation of the HCS, in particular about the 
relationship between the purchasers and the providers of health care. The purchaser of 
medical services can be either Health Insurance Funds or Health Authorities.  
By Health Insurance Funds (HIF) I refer to for private or public, non-profit or for profit 
organizations which act as an insurance but which are not part of the state administration.  
By Health Authorities (HA) I refer to institutions which are part of the public administration, 
comparable to the police force. Examples are local or regional Health Boards, local 
governments, county councils etc.  
 
Agency Status of the Purchasers 
The HCSI asks first about a characterization of the predominant status of the Health Insurance 
Funds (HIF) / Health Authority (HA). To characterize a purchaser one can for instance ask, 
whether it is for profit or non-profit, factually independent or only formally independent from 
the public administration or a part of the public administration, like an integral part of the 
 50
local government. Background of the question is, whether there is an independent agent or 
not. Empirically, there seems to be no clear distinction between NHS-systems and non-NHS-
systems. In some HCS the control of the government over the HIFs is such that their agency 
status is only a formality. The state determines all financial parameters, like contributions, and 
often enough also determines the top-level administration. On the other hand, in some 
countries the independence of the Health Authorities from the government is substantial. The 
HA, while being formally part of the public administration, is factually not part of the 
hierarchical chain of “command and control” extending from the government downwards but 
has substantial leeway. The HCSI proxies agency status by asking, whether the purchaser can 
determine it’s top-level management internally and can decide on the usage of a potential 
surplus. Both features proxy independence in decision making. If the government can 
determine the person leading the purchaser, the control exercised over the day to day business 
is also substantial; see the above section.  
 
Fragmentation and Competition of the Demand Side 
If there are negotiations between the purchasers and the providers the bargaining power of 
each side becomes relevant for the outcomes; see Ryll (1993). A basic measure of bargaining 
power is the fragmentation of each side. For the purchasers representing the demand side, 
fragmentation is captured by asking about how many purchasers there are. The position of the 
purchaser is stronger, if there is only one of them – acting as a monopsonist, at least in a 
region. It is substantially weaker, if the purchasers have to compete with other purchasers for 
contracts; see Anderson et al. (2003) and Barros/Martinez-Giralt (2005) for the role of 
bargaining power.  
The relative strength of the purchaser vis-à-vis the providers is also stronger, when they can 
provide services themselves. In the case of a persisting or impending conflict with the supply 
side, they can provide some services and keep the health provision operative. It is weaker, if 
there is a strict purchaser-provider-split and they are forced to come to an agreement to be 
able to purchase any services at all.  
 
As outlined above, competition is the main mechanisms to incentivize purchasers to perform 
all the task which are in the principal’s interest. Competition takes the form of attracting 
clients, and competitive pressure in the end amounts to the threat that the purchaser goes out 
of business if not enough clients remain. This can take the form of being forced to merge with 
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another purchaser or that the purchaser is formally abolished and the clients become 
automatically members of a fall back purchaser, as it has happened in the Czech Republic. 
The competition among the purchasers is captured by the free choice of the purchaser as 
opposed to the assignment of citizens to certain purchasers for instance by criteria like place 
of living or occupation. In the case both of municipalities as well as Health Insurance Funds, 
voting by feet exerts a basic pressure on the purchaser to perform well.  
Competition is captured by asking whether it is possible that the citizen’s contributions – be it 
premiums, percentage of income, or tax rates – to the Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities may vary, or whether the contributions are the same for all purchasers in a 
country.  
The same is asked for the catalogue of medical services covered. Even if the purchasers are 
forced to charge the same contributions, they may nevertheless compete for clients, and 
indicating their higher performance and administrative efficiency, by offering more services.  
Setting identical contribution rates and identical catalogues of services covered by law 
prohibits any competition among the purchasers. They are unable to signal their efficiency to 
the clients. While clients are free to chose their purchaser, there is no competition among 
them.  
Even if formally installed, competition might be offset by other regulations. The HCSI asks 
whether there is a financial equalization among purchasers, which limits the necessity to 
minimize administrative costs and allows a lax attitude in negotiations with providers. 
Depending on the design of the risk equalization and the transfers of funds, the threat of going 
out of business is more or less real.  
 
Evaluating the impact of these features on HCS performance is again an empirical question. 
Most of these features are double-edged. More purchasers, which are competing, put each 
purchaser under pressure to perform well. But it also weakens the bargaining power of the 
demand side vis-à-vis the providers. A risk equalization among the purchasers may prevent 
cream skimming, but may also set perverse incentives, which make it reasonable to spend as 
much resources as possible.  
 
Relationship among Purchaser and Patients 
As outlined above, the patients are locked in a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation, where 
collective and individual rationality diverge. It would be better for everybody in the group, if 
the individual would restrain its consumption to what is necessary and not exploit the 
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common pool. But for each individual, there is an incentive to over-consume services paid for 
from the common pool. In particular if the consumption is free at the point of use. Over-
consumption in one period will lead to higher contribution levels in the next. Typically for 
such dilemma situations, this is true independent of what the other members do. The dilemma 
is aggravated by the high value of health for a person: it is not realistic to assume that 
individuals put their health even slightly at risk by renouncing services, for the reason that by 
doing so they avoid some expenditure, which – given the size of the common pool – will have 
not noticeable effect.  
Given this problem, one of the purchaser’s tasks as an agent acting in the clients’ best interest 
consists of limiting the individual consumption to what is reasonable. Again, there are many 
possible options to do so. The HCSI covers those, which are actually implemented in at least 
some of the HCS: 
First, with regard to the control exerted by the purchaser over the patients the HCSI asks, 
whether it is possible that the same purchaser offers different packages of contributions and 
covered services to the insured. Examples are that the patient agrees to go to the general 
practitioner first, before visiting a specialists or accepts that some services, e.g. dental care, 
are not covered. In return, the patient pays a lower contribution. This sets an incentive for the 
patient to restrain the consumption.  
Second, the HCSI asks, whether the citizen can obtain a bonus by the Health Insurance Fund / 
Health Authority, if they participate in preventive health checks on a regular basis. Examples 
of these are a reduced contribution rate, a repayment or lower co-payments.  
 
Purchasers and Providers of Medical Care 
The problems in the relationship between the purchaser and the provider are similar to the 
problems in the patient-provider relationship: How can quality by assured?, How can the issue 
of supply-induced demand be tackled? The difference is, that while the individual patients is 
usually in no position to exercise control over the provider, the institution which is handling 
the affairs for a larger group of patients is able to do so. The purchaser may act as an agent in 
charge of controlling another agent on behalf of a principal.  
The possibilities to do so are manifold, concerning financial and quality aspects. The 
purchaser has access to a large quantity of data, which is accumulated during the payment of 
providers. The patient gets ill, contacts a provider, who decides on a treatment, which is billed 
to the purchaser. From this bill alone, the purchaser sees, what the provider has done, and 
whether the treatment was a success, i.e. whether the patient requires a second episode of 
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treatment. The purchaser can install a department consisting of medically trained staff, to 
evaluate the incoming information. This way it can collect information on what is the typical 
treatment in of a certain medical condition, and what is the most cost effective treatment. It 
can also implement a sampling-based auditing process to see, whether bills handed in by 
providers make sense. It can also collect information on quality problems occurring during 
treatment, e.g. collect information on the occurrence of medical maltreatment and readmission 
rates.  
With regard to the relationship among purchasers and providers of medical care, in particular 
the possibilities of control over the provider, I ask, whether the Health Insurance Fund / 
Health Authority can identify individual providers, e.g. individual GPs or Hospitals, who 
overspend. In particular, I ask, whether the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities 
usually receive a detailed bill from an individual provider, e.g. a hospital or a GP, which lists 
all medical services and medical goods provided in an individual case. In some countries, the 
provider bills directly to the purchaser, handing in bills listing all services provided. In others, 
the purchasers pay a lump sum to the organization of providers or the individual provider, and 
do not receive bills listing what services were provided in a case.  
A further question is, whether the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities have the 
possibility to exclude individual providers of medical services (individual physicians, 
hospitals etc.) from the provision of services, if they significantly oversupply medical 
services, provide insufficient quality or work in an inefficient way. 
Finally the HCSI asks, whether the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities can by one 
way or other force the providers (hospitals / physicians) to abide by clinical guidelines. In 
some countries, contracts specify obligations to quality, together with regulations on how the 
quality is controlled. An example would be that the provider’s activities are controlled for 
medical appropriateness on a sample basis.  
Two points have to be kept in mind: First, there are many possible options by which the 
purchaser can exert control over the providers on behalf of the patients. The list included in 
the HCSI covers only those, which can be found at least in some HCS. Second, the question 
whether and to what degree the purchaser actually uses the range of the possible options to 
control the providers, is a completely different question. The task of controlling providers is 
bothersome, requiring effort and is very likely to cause opposition from the providers. It 
might be easier to shirk from the task, just paying whatever costs arise.  
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B. The Data Handbook: Delegation and Control in Health Care Systems 1995 
and 2004 
 
Part I: Providers and Consumers of Health Services  
 
1. Primary Care and Outpatient Care 
1.1. Occupational Status of the Providers of Primary Care / Outpatient Care 
 
OS1  Primary Care Physicians / General Practitioners (GPs) are predominantly 
Austria 1995:  
Self-employed 
Remark:  
A substantial share of primary care is also 
provided by Primary Care Centers operated 
by the Health Insurance Funds 
(Kassenambulatorien) 
2004:  
Self-employed 
Remark:  
A substantial share of primary care is also 
provided by Primary Care Centers operated 
by the Health Insurance Funds 
(Kassenambulatorien) 
Belgium 1995: 
Self employed 
2005: 
Self employed 
Canada 1995:  
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Self-employed 
Remark: 
80% of all GPs were self employed. The 
provision of services takes place in Health 
Centers, which belong to the municipalities. 
The GP work in these facilities, and pay rent 
for the usage.  
2004: 
Self-employed 
Remark: 
The trend towards self employment continued 
and almost all GPs are self employed. Apart 
from private practices, the provision of 
services still takes place in Health Centers, 
which belong to the municipalities. The GP 
work in these facilities, and pay rent for the 
usage. 
Denmark 1995:  
Self employed 
2004:  
Self-employed 
Finland 1995: 
Employed but with the possibility or provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Primary care is predominantly provided by 
the Health Centers operated by the 
Municipalities. GPs are employed by them, 
but about one third have some kind of private 
practice where they work part time. 
2004: 
Employed but with the possibility or provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Primary care is predominantly provided by 
the Health Centers operated by the 
Municipalities. GPs are employed by them, 
but about one third have some kind of private 
practice where they work part time. 
France 1995:  
Self employed 
2004:  
Self employed 
Germany 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Greece 1995: 
Employed but with the possibility or provide 
2004: 
Employed but with the possibility or provide 
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OS1  Primary Care Physicians / General Practitioners (GPs) are predominantly 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Primary care is predominantly provided by 
the out-patient departments of hospitals. 
Frequently, the GPs work part time in a 
private practice. Parallel to the public system, 
there is a small and purely private system 
where providers charge fees which are either 
paid for by the patients or their VHI  
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Primary care is predominantly provided by 
the out-patient departments of hospitals. 
Frequently, the GPs work part time in a 
private practice. Parallel to the public system, 
there is a small and purely private system 
where providers charge fees which are either 
paid for by the patients or their VHI 
Hungary 1995 
Self employed 
Remark: 
85% are private entrepreneurs. Under the 
model of “functional privatization”, the GP is 
contracted by the municipalities, which are in 
charge of providing primary care, and is 
sometimes even working in facilities provided 
by the municipality  
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
They are contracted by the Municipalities 
which are in charge of providing primary care
Ireland 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark:  
About 2/3 of all GPs have a contract with the 
Health Boards, to provide treatment of 
Medical Card holders. 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark:  
About 2/3 of all GPs have a contract with the 
Health Boards, to provide treatment of 
Medical Card holders. 
Italy 1995: 
Employed by the ASL, Azienda Sanitaria 
Locale, the local health authority acting as the 
main provider and purchaser of health 
services at the local level. 
Remark:  
There are also self employed GPs, with a 
contract with the ASL. Both, the self 
employed and the employed have the 
possibility to provide additional services on 
own account 
2004: 
Employed by the ASL. 
 
 
Remark:  
There are also self employed GPs, with a 
contract with the ASL. Both, the self 
employed and the employed have the 
possibility to provide additional services on 
own account 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Netherlands 1995:  
Self employed 
2004:  
Self employed 
New Zealand 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Norway 1995:  
Self employed 
Remark: 
Some GPs are employed by municipalities. 
The share of the self employed, contracted by 
the municipalities, is increasing. In the 
beginning of the 90s, the split among 
employed and self-employed was about even. 
 
2004: 
Self employed (95%) 
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OS1  Primary Care Physicians / General Practitioners (GPs) are predominantly 
Portugal 1995: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account. 
Remark: 
GPs are employed in on of the about 350 
Health Centers, which are the predominant 
provider of primary care. About 50% of them 
have a private practice as well, in which they 
offer services on private terms 
2004: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account  
Remark: 
GPs are employed in on of the about 350 
Health Centers. About 50% of them have a 
private practice as well, in which they offer 
services on private terms 
Poland 1995 
Self employed 
Remark: 
There are also employed GPs working in one 
of the 3300 municipal Health Centers and 
GPs working part time on their own account. 
The tendency is towards self employment. 
2004: 
Self employed 
Spain 1995: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
90% of the GPs are employed in the Health 
Centers, many work part time in their own 
practice 
2004: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
90% of the GPs are employed in the Health 
Centers, many work part time in their own 
practice 
Sweden 1995: 
Employed 
Remark: 
GPs are employed by the county councils; 
Landstings, in charge of providing Primary 
care. Either they work in Primary Care 
Centers or in the outpatient departments of 
Hospitals 
2004: 
Employed 
Remark: 
GPs are employed by the county councils; 
Landstings, in charge of providing Primary 
care. Either they work in Primary Care 
Centers or in the outpatient departments of 
Hospitals 
Switzerland 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The GPs are self employed, usually working 
in group-practices, but have a contract with 
the NHS. This contract is negotiated between 
the NHS and the representatives of the GPs, 
and leaves substantial autonomy for the GPs 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The GPs are self employed, usually working 
in group-practices, but have a contract with 
the NHS. This contract is negotiated between 
the NHS and the representatives of the GPs, 
and leaves substantial autonomy for the GPs 
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OS2  Specialists and Providers of specialized medical services - like orthopedics, eye doctors, 
radiologists etc. - are predominantly: 
Austria 1995:  
Self employed 
Remark:  
Specialized care is also provided in Primary 
Care Centers operated by the Health 
Insurance Funds (Kassenambulatorien) 
2004:  
Self employed 
Remark:  
Specialized care is also provided in Primary 
Care Centers operated by the Health 
Insurance Funds (Kassenambulatorien) 
Belgium 1995: 
Most Specialists are self employed 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided in 
Hospitals, by specialists which also work in 
private practice. There is a strong tendency to 
provide specialized services on a ambulatory 
basis, i.e. in the practice of a self employed 
specialist 
2005: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided in 
Hospitals, by specialists which also work in 
private practice. There is a strong tendency to 
provide specialized services on a ambulatory 
basis, i.e. in the practice of a self employed 
specialist. 
Canada 1995:  
Self employed 
Remark:  
Specialized care is predominantly provided by 
self-employed specialists using hospital 
facilities, which are paid on a fee for service 
basis. Fees are negotiated among the 
provincial governments and the providers. 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark:  
Specialized care is predominantly provided by 
self-employed specialists using hospital 
facilities, which are paid on a fee for service 
basis. Fees are negotiated among the 
provincial governments and the providers. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Most Specialists are self employed. The 
provision of specialized services takes place 
in Health Centers and polyclinics, which 
belong to the municipalities. The specialists 
are self employed, but work in these facilities, 
and pay rent for the usage. 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Most Specialists are self employed. The 
provision of specialized services takes place 
in Health Centers and polyclinics, which 
belong to the municipalities. The specialists 
are self employed, but work in these facilities, 
and pay rent for the usage. 
Denmark 1995:  
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. Specialists are 
employed by the hospitals, but have the 
possibility to provide additional services on 
their own account. Denmark has a number of 
private practicing specialists besides 
specialists employed by public hospitals 
2004:  
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. Specialists are 
employed by the hospitals, but have the 
possibility to provide additional services on 
their own account. Denmark has a number of 
private practicing specialists besides 
specialists employed by public hospitals. In 
recent years, the counties reduce the number 
of extramural specialists in order to make 
better use of the capacities in hospitals 
operated by the counties. This is achieved by 
restrictive licensing. 
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OS2  Specialists and Providers of specialized medical services - like orthopedics, eye doctors, 
radiologists etc. - are predominantly: 
Finland 1995: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by Hospitals and in the Health 
Centers. Specialists are employed by them, 
but about one third have some kind of private 
practice where they work part time. 
2004: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by Hospitals and in the Health 
Centers. Specialists are employed by them, 
but about one third have some kind of private 
practice where they work part time. 
France 1995:  
About 50% of the Specialists are self 
employed; about 50 % employed by 
Hospitals, which are predominantly providing 
specialized care 
Remark:  
The status depends on the kind of specialty, 
Cardiology is mostly provided by specialists 
employed in Hospitals whereas gynecology 
and eye doctors are mostly self-employed  
2004: 
About 50% are self employed, about 50 % 
employed by Hospitals, which are 
predominantly providing specialized care 
Remark:  
The status depends on the kind of specialty, 
Cardiology is mostly provided by specialists 
employed in Hospitals whereas gynecology 
and eye doctors are mostly self-employed 
Germany 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Greece 1995: 
Employed 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. There are also self-
employed providers of specialized services 
which are contracted by the HIF. Some of the 
employed also work part time in private 
practice. Just like with primary care, there is a 
private system, parallel to the public health 
system, where fees are charged and paid 
directly by patients or VHI. 
2004: 
Employed 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. There are also self-
employed providers of specialized services 
with contracts. Some of the employed also 
work part time in private practice. Just like 
with primary care, there is a private system, 
parallel to the public health system, where 
fees are charged and paid directly by patients 
or VHI. 
Hungary 1995: 
Employed 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by hospitals and polyclinics 
operated by municipalities and by hospitals 
operated by the counties 
2004: 
Employed 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided by hospitals and polyclinics 
operated by municipalities and by hospitals 
operated by the counties 
Ireland 1995:  
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in hospitals by staff employed by the 
hospital.  
2004: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in hospitals by staff employed by the 
hospital. In 2003, only 200 specialists worked 
in private practice only. 
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OS2  Specialists and Providers of specialized medical services - like orthopedics, eye doctors, 
radiologists etc. - are predominantly: 
Italy 1995: 
Employed by the ASL. 
Remark:  
There are also self employed specialists, with 
a contract with the ASL. Both, the self 
employed and the employed have the 
possibility to provide additional services on 
own account by working part time in their 
own private practice. Specialized medical care 
is predominantly provided in the outpatient 
department of Hospitals. 
2004:  
Employed by the ASL. 
Remark:  
There are also self employed specialists, with 
a contract with the ASL. Both, the self 
employed and the employed have the 
possibility to provide additional services on 
own account by working part time in their 
own private practice. Specialized medical care 
is predominantly provided in the outpatient 
department of Hospitals. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Most specialists also use Hospital facilities. In 
fact, only in 2 of 34 hospitals, in-patient 
services are provided by employed staff. In 
the others, the Hospital is just the place where 
services are provided by specialist which are 
basically self employed and have hired the 
facilities.(Belegarztsystem) 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Most specialists also use Hospital facilities. In 
fact, only in 2 of 34 hospitals, in-patient 
services are provided by employed staff. In 
the others, the Hospital is just the place where 
services are provided by specialist which are 
basically self employed and have hired the 
facilities.(Belegarztsystem) 
Netherlands 1995:  
Self employed 
Remark:  
Specialized Care is provided predominantly in 
but not by Hospitals. Usually, specialists are 
not employed by the Hospital but have a 
contract with the Hospital and work on their 
own account, remunerated on a fee for service 
basis  
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark:  
Specialized Care is provided predominantly in 
but not by Hospitals. Usually, specialists are 
not employed by the Hospital but have a 
contract with the Hospital and work on their 
own account, remunerated on a fee for service 
basis 
New Zealand 1995: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided in 
outpatient departments of Hospitals. The 
specialists providing these services are 
employed by the DHB operating the 
Hospitals, but have the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account in a 
private practice, where they are remunerated 
on a fee for service basis. Further, there are 
also self-employed specialists providing 
specialized services in Hospitals. 
2004:  
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided in 
outpatient departments of Hospitals. The 
specialists providing these services are 
employed by the DHB operating the Hospital, 
but have the possibility to provide additional 
services on own account in a private practice, 
where they are remunerated on a fee for 
service basis. Further, there are also self-
employed specialists providing specialized 
services in Hospitals. 
Norway 1995: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account  
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
2004: 
Employed, but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account  
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
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OS2  Specialists and Providers of specialized medical services - like orthopedics, eye doctors, 
radiologists etc. - are predominantly: 
provided by Hospitals. The specialists are 
employed, but usually have the possibility to 
provide additional services on own account. 
There are also independent, contracted 
providers of specialized medical care. 
provided by Hospitals. The specialists are 
employed, but usually have the possibility to 
provide additional services on own account. 
There are also independent, contracted 
providers of specialized medical care. 
Portugal 1995:  
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account. 
Remark: 
Specialized Care is predominantly provided 
by hospitals; the specialists providing these 
services are employed and salaried by the 
Hospitals, but have the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account. Usually 
they also practice in a private practice. 
2004: 
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account. 
Remark: 
Specialized Care is predominantly provided 
by hospitals; the specialists providing these 
services are employed and salaried by the 
Hospitals, but have the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account. Usually 
they also practice in a private practice. 
Poland 1995: 
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account. 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals and Polyclinics 
operated by Municipalities (Gminas) and 
Regions (Voivodships). Specialists are 
usually employed there, but work part time in 
a private practice. 
2004: 
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account. 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals and Polyclinics 
operated by Municipalities (Gminas) and 
Regions (Voivodships). Specialists are 
usually employed there, but work part time in 
a private practice. 
Spain 1995: 
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized Care is predominantly provided 
by hospitals. Specialist are employed in the 
Hospitals but have the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account by 
working in their own practice. 
2004: 
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account  
Remark: 
Specialized Care is predominantly provided 
by hospitals. Specialist are employed in the 
Hospitals but have the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account by 
working in their own practice. 
Sweden 1995: 
Employed 
Remark:  
Specialists are employed by the county 
councils; Landstings. Specialized care is 
predominantly provided by Hospitals 
2004: 
Employed by the county councils; Landstings 
Remark:  
Specialists are employed by the county 
councils; Landstings. Specialized care is 
predominantly provided by Hospitals  
Switzerland 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided by 
hospitals; physicians providing specialized 
care are employed by the Hospitals but 
2004: 
Employed but with the possibility to provide 
additional services on own account 
Remark: 
Specialized Care is predominantly provided 
by hospitals; physicians providing specialized 
care are employed by the Hospitals but 
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radiologists etc. - are predominantly: 
usually have the possibility to provide 
additional services on their own account, 
often parallel in their own private practice 
usually have the possibility to provide 
additional services on their own account, 
often parallel in their own private practice 
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OS3  Dentists and the providers of dental care are predominantly... 
Austria 1995:  
Self employed 
Remark:  
Dental care is also provided by dentists 
employed in Primary Care Centers operated 
by Health Insurance Funds, 
(Kassenambulatorien) 
2004:  
Self employed 
Remark:  
Dental care is also provided by dentists 
employed in Primary Care Centers operated 
by Health Insurance Funds, 
(Kassenambulatorien) 
Belgium 1995: 
Self employed 
2005: 
Self employed 
Canada 1995:  
self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The share of self-employed was 90% in 1995 
and increasing. Dental care is part of the 
standard package of the HIF. 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Dental care is part of the standard package of 
the HIF. 
Denmark 1995:  
Self-employed 
Remark:  
Dental care for the below 18 age group is 
community based with hired dentists and free 
for the patient. The cost of adult dental care is 
not covered by the Health System and is 
provided by self employed dentists 
2004:  
Self-employed 
Remark:  
Dental care for the below 18 age group is 
community based with hired dentists and free 
for the patient. The cost of adult dental care is 
not covered by the Health System and is 
provided by self employed dentists 
Finland 1995: 
About half of the dentists are self employed, 
the rest is employed in Health Centers 
operated by the municipalities 
Remark: 
Most of dental care is not covered by the 
Health Centers operated municipalities but is 
paid for by the NHI. The coverage of dental 
care differs largely among municipalities 
2004: 
About half of the dentists are self employed, 
the rest is employed in Health Centers 
operated by the municipalities 
Remark: 
Most of dental care is not covered by the 
Health Centers operated municipalities but is 
paid for by the NHI. The coverage of dental 
care differs largely among municipalities 
France 1995: 
Self employed 
2004:  
Self employed 
Germany 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Greece 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Only the most basic dental care is covered, 
the majority of dental care is provided on a 
private basis outside of the public health 
system. 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Only the most basic dental care is covered, 
the majority of dental care is provided on a 
private basis outside of the public health 
system. 
Hungary 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Ireland 1995:  
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
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Italy 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The majority of dentists are self employed 
and the majority of dental services is 
purchased privately, outside of the SSN. Only 
dental care requiring hospital treatment is 
treated as hospital care.  
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The majority of dentists are self employed 
and the majority of services - about 87% of all 
dental care - is purchased privately, outside of 
the SSN. Only dental care requiring hospital 
treatment is treated as hospital care.  
Luxembourg 1994: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Netherlands 1995:  
Self employed 
2004:  
Self employed 
New Zealand 1995: 
Self employed  
2004:  
self employed 
Norway 1995:  
Self employed (70%) 
Remark: 
Only the dental care for the below 18 is 
covered by the public system. About 30% of 
the dentists are employed by the Health 
Centers, and in charge of providing dental 
care for those below 18 years of age. 
2004:  
Self employed (70%) 
Remark: 
Only the dental care for the below 18 is 
covered by the public system. Some dentists 
are employed, mainly for providing the dental 
care which is covered by the public system. 
Portugal 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The majority of dentists is in the private 
sector, since dental care for adults is factually 
not covered by the Health System and 
purchased privately 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The majority of dentists is in the private 
sector, since dental care for adults is factually 
not covered by the Health System and 
purchased privately  
Poland 1995: 
Self employed 
2004: 
Self employed 
Spain 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The purchasing of dental care is mostly 
private, since only dental care for children and 
extractions are covered. The later are 
provided in Hospitals and classify as hospital 
treatment 
2004: 
Self employed  
Remark: 
The purchasing of dental care is mostly 
private, since only dental care for children and 
extractions are covered. The later are 
provided in Hospitals and classify as hospital 
treatment 
Sweden 1995: 
Employed (53%);  
Remark:  
The share of employed dentists varies from 
43% to 80 % among the counties. A 
substantial share is also self-employed 
2004: 
Employed (about 58% in 2003) 
Remark:  
The share of employed dentists varies from 
43% to 80 % among the counties. A 
substantial share is also self-employed 
Switzerland 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The purchasing of dental care is mostly 
private, since dental is not covered by the 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
The purchasing of dental care is mostly 
private, since dental is not covered by the 
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Health Insurance Funds. Health Insurance Funds. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Usually, dentists have a contract with the 
NHS to provide services covered by the NHS, 
which specifies which services are covered 
and at what price.  
12% of the dentist work in community dental 
service, operated directly by the NHS 
2004: 
Self employed 
Remark: 
Usually, dentists have a contract with the 
NHS to provide services covered by the NHS, 
which specifies which services are covered 
and at what price.  
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OS4  What is the prevailing distribution channel of medicines and pharmaceuticals for out-
patient use?  
Austria 1995:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
A substantial share of pharmaceuticals for 
out-patient use is distributed by dispensing 
GPs 
2004:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
A substantial share of pharmaceuticals for 
out-patient use is distributed by dispensing 
GPs 
Belgium 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2005: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Canada 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Denmark 1995:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
Finland 1995:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
France 1995:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
Germany 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Greece 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Hungary 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
Pharmacies used to be state-owned but were 
privatized after the reform process. 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
By 1997, all previously state-owned 
pharmacies were privatized 
Ireland 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Italy 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Luxembourg 1994:  
privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
privately owned pharmacies 
Netherlands 1995:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
New Zealand 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Norway 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
Some pharmacies are owned by regional 
health authorities 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
About 10% of the sales are made by 
pharmacies owned and operated by public 
regional health authorities. 
Portugal 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Poland 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
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OS4  What is the prevailing distribution channel of medicines and pharmaceuticals for out-
patient use?  
Spain 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
2004:  
Privately owned pharmacies 
Sweden 1995: 
Publicly owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
All Pharmacies belong to the “Apoteket”, a 
state-owned monopoly corporation 
2004: 
Publicly owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
All Pharmacies belong to the “Apoteket”, a 
state-owned monopoly corporation 
Switzerland 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies (60%) 
Remark: 
A substantial share of pharmaceuticals for 
out-patient use is also distributed by 
dispensing GPs 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies (60%) 
Remark: 
A substantial share of pharmaceuticals for 
out-patient use is also distributed by 
dispensing GPs 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
The pharmacies have a contract with the 
NHS, in which mark ups and discounts are 
settled 
2004: 
Privately owned pharmacies 
Remark: 
The pharmacies have a contract with the 
NHS, in which mark ups and discounts are 
settled 
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OS5  What is the predominant occupational status of providers of laboratory services, like 
analyses of blood samples, tissue analyses? 
Austria 1995:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by self employed providers/ 
independent firms 
2004: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by self employed providers/ 
independent firms 
Belgium 1995: 
Laboratory services are provided 
predominantly in Hospitals, by hospital staff, 
as a part of the hospital treatment. But there 
are also by self employed providers/ 
independent firms  
2005: 
Laboratory services are provided 
predominantly in Hospitals, by hospital staff, 
as a part of the hospital treatment. But there 
are also by self employed providers/ 
independent firms 
Canada 1995: 
Laboratory services are provided by 
Hospitals;  
Remark: 
There are also independent firms providing 
laboratory services according to contracts. 
There is a trend of hospitals outsourcing 
laboratory services to independent providers 
in order to save costs. 
2004: 
Laboratory services are provided by 
Hospitals;  
Remark: 
There are also independent firms providing 
laboratory services according to contracts. 
There is a trend of hospitals outsourcing 
laboratory services to independent providers 
in order to save costs. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by independent firms 
2004: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by independent firms 
Denmark 1995:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals as part of in-patient 
treatment. 
Remark: 
There are also independent firms; which are 
both private and publicly owned, e.g. KPLL 
(owned by an independent fund), or the 
Statens Serum Institute which is publicly 
owned 
2004:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals as part of in-patient 
treatment. 
Remark: 
There are also independent firms; which are 
both private and publicly owned, e.g. KPLL 
(owned by an independent fund), or the 
Statens Serum Institute which is publicly 
owned 
Finland 1995: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals 
Remark: 
Laboratory services are also provided by 
public local laboratories associated with 
municipal Health Centers, and smaller 
Hospitals. There are also independent firms 
offering laboratory services, which are 
contracted. 
2004: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals 
Remark: 
Laboratory services are also provided by 
public local laboratories associated with 
municipal Health Centers, and smaller 
Hospitals. There are also independent firms 
offering laboratory services, which are 
contracted. 
France 1995: 
self employed /independent firms 
(commercial Laboratories) 
2004: 
self employed /independent firms 
4000 commercial Laboratories 
Germany 1995:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by self employed and independent 
2004: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by self employed and independent 
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analyses of blood samples, tissue analyses? 
firms  
Hospitals also conduct laboratory services as 
a part of their treatment, the same holds true 
for Physicians, which also offer laboratory 
services 
firms  
Hospitals also conduct laboratory services as 
a part of their treatment, the same holds true 
for Physicians, which also offer laboratory 
services 
Greece 1995: 
Self employed /independent firms 
Remark: 
80% of all diagnostic facilities are in the 
private sector. The sector providing 
laboratory and diagnostic services is largely 
unregulated. Some Health Insurance Funds 
run their own laboratory services, which have 
to be used by the insured of this HIF. 
Otherwise, the HIF will not cover the service.
2004: 
Self employed /independent firms 
Remark: 
80% of all diagnostic facilities are in the 
private sector. The sector providing laboratory 
and diagnostic services is largely unregulated. 
Some HIF run their own laboratory services, 
which have to be used by the insured of this 
HIF. Otherwise, the HIF will not cover the 
service. 
Hungary 1995: 
Self employed /independent firms but also in 
Hospitals as part of the in-patient treatment 
2004: 
Self employed /independent firms but also in 
Hospitals as part of the in-patient treatment 
Ireland1995:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals 
2004: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals 
Italy 1995: 
Laboratory services are provided by 
Hospitals contracted or operated by the SSN, 
but also by private laboratories, with a 
contract with the SSN 
2004: 
Laboratory services are provided by Hospitals 
contracted or operated by the SSN, but also 
by private laboratories, with a contract with 
the SSN 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Laboratory services are provided by the 
National Laboratory of Health, Hospital 
Laboratories as a part of the hospital 
treatment but also by self employed 
providers/ independent firms 
2004:  
Laboratory services are provided by the 
National Laboratory of Health, Hospital 
Laboratories as a part of the hospital 
treatment but also by self employed providers/ 
independent firms 
Netherlands 1995:  
Employed and salaried by Hospital  
Remark:  
Laboratory services are mainly provided in 
Hospitals as part of the hospital treatment 
There are also some self-employed, 
independent firms providing laboratory 
services 
2004:  
Employed and salaried by Hospital 
Remark:  
Laboratory services are mainly provided in 
Hospitals as part of the hospital treatment 
There are also some self-employed, 
independent firms providing laboratory 
services  
New Zealand 1995: 
Self-employed, independent firms 
2004: 
Self-employed, independent firms 
Norway 1995: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by staff employed by Hospitals and 
are provided during and as part of hospital 
treatment. 
Remark: 
There are some self employed /independent 
2004: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by staff employed by Hospitals and 
are provided during and as part of hospital 
treatment. 
Remark: 
There are some self employed /independent 
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analyses of blood samples, tissue analyses? 
firms which are contracted firms which are contracted 
Portugal 1995: 
Self employed / independent firms 
Sophisticated laboratory services are 
provided in Hospitals, as part of the Hospital 
treatment 
Remark: 
Most laboratory services provided on an out-
patient basis are provided by independent 
firms, not in Health Centers, which are 
usually not equipped for these kind of 
services; e.g. x-rays are provided by 
contracted private providers. By the end of 
the 80s, about 50 % of the x-rays and 70% of 
all laboratory services were done by private 
and contracted providers. 
Most heavy medical equipment is in the 
private sector and public Hospitals are also 
contracting services from the private sector 
2004:  
Self employed / independent firms 
Sophisticated laboratory services are provided 
in Hospitals, as part of the Hospital treatment 
 
Remark: 
Most laboratory services provided on an out-
patient basis are provided by independent 
firms, not in Health Centers, which are 
usually not equipped for these kind of 
services; e.g. x-rays are provided by 
contracted private providers.  
Most heavy medical equipment is in the 
private sector and public Hospitals are also 
contracting services from the private sector 
Poland 1995: 
Most laboratory services are provided in 
hospitals during in-patient treatment. 
 
 
Remark: 
There is a tendency to outsourcing to private, 
contracted providers 
2004: 
A substantial share is now provided by self 
employed / independent firms, but laboratory 
services are still also provided in hospitals 
during in-patient treatment. 
Remark: 
There is a tendency to further outsourcing to 
private, contracted providers 
Spain 1995: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by staff employed by Hospitals, 
where most of these services are provided as 
part of the hospital treatment 
Remark: 
Some are also provided by self employed 
providers and independent firms on a 
contract basis. There is a trend to outsource 
laboratory services to independent providers. 
2004: 
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by staff employed by Hospitals, 
where most of these services are provided as 
part of the Hospital treatment 
Remark: 
Some are also provided by self employed 
providers and independent firms on a contract 
basis. There is a trend to outsource laboratory 
services to independent providers. 
Sweden 1995: 
Employed and salaried by Hospital, where 
most of the laboratory services are provided 
 
2004: 
Employed and salaried by Hospital, where 
most of the laboratory services are provided 
 
Switzerland 1995:  
Self employed /independent firms 
 
Remark: 
There are about 500 laboratories operated by 
Hospitals, 100 private laboratories and 5000 
laboratories operated by physicians, most of 
the turnover is generated by the later. 
2004: 
Self employed /independent firms 
 
Remark: 
There are about 500 laboratories operated by 
Hospitals, 100 private laboratories and 5000 
laboratories operated by physicians, most of 
the turnover is generated by the later. 
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analyses of blood samples, tissue analyses? 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Employed and salaried by hospitals, where 
laboratory services are mainly provided 
2004: 
Employed and salaried by hospitals, where 
laboratory services are mainly provided 
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1.2. Remuneration Modes in Primary Care / Outpatient Care 
 
R1A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services provided by 
General Practitioners / Providers of Primary Care? 
Austria 1995:  
Fee for service  
Remark:  
The fee (monetary value) depends to some 
extend digressively on the quantity of 
services provided per period by the GPs. The 
value of the fee also differs among Health 
Insurance Funds, since the lump sum paid by 
HIF differs. 
2004:  
Fee for service  
Remark:  
The fee (monetary value) depends to some 
extend digressively on the quantity of services 
provided per period by the GPs. The value of 
the fee also differs among Health Insurance 
Funds, since the lump sums paid by the HIF 
differs. 
Belgium 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated between the Physician’s 
Association and the Association of the 
Health Insurance Funds. However, GPs are 
free to accept the conventions or not, they 
can also charge their own fees, but patients 
then have to pay more. 
2005: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated between the Physician’s 
Association and the Association of the Health 
Insurance Funds. However, GPs are free to 
accept the conventions or not, they can also 
charge their own fees, but patients then have 
to pay more. 
Canada 1995: 
Fee for service  
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated among the provincial 
governments and the provider organizations; 
usually on the provincial level. 
2004: 
Fee for service  
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated among the provincial 
governments and the provider organizations, 
usually on the provincial level. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
The capitation is age adjusted and negotiated 
between the providers and each of the HIF. It 
is part of a point-based remuneration system. 
Some services are remunerated on a fee for 
service basis: each service has a number of 
points assigned and the monetary value of a 
point results from the overall remuneration 
and the overall number of points billed by all 
providers.  
2004: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
The capitation is age adjusted and negotiated 
between the providers and each of the HIF. It 
is part of a point-based remuneration system. 
Some services are remunerated on a fee for 
service basis: each service has a number of 
points assigned and the monetary value of a 
point results from the overall remuneration 
and the overall number of points billed by all 
providers. The contracting of defined volumes 
limited the extension of the overall 
remuneration. 
Denmark 1995:  
2/3 Fee for service with fixed fees;  
1/3 Capitation per enrolled patient 
2004:  
2/3 Fee for service with fixed fees 
1/3 Capitation per enrolled patient 
Finland 1995: 
Salary 
Remark: 
For the GPs in Health Centers, about 60% of 
the income is from salary, 20% is a capitation 
2004: 
Salary 
Remark: 
For the GPs in Health Centers, about 60% of 
the income is from salary, 20% is a capitation 
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R1A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services provided by 
General Practitioners / Providers of Primary Care? 
per patient which is enrolled with the GP. 
There is also a fee for service component. 
When working in private practice, the 
remuneration is by fee for service. 
per patient which is enrolled with the GP. 
There is also a fee for service component. 
When working in private practice, the 
remuneration is by fee for service. 
France 1995:  
Fee for service for GPs working in sector 1 
(about 90% of all GPs) 
Remark: 
For providers working in sector 2 the 
remuneration is also by fee for service, but 
the fees are higher and set by the provider 
unilaterally, while in sector 1, it is negotiated 
with the Health Insurance Funds 
2004:  
Fee for service for GPs working in sector 1 
(about 90% of all GPs) 
Remark: 
For providers working in sector 2 the 
remuneration is also by fee for service, but the 
fees are higher and set by the provider 
unilaterally, while in sector 1, it is negotiated 
with the Health Insurance Funds 
Germany 1995: 
Fee for service  
Remark:  
The fee’s monetary value depends to some 
extend on the overall quantity of services 
provided per period by all GPs. Each service 
has assigned a number of points. The fixed 
sum paid by the Health Insurance Funds to 
the GP association is divided by the sum of 
all points of all services provided. This yields 
the monetary value of a point. 
2004: 
Fee for service  
Remark:  
The fee’s monetary value depends to some 
extend on the overall quantity of services 
provided per period by all GPs. Each service 
has assigned a number of points. The fixed 
sum paid by the Health Insurance Funds to the 
GP association is divided by the sum of all 
points of all services provided. This yields the 
monetary value of a point. 
Greece 1995: 
Salary 
Remark: 
Salaries are set by the Ministry of Health. 
Independent providers are remunerated with 
a fixed fee per visit. 
2004: 
Salary 
Remark: 
Salaries are set by the Ministry of Health. 
Independent providers are remunerated with a 
fixed fee per visit 
Hungary 1995: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
The Municipalities pay for capital 
investments of the practices, and sometimes 
provide the facilities in which the GP is 
working. The Purchaser, the National Health 
Insurance Fund Administration, NHIFA pays 
the GP per inscribed patient. The capitation 
is age adjusted and sets an incentive to limit 
the number of patients enrolled. If the GP is 
employed by the municipality, the NHIFA 
pays the capitation to the municipality which 
then pays the salary of the GP 
2004: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
The Municipalities pay for capital 
investments of the practices, and sometimes 
provide the facilities in which the GP is 
working. The NHIFA pays the GP per 
inscribed patient. The capitation is age 
adjusted and sets an incentive to limit the 
number of patients enrolled. If the GP is 
employed by the municipality, the NHIFA 
pays the capitation to the municipality which 
then pays the salary of the GP 
Ireland 1995 : 
Capitation per enrolled patient for the poorest 
third of the population (Medical Card 
holders) 
Fee for service for the remaining 2/3 of the 
2004: 
Capitation per enrolled patient for the poorest 
third of the population (Medical Card holders)
Fee for service for the remaining 2/3 of the 
population 
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General Practitioners / Providers of Primary Care? 
population 
Remark: 
Also for medical card holders, part of the 
GP’s remuneration is activity based. The 
consumption of medical services by medical 
card holders is substantially higher than that 
of non-medical card holders 
Remark: 
Also for medical card holders, part of the 
GP’s remuneration is activity based. The 
consumption of medical services by medical 
card holders is substantially higher than that 
of non-medical card holders 
Italy 1995: 
Capitation per inscribed patient 
Remark:  
This accounts for about 80% of the GPs 
income. There is also an activity based 
component, with fees for instance for minor 
surgeries. Further, the GP can treat patients 
on a private basis, charging individual fees  
2004:  
Capitation per inscribed patient 
Remark:  
This accounts for about 80% of the GPs 
income. There is also a activity based 
component, with fees for instance for minor 
surgeries. Further, the GP can treat patients on 
a private basis, charging individual fees 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Fee for service; 
Remark: 
The fee schedule is negotiated with the HIF 
Association; Union des Caisses de Maladie; 
UCM 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The fee schedule is negotiated with the HIF 
Association; Union des Caisses de Maladie; 
UCM 
Netherlands 1995: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
There is also a fee for service component in 
the remuneration 
2004: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
There is also a fee for service component in 
the remuneration 
New Zealand 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Formally, the RHA as purchaser should 
negotiate contracts with the GPs, but the 
negotiations were not concluded by this time. 
So, most of the GPs continued to charge fees 
and the majority of GP services was still 
remunerated on a fee for service basis, with 
fees set by the GP, paid for by the patients 
with subsidies from the government. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The payment is fees from the patients and 
subsidies from the government. The fees are 
set by the GPs themselves, while the subsidy 
is set by the government. Nevertheless, the 
fees charged are oriented at the flat rate 
subsidy paid by the government and the level 
of the fee is subject to review by the DHBs. 
The gap between the fee and the subsidy has 
to be covered by the patient. A small share of 
GPs get a capitation 15%. 
Norway 1995: 
Salaries for the GPs employed by the 
municipalities  
Fee for service with fixed fees 
Remark: 
The GPs who are contracted receive a 
general grant from the municipalities plus a 
fee for service component which is paid for 
by the National Insurance Scheme; NIS. Fees 
are set by the National Assembly. 
2004: 
Fee for service plus a capitation component 
Remark: 
The GP receives a fixed grant per patient 
enrolled from the municipality. Services are 
financed from the NIS and from out-of-pocket 
payments of the patients.  
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General Practitioners / Providers of Primary Care? 
Portugal 1995: 
Salary 
Remark:  
GPs are employed by the Health Centers, 
their salary is negotiated with the Ministry of 
Health. When working in his private practice, 
the GP can set his own fees 
2004: 
Salary 
Remark:  
GPs are employed by the Health Centers, their 
salary is negotiated with the Ministry of 
Health. When working in his private practice, 
the GP can set his own fees 
Poland 1995: 
Capitation per patient enrolled with the GP 
for self employed. 
Remark: 
Those who are still employed in Health 
Centers are salaried, but the share is 
diminishing.  
2004: 
Capitation per patient enrolled with the GP 
Spain 1995: 
Salary 
Remark: 
GPs are employed by the Health Centers. 
There are some incentives based on a 
capitation formula 
2004: 
Salary 
Remark: 
GPs are employed by the Health Centers. 
There are some incentives based on a 
capitation per patient enrolled by a certain GP
Sweden 1995: 
Salary  
Remark: 
GPs employed by the Primary Health Centers 
operated by the county councils (Landstings) 
2004: 
Salary  
Remark: 
GPs employed by the Primary Health Centers 
operated by the county councils (Landstings) 
Switzerland 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The remuneration is based on a point system. 
A number of points is assigned to each 
service, and the financial value of a point is 
negotiated at the cantonal level between the 
HIFs and the provider, subject to approval by 
the cantonal government.  
2004: 
fee for service 
Remark: 
The remuneration is based on a point system. 
A number of points is assigned to each 
service, and the financial value of a point is 
negotiated at the cantonal level between the 
HIFs and the provider, subject to approval by 
the cantonal government. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
Patients have to register with a GP, who is 
then their first contact for receiving medical 
care, acting as a gate keeper for specialized 
and in patient care. apart from the 
remuneration per patient enrolled, there are 
also elements of activity based remuneration 
2004: 
Capitation per enrolled patient 
Remark: 
Patients have to register with a GP, who is 
then their first contact for receiving medical 
care, acting as a gate keeper for specialized 
and in patient care. apart from the 
remuneration per patient enrolled, there are 
also elements of activity based remuneration 
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R1B  Can the provider of primary care / the GP increase his income one way or the other by 
extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
Austria 1995:  
Yes, by providing more services per case and 
period 
2004:  
Yes, by providing more services per case and 
period 
Belgium 1995. 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services, 
follow up consultations, usage of laboratory 
services. 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services, 
follow up consultations, usage of laboratory 
services  
Canada 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
provided 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, via the fee for service component of the 
remuneration  
 
Remark: 
The overall remuneration paid by a HIF is 
fixed. If more services are delivered, the 
value of a point and hence the remuneration 
for a service, declines. 
2004: 
Yes, via the fee for service component of the 
remuneration, e.g. by providing additional 
services, preventive measures and screenings. 
Remark: 
The overall remuneration paid by a HIF is 
fixed. If more services are delivered, the value 
of a point and hence the remuneration for a 
service, declines. The explicit contracting of 
defined volumes limited the extension of the 
overall remuneration. 
Denmark 1995:  
Yes, via the fee for service remuneration. 
The GP can ask the patient to come for a 
another consultation (e.g. a medical checkup 
or follow up consultation) 
2004:  
Yes, via the fee for service remuneration. The 
GP can ask the patient to come for a another 
consultation (e.g. a medical checkup or follow 
up consultation) 
Finland 1995: 
Not in the public sector, where most of the 
GP’s income is a fixed salary 
Remark: 
In addition to their employment in Health 
Centers, some GPs work also in private 
practice, where they are remunerated on a fee 
for services directly by the patients, which in 
turn are partially reimbursed by the NHI 
2004: 
Not in the public sector, where most of the 
GP’s income is a fixed salary 
Remark: 
In addition to their employment in Health 
Centers, some GPs work also in private 
practice, where they are remunerated on a fee 
for services directly by the patients, which in 
turn are partially reimbursed by the NHI 
France 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the number of services; 
also by providing services in sector 2, where 
the fees are higher  
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the number of services; 
also by providing services in sector 2, where 
fees are higher 
Germany 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services per patient 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services per patient 
Greece 1995: 
Yes, by providing services on private terms  
Remark: 
While the GP’s salary is fixed, there is a 
strong incentive to redirect patients from the 
public system to the private system, i.e. the 
GP refers the patient to receive services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing services on private terms 
Remark: 
While the GP’s salary is fixed, there is a 
strong incentive to redirect patients from the 
public system to the private system, i.e. the 
GP refers the patient to receive services 
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R1B  Can the provider of primary care / the GP increase his income one way or the other by 
extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
provided in the GP’s private practice at more 
lucrative terms. There is a strong “revolving 
door” effect in the public system. Further, the 
remuneration is usually by a fee per visit.  
provided in the GP’s private practice at more 
lucrative terms. There is a strong “revolving 
door” effect in the public system. Further, the 
remuneration is usually by a fee per visit. 
Hungary 1995: 
No, the capitation provides a fixed income.  
Remark: 
This is the case for both, self employed and 
for employed GPs 
2004: 
No, the capitation provides a fixed income. 
Remark: 
This is the case for both, self employed and 
for employed GPs 
Ireland 1995:  
Yes, via the fee for service component of the 
provider’s income for 2/3 of the patients, 
who are not medical card holders, and via the 
activity based remuneration for medical card 
holders 
2004: 
Yes, via the fee for service component for the 
patients without medical card for 2/3 of the 
patients, who are not medical card holders, 
and via the activity based remuneration for 
medical card holders 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, while the capitation per patient or the 
salary is fixed, income can be increased by 
providing additional services on own 
account, for instance by home visits, 
vaccinations, etc. which are remunerated 
activity based. Also by treating patients on a 
private basis. 
2004: 
Yes, while the capitation per patient or while 
the salary is fixed, income can be increased 
by providing additional services on own 
account, for instance by home visits, 
vaccinations, etc. which are remunerated 
activity-based. Also by treating patients on a 
private basis. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, via the fee for service component of 
remuneration which is paid in addition to the 
capitation. The GP can increase the repeated 
number of consultations. Services for 
privately insured and some activities are 
remunerated by fees for service 
2004:  
Yes, via the fee for service component of 
remuneration which is paid in addition to the 
capitation. The GP can increase the repeated 
number of consultations. Services for 
privately insured and some activities are 
remunerated by fees for service 
New Zealand 1995. 
Yes, by providing more services per case 
2004:  
Yes, by proving more services per case 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
provided per case 
Remark: 
In addition to the general grant from the 
municipality, the GPs get a fee for service 
component paid by the NIS. 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
provided per case 
Remark: 
In addition to the general grant from the 
municipality, the GPs get a fee for service 
component paid by the NIS. 
Portugal 1995: 
Yes.  
Remark: 
While the GP’s income from his work in the 
NHS is fixed, he can increase the income he 
earns in his private practice by increasing 
activity there – the option to do so is limited 
since the patients, the subsistema (HIF) or 
2004: 
Yes.  
Remark: 
While the GP’s income from his work in the 
NHS is fixed, he can increase the income he 
earns in his private practice by increasing 
activity there – the option to do so is limited 
since the patients, the subsistema (HIF) or 
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R1B  Can the provider of primary care / the GP increase his income one way or the other by 
extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
their VHI has to cover these services their VHI has to cover these services 
Poland 1995: 
No, the income per patient is fixed 
Remark: 
This is true both for the self-employed GP (a 
fixed capitation) as well as for the employed 
GPs (a fixed salary) 
2004: 
No, the income per patient is fixed  
Remark: 
Income of the self-employed GPs is a fixed 
capitation per patient enrolled 
Spain 1995: 
No, the GP’s salary is fixed 
Remark: 
Since most GPs work only part time in 
Health Centers, the GP can increase the 
income by treating patients on private terms 
in his private practice. 
2004: 
No, the GP’s salary is fixed 
Remark: 
Since most GPs work only part time in Health 
Centers, the GP can increase the income by 
treating patients on private terms in his 
private practice. 
Sweden 1995: 
No, the GP’s income is fixed 
2004: 
No, the GP’s income is fixed 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, by providing certain additional services 
Remark:  
The contract with the NHS also contains fees 
for certain activities, others are also paid for 
by the patients themselves - e.g. inoculations 
before trips abroad. In some areas, 
vaccination of children, chronic disease 
programs, GPs are rewarded, if they meet a 
certain target 
2004: 
Yes, by providing certain additional services 
Remark:  
The contract with the NHS also contains fees 
for certain activities, others are also paid for 
by the patients themselves - e.g. inoculations 
before trips abroad. In some areas, 
vaccination of children, chronic disease 
programs, GPs are rewarded, if they meet a 
certain target 
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R2A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services provided by 
Specialists/providers of specialized medical services to outpatients ? 
How are eye specialist, orthopedists, radiologists, gynecologists etc. remunerated? 
Austria 1995:  
Fee for service; 
Remark:  
The fee’s money value depends to some 
extend on the number of services per case 
and on the overall number of services 
provided per period 
2004:  
Fee for service  
Remark:  
The fee’s money value depends to some 
extend on the number of services per case and 
on the overall number of services provided 
per period  
Belgium 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated between the Physician’s 
Association and the Association of the 
Health Insurance Funds. However, all 
physicians are free to accept the conventions 
or not, they can also charge their own fees, 
but patients then have to pay more. 
2005: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated between the Physician’s 
Association and the Association of the Health 
Insurance Funds. However, all physicians are 
free to accept the conventions or not, they can 
also charge their own fees, but patients then 
have to pay more. 
Canada 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated among the provincial 
governments and the provider organizations. 
Specialized out-patient care is organized 
similar to primary care 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees are negotiated among the provincial 
governments and the provider organizations. 
Specialized out-patient care is organized 
similar to primary care 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Fee for service for self employed providers 
of specialized medical care 
Remark: 
While delivering the services in Health 
Centers and Polyclinics, the specialists are 
self employed and only rent the facilities. 
The remuneration is point based.  
2004: 
Fee for service for self employed providers of 
specialized medical care 
Remark: 
While delivering the services in Health 
Centers and Polyclinics, the specialists are 
self employed and only rent the facilities. The 
remuneration is point based, the contracting 
of defined volumes limited the extension of 
the overall remuneration. 
Denmark 1995: 
Salary for hospital based specialists (the 
majority);  
Fee for service with fixed fees for private 
practicing specialists (minority). The 
counties pay the self-employed providers on 
a fee for service with “broken tariffs” where 
different levels of turnover lead to different 
payment reductions 
2004:  
Salary for hospital based specialists (the 
majority);  
Fee for service with fixed fees for private 
practicing specialists (minority). The counties 
pay the self-employed providers on a fee for 
service with “broken tariffs” where different 
levels of turnover lead to different payment 
reductions 
Finland 1995: 
Salary  
Remark: 
In addition to their employment in Hospitals 
or Health Centers, many specialists work also 
2004: 
Salary 
Remark: 
In addition to their employment in Hospitals 
or Health Centers, many specialists work also 
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R2A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services provided by 
Specialists/providers of specialized medical services to outpatients ? 
How are eye specialist, orthopedists, radiologists, gynecologists etc. remunerated? 
part time in private practice, where they are 
remunerated on a fee for services directly by 
the patients, which in turn are partially 
reimbursed by the NHI  
part time in private practice, where they are 
remunerated on a fee for services directly by 
the patients, which in turn are partially 
reimbursed by the NHI 
France 1995:  
Fee for service for those who are self 
employed 
Salary for those who are employed by 
hospitals 
Remark: 
Payment mode depends on the status, the 
overall split is about 50-50, but it depends on 
the kind of specialty 
2004:  
Fee for service for those who are self 
employed 
Salary for those who are employed by 
hospitals 
Remark: 
Payment mode depends on the status, the 
overall split is about 50-50, but it depends on 
the kind of specialty 
Germany 1995: 
Fee for service; based on a point system  
Remark: 
The fee’s money value depends to some 
extend on the overall number of services 
provided per period (see remuneration of 
GPs) 
2004: 
Fee for service; based on a point system 
Remark: 
The fee’s money value depends to some 
extend on the overall number of services 
provided per period (see remuneration of 
GPs) 
Greece 1995: 
Salary; set by the Ministry of Health  
Remark 
Specialized care is provided predominantly 
by Hospitals, and specialists working in the 
Hospital are salaried. The minority of private 
providers are remunerated on a fee for 
service basis.  
2004: 
Salary, set by the Ministry of Health  
Remark: 
Specialized care is provided predominantly by 
Hospitals, and specialists working in the 
Hospital are salaried. The minority of purely 
private providers is remunerated on a fee for 
service basis. 
Hungary 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Specialized medical services are 
predominantly provided by hospitals. The 
services are paid fee for service, but the 
specialists providing the services are 
predominantly employed and salaried.  
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
in which each service has a certain number of 
points. Before 2000, the sectorial budget 
allocated to specialized care was divided by 
the sum of points billed, which then yielded 
the financial value of a point.  
Services provided by private providers on 
private terms are not regulated 
2004: 
Fee for service    
Remark: 
Specialized medical services are 
predominantly provided by hospitals. The 
services are paid fee for service, but the 
specialists providing the services are 
predominantly employed and salaried.  
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
in which each service has a certain number of 
points. Since 2000, the financial value of a 
point is fixed in advance. 
 
 
Services provided by private providers on 
private terms are not regulated 
Ireland 1995:  
Fee for services 
Remark: 
While consultants and specialists are 
2004: 
Fee for services 
Remark: 
While consultants and specialists are 
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R2A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services provided by 
Specialists/providers of specialized medical services to outpatients ? 
How are eye specialist, orthopedists, radiologists, gynecologists etc. remunerated? 
employed by Hospitals, where specialized 
medical services are predominantly provided, 
they are paid on a fee for service basis. 
employed by Hospitals, where specialized 
medical services are predominantly provided, 
they are paid on a fee for service basis 
Italy 1995: 
Fee for service with fixed fees 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals. Most of the employed 
specialists also work in private practice, 
where they are paid on a fee for service basis 
like the self-employed specialists. Further, 
the specialist can treat patients on a private 
basis, charging individual fees 
2004:  
Fee for service with fixed fees 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals. Most of the employed 
specialists also work in private practice, 
where they are paid on a fee for service basis 
like the self-employed specialists. Further, the 
specialist can treat patients on a private basis, 
charging individual fees. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
This is also true for the services provided by 
the independent specialists using Hospital 
facilities 
2004: 
Fee for service  
Remark: 
This is also true for the services provided by 
the independent specialists using Hospital 
facilities 
Netherlands 1995:  
Fee for service dominates 
Remark:  
Specialized care is provided predominantly 
by Hospitals. In the Hospital, specialists are 
working on their own account and are paid 
on a fee for service basis.  
Private providers are also paid on a fee for 
service basis 
2004: 
Fee for service dominates 
Remark:  
Specialized care is provided predominantly by 
Hospitals. In the Hospital, specialists are 
working on their own account and are paid on 
a fee for service basis.  
Private providers are also paid on a fee for 
service basis 
New Zealand 1995: 
Fee for services for the majority of 
specialized services provided 
Remark:  
Self-employed providers of specialized 
services are paid on a fee for service basis. 
Most of those specialists employed in 
Hospitals also have private practice, where 
they are remunerated on a fee for service 
basis. For their work in hospitals, they are 
salaried. 
2004: 
Fee for services for the majority of 
specialized services provided 
Remark:  
Self-employed providers of specialized 
services are paid on a fee for service basis. 
Most of those specialists employed in 
Hospitals also have private practice, where 
they are remunerated on a fee for service 
basis. For their work in hospitals, they are 
salaried. 
Norway 1995: 
Salary - specialized care is provided 
predominantly by and in Hospitals by 
salaried staff. 
Remark: 
Hospitals receive a block grant, i.e. a global 
budget usually based on past costs.  
The salary levels are set at the national level, 
negotiated with the Medical Association of 
2004: 
Salary - specialized care is provided 
predominantly by and in Hospitals by salaried 
staff. 
Remark: 
Hospitals receive a global budget plus a 
activity related component based on DRG  
The salary levels are set at the level of the 
individual Hospital.  
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R2A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services provided by 
Specialists/providers of specialized medical services to outpatients ? 
How are eye specialist, orthopedists, radiologists, gynecologists etc. remunerated? 
Norway. 
Contracted specialists receive a general 
grant, and a fee for service component from 
the NIS. 
Contracted specialists receive a general grant 
from the Regional Health Authority (part of 
the state administration), and a fee for service 
component from the NIS 
Portugal 1995: 
Salary when working in the Hospital 
Fee for service, when working in their 
private practice 
Remark: 
Most specialist do both. When working in his 
own practice, the specialist is paid on a fee 
for service basis where the setting of fees is 
free; 
2004: 
Salary when working in the Hospital 
Fee for service, when working in their private 
practice 
Remark: 
Most specialist do both. When working in his 
own practice, the specialist is paid on a fee for 
service basis where the setting of fees is free; 
Poland 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in hospitals. The remuneration is 
based on a point system: each service is 
allocated a number of points, and the 
financial value of a point is fixed. 
Multiplying both yields the remuneration for 
a certain service. However, the overall 
remuneration is also specified in the contract, 
which is a cost-volume contract. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in hospitals. The remuneration is 
based on a point system: each service is 
allocated a number of points, and the financial 
value of a point is fixed. Multiplying both 
yields the remuneration for a certain service. 
However, the overall remuneration is also 
specified in the contract. which is a cost-
volume contract. 
Spain 1995: 
The specialists providing the services in the 
Hospitals are remunerated by fixed salaries 
There are also some financial incentives 
based on the number of patients treated 
Remark: 
Since most Specialists work part time in 
private practice as well, they can increase the 
income by treating patients on private terms 
in his private practice. 
2004: 
The specialists providing the services in the 
Hospitals are remunerated by fixed salaries. 
There are also some financial incentives based 
on the number of patients treated 
Remark: 
Since most Specialists work part time in 
private practice as well, they can increase the 
income by treating patients on private terms 
in his private practice. 
Sweden 1995: 
Salary  
Remark:  
Specialists are predominantly employed in 
the Health Centers and Hospitals 
2004: 
Salary  
Remark:  
Specialists are predominantly employed in the 
Health Centers and Hospitals 
Switzerland 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The remuneration is based on a point system. 
A number of points is assigned to each 
service, and the financial value of a point is 
negotiated at the cantonal level between the 
HIFs and the provider, subject to approval by 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The remuneration is based on a point system. 
A number of points is assigned to each 
service, and the financial value of a point is 
negotiated at the cantonal level between the 
HIFs and the provider, subject to approval by 
 97
R2A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for the majority of services provided by 
Specialists/providers of specialized medical services to outpatients ? 
How are eye specialist, orthopedists, radiologists, gynecologists etc. remunerated? 
the cantonal government. the cantonal government. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Salary 
Remark: 
While most physicians providing this kind of 
services are employed in Hospitals, the 
specialist can work part time in their own 
practice 
2004: 
Salary 
Remark: 
While most physicians providing this kind of 
services are employed in Hospitals, the 
specialist can work part time in their own 
practice 
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R2B  Can the Specialist / Provider of Specialized Medical Services increase his income 
one way or the other by extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a 
patient? 
Austria 1995:  
Yes, by providing more services 
2004:  
Yes, by providing more services  
Belgium 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services - e.g. follow 
up consultations, usage of laboratory services
2005: 
Yes, by providing more services - e.g. follow 
up consultations, usage of laboratory services 
Canada 1995:  
Yes, by providing more services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, for self employed providers who are 
remunerated on a fee for service basis. 
Remark: 
The fixed remuneration paid by a HIF to the 
providers limits this incentive, since more 
services provided decrease the financial 
value of a point and hence the remuneration 
for a service. 
2004: 
Yes, for self employed providers who are 
remunerated on a fee for service basis. 
Remark: 
Again, the fixed remuneration paid by a HIF 
to the providers limits the incentive, since 
more services decrease the financial value of 
a point and hence the remuneration for a 
service. 
Denmark 1995:  
No for the majority of employed specialists 
employed by the Hospitals where most 
specialized care is provided. 
Yes for the minority of self employed; for 
instance by asking the patient to return for a 
checkup, or giving extra services (minority) 
2004:  
No for the majority of employed specialists 
employed by the Hospitals where most 
specialized care is provided. 
Yes for the minority of self employed; for 
instance by asking the patient to return for a 
checkup, or giving extra services (minority) 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, by offering services in his private 
practice 
2004: 
Yes, by offering services in his private 
practice 
France 1995: 
Yes, for the self employed by increasing the 
number of visits and/or its structure of acts 
delivered within a visit (some care and 
services are better paid than other) and/or by 
increasing the amount of extra fees for those 
who are in sector 2; the percentage of 
specialists working in sector 2 is higher than 
that of GPs 
For those employed and salaried by 
Hospitals, there is no such incentive  
2004: 
Yes, for the self employed by increasing the 
number of visits and/or its structure of acts 
delivered within a visit (some care and 
services are better paid than other) and/or by 
increasing the amount of extra fees for those 
who are in sector 2; the percentage of 
specialists working in sector 2 is higher than 
that of GPs 
For those employed and salaried by Hospitals, 
there is no such incentive 
Germany 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Greece 1995:  
Yes, in particular for those working in 
private practice; by providing more services 
and provide services on private terms 
Remark: 
While the specialist’s salary is fixed, there is 
a strong incentive to redirect patients from 
the public system to the private system, i.e. 
2004: 
Yes, in particular for those working in private 
practice; by providing more services and 
provide services on private terms 
Remark: 
While the specialist’s salary is fixed, there is a 
strong incentive to redirect patients from the 
public system to the private system, i.e. the 
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R2B  Can the Specialist / Provider of Specialized Medical Services increase his income 
one way or the other by extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a 
patient? 
the specialists refers the patient to receive 
services provided in his private practice at 
more lucrative terms. There is a strong 
“revolving door” effect in the public system. 
specialists refers the patient to receive 
services provided in his private practice at 
more lucrative terms. There is a strong 
“revolving door” effect in the public system. 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Ireland 1995:  
Yes, by providing more services which are 
remunerated on a fee for service basis 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services which are 
remunerated on a fee for service basis 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, by providing additional services in 
particular when working on their own 
account. Also by treating patients on a 
private basis. 
2004:  
Yes, by providing additional services in 
particular when working on their own 
account. Also by treating patients on a private 
basis. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Yes, by providing more services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services, e.g. a 
repeated number of visits 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services, e.g. a 
repeated number of visits 
New Zealand 1995. 
Yes, by providing more services, since most 
specialized services are paid for on a fee for 
service basis.  
Remark:  
This holds true for self-employed as well as 
most employed providers, which can provide 
additional services on own account 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services, since most 
specialized services are paid for on a fee for 
service basis 
Remark:  
This holds true for self-employed as well as 
most employed providers, which can provide 
additional services on own account 
Norway 1995: 
No, the provider’s income is a fixed salary 
Yes for contracted providers 
Remark: 
Most specialized physicians are working in 
the Hospital, where the specialized services 
are predominantly provided. The Hospital 
itself has some incentives to increase activity, 
see H9/H10. 
Contracted providers can increase their 
income via the fee for service component. 
2004: 
No, the provider’s income is a fixed salary  
Yes for contracted providers  
Remark: 
Most specialized physicians are working in 
the Hospital, where the specialized services 
are predominantly provided. The Hospital 
itself has some incentives to increase activity, 
see H9/H10 
Contracted providers can increase their 
income via the fee for service component. 
Portugal 19995: 
No, when working in the Hospital  
Yes, by spending more time working in his 
own practice and providing more services 
there  
 
Remark: 
The incentive on the margin is that increasing 
income by providing more services is 
possible 
2004: 
No, when working in the Hospital  
Yes, by spending more time working in his 
own practice and providing more services 
there  
 
Remark: 
The incentive on the margin is that increasing 
income by providing more services is possible
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one way or the other by extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a 
patient? 
Poland 1995: 
Yes, under some circumstances, the income 
can be increased by providing more services 
than were agreed on in the contract 
Remark: 
Since most specialized services are provided 
in hospitals, the relevant actor is the hospital. 
Usually, the contract is a cost volume 
contract, which limits the overall 
expenditure. This can be circumvented only 
in the case of emergencies. 
2004: 
Yes, under some circumstances, the income 
can be increased by providing more services 
than were agreed in the contract 
Remark: 
Since most specialized services are provided 
in hospitals, the relevant actor is the hospital. 
Usually, the contract is a cost volume 
contract, which limits the overall expenditure. 
This can be circumvented only in the case of 
emergencies. 
Spain 1995: 
Basically no 
Remark: 
The provider’s income is a fixed salary. 
However, they can offer services to private 
patients in their extra time 
2004: 
Basically no 
Remark: 
The provider’s income is a fixed salary. 
However, they can offer services to private 
patients in their extra time. 
Sweden 1995: 
No, the specialist’s income is fixed, since he 
is employed by the County Council 
2004: 
No, the specialist’s income is fixed, since he 
is employed by the County Council 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No, the salary is fixed 
Remark: 
They may earn up to 10% of their income 
from operating a private practice, where they 
provide services. 
2004: 
No, the salary is fixed 
Remark: 
They may earn up to 10% of their income 
from operating a private practice, where they 
provide services 
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R3A  What is the predominant remuneration mode for Dentists and Dental Care? 
Austria 1995:  
Fee for service  
Remark: 
The fee’s monetary value depends to some 
extend on the number of services per case 
and on the overall number of services 
provided per period. 
2004:  
Fee for service  
Remark: 
The fee’s monetary value depends to some 
extend on the number of services per case and 
on the overall number of services provided 
per period. 
Belgium 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees for those services covered by the Health 
system are negotiated between the Dentist’s 
Association and the Association of the HIFs, 
subject to approval by the Government. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Fees for those services covered by the Health 
system are negotiated between the Dentist’s 
Association and the Association of the HIFs, 
subject to approval by the Government. 
Canada 1995: 
Fee for service  
Remark:  
Dental care is predominantly privately 
purchased (either out of pocket or by the 
supplementary insurance) and dentists are fee 
to set their own fees 
2004: 
Fee for service  
Remark:  
Dental care is predominantly privately 
purchased and dentists are fee to set their own 
fees 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark 
The remuneration is based on a catalogue of 
services and an assigned monetary price. The 
contracting of defined volumes for a defined 
remuneration limited the extension of the 
overall remuneration. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark 
The remuneration is based on a catalogue of 
services and an assigned monetary price. The 
contracting of defined volumes for a defined 
remuneration limited the extension of the 
overall remuneration. 
Denmark 1995:  
Fee for service for the majority of services 
provided to adults. 
Salary for the dentists working under the 
municipal dental services which are free of 
charge for those under 18 years of age. 
Remark: 
The agreement with the Health Care 
Reimbursement Negotiation Committee 
contains fixed fee with fixed user-payment 
levels, however some services are not 
covered by the public funds, and there may 
be variable prices. Most dental care is 
privately purchased 
2004:  
Fee for service for the majority of services 
provided to adults. 
Salary for the dentists working under the 
municipal dental services which are free of 
charge for those under 18 years of age. 
Remark: 
The agreement with the Health Care 
Reimbursement Negotiation Committee 
contains fixed fee with fixed user-payment 
levels, however some services are not covered 
by the public funds, and there may be variable 
prices. Most dental care is privately purchased
Finland 1995: 
Fee for service for the self-employed dentists 
Salary for the dentist employed 
Remark:  
The share is about 50:50, since many adults 
did not have access to the dental care 
2004: 
Fee for service for the self-employed dentists 
Salary for the dentist employed 
Remark:  
Since 2002 all citizens have access to dental 
care provided in the Health Centers. The fees 
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provided in Health Centers. The fees for 
privately provided dental services are paid 
for by the patient and partially reimbursed by 
the National Health Insurance according to a 
basic tariff schedule. Dentists are free to 
charge more than the basic tariff, but the 
reimbursement by the NHI is only based on 
the basic tariff. The patient has to cover the 
difference 
for privately provided dental services are paid 
for by the patient and partially reimbursed by 
the National Health Insurance according to a 
basic tariff schedule. Dentists are free to 
charge more than the basic tariff, but the 
reimbursement by the NHI is only based on 
the basic tariff, and the patient has to cover 
the difference. 
France 1995: 
Fee for service with fixed fees  
2004: 
Fee for service with fixed fees 
Germany 1995: 
Fee for service with variable fees;  
Remark: 
The fee’s money value depends to some 
extend on the overall number of services 
provided per period.  
2004: 
Fee for service with variable fees;  
Remark: 
The fee’s money value depends to some 
extend on the overall number of services 
provided per period 
Greece 1995:  
Fee for service  
Remark: 
Usually, a visit at a Dentists, including all 
treatment during this visit, is remunerated 
with a fixed fee. The Dentists can also offer 
services on private terms. 
2004: 
Fee for service  
Remark: 
Usually, a visit at a Dentists, including all 
treatment during this visit, is remunerated 
with a fixed fee. The Dentists can also offer 
services on private terms. 
Hungary 1995 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Dental care was excluded, then reintroduced 
in the catalogue again, but were subject to 
co-payments. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
After the reintroduction of dental care in the 
catalogue of medical services covered, even 
the co-payments were abolished in 2001. 
Ireland 1995:  
Fee for service for non medical card holders, 
which are the majority of the population 
Remark: 
Apart from those, there are dentists working 
full time in public dental care centers, and 
also dentists with a part time contract with 
the Health Boards 
 
2004: 
Fee for service for non medical card holders, 
which are the majority of the population 
Remark: 
Apart from those, there are dentists working 
full time in public dental care centers, and 
also dentists with a part time contract with the 
Health Boards 
Italy 1995: 
Fee for service within the SSN 
Fee for service outside of the SSN contracts; 
i.e. when the services are privately 
purchased. 
Remark: 
Fees are set in the contract between the 
dentists and the SSN. Most dental care is 
provided outside of the SSN, i.e. is purchased 
privately. 
 
2004:  
Fee for service within the SSN 
Fee for service outside of the SSN contracts; 
i.e. when the services are privately purchased  
Remark: 
Fees are set in the contract between the 
dentists and the SSN. Most dental care is 
provided outside of the SSN, i.e. is purchased 
privately. 
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Luxembourg 1994 
Fee for service 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The co-payments made directly by patients 
for dentures make up a substantial part of the 
dentist’s income 
Netherlands 1995: 
Fee for service with fixed fees 
2004: 
Fee for service with fixed fees 
New Zealand 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The dentists sets his own fees according to 
market prices. There is a fee schedule only 
for patients under 18 years of age and event 
here with many exemptions. 
2004: 
Fee for service  
Remark: 
The dentists sets his own fees according to 
market prices. There is a fee schedule only for 
patients under 18 years of age and event here 
with many exemptions. 
Norway 1995: 
Fee for service  
Remark: 
The fees are set by the dentist himself. Only 
services for the under 18 are covered by the 
public health system, and provided by 
employed dentists. 
2004: 
Fee for service  
Remark: 
The fees are set by the dentist himself. Only 
services for the under 18 are covered by the 
public health system, and provided by 
employed dentists. 
Portugal 1995: 
Fee for service with variable fees for dentists 
in the private sector, where most dental care 
is provided 
Remark: 
While not formally excluded from coverage, 
dental care is factually not provided by the 
NHS. The dentists are free to set their own 
fees within a minimum and a maximum set 
by the National Dental Association. In the 
case of coverage by a subsistema, HIF, the 
fees are negotiated between the HIF and the 
Dentists. Fee is paid either by the patient, the 
VHI or the subsistema. 
2004: 
Fee for service with variable fees for dentists 
in the private sector, where most dental care is 
provided 
Remark: 
While not formally excluded from coverage, 
dental care is factually not provided by the 
NHS. The dentists are free to set their own 
fees within a minimum and a maximum set by 
the National Dental Association. In the case 
of coverage by a subsistema, HIF, the fees are 
negotiated between the HIF and the Dentists. 
Fee is paid either by the patient, the VHI or 
the subsistema 
Poland 1995 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The contract with the Dentists specifies both 
a volume of services and the overall 
remuneration. The fees are calculated using a 
point system, where each service has a 
number of points.  
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The contract with the Dentists specifies both a 
volume of services and the overall 
remuneration. The fees are calculated using a 
point system, where each service has a 
number of points. 
Spain 1995: 
Fee for service with fixed and variable fees 
Remark: 
Dentists working in Health Centers are 
salaried. Most dental care is not covered by 
the public health system, but is 
2004: 
Fee for service with fixed and variable fees 
Remark: 
Dentists working in Health Centers are 
salaried. Most dental care is not covered by 
the public health system, but is predominantly 
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predominantly privately purchased. Each 
dentists sets his fees according to the market 
conditions. 
privately purchased. Each dentists sets his 
fees according to the market conditions. 
Sweden 1995: 
Salary for the employed dentists 
Fee for service for self employed providers; 
the share of both is about even 
Remark: 
The pricing of dental services is free, but 
there are fixed subsidies for some dental 
services. Dental care for persons over 20 
years of age only partly subsidized. Thus 
most dental care is provided in a fee for 
service setting. 
2004: 
Salary for the employed dentists 
Fee for service for self employed providers; 
the share of both is about even.  
Remark: 
The pricing of dental services is free, but 
there are fixed subsidies for some dental 
services. Dental care for persons over 20 
years of age is only partly subsidized. Thus 
most dental care is provided in a fee for 
service setting. 
Switzerland 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The fees are loosely based on a fee schedule 
negotiated between the Dental Association 
and some HIFs. Most of dental care is 
privately paid for – either out of pocket or by 
a VHI. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The fees are loosely based on a fee schedule 
negotiated between the Dental association and 
some HIFs. Most of dental care is privately 
paid for – either out of pocket or by a VHI. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Fee for service with fixed fees for dentists 
working for the NHS.  
Fee for service also if the dental care is 
purchased on private terms 
Remark:  
Most dental care is privately purchased, fees 
there are fixed by the market. When visiting 
a dentists with a NHS contract, the patient 
has to indicate, whether he wants to be 
treated as a private patient or as a NHS 
patient on NHS terms. The access to 
treatment on NHS terms is limited due to 
supply. 
2004: 
Fee for service with fixed fees for dentists 
working for the NHS.  
Fee for service also if the dental care is 
purchased on private terms 
Remark:  
Most dental care is privately purchased, fees 
there are fixed by the market. When visiting a 
dentists with a NHS contract, the patient has 
to indicate, whether he wants to be treated as 
a private patient or as a NHS patient on NHS 
terms. The access to treatment on NHS terms 
is limited due to supply 
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R3B  Can the Dentist /Provider of Dental Care increase his income one way or the other by 
extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
Austria 1995:  
Yes, by providing more services 
2004:  
Yes, by providing more services 
Belgium 1995: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Remark: 
E.g. more frequent consultations; the billing 
of implants and dentures is rather 
intransparent and offers another possibility of 
increasing the income 
2004: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Remark: 
E.g. more frequent consultations; the billing 
of implants and dentures is rather 
intransparent and offers another possibility of 
increasing the income 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Remark: 
Like with other providers, the fixed 
remuneration paid by a HIF to the providers 
of dental care limits this incentive. If more 
services are provided, the financial value of a 
point and hence the remuneration for a 
service decrease. 
2004: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Remark: 
Like with other providers, the fixed 
remuneration paid by a HIF to the providers 
of dental care limits this incentive. If more 
services are provided, the financial value of a 
point and hence the remuneration for a service 
decrease. 
Denmark 1995:  
Yes, by providing extra services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, the self employed dentists can do so by 
providing extra services 
2004: 
Yes, the self employed dentists can do so by 
providing extra services 
Remark: 
Formally, the whole population has now 
access to dental care provided in Health 
Centers by salaried Dentists. 
France 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the number of visits 
and/or structure of services delivered within 
a visit; but mostly by the amount of extra 
billing on dental prosthesis 
2004:  
Yes, by increasing the number of visits and/or 
structure of services delivered within a visit; 
but mostly by the amount of extra billing on 
dental prosthesis 
Germany 1995: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Greece 1995: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Remark: 
Since the payment is fee per visit, the 
incentive is to increase the number of visits. 
In particular, the Dentists can offer services 
on private terms. 
2004: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Remark: 
Since the payment is fee per visit, the 
incentive is to increase the number of visits. 
In particular, the Dentists can offer services 
on private terms. 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
Ireland 1995:  
Yes by increasing the quantity of services – 
for non medical card holders 
2004: 
Yes by increasing the quantity of services – 
for non medical card holders 
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extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, by providing additional services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing additional services 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Yes, by providing more services;  
Remark: 
Also by providing services which are not 
covered by the Health Insurance 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Remark: 
Also by providing services, which are not 
covered by the Health Insurance 
Netherlands 1995:  
Yes, by providing additional services 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services 
New Zealand 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the number of visits; the 
dentist sets his own rates and fees 
Remark: 
Since dental services are not covered and 
there is only in some cases a subsidy by the 
NIS, the incentive is counteracted by the 
patient’s willingness to pay. 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing his activities; the dentist 
sets his own rates and fees 
Remark: 
Since dental services are not covered and 
there is only in some cases a subsidy by the 
NIS, the incentive is counteracted by the 
patient’s willingness to pay. 
Portugal 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services; 
the dentist sets his own rates and fees within 
certain limits 
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the quantity of services; 
the dentist sets his own rates and fees within 
certain limits 
Poland 1995: 
Yes, by increasing the number of services. 
Remark: 
While the contract sets a volume of services 
and a total remuneration, the dentists may 
offer more services which are paid for by the 
patient.  
2004: 
Yes, by increasing the number of services. 
Remark: 
While the contract sets a volume of services 
and a total remuneration, the dentists may 
offer more services which are paid for by the 
patient. 
Spain 1995: 
Yes, the self employed dentists can do so by 
increasing activity and using more resources 
Remark: 
Since most dental care is purchased privately, 
this concerns the majority of dental care  
2004: 
Yes, the self employed dentists can do so by 
increasing activity and using more resources 
Remark: 
Since most dental care is purchased privately, 
this concerns the majority of dental care 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, for the self-employed by increasing 
activity  
No only for the employed dentists, and only 
when providing dental care in the setting of 
their employment. 
Remark: 
While the share employed / self-employed is 
about even, most dental care is provided in 
the fee for service setting, which sets an 
incentive to increase the quantity of services. 
The employed dentists also treat adults on a 
private basis charging fee for service. 
2004: 
Yes, for the self-employed by increasing 
activity  
No only for the employed dentists, and only 
when providing dental care in the setting of 
their employment. 
Remark: 
While the share employed / self-employed is 
about even, most dental care is provided in 
the fee for service setting, which sets an 
incentive to increase the quantity of services. 
The employed dentists also treat adults on a 
private basis charging fee for service. 
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extending the quantity of services provided in a given case, i.e. for a patient? 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
2004: 
Yes, by providing extra services 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, by treating the patient on a private basis 
Remark: 
Treating patients on private terms is more 
attractive than those terms set by the NHS. 
Further, the dentists can increase the activity. 
Increasing activity leads to higher income, 
both within the contract with the NHS and 
the treatment on private terms. 
2004: 
Yes, by treating the patient on a private basis  
Remark: 
Treating patients on private terms is more 
attractive than those terms set by the NHS. 
Further, the dentists can increase the activity. 
Increasing activity leads to higher income, 
both within the contract with the NHS and the 
treatment on private terms. 
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R4  How are the Physicians/Surgeons working in a hospital (e.g. surgeons, anesthetists) 
remunerated? 
Austria 1995:  
Fixed Salary plus a share of fees arising from 
patients treated outside of the Social Health 
Insurance System, i.e. on a private basis 
2004:  
Fixed Salary plus a share of fees arising from 
patients treated outside of the Social Health 
Insurance System, i.e. on a private basis 
Belgium 1995: 
Fee for service in private non-profit 
Hospitals (the predominant form)  
Fixed salary in University Hospitals and for 
consultants which are still in training 
Remark: 
Patients are on entry assigned to a consultant, 
who is billing the services provided on a fee 
for service basis directly to the patient. The 
fees are negotiated among the Physician’s 
Association and the Association of the HIFs 
2004: 
Fee for service in private non-profit Hospitals 
(the predominant form)  
Fixed salary in University Hospitals and for 
consultants which are still in training 
Remark: 
Patients are on entry assigned to a consultant, 
who is billing the services provided on a fee 
for service basis directly to the patient. The 
fees are negotiated among the Physician’s 
Association and the Association of the HIFs 
Canada 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Physicians providing in-patient or specialized 
services in hospital’s are actually self 
employed with a contract to use the 
hospital’s facilities. Most surgeons are paid 
on a fee for service basis.   
Some are of the technical staff, are employed 
and salaried. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Physicians providing in-patient or specialized 
services in hospital’s are actually self 
employed with a contract to use the hospital’s 
facilities. Most surgeons are paid on a fee for 
service basis.   
Some are of the technical staff, are employed 
and salaried. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Fixed salary 
2004: 
Fixed salary 
Denmark 1995:  
Fixed salary 
2004:  
Fixed salary 
Finland 1995:  
Fixed salary 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
France 1995: 
Fixed salary for physicians working in public 
hospitals, the majority, which are state 
employees. Their salary is set by the state – 
i.e. negotiated between their association and 
the state 
University hospital doctors can devote a part 
of their working time to private practice 
within the hospital ( a minority). 
Fee for service for physicians working in 
private hospitals; the fee is paid by the 
patient to the provider, who transfers part of 
it to the private hospital, as a payment for the 
usage of the hospitals equipment 
2004: 
Fixed salary for physicians working in public 
hospitals, the majority, which are state 
employees. Their salary is set by the state – 
i.e. negotiated between their association and 
the state 
University hospital doctors can devote a part 
of their working time to private practice 
within the hospital ( a minority). 
Fee for service for physicians working in 
private hospitals; the fee is paid by the patient 
to the provider, who transfers part of it to the 
private hospital, as a payment for the usage of 
the hospitals equipment 
Germany 1995: 
Salary 
Remark:  
2004: 
Salary 
Remark:  
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remunerated? 
The salary is negotiated between the 
Association of Hospital Doctors, “Marburger 
Bund”, and the association of the Regions 
respectively the association of the 
Municipalities operating the Hospitals 
The Chief consultants can obtain additional 
income from treating patients on a private 
basis 
The salary is negotiated between the 
Association of Hospital Doctors, “Marburger 
Bund”, and the association of the Regions 
respectively the association of the 
Municipalities operating the Hospitals 
The Chief consultants can obtain additional 
income from treating patients on a private 
basis 
Greece 1995: 
Fixed Salary 
Remark:  
The salary is set by the Ministry of Health, or 
rather, negotiated among the Ministry and the 
professional representations 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
Remark: The salary is set by the Ministry of 
Health, or rather, negotiated among the 
Ministry and the professional representations 
Hungary 1995: 
Salary 
2004: 
Salary 
Ireland 1995: 
Fee for service for most hospital consultants. 
Remark: 
While being formally employed, hospital 
consultants are paid on a fee for service 
basis, and also may work part time in a 
private practice. Fixed salary for some of the 
physicians working in the Hospital.  
2004: 
Fee for service for most hospital consultants. 
Remark: 
While being formally employed, hospital 
consultants are paid on a fee for service basis, 
and also may work part time in a private 
practice. Fixed salary for some of the 
physicians working in the Hospital. 
Italy 1995. 
Fixed salary in public Hospitals. 
Remark: 
The salaries are negotiated between the 
government and the association of hospital 
physicians. Up to 1999, consultants in 
Hospitals could earn additional income by 
treating patients privately, on a fee for 
service basis, paying part of the income to 
the hospitals in exchange for using the 
facilities 
2004: 
Fixed salary in public Hospitals. 
Remark: 
The salaries are negotiated between the 
government and the association of hospital 
physicians 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Only in 2 of 34 hospitals, in-patient services 
are provided by staff which is employed by 
the Hospital.  
In the others, independent, self-employed 
specialists use Hospital facilities. The 
Hospital is just the place where services are 
provided. The specialist have detailed 
arrangements with the Hospitals, in which 
payments are defined. The fees themselves 
are negotiated by the specialists and the HIF 
Association 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Only in 2 of 34 hospitals, in-patient services 
are provided by staff employed by the 
Hospital.  
In the others, independent, self-employed 
specialists use Hospital facilities. The 
Hospital is just the place where services are 
provided. The specialist have detailed 
arrangements with the Hospitals, in which 
payments are defined The fees themselves are 
negotiated by the specialists and the HIF 
Association  
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remunerated? 
Netherlands 1995: 
Fee for service for the majority of physicians 
which are basically self employed but have a 
contract with the hospital to use the hospitals 
equipment 
Remark:  
Only about one quarter of the physicians 
working in hospitals is employed and 
salaried. 
2004: 
Fee for service for the majority of physicians 
which are basically self employed but have a 
contract with the hospital to use the hospitals 
equipment 
Remark:  
Only about one quarter of the physicians 
working in hospitals is employed and salaried.
New Zealand 1995: 
Fixed Salary 
Remark: 
Salaries were negotiated between the 
individual physician and the Hospital. 
Surgeons in private hospitals are paid on a 
fee for service basis. 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
Remark: 
Salaries were negotiated collectively between 
the physicians and the District Health Boards 
operating the Hospitals. Surgeons in private 
hospitals are paid on a fee for service basis. 
Norway 1995: 
Fixed salary 
Remark: 
The salary levels are set at the national level; 
negotiated with the Medical Association of 
Norway. 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
Remark: 
The salary levels are set at the national level, 
negotiated with the Medical Association of 
Norway. 
Portugal 1995 
Fixed salary 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
Poland 1995: 
Fixed salary 
2004: 
Fixed salary 
Spain 1995: 
Fixed Salary 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
Sweden 1995: 
Fixed Salary 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
Switzerland 1995: 
A fixed salary plus a fee for service 
component 
2004: 
A fixed salary plus a fee for service 
component 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Fixed Salary, with some elements of a merit 
awards 
Remark: 
Consultants have a fixed salaries, but can 
work part time in private practice. There are 
several types of employment contracts, 
allowing different shares of private activity 
outside the Hospital. 
2004: 
Fixed Salary 
Remark: 
Consultants have a fixed salaries, but can 
work part time in private practice. There are 
several types of employment contracts, 
allowing different shares of private activity 
outside the Hospital  
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R5   How is the income of pharmacists / the pharmacy related to the quantity of medicines 
sold?  
Austria 1995:  
The pharmacy’s profit is the difference 
between the price at which the Pharmacy 
buys the medicine and the retail price; (retail 
margin) 
Remark:  
Prices are regulated on manufacturer and 
retail level; the Health Insurance Funds fix a 
digressive relationship of the retail mark up 
to the amount of packages sold; mark ups 
were reduced during the period 1995–2004. 
2004:  
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
 
Remark:  
Prices are regulated on both levels; Social 
Insurance fixes a relationship of the retail 
mark up to the amount of packages sold; mark 
ups were reduced during the period 1995 – 
2004 
Belgium 1995: 
A percentage of the total value of the 
medicines sold; (retail margin). 
Remark: 
In 1995, the percentage was 31% of the retail 
price of a drug, with a cap of 300 BFR. A 
substantial share of the pharmacies income 
arises from the sale of cosmetics etc 
2004: 
A percentage of the total value of the 
medicines sold; (retail margin). 
 
Remark: 
A substantial share of income arises from the 
sale of cosmetics etc. 
Canada 1995: 
A dispensing fee paid usually by the patient 
plus a retail margin for pharmacies 
Remark: 
The dispensing fee set by the pharmacy. In 
addition, the pharmacy can obtain profit from 
the difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine from the 
wholesaler and the retail price. 
2004: 
Dispensing fee paid usually by the patient 
plus a retail margin for pharmacies 
Remark: 
The dispensing fee set by the pharmacy. In 
addition, the pharmacy can obtain profit from 
the difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine from the 
wholesaler and the retail price. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
Remark: 
The retail margin is set by the government. 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
Denmark 1995:  
Income is the difference between the price at 
which the Pharmacy buys the medicine and 
the retail price; (retail margin) 
Plus a fixed amount per package sold 
(dispensing fee) 
Remark: 
The gross-income of a pharmacy is set by the 
Ministry of Health 
2004:  
Income is the difference between the price at 
which the Pharmacy buys the medicine and 
the retail price; (retail margin) 
Plus a fixed amount per package sold 
(dispensing fee) 
Remark: 
The gross-income of a pharmacy is set by the 
Ministry of Health 
Finland 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
Remark: 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
Remark: 
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The retail margin is set by the government The retail margin is set by the government 
France 1995:  
For pharmacist who own pharmacies, income 
is the difference between the price at which 
the Pharmacy buys the medicine and the 
retail price. (retail margin)  
Remark: 
The retail price is fixed by the government 
for those pharmaceuticals which are 
reimbursed by the Health Insurance System 
2004: 
For pharmacist who own pharmacies, income 
is the difference between the price at which 
the Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price. (retail margin) 
Remark: 
The retail price is fixed by the government for 
those pharmaceuticals which are reimbursed 
by the Health Insurance System 
Germany 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; plus a fixed percentage mark up of 3% 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; 
An amount per package sold plus a mark-up 
of 3% 
Plus a fixed percentage mark up 
Greece 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin) 
Remark:  
While the retail margin is formally set by the 
government; the retail margin is negotiated 
between the government and the pharmacy 
association 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin) 
Remark:  
While the retail margin is formally set by the 
government; the retail margin is negotiated 
between the government and the pharmacy 
association 
Hungary 1995: 
Percentage of the total value of the medicines 
sold (pharmacy retail margin) 
2004: 
Percentage of the total value of the medicines 
sold (pharmacy retail margin) 
Ireland 1995:  
An amount per package sold (dispensing fee) 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price 
2004: 
An amount per package sold (dispensing fee) 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price 
Italy 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price – this is set nationally  
Remark: 
In 1996, this percentage was by the state to 
be 26,7 % of the price of the pharmaceutical 
before VAT. 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price– this is set nationally 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
Remark: 
All issues concerning the remuneration are 
negotiated between the pharmacists’ 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
Remark: 
All issues concerning the remuneration are 
negotiated between the pharmacists’ 
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association and the Union of Health 
Insurance Funds, UCM  
association and the Union of Health Insurance 
Funds, UCM 
Netherlands 1995:  
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin) 
Plus a fixed amount per package sold 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin) 
Plus a fixed amount per package sold 
New Zealand 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
An amount per package sold; “dispensing 
fee” 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price; (retail margin) 
An amount per package sold; “dispensing fee”
Norway 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin) 
Remark: 
The retail margin is set by the state 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin) 
Remark: 
The retail margin is set by the state 
Portugal 1995: 
A percentage of the total value of the 
medicines sold (retail margin) 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price 
Remark: 
The retail margin is negotiated among the 
Pharmacist’s Association and the state. 
The patients pays his share of the price (0-
100%), the rest of the bill is paid from the 
purchaser to which the prescriber is 
associated: if its a GP working for the NHS, 
the Regional Health Authority, 
Administração Regionais de Saúde, pays, if 
its a private provider contracted by the VHI 
or the subsistema. i.e. the HIF, the VHI or the 
subsistema pays for the drug. The payment 
goes in bulk to the Association of 
Pharmacies, which distributes the payments 
to the individual pharmacies. There is a 
strong incentive not to have cheaper 
medicines in stock to foster the sale of more 
expensive ones. 
2004: 
A percentage of the total value of the 
medicines sold (retail margin) 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price 
Remark: 
The retail margin is negotiated among the 
Pharmacist’s Association and the state. 
The patients pays his share of the price (0-
100%), the rest of the bill is paid from the 
purchaser to which the prescriber is 
associated: if its a GP working for the NHS, 
the Regional Health Authority pays, if its a 
private provider contracted by the VHI or the 
subsistema, the VHI or the subsistema pays 
for the drug. The payment goes in bulk to the 
Association of Pharmacies, which distributes 
the payments to the individual pharmacies. 
There is a strong incentive not to have 
cheaper medicines in stock to foster the sale 
of more expensive ones. 
Poland 1995: 
Retail margin –the margin is set by the 
government and is degressive  
2004: 
Retail margin –the margin is set by the 
government and is degressive 
Spain 1995: 
A percentage of the total value of the 
medicines sold (retail margin) 
2004: 
A percentage of the total value of the 
medicines sold (retail margin) 
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Sweden 1995: 
Fixed Salary; the pharmacists are employed 
by the state-owned “Apoteket” 
2004: 
Fixed Salary; the pharmacists are employed 
by the state-owned “Apoteket” 
Switzerland 1995: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin) 
 
Remark: 
This is identical for Pharmacies and 
dispensing physicians. The retail margin is 
regressive, in order to limit the incentive to 
promote the usage of expensive drugs. 
2004: 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price (retail margin); plus a fixed amount per 
package sold (dispensing fee) 
Remark: 
This is identical for Pharmacies and 
dispensing physicians. The retail margin is 
regressive, in order to limit the incentive to 
promote the usage of expensive drugs. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
An amount per package sold / prescription 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price less a deduction for the discounts 
received by the pharmacies from the 
wholesaler 
2004: 
An amount per package sold / prescription 
Difference between the price at which the 
Pharmacy buys the medicine and the retail 
price less a deduction for the discounts 
received by the pharmacies from the 
wholesaler 
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R6  How are Laboratory Services (diagnostics, analyses of blood and tissue samples etc.) 
predominantly remunerated? 
Austria 1995:  
Fee for services.  
Remark:  
These fees are limited; limits were stressed 
during the period 1995-2004 
2004:  
Fee for services  
Remark:  
Fees are limited; limits were stressed during 
the period 1995-2004 
Belgium 1995: 
Fee for services 
Remark: 
Both, laboratory services provided by the 
consultants in the Hospital as well as services 
provided by independent providers outside 
hospitals are remunerated on a fee for service 
basis; the fees are negotiated between the 
providers and the HIF Association  
2004: 
Fee for services 
Remark: 
Both, laboratory services provided by the 
consultants in the Hospital as well as services 
provided by independent providers outside 
hospitals are remunerated on a fee for service 
basis; the fees are negotiated between the 
providers and the HIF Association 
Canada 1995: 
Laboratory services provided in hospitals are 
part of the Hospital budget 
Fee for service for services provided by 
independent private firms 
2004: 
Laboratory services provided in hospitals are 
part of the Hospital budget 
Fee for service for services provided by 
independent private firms 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Fee for service for services provided by 
independent private firms providing most 
laboratory services 
Remark: 
Usually, the HIF negotiate an overall amount 
of remuneration. This limits the possibility to 
increase the remuneration by providing more 
services.  
2004: 
Fee for service for services provided by 
independent private firms providing most 
laboratory services 
Remark: 
Usually, the HIF negotiate an overall amount 
of remuneration. This limits the possibility to 
increase the remuneration by providing more 
services. 
Denmark 1995:  
Budgets.  
Remark:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by hospitals, here, the laboratory 
services are part of the hospital’s budget 
Fee for services for services provided by self 
employed providers or independent firms 
2004:  
Budgets.  
Remark:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided by hospitals, here, the laboratory 
services are part of the hospital’s budget 
Fee for services for services provided by self 
employed providers or independent firms 
Finland 1995: 
Budgets – laboratory services are part of the 
budget of the Hospitals and Health Centers 
which are predominantly providing them. 
Self employed firms have contracts with the 
municipalities 
2004: 
Budgets – laboratory services are part of the 
budget of the Hospitals and Health Centers 
which are predominantly providing them. 
Self employed firms have contracts with the 
municipalities. 
France 1995:  
Fee for service for the commercial providers 
of laboratory services (majority of provision) 
2004:  
Fee for service for the commercial providers 
of laboratory services (majority of provision) 
Germany 1995: 
Those provided by independent firms are 
remunerated on a fee for service basis 
2004: 
Those provided by independent firms are 
remunerated on a fee for service basis 
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predominantly remunerated? 
(majority)  
Those provided by Hospitals are part of the 
hospitals budget 
(majority)  
Those provided by Hospitals are part of the 
hospitals budget 
Greece 1995:  
Fee for Service 
Remark: 
Laboratories have a contract with the HIF. 
The HIF also control the access to laboratory 
services, by requiring approval. Otherwise, 
the patients have to pay the services 
themselves. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
Laboratories have a contract with the HIF. 
The HIF also control the access to laboratory 
services, by requiring approval. Otherwise, 
the patients have to pay the services 
themselves. 
Hungary 1995: 
Fee for service for independent providers 
Part of the hospital’s budget, if provided as 
part of the hospital treatment 
2004: 
Fee for service for independent providers 
Part of the hospital’s budget, if provided as 
part of the hospital treatment 
Ireland 1995: 
Budgets 
Remark:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals as part of the hospital 
treatment 
2004: 
Budgets 
Remark:  
Laboratory services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals as part of the hospital 
treatment 
Italy 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The fees are part of the contract the SSN 
concludes with the providers (independent 
laboratories or hospitals).  
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark: 
The fees are part of the contract the SSN 
concludes with the providers (independent 
laboratories or hospitals). 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Fee for services 
Remark: 
Both, independent providers and Hospitals 
were remunerated this way for their 
laboratory services. In particular for the 
Hospitals, this set the incentive to provide 
many analyses and diagnostics  
2004: 
Fee for service for the independent providers 
Budgets – costs for laboratory services are 
part of the Hospitals budget for those 
provided by the Hospitals themselves 
 
Netherlands 1995:  
Budgets 
Remark: 
The majority of laboratory services is 
provided by Hospitals and is paid for by a 
part of the Hospital’s budget 
Fee for services for services provided outside 
of the Hospital – i.e. by independent 
providers like GPs and self employed 
specialists 
2004: 
Budgets 
Remark: 
The majority of laboratory services is 
provided by Hospitals and is paid for by a part 
of the Hospital’s budget 
Fee for services for services provided outside 
of the Hospital – i.e. by independent providers 
like GPs and self employed specialists  
New Zealand 1995: 
Fee for service for independent providers, the 
majority 
Budgets for services provided in Hospitals 
2004: 
Fee for service for independent providers, the 
majority 
Budgets for services provided in Hospitals 
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predominantly remunerated? 
Remark: 
Laboratories have contracts specifying either 
fees for defined services or a budget paid in 
advance. A Hospital’s budget covers the 
provision of laboratory services.  
Remark: 
Laboratories have contracts with the DHB 
specifying either fees for defined services or a 
budget paid in advance. A Hospital’s budget 
covers the provision of laboratory services. 
Norway 1995: 
Most of the laboratory services are provided 
in Hospitals and are covered from the 
Hospital’s Budget; 
 
Remark: 
Services provided by the hospital on an out-
patient basis and services from contracted 
independent providers are paid fee for 
services by the National Insurance Scheme. 
2004: 
Most of the laboratory services are provided 
in Hospitals during in patient treatment. They 
are partly covered from the Hospital’s 
Budget, partly financed on a DRG basis.  
Remark: 
Services provided by the hospital on an out-
patient basis and services from contracted 
providers are paid fee for services by the 
National Insurance Scheme. 
Portugal 1995: 
Laboratory services provided in private 
practices/by independent providers are 
remunerated by fee for service  
In public Hospitals, laboratory services are 
covered by the hospital’s budget 
 
Remark: 
In the out-patient sector, most laboratory 
services are provided by independent 
providers. Most diagnostic equipment is in 
the private sector and even hospitals are 
contracting services from private providers 
2004: 
Laboratory services provided in private 
practices/by independent providers are 
remunerated by fee for service  
In public Hospitals, laboratory services are 
covered by the hospital’s budget 
 
Remark: 
In the out-patient sector, most laboratory 
services are provided by independent 
providers. Most diagnostic equipment is in the 
private sector and even hospitals are 
contracting services from private providers 
Poland 1995: 
Fee for services 
Remark 
The contract with the between the providers 
of laboratory services includes a certain 
volume of services and a certain overall 
remuneration for this volume. The financial 
value of the fees are based on a point system.
2004: 
Fee for services 
Remark 
The contract with the providers includes a 
certain volume of services and a certain 
overall remuneration for this volume. The 
financial value of the fees are based on a point 
system. 
Spain 1995: 
Laboratory services are part of the Hospital’s 
budget – the majority of services 
Fee for service for contracted providers 
 
2004: 
Laboratory services are part of the Hospital’s 
budget – the majority of services 
Fee for service for contracted providers 
 
Sweden 1995: 
Budgets 
Remark: 
Laboratory services are part of the Hospital’s 
budget, where the majority of laboratory 
services is provided. 
2004: 
Budgets 
Remark: 
Laboratory services are part of the Hospital’s 
budget, where the majority of laboratory 
services is provided 
Switzerland 1995: 
Fee for services 
2004: 
Fee for services 
 118
R6  How are Laboratory Services (diagnostics, analyses of blood and tissue samples etc.) 
predominantly remunerated? 
United Kingdom 1995. 
Budgets 
Remark:  
Laboratory services are part of the budgets of 
Hospitals, where they are predominantly 
delivered , both for out patients and in 
patients 
2004: 
Budgets 
Remark:  
Laboratory services are part of the budgets of 
Hospitals, where they are predominantly 
delivered , both for out patients and in 
patients 
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2. Hospitals and In-Patient Care 
 
H0  Ownership and institutional status of Hospitals 
Austria 1995:  
Hospitals are predominantly public and non-
profit, owned and operated by regional 
governments (Bundesländer; 54%), 
Municipalities (16%) or Welfare 
organizations, a small number also by the 
Health insurance Funds (8% of beds) 
Some are private but also have contracts with 
the Health Insurance Funds 
2004:  
Hospitals are predominantly operated by 
regional governments (Bundesländer), 
Municipalities or Welfare organizations 
Most Hospitals are public and non-profit, 
some are private 
Belgium 1995: 
Hospitals are owned and operated by Health 
Insurance Funds and religious associations 
on a private, but non-profit basis (63%). The 
rest is owned and operated by municipalities 
and districts. 
Remark:  
Since the required size of a hospital was 
increased by law in recent years, there was a 
wave of mergers. 
2004: 
Hospitals are owned and operated by Health 
Insurance Funds and religious associations on 
a private, but non-profit basis 
The rest is owned and operated by 
municipalities and districts. 
 
Canada 1995: 
Most of the hospitals are operated by the 
Provincial Governments (through their 
Regional Health Authorities, RHA) 
Remark: 
Most are semi-autonomous and self governed 
by a board of trustees, which have broad 
control over the management of the hospital. 
2004: 
Most of the hospitals are operated by the 
Provincial Governments (through their 
Regional Health Authorities, RHA) 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities 
Remark:  
Some, usually more specialized hospitals 
with a national level catchment area, are 
operated directly by the Ministry of Health. 
Ownership of the Hospitals was transferred 
from the Central Government to the Regions 
and the Municipalities. 
2004: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities 
Remark:  
Some, usually more specialized hospitals with 
a national level catchment area, are operated 
directly by the Ministry of Health. 
 
Denmark 1995:  
Hospitals are operated by the county 
councils, “Amter” 
2004: 
Hospitals are operated by the county councils, 
“Amter”. 
Finland 1995: 
Hospitals are operated by the municipalities; 
Remark: 
There are 21 Hospital Districts, in which 
several Municipalities jointly own and 
operate Hospitals. The Council 
administrating the Hospital District is 
2004: 
Hospitals are operated by the municipalities 
Remark: 
There are 21 Hospital districts, in which 
several Municipalities jointly own and operate  
Hospitals. The Council administrating the 
Hospital District is appointed by the 
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appointed by the municipalities, but is quite 
independent of them. Factually, the 
municipalities have little cost control over 
the Hospital District they are member of.  
municipalities, but is quite independent of 
them. Factually, the municipalities have little 
cost control over the Hospital District they are 
member of. 
France 1995:  
Public Hospitals, the majority of beds, are 
owned and operated by the municipalities 
and the “Departement”. The mayor of the 
municipality respectively the president of the 
Departement is the head of the hospitals 
executive board. 
Some Hospitals are also owned by Welfare 
Foundations. There are many smaller, private 
“cliniques” operated on a for-profit basis. 
2004:  
Public Hospitals, the majority of beds, are 
owned and operated by the municipalities and 
the “Departement”. The mayor of the 
municipality respectively the president of the 
Departement is the head of the hospitals 
executive board. 
Some Hospitals are also owned by Welfare 
Foundations. There are many smaller, private 
“cliniques” operated on a for-profit basis 
Germany 1995: 
Most hospitals are operated by regional 
governments (Bundesländer) or 
Municipalities (Gemeinden). 
Some are owned and operated by Welfare 
Associations and religious Orders 
While most Hospitals are public and non-
profit, some are private for profit. 
2004: 
Most hospitals are operated by regional 
governments (Bundesländer) or 
Municipalities (Gemeinden). 
Some are owned and operated by Welfare 
Associations and religious Orders 
While most Hospitals are public and non-
profit, some are private for profit.  
Remark: 
Recently, the highly indebted municipalities 
have sold of hospitals to private firms  
Greece 1995: 
About 70% of the Hospitals are owned and 
operated by the National Health Service 
ESY, i.e. by the state. 
The rest is privately owned and operated, 
offering either services on private terms or is 
contracted by the HIF. 
2004: 
About 70% of the Hospitals are owned and 
operated by the ESY, i.e. by the state. 
The rest is privately owned and operated, 
offering either services on private terms or is 
contracted by the HIF. 
Hungary 1995: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities or at County Level, by the 
county governments  
2004: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities or at County Level, by the 
county governments  
Ireland 1995:  
About half of the Hospitals are owned and 
operated by the Health Boards. Many of the 
remaining Hospitals are owned and operated 
by the Church. 
Remark: 
In 1993, there were 78 Health Board 
Hospitals, 27 Hospitals run by Charities and 
22 private Hospitals, working for profit as 
well as non-profit 
2004: 
About half of the Hospitals are owned and 
operated by the Health Boards. Many of the 
remaining Hospitals are owned and operated 
by the Church. 
 
Italy 1995: 
Most Hospitals are operated by the SSN; 
directly by the ASL  
The biggest ones – University Hospitals and 
2004:  
Most Hospitals are operated by the SSN.  
The biggest ones – University Hospitals and 
specialized hospitals -are organized as Trusts, 
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specialized hospitals - are organized as 
Trusts, with a high degree of financial 
autonomy – in 1995, there were about 82 
Remark 
There are also private Hospitals which have a 
contract with the SSN – about 20% of the 
beds 
with a high degree of financial autonomy. In 
2000, in 1995, there were about 98 
 
Remark: 
There are also private Hospitals which have a 
contract with the SSN  
Luxembourg 1994:  
About half of the Hospitals are owned by the 
Municipalities, the rest is owned and 
operated by religious orders 
2004: 
About half of the Hospitals are owned by the 
Municipalities, the rest is owned and operated 
by religious orders 
Netherlands 1995:  
9 University Hospitals are owned and 
operated by the Municipality or County 
where it is located.  
The rest is owned and operated by religious 
orders 
2004: 
9 University Hospitals are owned and 
operated by the Municipality or County where 
it is located.  
The rest is owned and operated by religious 
orders 
New Zealand 1995: 
Most Hospitals are publicly owned and 
operated by way of 23 formally independent 
“Crown Health Enterprises”. In particular 
they were independent from the 4 Regional 
Health Board, which had contracts with the 
Hospitals 
2004: 
Most Hospitals are publicly owned and 
operated by the 21 District Health Boards 
Remark: 
The private hospitals are providing elective 
surgery or geriatric care. 
Norway 1995: 
Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
counties, sometimes jointly by several of 
them. 
Remark: 
While the hospital usually has a board, the 
control rests with the councils. The Hospital 
system is layered: there are five hospital 
regions, with Regional Hospitals providing 
more specialized services. Below that is the 
level of the District Hospitals, owned and 
operated by the Counties. There are two very 
advanced national level Hospitals (for 
Transplantation and Oncology). 
2004: 
Hospitals were transformed into Health 
Enterprises (2001), which are formally 
independent legal entities, but are factually 
owned and operated by the central 
government via five Regional Health 
Authorities. 
Remark: 
The factual control over the Hospitals has 
shifted to the National Government. The 
degree to which the hospitals are actually 
independent and self governed, is debated. 
The hospital system is still layered: there are 
five Hospital regions, with Regional Hospitals 
providing more specialized services. Below 
that is the level of the District Hospitals, 
owned and operated by the Counties. There 
are two very advanced national level 
Hospitals (for Transplantation and Oncology).
Portugal 1995: 
Most hospitals are owned and operated by 
the state, i.e. the Administraçãos Regionais 
de Saúde. About 80% of the capacity and of 
the bed-days are in NHS Hospitals 
Remark: 
Some are owned and operated by charitable 
2004: 
Most hospitals are owned and operated by the 
state , i.e. the Administraçãos Regionais de 
Saúde 
Some are owned and operated by charitable 
Welfare Associations and religious Orders; 
some are private and for-profit. 
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Welfare Associations and religious Orders, 
some are private and for-profit. 
Remark: 
Recently, a number of Hospitals have been 
transformed in public enterprises with more 
autonomy. These Hospitals are still 
contracted, the contracts are negotiated 
annually between the Ministry of Health and 
the Hospital 
Poland 1995: 
Most hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities (gmina) or the Region 
(voivodship) 
Remark: 
Many nationalized Hospitals were returned 
during the transition period to their previous 
owners, e.g. the church. The Hospitals are 
managed by a Hospital Director, accountable 
to a Hospital Executive Board, in which the 
owner (gmina; voivodship), the staff and the 
trade unions are present.  
2004: 
Most hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities (gmina) or the Region 
(voivodship) 
Remark: 
Formally, the Hospitals were transformed in 
Independent Health Care Institutions. The 
Hospitals are managed by a Hospital Director, 
accountable to a Hospital Executive Board, in 
which the owner (gmina; voivodship), the 
staff and the trade unions are present. 
Spain 1995: 
About half of the Hospital beds are in 
Hospitals directly owned and operated by the 
INSALUD 
The rest is in private hospitals, but has a 
contract with the INSALUD 
Remark: 
There are strong regional differences, in 
Catalonia, 80% of the hospital beds are 
private 
2004: 
About half of the Hospitals are directly owned 
and operated by the Regional Health 
Authorities of the Autonomous Communities; 
(Communidades Autónomas) the Servicio 
Regional de Salud, SRS. 
The rest is private, but is contracted by the 
SRS. 
Remark: 
There are strong regional differences in 
ownership. In Catalonia, about 80% of the 
Hospital capacity is private and independent. 
Sweden 1995: 
Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
county councils; Landsting 
 
Remark: 
Specialized Hospitals are operated jointly by 
several Landstings and cover the area of all 
of these 
2004: 
Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
county councils; Landsting 
 
Remark: 
Specialized Hospitals are operated jointly by 
several Landstings and cover the area of all of 
these 
Switzerland 1995: 
Most of the Hospitals are owned and 
operated by the Regional Government, the 
Kanton. In some cases, several Kantons 
jointly own and operate a hospital. 
 
Remark: 
Some are owned and operated by 
municipalities. About 10% of the Hospitals 
are private and for profit, owned by Banks, 
Physicians etc.  
2004: 
Most of the Hospitals are owned and operated 
by the Regional Government, Kanton. In 
some cases, several Kantons jointly own and 
operate a hospital. 
 
Remark: 
Some are owned by municipalities. About 
10% of the Hospitals are private and for 
profit, owned by Banks, Physicians 
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United Kingdom 1995:  
The hospitals are organized as a “NHS 
Trust”, since 1991.  
Remark: 
While formally owned by the NHS, they are 
relatively autonomous and independent from 
the NHS, but with a contract with the 
regional Health Authority. The executive of 
the NHS trust is determined by the Ministry 
of Health. Contracting with the regional 
Health Authority is relatively free, it can be a 
defined budget, covering all cases expected 
in the catchment are, or a case-based 
remuneration and extra fees NHS 
2004: 
The hospitals are organized as a “Trust” 
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H1  Would a Deficit of a Hospital be covered by the state or some other institution? 
Austria 1995:  
Deficits of public Hospitals (the majority) are 
covered almost completely ex post for public 
Hospitals by the Hospital Coordination Fund, 
KRAZAF 
 
2004:  
Deficits of public Hospitals (the majority) are 
covered in some of the states (Bundesländer) 
completely, in some states partly. Usually the 
deficit is covered by whichever institution 
(regional or municipal government) is 
operating it.  
In the case of private non-profit Hospitals, 
deficits are only partly covered 
Belgium 1995: 
No, for the majority of the private Hospitals, 
owned by religious orders or HIFs, deficits 
are not covered.  
If the hospital is public, e.g. owned by a  
municipality, deficits are automatically 
covered from local taxes 
2004: 
No, for the majority of the private Hospitals, 
owned by religious orders or HIFs, deficits 
are not covered.  
If the hospital is public, e.g. owned by a  
municipality, deficits are automatically 
covered from local taxes 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, deficits are covered partly by the 
provincial government 
Remark: 
While the budget is fixed in the short run, it 
will be covered in the long run by being 
allocated a higher budget. Hospitals may not 
take up loans. 
2004: 
Yes, deficits are covered partly by the 
provincial government 
Remark: 
While the budget is fixed in the short run, it 
will be covered in the long run by being 
allocated a higher budget. Hospitals may not 
take up loans. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered completely 
Remark: 
While hospital deficits are not formally 
covered, they are covered in practice, usually 
by the owner ( municipality or Ministry of 
Health). 
2004: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered completely  
Remark: 
Hospitals often run deficits over long periods 
of time. While these deficits are not formally 
covered, they are covered in practice, usually 
by the owner (Municipality or Ministry of 
Health). 
Denmark 1995:  
Yes, hospital deficits are covered completely 
by the county councils, “Amter”, which are 
operating the hospitals.  
Remark: 
The deficit of an Amter is not covered but 
there are grants from the central government. 
2004: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered completely 
by the county councils, “Amter”, which are 
operating the hospitals.  
Remark: 
The deficit of an Amter is not covered but 
there are grants from the central government 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered completely 
by the municipalities operating the Hospital 
Remark: 
The hospitals are organized to Hospital 
Districts as the main administrative unit, in 
which several municipalities are member. 
The Hospital District can borrow money, i.e. 
can run debts. In the end, the deficits are 
covered by the municipalities. 
2004: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered completely 
by the municipalities operating the hospital 
Remark: 
The hospitals are organized to Hospital 
Districts as the main administrative unit, in 
which several municipalities are member. The 
Hospital District can borrow money, i.e. can 
run debts. In the end, the deficits are covered 
by the municipalities. 
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France 1995:  
Yes, deficits are covered partly by another 
institution 
Remark:  
This is the responsibility of the Regional 
Hospital Agency (Agence Régionale 
d’Hospitalisation, ARH), a regional body 
under the supervision of the central 
government, for public and not-profit private 
hospitals (who represent the majority of 
hospitals beds) to decide whether to cover or 
not the deficit. It the Hospital can also decide 
to contract a loan. 
2004:  
Yes, deficits are covered partly by another 
institution  
Remark:  
This is the responsibility of the Regional 
Hospital Agency (Agence Régionale 
d’Hospitalisation, ARH), a regional body 
under the supervision of the central 
government, for public and not-profit private 
hospitals (who represent the majority of 
hospitals beds) to decide whether to cover or 
not the deficit. It the Hospital can also decide 
to contract a loan. 
Germany 1995: 
Yes, deficits are covered by the Municipality 
or the Bundesland owning and operating the 
Hospital   
2004: 
Yes, deficits are covered by the Municipality 
or the Bundesland owning and operating the 
Hospital  
Greece 1995: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered by the state 
via the ESY, which is owning and operating 
the Hospitals 
Remark: 
Most hospitals constantly run deficits, and 
substantial deficits may be accumulated. In 
the end, most of the deficits are covered by 
the Ministry of Health, by ad hoc funding. 
The rest is paid for by the HIFs which are 
paying for hospital care on a per diem basis. 
Deficits often take the form of unpaid bills.  
2004: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered by the state 
via the ESY, which is owning and operating 
the Hospitals 
Remark: 
Most hospitals constantly run deficits, and 
substantial deficits may be accumulated. In 
the end, most of the deficits are covered by 
the Ministry of Health, by ad hoc funding. 
The rest is paid for by the HIFs which are 
paying for hospital care on a per diem basis. 
Deficits often take the form of unpaid bills. 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, deficits are covered by the Municipality 
or County owning and operating the Hospital
2004: 
Yes, deficits are covered by the Municipality 
or County owning and operating the Hospital 
Ireland 1995:  
Yes, the hospital’s deficit is covered 
completely by another institution – either the 
state or the Health Boards 
2004: 
Yes, the hospital’s deficit is covered 
completely by another institution – either the 
state or the Health Boards 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, a hospital’s deficit is covered. In the 
case of public hospitals operated by the SSN, 
the deficit is covered completely by the SSN: 
the hospital is integrated in the ASL, and 
financed from the budget of the ASL 
 
Remark: 
For “Trust” hospitals independent of the 
ASL, the financing was a budget based on 
past expenditure, i.e. a deficit would be 
covered in the long run. 
In the case of private hospitals with contracts 
with the SSN, deficits are not covered. 
2004: 
Yes, a hospital’s deficit is covered. In the case 
of public hospitals operated by the SSN, the 
deficit is covered completely by the SSN: the 
hospital is integrated in the ASL, and financed 
from the budget of the ASL 
 
Remark: 
For “Trust” hospitals independent of the ASL, 
the financing was a budget based on past 
expenditure, i.e. a deficit would be covered in 
the long run. 
In the case of private hospitals with contracts 
with the SSN, deficits are not covered. 
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Luxembourg 1994: 
Yes, hospital deficits are covered completely 
by the state and the HIF Association, UCM 
2004: 
Yes, while deficits are not covered by the 
State or the HIFs, they are covered by the 
owner  
Remark: 
In the end, hospital deficits are covered by the 
funding received from the state or the HIFs 
Netherlands 1995:  
No, deficits are not covered but have to be 
covered from next year’s budget 
2004: 
No, deficits are not covered but have to be 
covered from next year’s budget 
New Zealand 1995: 
Yes, the Hospital’s deficit is covered 
completely by the state 
Remark: 
Formally, hospitals were independent and 
supposed to operate like a commercial 
enterprise. Funding was done by historical 
budgets, based on a price volume contracts. 
While provision of services above the 
contracted volume was usually not 
remunerated, funding was usually increased, 
if it was insufficient.  
2004: 
No.  
 
Remark: 
The Hospital may take a loan from the 
government, which has to be repaid later on 
from next years budget. The budget however 
will be adapted to need in the long run  
Norway 1995: 
Yes, completely by the County (County 
Council) owning and operating the hospital 
Remark: 
While there is no formal obligation to cover 
the deficit, it is usually covered by the county 
council, e.g. by allocating a higher budget for 
the next period. There are also subsidies from 
the Central Government 
2004: 
Yes, completely by the Central Government 
 
Remark: 
While there is still no formal obligation to 
cover the deficit, it is usually covered e.g. by 
allocating a higher budget for the next period. 
There are also subsidies for investments. 
Portugal 1995: 
Yes, deficits are covered completely by the 
state 
Remark: 
This is done by special funds which are 
allocated in the case of need. The financing is 
negotiated and settled directly between the 
Hospital and the Ministry of Health, without 
involvement of the Regional Health 
Authority, Administração Regionais de 
Saúde. 
2004: 
Yes, deficits are covered completely by the 
state 
Remark: 
This is done by special funds which are 
allocated in the case of need. The financing is 
negotiated and settled directly between the 
Hospital and the Ministry of Health, without 
involvement of the Administração Regionais 
de Saúde. 
Poland 1995: 
No, formally, deficits of hospitals are not 
covered, but have to be covered from the 
income in the next year. 
Remark: 
Factually, debts can be covered by the 
Ministry of Health or the Local 
Governments. Many Hospitals have incurred 
2004: 
No, formally deficits of hospitals are not 
covered, but have to be covered from the 
income in the next year. 
Remark: 
Factually, debts can be covered by the 
Ministry of Health or the founder and owner – 
the municipal or regional governments. Many 
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large debts, which were periodically covered 
by the state. 
Hospitals have incurred large debts, which 
were later covered by the state. 
Spain 1995: 
Yes, the deficit of public hospitals is covered 
completely by the Central Government via 
the INSALUD 
Deficits of independent hospitals are not 
covered. 
2004: 
Yes, deficits of public hospitals are covered 
completely by the Autonomouy Communities, 
i.e. the Regions (Communidades Autónomas) 
via the SRS 
Deficits of independent hospitals are not 
covered. 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, the deficit is covered. 
Remark: 
Formally, the hospital receives a budget from 
the Landsting, and a deficit would have to be 
covered from next year’s budget. In the end, 
the deficit is covered completely by the 
County council, Landsting, operating the 
hospital 
2004: 
Yes, the deficit is covered. 
Remark: 
Formally, the hospital receives a budget from 
the Landsting, and a deficit would have to be 
covered from next year’s budget. In the end, 
the deficit is covered completely by the 
County council, Landsting, operating the 
hospital 
Switzerland 1995: 
Deficits are covered almost completely ex 
post by the regional government, Kanton, 
which owns and operates them. 
2004: 
Deficits are covered almost completely ex 
post by the regional government, Kanton, 
which owns and operates them 
United Kingdom 1995:  
No, deficits are not covered. 
Remark: 
The hospital (“Trust”) has to cover deficits 
from reserves or by short term borrowing. 
Predominantly, there were block grants: a 
fixed sum of money in exchange for the 
provision of services to all residents in the 
Health Authority’s catchment area. The 
block grant was partly based on past costs, so 
deficits were in the long run covered by 
higher grants. Deficits were also avoided by 
rationing. If there are more cases than 
expected, the trust receives a extra 
remuneration. 
2004: 
No, formally deficits are not covered. 
Remark: 
Deficits of a hospital trust are in the end 
covered completely by the Health Authority 
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H2  In the case that a Hospital realizes a Surplus – who decides how this surplus is used? 
Austria 1995:  
In public hospitals (where the majority of 
inpatient services is provided) a surplus is not 
really possible;  
Remark:  
If existent, a surplus would belong to the 
regional government operating it but the 
Hospital may use it for investments 
In private hospitals the hospital owner 
decides about the use of the surplus 
2004:  
In public hospitals (where the majority of 
inpatient services is provided) a surplus is not 
really possible;  
Remark:  
If existent, a surplus would belong to the 
regional government operating it but the 
Hospital may use it for investments 
In private hospitals the hospital owner decides 
about the use of the surplus 
Belgium 1995: 
The hospital itself, it can use it for 
investments 
Remark: 
This holds true both for public and private 
hospitals. The Hospital can invest, but in 
doing so is subjects to constraints set by the 
Government. The government issues plans 
on what medical equipment is required in a 
region, and it determines, what investments 
can be made from the funds the hospital has 
available for investment.  
2004: 
The hospital itself, it can use it for 
investments 
Remark: 
This holds true both for public and private 
hospitals. The Hospital can invest, but in 
doing so is subjects to constraints set by the 
Government. The government issues plans on 
what medical equipment is required in a 
region, and it determines, what investments 
can be made from the funds the hospital has 
available for investment. 
Canada 1995:  
In public Hospitals, the Regional Health 
Authority in agreement with the Hospital 
board decides on the usage of a surplus.  
In Private Hospitals (run by charities) the 
owner decides 
2004: 
In public Hospitals, the Regional Health 
Authority in agreement with the Hospital 
board decides on the usage of a surplus.  
In Private Hospitals (run by charities) the 
owner decides 
Czech Republic 1995:  
The Hospital, together with the owner – 
Mostly the municipality, Regional 
Government or Central Government 
2004: 
The Hospital, together with the owner – 
Mostly the municipality, Regional 
Government or Central Government 
Denmark 1995:  
The Local/County Government, “Amter”, 
which is operating the Hospital but in 
consultation with the Hospital 
2004:  
The Local/County Government, “Amter”, 
which is operating the Hospital but in 
consultation with the Hospital 
Finland 1995: 
The Municipality / Municipalities operating 
the Hospital decides 
2004: 
The Municipality / Municipalities operating 
the Hospital decides 
France 1995:  
The Hospital itself, e.g. can use the surplus 
for investments 
2004:  
The Hospital itself, e.g. can use it for 
investments 
Germany 1995: 
The Hospital itself, e.g. can use it for 
investments 
2004: 
The Hospital itself, e.g. can use it for 
investments 
Greece 1995: 
The national government 
Remark:  
To some degree the Hospital itself can decide 
2004: 
The national government 
Remark:  
To some degree the Hospital itself can decide 
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H2  In the case that a Hospital realizes a Surplus – who decides how this surplus is used? 
and can use it for investments; However, this 
is rarely the case, see H1. 
and can use it for investments; However, this 
is rarely the case, see H1. 
Hungary 1995: 
The Municipality or County owning and 
operating the Hospital 
2004: 
The Municipality or County owning and 
operating the Hospital 
Ireland 1995: 
For those hospitals in ownership of the 
Health Boards respectively the National 
Government, these decide. 
For those in ownership by religious orders, 
the Hospital or the owner decided on the 
usage 
Remark: 
The split among both forms of ownership is 
about equal; the national government’s 
influence is substantial. 
2004: 
For those hospitals in ownership of the Health 
Boards respectively the National Government, 
these decide. 
For those in ownership by religious orders, 
the Hospital or the owner decided on the 
usage 
Remark: 
The split among both forms of ownership is 
about equal; the national government’s 
influence is substantial. 
Italy 1995: 
In the case of the hospital integrated into and 
run by the ASL, the ASL decides (most 
Hospitals). The ASL is factually controlled 
of the local government 
In the case of independent Trust-Hospitals 
the Hospital itself and the regional 
Government decide. In the case of private 
Hospitals, the hospital itself decides  
2004: 
In the case of the hospital integrated into and 
run by the ASL, the ASL decides (most 
Hospitals). The ASL is factually controlled of 
the local government. 
In the case of independent Trust-Hospitals the 
Hospital itself and the regional Government 
decide. In the case of private Hospitals, the 
hospital itself decides 
Remark:  
In the case of public Hospitals which are 
independent of the SSN, “Aziende 
Ospedaliere”, the hospital itself and Region 
decide on the surplus, it can be used for 
investments 
Luxembourg 1994:  
The Hospital itself, it can use it for 
investments 
2004: 
The Hospital itself, it can use it for 
investments 
Netherlands 1995: 
The Hospital itself, e.g. can use it for 
investments, cover previous deficits or keep 
it as a reserve. 
2004: 
The Hospital itself, e.g. can use it for 
investments, cover previous deficits or keep it 
as a reserve. 
New Zealand 1995: 
The Hospital and the Purchaser - Regional 
Health Authorities - decide on the usage of 
the surplus 
Remark: 
The idea was, that the Hospital should invest 
surpluses, e.g. in technology.   
2004: 
The Hospital, albeit not single handed. 
Remark: 
There is a 50-50 sharing agreement between 
the Hospital and the District Health Board. 
The National Government in the Minister of 
Health have substantial influence 
Norway 1995: 
The County Government (County Council) 
Remark: 
The county as the owner is most influential, 
but the Hospital itself also has some say. The 
2004: 
The National Government 
Remark: 
The Hospital itself also has some say. The 
issue is not relevant, since there usually are no 
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issue is not relevant, since there are no 
surpluses. 
surpluses. 
Portugal 1995: 
National Government  
2004: 
National Government  
Poland 1995: 
The hospital itself 
Remark: 
The owner is consulted on the usage 
2004: 
The hospital itself 
Remark: 
The owner is consulted on the usage 
Spain 1995:  
The INSALUD which is operating the 
Hospital.  
Remark:  
Since the INSALUD is under direct control 
of the national government, its the 
government which decides. Public Hospitals 
cannot really realize a surplus; private 
Hospitals can, and then can decide on how to 
use it.   
2004: 
The government of the Autonomous 
Community, via the Servicio Regional de 
Salud, SRS, which is directly controlled by it, 
since the devolution of 2002 
Remark: 
Public Hospitals cannot really realize a 
surplus; private Hospitals can, and then can 
decide on how to use it. 
Sweden 1995: 
The regional government; Landsting, which 
is operating the Hospital  
2004: 
The regional government; Landsting, which is 
operating the Hospital 
Switzerland 1995: 
Regional Government (Kanton), which is 
operating the Hospital 
Remark: 
Formally, a surplus is, like a deficit, 
transferred to the next year.  
2004: 
Regional Government (Kanton), which is 
operating the Hospital 
Remark: 
Formally, a surplus is, like a deficit, 
transferred to the next year. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Surpluses can be retained by the Hospital, 
but cannot invest them without approval of 
the NHS authorities 
2004: 
The Hospital, “NHS Trust” decides how to 
use surpluses, again, this is subject to 
approval by the NHS authorities 
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H3  Which actor is the most influential decision maker in questions of Hospital Capacity - 
i.e. whether the number of beds in a Hospital is to be increased or decreased? 
Austria 1995:  
Regional government (Bundesland) 
2004:  
Regional government (Bundesland) 
Belgium 1995: 
National Government 
Remark: 
The government increased the required 
minimum size of a hospital, leading to 
hospital mergers. While not determining the 
size of a hospital, the hospitals require 
accreditation by the Ministry of public 
Health, and this is granted only, if the 
hospital does meet certain requirements and 
not exceed the planned capacity in the region 
which is set by the government 
2004: 
National Government 
Remark:  
The government increased the required 
minimum size of a hospital, leading to 
hospital mergers. While not determining the 
size of a hospital, the hospitals require 
accreditation by the Ministry of public Health, 
and this is granted only, if the hospital does 
meet certain requirements and not exceed the 
planned capacity in the region which is set by 
the government.  
Since 2002, hospitals can increase the number 
of beds, if they can justify this with an 
increased demand 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Government 
2004: 
Provincial Government 
Czech Republic 1995: 
The owner – mostly the municipality, or 
Central Government  
2004: 
The owner – mostly the municipality, or 
Central Government 
Denmark 1995:  
Local / Municipal Government; Amter 
Remark: 
For the three university hospitals (in 
Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense) the 
national government decides 
2004:  
Local / Municipal Government; Amter 
Remark: 
For the three university hospitals 
(Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense) the 
national government decides 
Finland 1995: 
The Hospital and the Municipality operating 
the Hospital decide together 
2004: 
The Hospital and the Municipality operating 
the Hospital decide together 
France 1995: 
The regional government through the 
regional hospital agencies ARH; acting under 
the national constraint defined by the 
ministry of health 
Remark:  
The Health Insurance Funds have some say 
2004:  
The regional government through the regional 
hospital agencies ARH; acting under the 
national constraint defined by the ministry of 
health 
Remark:  
The Health Insurance Funds have some say 
Germany 1995: 
The Regional Government or Municipality 
which is operating the Hospital; 
(Bundesländer or Gemeinden) 
 
Remark: 
The regional governments (Bundesländer) 
have a overall planning competence for 
Hospitals in a region and decide on 
investments  
2004: 
The Regional Government or Municipality 
which is operating the Hospital; 
(Bundesländer or Gemeinden) 
 
Remark: 
The regional governments (Bundesländer) 
have a overall planning competence for 
Hospitals in a region and decide on 
investments 
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i.e. whether the number of beds in a Hospital is to be increased or decreased? 
Greece 1995: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
2004: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
Hungary 1995: 
The Municipality or County owning and 
operating the Hospital 
2004: 
The Municipality or County owning and 
operating the Hospital 
Ireland 1995:  
National Government 
2004: 
National Government 
Italy 1995: 
Regional Government, by setting an overall 
health plan. 
Remark: 
In the case of independent public Hospitals 
(“Aziende Ospedaliere”), the Hospital and 
the Regional Government decide on the 
capacity. 
In the case of hospitals managed by the 
ASLs, the Local / Municipal Government 
which is in control of the ASL, decides. 
2004:  
Regional Government, by setting an overall 
health plan. 
Remark: 
In the case of independent public Hospitals 
(“Aziende Ospedaliere”), the Hospital and the 
Regional Government decide on the capacity. 
In the case of hospitals managed by the ASLs, 
the Local / Municipal Government which is in 
control of the ASL, decides 
Luxembourg 1994: 
National Government 
Remark: 
Most staff is not actually employed by the 
hospital but is “renting” hospital facilities 
2004: 
National Government 
Remark: 
Most staff is not actually employed by the 
hospital but is “renting” hospital facilities 
Netherlands 1995:  
National Government 
Remark: 
While the regional government of the 
province holds a formal planning 
competence, it is factually a joint decision of 
the Hospital, the Regional and the Central 
Government  
2004: 
National Government 
Remark: 
While the regional government of the 
province holds a formal planning competence, 
it is factually a joint decision of the Hospital, 
the Regional and the Central Government 
New Zealand 1995: 
The Hospital itself in consultation with the 
National Government 
 
Remark: 
While the Hospitals were, as Crown Health 
Enterprises, quite independent, the 
government had influence. 
2004: 
The District Health Board which are now 
operating the hospitals decide in consultation 
with the National Government 
Norway 1995: 
The County Government (County Councils) 
 
Remark: 
The central government has some influence. 
Investments like buildings etc. are often 
subsidized by government grants / loans. 
2004: 
The National Government 
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H3  Which actor is the most influential decision maker in questions of Hospital Capacity - 
i.e. whether the number of beds in a Hospital is to be increased or decreased? 
Portugal 1995: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence 
2004: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence 
Poland 1995: 
The Hospital itself, together and in 
accordance with the founding entity, i.e. the 
municipality or the local government which 
owns and operates the Hospital  
2004: 
The Hospital itself, together and in 
accordance with the founding entity, i.e. the 
municipality or the local government which 
owns and operates the Hospital 
Spain 1995: 
National government, via the INSALUD 
2004: 
The regional government of the Autonomous 
Communities via the Servicio Regional de 
Salud controlled by the regional government 
Sweden 1995: 
The regional government; Landsting 
2004: 
The regional government; Landsting 
Switzerland 1995: 
Regional Government (Kanton) 
2004: 
Regional Government (Kanton) 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The hospital itself 
Remark: 
For major changes, approval of the, Health 
Authority is required 
 
2004: 
The hospital itself 
Remark: 
For major changes, approval of the, Health 
Authority is required 
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H4 Which of the following actors is the most influential decision maker in questions of 
investments in the Medical Technology available in the Hospitals (e.g. procurement of new 
medical devices and equipment)? 
Austria 1995:  
Regional government (Bundesland) 
Remark: 
The Hospitals have some influence 
2004:  
Regional government (Bundesland)  
Remark: 
The Hospitals have some influence  
Belgium 1995: 
The national government 
Remark: 
The decision competence is split: the 
Hospital can purchase technology, which is 
not yet included in coverage by the Health 
system. 
The regional government is responsible for 
planing requirements but has to abide by the 
restrictions set in the national government’s 
plan of what and how much of medical 
equipment is appropriate in a region. The 
national government is responsible for the 
funding of heavy equipment and the overall 
hospital planning. Control is exercised by the 
central government by subsidizing 
investments and determining, which 
investments can be paid for from the 
hospital’s income 
2004: 
The national government 
Remark: 
Decision competence is split: the Hospital can 
purchase technology, which is not yet 
included in coverage by the Health system. 
The regional government is responsible for 
planing requirements but has to abide by the 
restrictions set in the national government’s 
plan of what and how much medical 
equipment is appropriate in a region. The 
national government is responsible for the 
funding of heavy equipment and the overall 
hospital planning. Control is exercised by the 
central government by subsidizing 
investments and determining, which 
investments can be paid for from the 
hospital’s income 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Government 
Remark: 
Also the Hospital itself, by proposing 
investments in equipment, the Regional 
Health Authority which is the “instrument” 
of the Provincial Government and the federal 
(national-level) Government have influence 
2004: 
Provincial Government 
Remark: 
Also the Hospital itself, by proposing 
investments in equipment, the Regional 
Health Authority which is the “instrument” of 
the Provincial Government and the federal 
(national-level) Government have influence 
Czech Republic 1995: 
The Hospital, together with the municipality, 
or Central Government 
Remark: 
Capital investments are usually funded from 
the state budget. Funding for municipal 
hospitals mostly comes from the 
municipality. 
2004: 
The Hospital, together with the Municipality, 
or Central Government 
Remark: 
Capital investments are usually funded from 
the state budget. Funding for municipal 
hospitals mostly comes from the municipality.
Denmark 1995:  
For major investments the county 
government; Amter  
For smaller investments the Hospital itself 
2004:  
For major investments the county 
government; Amter  
For smaller investments the Hospital itself  
Finland 1995: 
The hospital itself 
Remark: 
The Council of the Hospital District decides 
2004: 
The Hospital itself 
Remark: 
The Council of the Hospital District decides 
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H4 Which of the following actors is the most influential decision maker in questions of 
investments in the Medical Technology available in the Hospitals (e.g. procurement of new 
medical devices and equipment)? 
France 1995:  
The regional government through the 
regional hospital agencies ARH; acting under 
the national constraint defined by the 
ministry of health 
2004:  
The regional government through the regional 
hospital agencies ARH; acting under the 
national constraint defined by the ministry of 
health 
Germany 1995: 
The Hospital itself 
2004: 
The Hospital itself 
Greece 1995: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
2004: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
Hungary 1995: 
The Municipality or County owning and 
operating the Hospital 
2004: 
The Municipality or County owning and 
operating the Hospital 
Ireland 1995: 
National Government via its control over the 
Health Boards 
2004: 
National Government via its control over the 
Health Boards 
Italy 1995: 
Regional Government, by setting an overall 
health plan. 
 
Remark: 
In the case of independent public Hospitals 
(“Aziende Ospedaliere”), the Hospital and 
the Regional Government decide on 
investment in medical technology 
In the case of Hospitals managed by the 
ASLs, the Local / Municipal Government 
which is in control of the ASL, decides 
2004: 
Regional Government, by setting an overall 
health plan. 
 
Remark: 
In the case of independent public Hospitals 
(“Aziende Ospedaliere”), the Hospital and the 
Regional Government decide on investment 
in medical technology 
In the case of Hospitals managed by the 
ASLs, the Local / Municipal Government 
which is in control of the ASL, decides 
Luxembourg 1994: 
The Hospital itself 
Remark: 
For major investments in equipment, the 
Ministry of health’s approval is required  
2004: 
The HIFs and the National Government 
Netherlands 1995: 
The Hospital itself 
For larger investments the National and the 
Regional Government decide 
2004: 
The Hospital itself 
For larger investments the National and the 
Regional Government decide 
New Zealand 1995: 
The Hospital itself 
 
Remark: 
Hospitals were expected to use surpluses for 
investments in technology. Since surpluses 
almost never arose, there was very little 
investment in medical technology during the 
1990s. 
2004: 
The District Health Board, operating the 
Hospital, in consultation with the Ministry of 
Health, which plans and oversees all 
investments in the Health System. Major 
investments are financed by loans from the 
Government, which have to be paid back later 
on 
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H4 Which of the following actors is the most influential decision maker in questions of 
investments in the Medical Technology available in the Hospitals (e.g. procurement of new 
medical devices and equipment)? 
Norway 1995: 
The County Government (County Council) 
Remark: 
The National Government has influence, also 
because it is subsidizing investments in 
medical technology. 
2004: 
The National Government 
Portugal 1995: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence and a budget for capital 
investment 
Remark: 
If the procurement of the equipment requires 
an increase of the budget, the Hospital makes 
a proposal, which is negotiated with the 
Institute for Financial Management of Health 
(IGIF) and the Regional Health Authority 
(Administração Regionais de Saúde). When 
the budget increase is substantial the 
Secretary of State or, even, the Minister 
decide. Most of the heavy equipment is in the 
private sector 
2004: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence and a budget for capital 
investment 
Remark: 
If the procurement of the equipment requires 
an increase of the budget, the Hospital makes 
a proposal, which is negotiated with the 
Institute for Financial Management of Health 
(IGIF) and the Regional Health Authority 
(Administração Regionais de Saúde). When 
the budget increase is substantial the 
Secretary of State or, even, the Minister 
decide. Most of the heavy equipment is in the 
private sector 
Poland 1995: 
The Hospital itself, together and in 
accordance with the founding entity, i.e. the 
municipality or the local government which 
owns and operates the Hospital. 
Remark: 
Usually, there is also funding coming from 
the central government, which gives this 
level some control.  
2004: 
The Hospital itself, together and in 
accordance with the founding entity, i.e. the 
municipality or the local government which 
owns and operates the Hospital 
Remark: 
Usually, there is also funding coming from 
the central government, which gives this level 
some control. 
Spain 1995: 
The national government via the INSALUD; 
Remark: 
The Hospital proposes investments in 
medical technology, but cannot decide.  
2004: 
The Governments of the Autonomous 
Communities / Servicio Regional de Salud 
Remark: 
The Hospital proposes investments in medical 
technology, but cannot decide. 
Sweden 1995: 
The Hospital for minor investments, and the 
replacement of existing equipment 
The Regional Government, Landsting, for 
major investments and new procurements 
2004: 
The Hospital for minor investments, and the 
replacement of existing equipment 
The Regional Government, Landsting, for 
major investments and new procurements 
Switzerland 1995: 
Regional Government (Kanton), but also the 
Municipality 
2004: 
Regional Government (Kanton) but also the 
Municipality 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The hospital trust itself 
Remark: 
Both, the health authority and the regional 
2004: 
The hospital trust itself 
Remark: 
Both, the health authority and the regional 
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H4 Which of the following actors is the most influential decision maker in questions of 
investments in the Medical Technology available in the Hospitals (e.g. procurement of new 
medical devices and equipment)? 
government have substantial influence government have substantial influence 
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H5 Which actor is most important for deciding on the Establishment of new Hospitals? 
Austria 1995:  
Regional government (Bundesland) 
2004:  
Regional government (Bundesland) 
Belgium 1995: 
National Government.  
Remark:  
Hospitals need accreditation by the Ministry 
of Public Health. Among the accreditation 
criteria is the necessity of another hospital in 
a area and the capacity already existing. Due 
to over-capacities, the creation of new 
hospitals is not an issue; many hospitals are 
merging because the required minimum size 
of a hospital was increased by the national 
government. Regional government is funding 
the renovation of existing hospitals. 
2004: 
National Government.  
Remark:  
Hospitals need accreditation by the Ministry 
of Public Health. Among the accreditation 
criteria is the necessity of another hospital in a 
area and the capacity already existing. Due to 
over-capacities, the creation of new hospitals 
is not an issue; many hospitals are merging 
because the required minimum size of a 
hospital was increased by the national 
government. Regional government is funding 
the renovation of existing hospitals. 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Government 
2004: 
Provincial Government 
Czech Republic 1995: 
The Central Government 
Remark: 
This question is purely hypothetical, because 
the overall trend is towards a reduction of 
over-capacities. A private hospital can 
factually only be established, if the HIFs are 
willing to contract it.  
2004: 
The Central Government 
Remark: 
There is still an overall trend towards 
reducing over-capacities of hospital beds. A 
private hospital can factually only be 
established, if the HIFs are willing to contract 
it. 
Denmark 1995:  
County Government; Amter for local 
hospitals 
Central government for university hospitals 
2004:  
County government, Amter, for local 
hospitals 
Central government for university hospitals 
Finland 1995: 
The Municipalities  
2004: 
The Municipalities 
France 1995: 
The regional government through the 
regional hospital agencies, ARH; acting 
under the national constraint defined by the 
Ministry of health 
2004:  
The regional government through the regional 
hospital agencies, ARH ; acting under the 
national constraint defined by the Ministry of 
health 
Germany 1995: 
The Regional Government or Municipality 
(Bundesländer or Gemeinden) 
Remark: 
The Regional Governments, Bundesländer, 
have a formal planning competence 
2004: 
The Regional Government or Municipality 
(Bundesländer or Gemeinden) 
Remark: 
The Regional Governments, Bundesländer, 
have a formal planning competence 
Greece 1995: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
2004: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
Hungary 1995: 
Central government 
2004: 
Central government 
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H5 Which actor is most important for deciding on the Establishment of new Hospitals? 
Ireland 1995: 
National Government 
2004: 
National Government 
Italy 1995: 
Regional government, by setting an overall 
health plan 
2004: 
Regional Government by setting an overall 
health plan 
Luxembourg 1994:  
National Government 
2004: 
National Government 
Netherlands 1995:  
National Government 
Remark: 
There are no creations of new hospitals; only 
replacements of existing ones 
2004: 
National Government 
Remark: 
There are no creations of new hospitals; only 
replacements of existing ones 
New Zealand 1995: 
National Government – by overall planning 
of capacities 
2004: 
National Government – by overall planning of 
capacities 
Norway 1995: 
The county Government (County Council) 
Remark: 
The National Government has some 
influence 
2004: 
National Government 
Portugal 1995: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence 
2004: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence 
Poland 1995: 
The region and the central government. 
Remark: 
The region (Voivodship) or the municipality 
(Gmina) which usually own and operate the 
Hospitals, decide together with the Ministry 
of Health, whether another hospital is needed 
in a region. The Ministry of Health has the 
most influence in the decision, since it covers 
most of the costs. Factually, no new hospitals 
were established in the last years. 
2004: 
The region and the central government. 
Remark: 
The region (Voivodship) or the municipality 
(Gmina) which usually own and operate the 
Hospitals, decide together with the Ministry 
of Health, whether another hospital is needed 
in a region. The Ministry of Health has the 
most influence in the decision, since it covers 
most of the costs. Factually, no new hospitals 
were established in the last years. 
Spain 1995: 
Central Government; via the INSALUD 
2004: 
Autonomous Communities via the Servicio 
Regional de Salud 
Sweden 1995: 
Regional Government, Landsting 
2004: 
Regional Government, Landsting 
Switzerland 1995: 
Regional Government (Kanton) 
2004: 
Regional Government (Kanton) 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The Health Authorities are most important 
The national Government has influence 
Remark:  
New Hospitals are mostly re-buildings or 
replacement of existing ones. The major 
trend is towards closing down Hospitals 
2004: 
The Health Authorities are most important 
The national Government has influence 
Remark:  
New Hospitals are mostly re-buildings or 
replacement of existing ones. The major trend 
is towards closing down Hospitals 
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H6 Which actor is most influential for deciding on Closing of existing Hospitals? 
Austria 1995:  
Regional government (Bundesland) 
2004:  
Regional government (Bundesland) 
Belgium 1995: 
National Government 
Remark: 
The national government does this by setting 
a minimum size for a hospital – which lead to 
hospital mergers. 
2004: 
The national government 
Remark: 
The national government does this by setting 
a minimum size for a hospital – which lead to 
hospital mergers 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Government 
2004: 
Provincial Government 
Czech Republic 1995: 
The Municipality or Central Government 
Remark: 
To be operative, a Hospital needs contracts 
with the HIF. If the HIF do not contract the 
hospital any longer, it will go out of business. 
In the end, the political actors decide whether 
this happens or not, and usually, they are not 
really willing to close a hospital. 
2004: 
The Municipality or Central Government 
Remark: 
To be operative, a Hospital needs contracts 
with the HIF. If the HIF do not contract the 
hospital any longer, it will go out of business. 
In the end, the political actors decide whether 
this happens or not, and usually, they are not 
really willing to close a hospital. 
Denmark 1995:  
County Government, Amter, for local 
hospitals,  
National Government for the university 
hospitals. 
2004:  
County Government, Amter, for local 
hospitals,  
National Government for the university 
hospitals. 
Finland 1995: 
The municipalities 
2004: 
The municipalities 
France 1995: 
Regional government through the regional 
hospital agencies, ARH; acting under the 
national constraint defined by the ministry of 
health 
2004:  
Regional government through the regional 
hospital agencies ARH; acting under the 
national constraint defined by the ministry of 
health 
Germany 1995: 
The Regional Government or Municipality 
which is operating the Hospital 
(Bundesländer or Gemeinden) 
2004: 
The Regional Government or Municipality 
which is operating the Hospital (Bundesländer 
or Gemeinden) 
Greece 1995: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
2004: 
National Government 
Remark: 
By exercising control over the ESY, which in 
turn is operating most hospitals 
Hungary 1995: 
Central government 
Remark: 
2004: 
Central government 
Remark: 
Ireland 1995: 
National government 
2004: 
National Government 
Italy 1995: 
Regional government, by setting an overall 
health plan. The ASL operated by the local 
government has some say. 
2004: 
Regional government, by setting an overall 
health plan. The ASL operated by the local 
government has some say. 
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H6 Which actor is most influential for deciding on Closing of existing Hospitals? 
Luxembourg 1994: 
National Government 
2004: 
National Government 
Netherlands 1995:  
National government 
Remark: 
The Health Insurance Fund, as Purchaser of 
in-patient services has some influence 
2004: 
National Government  
Remark: 
The Health Insurance Fund, as Purchaser of 
in-patient services has some influence 
New Zealand 1995: 
National Government – by an overall planing 
competence 
2004: 
National Government - by an overall planing 
competence 
Norway 1995: 
The County Government (County Council) 
Remark: 
The National Government has some 
influence 
2004: 
National Government 
Portugal 1995: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence 
2004: 
National Government – by an overall 
planning competence 
Poland 1995: 
The region (Voivodship) or the municipality 
(Gmina) which usually own and operate the 
Hospitals, decide on the closing of a hospital, 
but together with the Ministry of Health. 
2004: 
The region (Voivodship) or the municipality 
(Gmina) which usually own and operate the 
Hospitals, decide on the closing of a hospital, 
but together with the Ministry of Health. 
Spain 1995: 
Central Government / INSALUD 
2004: 
The Regions (Autonomous Communities) 
/SRS 
Sweden 1995: 
Regional Government, Landsting 
2004: 
Regional Government, Landsting 
Switzerland 1995: 
Regional Government (Kanton) 
2004: 
Regional Government (Kanton) 
United Kingdom 1995. 
The Health Authority 
Remark: 
The decision is a complex process involving 
all levels of government. In some cases of 
small Hospitals, the proposal to close the 
hospital came from the Hospital itself  
2004: 
The Health Authorities  
Remark: 
The decision is a complex process involving 
all levels of government. In some cases of 
small Hospitals, the proposal to close the 
hospital came from the Hospital itself 
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H7  In some countries, several Hospitals offering the same kind of services (e.g. cover the 
same indications, the same degree of specialization etc.) exist in the same region.  
In others, a Hospital is typically the only provider of in-patient care in a region.  
What is the prevailing situation in [Country]? 
Austria 1995:  
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region; in regions 
with high population density there exists 
competition between different hospitals 
2004:  
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region; in regions 
with high population density there exists 
competition between different hospitals 
Remark: 
There is a tendency, to remove over-
capacities and redundancies in the Hospital 
sector 
Belgium 1995: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care 
2004: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care  
Canada 1995: 
Usually, there are several Hospitals offering 
basic in-patient services in an area, but only 
one offering specialized services  
Remark:  
Availability of Hospitals differs among 
regions. In less populated areas, there is 
usually only one Hospital, in cities, there are 
typically more than one Hospital.  
2004: 
Usually, there are several Hospitals offering 
basic in-patient services in an area, but only 
one offering specialized services  
Remark: 
Availability of Hospitals differs among 
regions. In less populated areas, there is 
usually only one Hospital, in cities, there are 
typically more than one Hospital.  
Czech Republic 1995: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care, e.g. 
cardiac surgery. 
Remark: 
While Health Centers and Municipal 
Hospitals provide general care, the Hospitals 
operated by the Ministry of Health have a 
national level catchment area.  
2004: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care, e.g. 
cardiac surgery 
Denmark 1995:  
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care, e.g. 
cardiac surgery.  
Remark: 
The specialized hospitals cover larger 
regions, i.e. several counties 
2004: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care, e.g. 
cardiac surgery 
Remark: 
The specialized hospitals cover larger regions, 
i.e. several counties 
Finland 1995: 
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region 
Remark: 
The provision of hospital services is based on 
Hospital districts, usually covering the area 
of several municipalities. The availability of 
2004: 
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region 
Remark: 
The provision of hospital services is based on 
Hospital districts, usually covering the area of 
several municipalities. The availability of 
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H7  In some countries, several Hospitals offering the same kind of services (e.g. cover the 
same indications, the same degree of specialization etc.) exist in the same region.  
In others, a Hospital is typically the only provider of in-patient care in a region.  
What is the prevailing situation in [Country]? 
Hospitals differs according to the population 
density – in some areas, there is just one 
Hospital.  
Hospitals differs according to the population 
density – in some areas, there is just one 
Hospital. 
France 1995:  
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care.  
Remark:  
For certain, high specialized activities the 
provision of treatment is distributed between 
different hospitals (maternity, specialized 
cardiac surgery, cancer treatment etc.) 
2004:  
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care. Remark:  
For certain, high specialized activities the 
provision of treatment is distributed between 
different hospitals (maternity, specialized 
cardiac surgery, cancer treatment etc.) In 
2004, there were 562 General Hospitals, 349 
Local Hospitals and 29 regional Hospitals 
offering highly specialized treatment 
Germany 1995: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care.  
To some degree there are specialized 
Hospitals which have a focus on certain 
treatments, e.g. accidents. 
2004: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care. 
To some degree there are specialized 
Hospitals which have a focus on certain 
treatments, e.g. accidents. 
Greece 1995: 
There is usually only one hospital in a region 
offering in-patient care. 
Remark: 
Availability of hospitals differs among areas. 
In some parts of the country, e.g. the islands, 
availability is low. 
2004: 
There is usually only one hospital in a region 
offering in-patient care. 
Remark: 
Availability of hospitals differs among areas. 
In some parts of the country, e.g. the islands, 
availability is low. 
Hungary 1995: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care 
Remark: 
This corresponds to the catchment area of the 
territorial unit operating the hospital. 
Hospitals operated by the municipalities offer 
basic in-patient and specialized out-patient 
care. Hospitals operated by the counties offer 
specialized in patient care, and the University 
Hospitals cover highly specialized treatment 
for the whole country 
2004: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care 
Remark: 
This corresponds to the catchment area of the 
territorial unit operating the hospital. 
Hospitals operated by the municipalities offer 
basic in-patient and specialized out-patient 
care. Hospitals operated by the counties offer 
specialized in patient care, and the University 
Hospitals cover highly specialized treatment 
for the whole country 
Ireland 1995: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care 
2004: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain region but only one 
offering specialized in patient care 
Italy 1995. 
There are usually several Hospitals offering 
basic in-patient care in a certain region. For 
highly specialized treatments, there is usually 
2004: 
There are usually several Hospitals offering 
basic in-patient care in a certain region. For 
highly specialized treatments, there is usually 
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H7  In some countries, several Hospitals offering the same kind of services (e.g. cover the 
same indications, the same degree of specialization etc.) exist in the same region.  
In others, a Hospital is typically the only provider of in-patient care in a region.  
What is the prevailing situation in [Country]? 
only one Hospital offering these services in a 
region 
Remark: 
The hospital system is layered: the more 
specialized the hospital, the larger the 
geographical are it covers. The Hospitals 
operated by the ASL cover the basic in-
patient needs of a local population, the Trust-
hospitals cover larger areas or regions 
only one Hospital offering these services in a 
region 
Remark: 
The hospital system is layered: the more 
specialized the hospital, the larger the 
geographical are it covers. The Hospitals 
operated by the ASL cover the basic in-
patient needs of a local population, the Trust-
hospitals cover larger areas or regions 
Luxembourg 1994: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care 
2004: 
Usually, there are several Hospitals offering 
basic in-patient services in an area, but only 
one offering specialized services 
Remark:  
The Ministry of Health publishes a “carte 
sanitaire”, in which services and the Hospitals 
to get them are listed. 
Netherlands 1995:  
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care 
2004: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care. 
New Zealand 1995: 
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region 
Remark:  
Only in more densely populated regions and 
big cities, there are more than one Hospital. 
These regions also have private Hospitals 
2004: 
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region;  
Remark: 
Only in more densely populated regions and 
big cities, there are more than one Hospital. 
these regions also have private Hospitals 
Norway 1995: 
There are usually many hospitals offering 
basic in-patient care in a certain region but 
only one offering specialized in-patient care 
Remark: 
The hospital system is layered: There are 
district hospitals for basic services, five 
hospital regions with regional hospitals, for 
more specialized services and national level 
hospitals for very advanced treatments. The 
factual access depends on the area. 
2004: 
There are usually many hospitals offering 
basic in-patient care in a certain region but 
only one offering specialized in-patient care. 
Remark: 
The hospital system is layered: There are 
district hospitals for basic services, five 
hospital regions with regional hospitals, for 
more specialized services and national level 
hospitals for very advanced treatments. The 
factual access depends on the area. 
Portugal 1995: 
There is usually one Hospital offering basic 
in-patient care in a certain region and only 
one Hospital offering specialized in-patient 
care. 
Remark: 
There are highly specialized Hospitals 
covering more or less the whole country. 
Next, there are Central Hospitals for a region 
2004: 
There is usually one Hospital offering basic 
in-patient care in a certain region and only 
one Hospital offering specialized in-patient 
care. 
Remark: 
There are highly specialized Hospitals 
covering more or less the whole country. 
Next, there are Central Hospitals for a region 
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H7  In some countries, several Hospitals offering the same kind of services (e.g. cover the 
same indications, the same degree of specialization etc.) exist in the same region.  
In others, a Hospital is typically the only provider of in-patient care in a region.  
What is the prevailing situation in [Country]? 
offering specialized services; below the 
regional level is the district level, usually two 
per region, with hospitals offering basic 
services. The density of Hospitals follows the 
population density. Availability is highest in 
Lisbon and the coastal area 
offering specialized services; below the 
regional level is the district level, usually two 
per region, with hospitals offering basic 
services. The density of Hospitals follows the 
population density. Availability is highest in 
Lisbon and the coastal area 
Poland 1995: 
There is usually one Hospital offering basic 
in-patient care in a certain geographic area 
and only one Hospital offering specialized 
in-patient care. 
Remark: 
The catchment area of hospitals corresponds 
to the area of the administrative entity 
operating the hospital (municipality/gmina or 
region/voivodship). More specialized 
hospitals have a larger catchment area. 
2004: 
There is usually one Hospital offering basic 
in-patient care in a certain geographic area 
and only one Hospital offering specialized in-
patient care. 
Remark: 
The catchment area of hospitals corresponds 
to the area of the administrative entity 
operating the hospital (municipality/gmina or 
region/voivodship). More specialized 
hospitals have a larger catchment area. 
Spain 1995: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain area but only one 
offering specialized in patient care 
Remark: 
The availability differs among and within 
Regions. Usually, the availability of basic 
services is distributed quite equally, while 
most often a Region has only one Hospital 
providing specialized services 
2004: 
There are many Hospitals offering basic in-
patient care in a certain area but only one 
offering specialized in patient care 
Remark: 
The availability differs among and within 
Regions. Usually, the availability of basic 
services is distributed quite equally, while 
most often a Region has only one Hospital 
providing specialized services 
Sweden 1995: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care 
Remark: 
The area belonging to a certain Landsting has 
usually a Hospital providing basic services. 
Hospitals offering specialized care are 
covering the areas of several Landstings 
2004: 
There is usually more than one Hospital in a 
region offering in-patient care 
Remark: 
The area belonging to a certain Landsting has 
usually a Hospital providing basic services. 
Hospitals offering specialized care are 
covering the areas of several Landstings 
Switzerland 1995: 
There are usually many Hospitals offering 
basic in-patient care in a certain region 
(Kanton) but only one offering specialized in 
patient care, e.g. cardiac surgery. 
2004: 
There are usually many Hospitals offering 
basic in-patient care in a certain region 
(Kanton) but only one offering specialized in 
patient care, e.g. cardiac surgery. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region / district 
Remark: 
The Hospital structure is hierarchical: 
community hospitals, with typically 50 beds, 
District General Hospitals, providing basic 
2004: 
There is usually only one Hospital for in-
patient care in a certain region / district 
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H7  In some countries, several Hospitals offering the same kind of services (e.g. cover the 
same indications, the same degree of specialization etc.) exist in the same region.  
In others, a Hospital is typically the only provider of in-patient care in a region.  
What is the prevailing situation in [Country]? 
secondary care, then al level of highly 
specialized hospitals covering larger areas 
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H8  If there is more than one Hospital to chose from, do the Treatment Costs charged by the 
Hospital (e.g. cost per case, per diem etc.) to the Purchaser (Health Authority/Health 
Insurance Fund) differ among these Hospitals?  
Or are the treatment costs charged by Hospitals the same for all Hospitals in a region / degree 
of specialization? 
Austria 1995:  
Treatment costs (per diem) are the same for 
all Hospitals of similar degree of 
specialization 
 
2004:  
Treatment costs (DRGs) are the same for all 
Hospitals of similar degree of specialization 
Remark: 
For some Hospitals, there arise however 
additional costs for the Health Insurance 
Funds 
Belgium 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark: 
The fees charged by the consultants are 
identical for all hospitals. But each Hospital 
receives also a prospective budget for 
covering non medical services and the 
infrastructure. This budget is based on a per 
diem / patient-day system. These per diems 
are different among different hospitals. 
2004:  
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark: 
The fees charged by the consultants are 
identical for all hospitals. But each Hospital 
receives also a prospective budget for 
covering non medical services and the 
infrastructure. This budget is based on a per 
diem / patient-day system. These per diems 
are different among different hospitals 
Canada 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark: 
Hospitals are remunerated by budgets from 
the Regional Health Authorities, but the 
number of cases treated is taken into account. 
This budget predominantly covers the 
operating costs. Services are billed to the 
provincial governments. While no price per 
case is charged, hospital costs can be 
compared. However, there is no price 
competition. 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark: 
Hospitals are remunerated by budgets from 
the Regional Health Authorities, but the 
number of cases treated is taken into account. 
This budget predominantly covers the 
operating costs. Services are billed to the 
provincial governments. While no price per 
case is charged, hospital costs can be 
compared. However, there is no price 
competition. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Treatment costs are the same for all 
Hospitals, independent of the specialization 
Remark:  
The remuneration is by a point system/ fee 
for service. From the perspective of the HIF, 
the purchaser, the value of a point is identical 
for all Hospitals. The value of a point results 
from a budgetary limit negotiated between a 
HIF and the individual Hospital.  
The costs differ among HIFs since each HIF 
negotiates individually with all the Hospitals. 
The Hospital sends an invoice, listing the 
services and the points to the HIF and 
receives payments. 
 
2004: 
Treatment costs are the same for all Hospitals, 
independent of the specialization 
Remark:  
The remuneration is by a point system/ fee for 
service. From the perspective of the HIF, the 
value of a point is identical for all Hospitals. 
The value of a point results from a budgetary 
limit negotiated between a HIF and the 
individual Hospital.  
The costs differ among HIFs since each HIF 
negotiates individually with all the Hospitals. 
The Hospital sends an invoice, listing the 
services and the points to the HIF and 
receives payments. 
 148
H8  If there is more than one Hospital to chose from, do the Treatment Costs charged by the 
Hospital (e.g. cost per case, per diem etc.) to the Purchaser (Health Authority/Health 
Insurance Fund) differ among these Hospitals?  
Or are the treatment costs charged by Hospitals the same for all Hospitals in a region / degree 
of specialization? 
Denmark1995:  
No rates are charged within a county, where 
hospitals are predominantly financed by 
prospective fixed budgets. Thus there is no 
price competition among hospitals. 
If a patient is treated outside the county, 
either a DRG charge is used, or a rate that is 
specifically calculated to cover total costs 
(specialized services). The payment of the 
treatment costs takes place between counties, 
Amter. 
2004:  
No rates are charged within a county, where 
hospitals are predominantly financed by 
prospective fixed budgets. Thus there is no 
price competition among hospitals. 
If a patient is treated outside the county, either 
a DRG charge is used, or a rate that is 
specifically calculated to cover total costs 
(specialized services). The payment of the 
treatment costs takes place between counties, 
Amter. 
Finland 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among hospitals 
Remark: 
Services and costs are negotiated in an 
informal agreement between the Hospital 
district and the Municipalities. The Hospital 
District can more or less unilaterally set the 
terms of the agreement but the Municipalities 
have to some degree a choice which Hospital 
district to join. 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among hospitals 
Remark: 
Services and costs are negotiated in an 
informal agreement between the Hospital 
district and the Municipalities. The Hospital 
District can more or less unilaterally set the 
terms of the agreement but the Municipalities 
have to some degree a choice which Hospital 
district to join. 
France 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among hospitals 
Remark: 
Because of the predominance of budgeting, 
there is no price competition among hospitals
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among hospitals 
Remark: 
The DRGs charged by Hospitals differ, but 
because of the predominance of budgeting, 
there is no price competition among hospitals 
Germany 1995: 
Treatment costs, the per diem, differ among 
Hospitals 
2004: 
Treatment costs, price per DRG, differ among 
regions, but within a region ( Bundesland) 
each Hospital charges the same amount for a 
defined DRG 
Greece 1995: 
Treatment costs are the same independent of 
the degree of specialization 
Remark: 
Budgets for running costs differ among 
hospitals. HIF pay hospitals on a per diem 
basis. The per diem and other fees are set by 
the Government and are identical for all ESY 
run hospitals in the country. Main differences 
among hospitals are quality issues. 
2004: 
Treatment costs are the same independent of 
the degree of specialization 
Remark: 
Budgets for running costs differ among 
hospitals. HIF pay hospitals on a per diem 
basis. The per diem and other fees are set by 
the Government and are identical for all ESY 
run hospitals in the country. Main differences 
among hospitals are quality issues. 
Hungary 1995: 
Treatment costs are the same independent of 
the degree of specialization 
Remark: 
2004: 
Treatment costs are the same independent of 
the degree of specialization 
Remark: 
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H8  If there is more than one Hospital to chose from, do the Treatment Costs charged by the 
Hospital (e.g. cost per case, per diem etc.) to the Purchaser (Health Authority/Health 
Insurance Fund) differ among these Hospitals?  
Or are the treatment costs charged by Hospitals the same for all Hospitals in a region / degree 
of specialization? 
The NHIFA pays the Hospitals on a DRG 
system based on points, and the financial 
value of a point is equal for the whole 
country 
The NHIFA pays the Hospitals on a DRG 
system based on points, and the financial 
value of a point is equal for the whole country
Ireland 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
according to the degree of specialization. Part 
of the Hospital’s budget is calculated on 
costs per case indicators. Hospitals with high 
costs per case levels can be penalized 
financially. Hospitals with lower costs per 
case may be rewarded. 
Remark: 
Since the amount of the reward is very 
limited, there is no price competition among 
Hospitals. Hospitals were supposed to 
publish price lists, however, whether this was 
actually operative is unclear. 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
according to the degree of specialization. Part 
of the Hospital’s budget is calculated on costs 
per case indicators. Hospitals with high costs 
per case levels can be penalized financially. 
Hospitals with lower costs per case may be 
rewarded. 
Remark: 
Since the amount of the reward is very 
limited, there is no price competition among 
Hospitals. Hospitals were supposed to publish 
price lists, however, whether this was actually 
operative is unclear. 
Italy 1995: 
Treatment cost differ among Hospitals of 
different degree of specialization 
Remark: 
The treatment costs charged by the Hospitals 
for a defined treatment are the same for all 
hospitals of similar degree of specialization 
in a region, but differ among the regions. 
There is a cost per admission, which is paid 
in addition to the DRG, and this may differ 
among Hospitals. The DRG rates are set 
nationally and are the maximum, the Regions 
can deviate, but only by setting lower rates. 
2004:  
Treatment cost differ among Hospitals of 
different degree of specialization 
Remark: 
The treatment costs charged by the Hospitals 
for a defined treatment are the same for all 
hospitals of similar degree of specialization in 
a region, but differ among the regions. There 
is a cost per admission, which is paid in 
addition to the DRG, and this may differ 
among Hospitals. The DRG rates are set 
nationally and are the maximum, the Regions 
can deviate, but only by setting lower rates. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Treatment costs ( a per diem) are the same 
for all Hospitals of similar degree of 
specialization; see H9 
Remark:  
Up to the year 1995, a per diem, identical for 
all Hospitals, was the predominant 
remuneration form for Hospitals. The 
services provided by the specialists using the 
Hospital facilities were remunerated on a fee 
for services basis and remuneration took 
place between the Specialist and the HIF. 
There were extra fees for other activities. The 
per diem itself was negotiated between the 
HIFs and the Hospitals and was valid for all 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark: 
Since 1995, budgets are negotiated among the 
HIF association, UCM, and the individual 
Hospital. The budgets are of different size, 
making hospitals with bigger budgets relative 
to the capacities more expensive, e.g. highly 
specialized hospitals. 
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H8  If there is more than one Hospital to chose from, do the Treatment Costs charged by the 
Hospital (e.g. cost per case, per diem etc.) to the Purchaser (Health Authority/Health 
Insurance Fund) differ among these Hospitals?  
Or are the treatment costs charged by Hospitals the same for all Hospitals in a region / degree 
of specialization? 
hospitals 
Netherlands 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark:  
While Hospitals were predominantly 
remunerated by budgets, a part of the budget 
was actually paid in the form of a per diem. 
These per diems differed among the 
Hospitals 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals,  
Remark: 
Only for services remunerated by the DRG 
system, the remuneration is the same for a 
defined service. 
New Zealand 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals  
Remark: 
Hospitals were independent entities, and the 
remuneration was case-based: there were 
fixed price-volume contracts, which resulted 
in a fixed annual budget. The price and 
volumes were negotiated. However, usually 
there was no competition among hospitals, 
e.g. only one hospital in a region, and the 
hospital could negotiate a higher 
remuneration. There was no price 
competition. 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals  
Remark: 
Part of the Hospitals remuneration is a case 
based and this component differs among 
hospitals. However, usually the DHB do no 
longer purchase services in a market setting, 
but operate the hospitals directly, so 
differences in treatment costs are irrelevant 
and there is no price competition.. 
Norway 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals;  
Remark: 
The budgets allocated to the hospitals differ 
and this yields a different price per treatment. 
There is further a price system if a patient is 
treated in another county. But there is no 
comparable data on how much prices and 
treatment costs differ and there is no price 
competition among hospitals. 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals;  
Remark: 
The usage of DRGs in addition to block 
grants has increased transparency. The level 
of payment for a DRG does not differ. There 
is no comparable data on treatment costs and 
hence no price competition. This is true for 
in-patient care and for specialized out-patient 
care provided by hospitals. 
Portugal 1995: 
Treatment costs do not differ.  
Remark:  
The payment of hospitals is based on a 
budget, which in turn partly rests on a DRG 
system. The budgets are negotiated directly 
between the Ministry of Health and the 
Hospital. The payment for a DRG is identical 
for all hospitals in the country.  
2004: 
Treatment costs do not differ.  
Remark:  
The payment of hospitals is based on a 
budget, which in turn partly rests on a DRG 
system. The budgets are negotiated directly 
between the Ministry of Health and the 
Hospital. The payment for a DRG is identical 
for all hospitals in the country. 
Poland 1995: 
Treatment costs differ with the degree of 
specialization, but there is no price 
competition 
Remark: 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ with the degree of 
specialization, but there is no price 
competition 
Remark: 
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H8  If there is more than one Hospital to chose from, do the Treatment Costs charged by the 
Hospital (e.g. cost per case, per diem etc.) to the Purchaser (Health Authority/Health 
Insurance Fund) differ among these Hospitals?  
Or are the treatment costs charged by Hospitals the same for all Hospitals in a region / degree 
of specialization? 
The hospital remuneration is by budgets 
based on the budgets of previous years. Thus, 
treatment in some hospitals is cheaper. But 
nevertheless, gminas and voivodships refer 
patients to the local hospitals.  
The hospital remuneration is case-based 
Spain 1995: 
Treatment costs differ with the degree of 
specialization of the hospital. 
Remark: 
The degree of specialization is partly 
determined for each Hospital individually, 
depending on its resources. There is however 
no price competition. 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ with the degree of 
specialization of the hospital. 
Remark: 
The degree of specialization is partly 
determined for each Hospital individually, 
depending on its resources. There is however 
no price competition. 
Sweden 1995: 
Rates and treatment costs differ among 
Hospitals.  
Remark:  
The DRGs negotiated between the 
Landstings and the Hospitals differ among 
Hospitals. There is however, no price 
competition 
2004: 
Rates and treatment costs differ among 
Hospitals 
Remark:  
The DRGs negotiated between the Landstings 
and the Hospitals differ among Hospitals. 
There is no price competition. 
Switzerland 1995:  
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark: 
The remuneration of Hospitals is by per 
diems, which differ primarily among cantons. 
Since usually patients are treated in their 
home-Canton, there is no real price 
competition. 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals 
Remark: 
The remuneration of Hospitals is by per 
diems, which differ primarily among cantons. 
Since usually patients are treated in their 
home-Canton, there is no real price 
competition. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals, but 
there is no price competition among 
hospitals, since they cannot actually charge 
different prices 
Remark: 
The degree of specialization influences the 
budget, which makes some Hospitals more 
expensive from the perspective of the health 
authority 
2004: 
Treatment costs differ among Hospitals, but 
there is no price competition among hospitals, 
since they cannot actually charge different 
prices 
Remark: 
The degree of specialization influences the 
budget, which makes some Hospitals more 
expensive from the perspective of the Health 
Authority 
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H9  What is the predominant Remuneration Mode for Hospitals?  
How are Hospitals funded? 
Austria 1995:  
Per diem (up to 1996) 
Remark: 
The per diem was negotiated between the 
owner of the Hospitals and the Health 
Insurance Funds, which together funded the 
hospitals. 
2004:  
DRGs 
Remark: 
While the running costs are financed by the 
Health Insurance Funds, the investment costs 
are covered by subsidies of the Regional 
Government 
Belgium 1995: 
Fee for service for the services – the patient 
pays a per diem, the HIF the remainder 
A budget based on a per diem-indicator for 
the running costs of the hospital 
infrastructure 
2004: 
Fee for service for the services – the patient 
pays a per diem, the HIF the remainder 
A budget based on a per diem-indicator for 
the running costs of the hospital infrastructure 
Remark: 
Both, the remuneration by the prospective 
fixed budget and the remuneration by fees for 
service make up about 50% each. 
Canada 1995: 
Global capped budget 
Remark:  
The budget is negotiated between the RHA 
and the individual hospital. The budgeting 
takes to some degree the expected number of 
cases into account, to some degree it is based 
on the historical “need”. The budget is 
predominantly for covering the operating 
costs, usually not the services.  
Physicians providing the services are often 
self employed. They use the Hospital 
facilities, but are remunerated on a fee for 
service basis. The fees are negotiated among 
the providers and the provincial government. 
2004: 
Global capped budget 
Remark:  
The budget is negotiated between the RHA 
and the individual hospital. The budgeting 
takes to some degree the expected number of 
cases into account, to some degree it is based 
on the historical “need”. The budget is 
predominantly for covering the operating 
costs, usually not the services.  
Physicians providing the services are often 
self employed. They use the Hospital 
facilities, but are remunerated on a fee for 
service basis. The fees are negotiated among 
the providers and the provincial government 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Fee for service 
Remark:  
The remuneration is by a point system/ fee 
for service. Each HIF negotiates a value of a 
point with all Hospitals which is then 
identical for all the contracted Hospitals. The 
costs differ among HIFs since each HIF 
negotiates individually with the Hospitals. 
From the point of the Hospital, some patients 
are more attractive then others.  
The number of points a service is worth, is 
set by the Ministry of Health. 
2004: 
Fee for service 
Remark:  
The remuneration is still by a point system/ 
fee for service like in 1995. But in practice, 
the remuneration has now strong elements of 
a capped budget, since the overall 
remuneration paid by a HIF for in-patient 
treatment for its insured is fixed. The 
budgetary limit is negotiated between the 
individual Hospital and the individual HIF. 
The point system now serves basically as an 
administrative tool, which shall show, what 
was delivered for the budget. Since 2001, 
there are degressive flat-fees for patients 
treated in addition to the budget. The number 
of points a medical service is worth, is set by 
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H9  What is the predominant Remuneration Mode for Hospitals?  
How are Hospitals funded? 
the Ministry of Health.  
Denmark 1995:  
Prospective global budget, negotiated 
between the Amter and the Hospital 
2004:  
Global Capped Budget and DRGs (since 
1999) 
Finland 1995: 
Case based remuneration 
Remark: 
There is substantial variation in 
reimbursement modes among Hospital 
Districts. The services and costs are 
negotiated in an informal agreement between 
the Hospital District and the Municipalities; 
this yields a loose budget. The Council 
administrating the Hospital District can more 
or less unilaterally set the terms of the 
agreement but the Municipalities have to 
some degree a choice which Hospital District 
to join. The payment is done based on the 
services delivered for citizens of a 
municipality. Out-patient specialized services 
provided by Hospitals are usually 
remunerated with a prospective budget, 
which is negotiated between the Hospital 
District and each municipality. 
2004: 
Case based remuneration (DRG) plus a fee for 
service component 
Remark: 
There is substantial variation in 
reimbursement modes among Hospital 
Districts. The services and costs are 
negotiated in an informal agreement between 
the Hospital District and the Municipalities; 
this yields a loose budget. The Council 
administrating the Hospital District can more 
or less unilaterally set the terms of the 
agreement but the Municipalities have to 
some degree a choice which Hospital District 
to join. The payment is done based on the 
services delivered for citizens of a 
municipality. Out-patient specialized services 
provided by Hospitals are usually 
remunerated with a prospective budget, which 
is negotiated between the Hospital District 
and each municipality. 
France 1995:  
Prospective budget which is factually based 
on past costs 
Remark: 
The budget is set by the Ministry together 
with regional authorities; ARH 
2004: 
Prospective budget  
The budget is still based on past costs, but 
also on DRGs, which differ among hospitals, 
and also on regional plans set by the ARH  
Remark: 
The prospective fixed budget is the authorized 
expenditure of the Hospital. Other types of 
income – e.g. arising from treatments of 
private patients and fees charged for 
accommodation - are subtracted from the 
payments made by the ARH to the Hospital. 
The ARH pays the difference between the 
income and the total expenditure allowance 
Germany 1995: 
Per diem 
Remark: 
While the running costs are financed by the 
Health Insurance Funds, the investment costs 
are covered by subsidies of the Regional 
Government. The overall costs of the 
Hospitals are added and divided by the 
number of patient-days, this yields the per 
diem. 
2004: 
Prospective fixed Budget and DRGs 
Remark: 
While the running costs are financed by the 
Health Insurance Funds, the investment costs 
are covered by subsidies of the Regional 
Government 
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H9  What is the predominant Remuneration Mode for Hospitals?  
How are Hospitals funded? 
Greece 1995: 
Per diem 
Remark: 
The hospital receives a budget for the 
running costs from the state. The HIF pay by 
per diems, the per diem is determined by the 
Government, it was raised substantially in the 
past to increase hospital financing. Some 
specialized services, like cardiac surgery, are 
remunerated separately by mark ups. 
2004: 
Per diem 
Remark: 
The hospital receives a budget for the running 
costs from the state. The HIF pay by per 
diems, the per diem is determined by the 
Government. Some specialized services are 
remunerated separately by mark ups. 
Hungary 1995: 
Case based remuneration based on DRGs 
Remark:  
The remuneration for the DRGs is based on a 
point system, each DRG has a certain 
number of points. Each point has a certain 
value, the national base fee, which are set at 
national level by the NHIFA. The Hospital 
reports the monthly sum of points and gets 
remuneration  
2004: 
Case based remuneration, based on DRGs 
Remark: 
The remuneration for the DRGs is based on a 
point system, each DRG has a certain number 
of points. Each point has a certain value, the 
national base fee, which are set at national 
level by the NHIFA. The Hospital reports the 
monthly sum of points and gets remuneration 
Ireland 1995: 
Prospective fixed budget 
Remark: 
The budget is negotiated annually between 
the individual Hospital and the Health 
Boards / Ministry of Health, and depended 
on the location of the Hospital. The budget 
was detailed and the allocation of funds to 
the functions was also settled. 
2004: 
Prospective fixed budget 
Remark: 
The budget is negotiated annually between the 
individual Hospital and the Health Boards / 
Ministry of Health, and depended on the 
location of the Hospital. The budget was 
detailed and the allocation of funds to the 
functions was also settled. 
Italy 1995: 
Case based remuneration: DRGs for 
Hospitals which are independent of the 
ASLs. 
Remark: 
Hospitals managed by the ASL are basically 
remunerated on a cost reimbursement ex-post 
budget basis: they are integrated part of the 
ASL. The DRG itself is set by the regional 
government for the region, it may differ 
among regions, but may not exceed a level 
set by the national government 
2004: 
Case based remuneration: DRGs for Hospitals 
which are independent of the ASLs. 
 
Remark: 
Hospitals managed by the ASL are basically 
remunerated on a cost reimbursement ex-post 
budget basis: they are integrated part of the 
ASL. The DRG itself is set by the regional 
government for the region, it may differ 
among regions, but may not exceed a level set 
by the national government. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Per diem  
Remark: 
Up to the year 1995, a per diem, identical for 
all Hospitals, was the predominant 
remuneration form for Hospitals. The 
services provided by the specialists using the 
Hospital facilities were remunerated on a fee 
2004: 
Prospective fixed Budget  
Remark: 
For each Hospital, a budget is negotiated 
between the Hospital and the HIF 
associations, UCM 
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H9  What is the predominant Remuneration Mode for Hospitals?  
How are Hospitals funded? 
for services basis and remuneration took 
place between the Specialist and the HIF. 
There were extra fees for other activities, like 
diagnostic services. 
Netherlands 1995: 
Global capped budget 
Remark: 
Part of the Hospital budget was paid as a per 
diem. This was calculated by dividing a part 
of the budget by the number of patient-days 
2004: 
Prospective fixed budgets 
DRG system (10%) 
New Zealand 1995: 
Hospital remuneration was largely case 
based. Contracts contained both volumes and 
prices, so factually, it was an annual budget. 
Remark: 
The remuneration was negotiated between 
the RHA and the Hospitals (then Crown 
Health Enterprises). Given the monopoly 
position of the Hospitals, this resulted in 
higher remuneration for them. 
2004: 
Hospitals get a budget for the operating costs 
The services are remunerated using a DRG / 
case based system. This component is paid as 
a price-volume contract, using the number of 
patients and procedures as basis.  
Remark: 
Remuneration mode varies and there are still 
services which are remunerated on a fee for 
case basis.  
Norway 1995: 
Global capped budget plus an additional 
“soft” budget 
Remark: 
The hospital receives a block grant from the 
county. The budget is soft, since deficits are 
covered and the budget is increased, if 
necessary. 
2004: 
DRG plus an additional “Soft Budget” 
Remark: 
Part of the block grants are now paid based on 
activity. The share of payment by DRG and 
by the block grant is annually set by the state  
Portugal 1995: 
Budgets based on past costs 
Remark: 
The budget used to be based on historical 
budgets increased by inflation and other 
factors.  
From 1995 on, part of the budget was based 
on a DRG system. The percentage of the 
budget, which is based on the DRG 
component was about 10% in 1997. 
Financing is negotiated annually between the 
individual Hospital and the Ministry of 
Health without involvement of the Regional 
Health Authorities. 
2004: 
Budgets based on past costs, combined with a 
system of DRG based contracts  
Remark: 
The budget used to be based on historical 
budgets only, increased by inflation. From 
1995 on, part of the budget was based on a 
DRG system. The percentage of the budget, 
which is based on the DRG component 
increased in 2002 to 50%. Financing is 
negotiated annually between the individual 
Hospital and the Ministry of Health without 
involvement of the Regional Health 
Authorities.  
Poland 1995: 
Budgets 
Remark: 
Each hospitals gets a budget allocated by the 
owning entity (gmina, voivodship), which is 
based on the budgets the hospital had in the 
past.  
2004: 
Case based remuneration  
Remark: 
Each procedure has a number of points 
assigned to it, and the remuneration for the 
procedure is calculated based on the financial 
value of a point, which is set in the contract. 
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H9  What is the predominant Remuneration Mode for Hospitals?  
How are Hospitals funded? 
The National Health Fund pays only the most 
expensive procedure listed in the patient’s 
file. 
Spain 1995: 
Budget for Hospitals operated by the 
INSALUD - factually all costs are covered ex 
post 
Remark:  
The setting of a Hospital’s budget is 
increasingly based on activity, i.e. on cases 
and costs per case, resembling a DRG 
system. The setting of a hospital’s budget 
takes place on the level of the individual 
hospital.  
Contracted hospitals are remunerated on a 
per diem basis, set in the contract. 
2004: 
Budget for Hospitals operated by the SRS – 
factually, all costs are covered 
Remark:  
The setting of a Hospital’s budget is 
increasingly based on activity, i.e. on cases 
and costs per case, resembling a DRG system. 
Usually, the funding of the operational costs 
is distinct from the funding of the service 
provision. The setting of a hospital’s budget 
takes place on the level of the individual 
hospital.  
Contracted hospitals are remunerated on a per 
diem basis, set in the contract 
Sweden 1995: 
Global capped budget fixed prospectively in 
negotiations between the Hospitals and the 
Landstings 
2004: 
Predominantly by a global capped budget 
fixed prospectively by the Landsting, 
supplemented by a DRG remuneration with 
DRGs negotiated between Hospitals and 
Landstings. This is usually the case in 
counties which have installed a purchaser 
provider split. 
Switzerland 1995: 
Per diem 
Remark: 
The per diems are negotiated at the cantonal 
level, between the cantonal HIFs and the 
cantonal association of Hospitals or 
individual Hospitals. The per diems differ 
primarily among cantons. 
2004: 
Per diem is still predominant 
Remark: 
A prospective fixed budget plus DRGs are 
being introduced but not yet operative. The 
per diems are negotiated at the cantonal level, 
between the cantonal HIFs and the cantonal 
association of Hospitals or individual 
Hospitals. The per diems differ primarily 
among cantons. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Prospective fixed budget  
Remark:  
There is a contract between the District 
Health Authority, DHA, and the Hospital to 
provide certain services in exchange for a 
certain budget for all residents in the area 
covered by the DHA.  
2004: 
Prospective fixed budget, 
Remark: 
While a DRG system with a national tariff is 
being introduced, but not yet operative 
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H10 Can the Hospital increase the remuneration received for an individual case ?  
E.g. by extending the quantity of services provided to a patient or by extending the length of 
a patient’s stay in the Hospital? 
Austria 1995:  
Yes, until 1996 by increasing the length of 
stay ( more per diems charged) 
2004:  
Yes, the DRG-system introduced since 1997 
is not exclusively related to the diagnosis, but 
also includes activity related elements. 
Increasing the activity, assigning more than 
one DRG to a case, can be used to increase 
remuneration 
Belgium 1995: 
Yes, via the fee for service component, in 
particular for laboratory services, and by 
extending the length of stay 
Remark: 
This incentive exists both for the hospital 
providing the infrastructure and for the 
consultant providing the actual services.  
2004: 
Yes, via the fee for service component and by 
extending the length of stay 
Remark: 
This incentive exists both for the hospital 
providing the infrastructure and for the 
consultant providing the actual services. 
Since 1996, there is a system of financial 
penalties and rewards counteracting the 
incentives to prolong the length of stay and 
extend the quantity of laboratory services 
provided by the hospitals. 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, while the hospital cannot do so, the 
physician providing the services can do so by 
providing more services  
2004: 
Yes, while the hospital cannot do so, the 
physician providing the services can do so by 
providing more services  
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Remark:  
The remuneration is by a point system/ fee 
for service. Providing more and higher 
evaluated services and keeping patients 
longer, increases the remuneration in a case. 
However, the remuneration has strong 
elements of a capped budget, since the 
overall remuneration paid by a HIF for in-
patient treatment for its insured is fixed, at 
least in short term. 
2004: 
Yes, by providing more services 
Remark:  
The remuneration is by a point system/ fee for 
service. Providing more and higher evaluated 
services and keeping patients longer, 
increases the remuneration in a case. 
However, the remuneration has strong 
elements of a capped budget, since the overall 
remuneration paid by a HIF for in-patient 
treatment for its insured is fixed in 
negotiations with each hospital. 
Consequently, the value of a point decreases, 
if too many services are provided. 
Denmark 1995:  
No, the hospital’s budget is fixed 
Remark: 
Factually, hospitals have been encouraged to 
take in more patients and have been paid by a 
specific government fund for extra patients 
2004:  
No for most treatments. 
Remark: 
An increase in remuneration is possible via 
the DRG component of remuneration, e.g. by 
increasing the number of complicating co-
diagnosis; “DRG creep” 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, the remuneration is activity based 
 
2004: 
Yes, the remuneration is activity based 
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H10 Can the Hospital increase the remuneration received for an individual case ?  
E.g. by extending the quantity of services provided to a patient or by extending the length of 
a patient’s stay in the Hospital? 
France 1995:  
No, for public hospitals, the majority.  
Yes, for private hospitals by increasing 
activity  
Remark: 
Since the budget is based on historical 
budgets, the hospital can increase its budget 
in the long run. 
2004: 
Yes.  
Remark: 
Since 2004, both public and private hospitals 
can increase the remuneration by increasing 
activity and selecting the most well-paid cases
Germany 1995: 
Yes, by extending the length of stay (via the 
per diem component) 
2004: 
Yes, by assigning the case to more than one 
DRG  
Greece 1995: 
Yes, by extending the length of stay  
Remark: 
In ESY Hospitals, the incentive arises from 
the per diem component of remuneration. In 
private hospitals, the possibility arises from 
providing services and treatments without an 
indication. 
2004: 
Yes, mainly by extending the length of stay  
Remark: 
In ESY Hospitals, the incentive arises from 
the per diem component of remuneration. In 
private hospitals, the possibility arises from 
providing services and treatments without an 
indication. 
Hungary 1995 
Yes, e.g. by DRG creep. 
Remark: 
While the sectorial budget for in-patient 
treatment is set in advance, there are 
problems of point inflation, DRG creep, and 
treating patients on an in-patient basis rather 
than on an out-patient basis. 
2004: 
Yes, e.g. by DRG creep. 
Remark: 
While the sectorial budget for in-patient 
treatment is set in advance, there are problems 
of point inflation, DRG creep, and treating 
patients on an in-patient basis rather than on 
an out-patient basis. 
Ireland 1995:  
No – at least not in the short run 
Remark: 
The specialists providing the services are 
paid for on a fee for service basis, and have 
an incentive to increase the quantity of 
services. In the long run, the budget will be 
increased too. 
2004: 
No – at least not in the short run 
Remark: 
The specialists providing the services are paid 
for on a fee for service basis, and have an 
incentive to increase the quantity of services. 
In the long run, the budget will be increased 
too. 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, to a limited degree by miscoding, “DRG 
creep” 
2004:  
Yes, to a limited degree by miscoding, “DRG 
creep” 
Luxembourg 1994 
Yes. 
Remark: 
The remuneration obtained via the per diem 
did not suffice to cover the running costs of 
the Hospital. There were extra fees for other 
activities, like diagnostic services. By 
providing more of theses, the Hospital could 
in the end cover its costs.  
 
2004: 
Yes 
Remark: 
While the Hospital cannot do so, the 
physicians working respectively using the 
Hospital facilities can do so 
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H10 Can the Hospital increase the remuneration received for an individual case ?  
E.g. by extending the quantity of services provided to a patient or by extending the length of 
a patient’s stay in the Hospital? 
Netherlands 1995:  
Basically no, since most of the remuneration 
is a budget and deficits would not be 
covered. Even increasing the length of stay 
did not set an incentive, since the overall 
amount paid via the per diem was fixed in 
advance 
2004:  
Basically no, since most of the remuneration 
is a budget and deficits would not be covered. 
Remark: 
To a limited degree the hospital can do so via 
the DRG component of remuneration 
New Zealand 1995:  
No. 
Remark: 
While based on DRGs, the contracts 
specified both volumes and prices, resulting 
in a fixed annual budget. While provision of 
services above the contracted volume was 
usually not remunerated, funding was usually 
increased in the following period. 
2004:  
Yes. The hospital has an incentive, to increase 
the throughput of patients and procedures, to 
maintain the flow of income which is 
dependent on the consumption  
Norway 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
The hospital has not an incentive to increase 
efficiency. The incentive is to increase the 
budget in the long run. 
2004: 
Partly, via the DRG component 
Portugal 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
The budgeting did not set an explicit 
incentive to increase the costs, but neither set 
an incentive to reduce costs. 
2004: 
Yes 
Remark: 
If there is more activity, the remuneration 
received increases via the DRG component; 
additional costs will also be covered. 
Poland 1995: 
Yes. 
Remark: 
While the budget was a limit, the possibility 
of incurring debts which were covered later 
on by the state and possibility to get bigger 
budgets in the future set such an incentive.  
2004: 
Yes. 
Remark: 
The National Health Insurance Fund pays 
only the most expensive procedure listed in 
the patient’s file. While increasing the number 
of services provided does not increase the 
hospital’s remuneration assigning the patient 
to a higher group, using higher paid 
procedures, may increase the payment. 
Spain 1995: 
No for public hospitals 
Yes for private contracted hospitals, there is 
due to the per diem remuneration a certain 
incentive to prolong the length of stay. 
2004: 
No for public hospitals 
Yes for private contracted hospitals, there is 
due to the per diem remuneration a certain 
incentive to prolong the length of stay. 
Sweden 1995: 
No, the budget is fixed 
2004: 
No; the budget is fixed. 
Remark: 
Also the DRG system does not set an 
incentive to increase the quantity of services 
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H10 Can the Hospital increase the remuneration received for an individual case ?  
E.g. by extending the quantity of services provided to a patient or by extending the length of 
a patient’s stay in the Hospital? 
provided. 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, via the per diem remuneration, by 
increasing the length of stay 
2004: 
Yes, via the per diem component in the 
overall remuneration, by increasing the length 
of stay 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No, the budget is fixed 
Remark: 
Only in some contracts there were elements 
of activity based funding, which allowed an 
increase in remuneration 
2004: 
No, the budget is fixed 
Remark: 
Only in some contracts there were elements of 
activity based funding, which allowed an 
increase in remuneration 
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3. Pharmaceuticals  
 
 
PH1    Which of the following Regulations on Pharmaceuticals are in place in [Country]? 
Austria 1995:  
Price control – a maximum price level is 
negotiated between a committee and the 
producer 
Positive Listing (a list, from which the 
prescriber can choose) 
2004:  
Price control – a maximum price level is 
negotiated between a committee and the 
producer 
Positive Listing 
Remark: 
While there is no budget for a physician, the 
Physician Association may claim back 
pharmaceutical expenditure which is above 
the average for this kind of physician 
Belgium 1995: 
Price control – a maximum price is set by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Negative List (a list of pharmaceuticals, 
which are not covered by the health system 
albeit they are available) 
Positive List 
Overall pharmaceutical budget 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals (Medicines are 
grouped to classes of equivalent products for 
treating similar medical conditions. The 
Health System covers only the cheapest 
product of this group; i.e. the reference price 
for this group of medicines. If the patient 
wants another, more expensive product, he 
has to pay the difference) 
2004: 
Price control – a maximum price is set by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Negative List 
 
 
Positive List 
Overall pharmaceutical budget 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
Canada 1995: 
Price control - prices of patented drugs are 
regulated by the Patented Medicines Prices 
Review Board 
Negative List 
Positive List 
Pharmaceutical budget for Hospitals 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals  
Remark: 
Most of pharmaceutical expenditure is paid 
for by the patients themselves, subject to 
subsidies by the provinces and to coverage 
by VHI 
2004: 
Price control - prices of patented drugs are 
regulated by the Patented Medicines Prices 
Review Board 
Negative List 
Positive List 
Pharmaceutical budget for Hospitals 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals  
Remark: 
Most of pharmaceutical expenditure is paid 
for by the patients themselves, subject to 
subsidies by the provinces and to coverage by 
VHI 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Price regulation 
Positive List 
2004: 
Price regulation 
Negative List 
Positive List 
Pharmaceutical budget for individual 
prescribers like GPs and Hospitals 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
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PH1    Which of the following Regulations on Pharmaceuticals are in place in [Country]? 
Remark: 
The budgets for pharmaceutical spending by 
individual prescribers were introduced in 
1999 and concern only the GHIF. Further, the 
GHIF – as the largest purchaser of drugs - 
started to influence pharmaceutical prices. 
Denmark 1995: 
Positive Listing  
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals for generics 
Remark: 
Since 1991, there is a scheme of groups of 
medicines, for each group, a generic is the 
cheapest alternative and only this is covered 
2004: 
Positive Listing 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals for generics 
Remark: 
Since 1991, there is a scheme of groups of 
medicines, for each group, a generic is the 
cheapest alternative and only this is covered 
Finland 1995: 
Price regulation 
Positive Listing 
 
Remark: 
The National Agency for Medicines decides 
on the market authorization, the 
Pharmaceutical Pricing Board decides on the 
price of drugs which are reimbursed by the 
NHI. The price has to be reasonable, given 
the effectiveness of the drug. 
2004: 
Price regulation  
Positive Listings 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
Remark: 
The National Agency for Medicines decides 
on the market authorization, the 
Pharmaceutical Pricing Board decides on the 
price of drugs which are reimbursed by the 
NHI. The price has to be reasonable, given the 
effectiveness of the drug. 
France 1995: 
Price regulation 
Positive List 
Negative list – only for Asthma, which is 
excluded from coverage 
2004: 
Price regulation  
Positive List 
Negative list – only for Asthma, which is 
excluded from coverage 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals – since 1998, 
therapeutic groups and generic substitution 
have been introduced 
Germany 1995: 
Negative List 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals  
A regional budget for pharmaceutical 
expenditure with a spending cap 
Remark: 
The regional budget was not effective in 
containing pharmaceutical expenditure 
2004: 
Negative Lists 
Positive Lists 
Pharmaceutical budgets for individual 
prescribers (not really effective) 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
Greece 1995: 
Price regulation 
Positive List 
Budget for pharmaceutical expenditure for 
each HIF 
Remark: 
The positive list was introduced by one HIF, 
the IKA, but not effective. The budget for 
pharmaceutical expenditure for each HIF is 
set by the state, but is not effective. 
2004: 
Price regulation 
Positive List 
Budget for pharmaceutical expenditure for 
each HIF 
Remark: 
A positive list for the whole country was 
introduced in 2004, but not effective and was 
abolished shortly afterwards. The budget for 
pharmaceutical expenditure for each HIF is 
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PH1    Which of the following Regulations on Pharmaceuticals are in place in [Country]? 
set by the state, but is not effective. 
Hungary 1995 
Price control – prices are negotiated among 
the manufacturer and a government 
committee 
Positive List 
2004: 
Price control – prices are negotiated among 
the manufacturer and a government 
committee 
Positive List 
Ireland 1995: 
Price control - prices may not be higher than 
in the UK  
Positive Listing  
Pharmaceutical budgets for individual 
prescribers – since 1993, there is the 
Indicative Drug Targeting Saving Scheme, 
which is an indicative target for the GP’s 
spending for pharmaceuticals prescribed to 
medical card holders 
Remark: 
Even if licensed, a pharmaceutical needs to 
be on the positive list, in order to have a 
substantial market.  
2004: 
Price control - prices may not be higher than 
in the UK  
Positive Listing 
Pharmaceutical budgets for individual 
prescribers – since 1993, there is the 
Indicative Drug Targeting Saving Scheme 
 
 
 
Remark: 
Even if licensed, a pharmaceutical needs to be 
on the positive list, in order to have a 
substantial market  
Italy 1995. 
Price control - price must not be higher than 
the European average price  
Positive Listings 
Negative Listings 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals – 
introduced in 1994, this is however not really 
binding 
2004: 
Price control - price must not be higher than 
the European average price 
Positive Listings 
Negative Listings 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals since 
1994 – this is however not really binding 
 
Luxembourg 1994:  
Negative List 
2004: 
Positive List  
Remark: 
Since 2002 but only for medicines in out-
patient use 
Netherlands 1995: 
Positive list – the Ministry of Health decides, 
whether the product is reimbursable by the 
HIFs 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
2004: 
Positive list 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals with reference 
pricing  
Remark: 
There is also an overall ceiling for 
pharmaceutical expenditure targets 
New Zealand 1995: 
Price Control  
Positive Listings 
Overall Pharmaceutical budget  
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
2004: 
Price Control  
Positive Listing 
Overall pharmaceutical budget  
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
Norway 1995: 
Price control – the price is controlled by the 
National Medicines Agency 
Positive Listing (“blue list”) 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals – the National 
2004: 
Price control 
Positive Listing 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals 
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PH1    Which of the following Regulations on Pharmaceuticals are in place in [Country]? 
Medicines Agency issues lists of substitutes 
for certain product classes 
Portugal 1995: 
Price control – based on the prices in other 
countries 
Positive Lists 
2004: 
Price control – based on the prices in other 
countries 
Positive Lists 
Grouping of medicines with reimbursement 
based on reference pricing 
Remark: 
Since 2003, there is a grouping for medicines 
which are no longer protected by a patent. 
Reimbursement is based on a reference 
pricing system: the most expensive generic in 
the group is the reference for a therapeutic 
group, and this price may not exceed 65% of 
the original’s price.  
Poland 1995: 
Price control – the price is oriented at the 
level of the price in other countries 
Positive listing 
Overall pharmaceutical budget – a share of 
the health budget is earmarked for 
pharmaceuticals 
Grouping of pharmaceuticals 
2004: 
Price control 
 
Positive listing 
Overall pharmaceutical budget 
 
Grouping of pharmaceuticals  
Spain 1995: 
Price control 
Negative lists 
 
2004: 
Price control  
Negative lists 
Grouping of Medicines 
Sweden 1995: 
Negative Lists 
Positive Listing 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals – since 1993 
for generics 
2004: 
Negative Lists 
Positive Listing 
Grouping of Pharmaceuticals; extended in 
2002 
Switzerland 1995: 
Positive Listing 
Remark: 
The Inter-Cantonal Office for the Control of 
Medicines and the Federal Office of Social 
Insurance decide on the coverage – i.e. the 
inclusion in the positive list. 
2004: 
Positive listing 
Remark: 
The Inter-Cantonal Office for the Control of 
Medicines and the Federal Office of Social 
Insurance decide on the coverage – i.e. the 
inclusion in the positive list. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Negative Listing 
 
Budgets for pharmaceutical spending - 
indicative budgets for individual prescribers, 
albeit not binding since 1990 
 
 
 
 
2004: 
Negative Listing -only products of doubtful 
value e.g. cough medicines, are excluded 
Positive Listing - while all licensed products 
can be prescribed, some Hospitals have their 
own lists to make control of usage and 
expenditure easier. 
Budgets for pharmaceutical spending - 
management budgets for pharmaceutical 
spending for individual prescribers, albeit for 
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PH1    Which of the following Regulations on Pharmaceuticals are in place in [Country]? 
 
Remark: 
While prices are not controlled, the overall 
profit a manufacturer may make from sales to 
the NHS is limited by an agreement. 
purposes of management only and not binding
Remark: 
While prices are not controlled, the overall 
profit a manufacturer may make from sales to 
the NHS is limited by an agreement. 
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PH2    Thinking about the introduction of new medicines:  
Is the Price or the Coverage by the Health Care System of a new medicine based on a 
evaluation of its medical efficacy and degree of innovation compared to existing medicines? 
Austria 1995:  
In principle price and coverage are based on 
an evaluation of medical efficacy. 
Remark:  
The form of evaluation does not fit the 
standards of NICE and is handled lax 
2004:  
In principle price and coverage are based on 
an evaluation of medical efficacy 
Remark:  
The form of evaluation does not fit the 
standards of NICE and is handled lax 
Belgium 1995: 
Price and coverage are based on an 
evaluation of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The medicine requires registration. During 
the process, a maximum price is set, which is 
based on the innovative character of the drug. 
The manufacturer must then apply to the 
INAMI; Institute National d’Assurance 
Maladie Invalidité, to include the drug in the 
remuneration by the HIFs. While about 6000 
drugs are available, only 2500 are covered by 
the HIF system, i.e. at least partially 
reimbursed. 
2004:  
Price and coverage are based on an evaluation 
of medical efficacy 
Canada 1995: 
Price and coverage are based on an 
evaluation of medical efficacy 
2004: 
Price and coverage are based on an evaluation 
of medical efficacy 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, the coverage is based on an evaluation 
of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
This also concerns the level of 
reimbursement, i.e. whether the patients is 
full, partly or not at all reimbursed. 
2004: 
Yes, the coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Remark: 
This also concerns the level of 
reimbursement, i.e. whether the patients is 
full, partly or not at all reimbursed. 
Denmark 1995:  
Coverage, i.e. whether it is reimbursed by the 
HCS, is based on efficacy and the price 
demanded by the producer.  
Remark: 
The medicine is covered, if it is at least as 
effective as an existing one and has a “fair” 
price which is proportionate to its efficacy 
2004: 
Coverage, i.e. whether it is reimbursed by the 
HCS, is based on efficacy and the price 
demanded by the producer. 
Remark: 
The medicine is covered, if it is at least as 
effective as an existing one and has a “fair” 
price which is proportionate to its efficacy 
Finland 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
The Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board only 
includes a new drug into reimbursement by 
the NHI, if the price is “reasonable”. 
2004: 
Price and coverage are based on an evaluation 
of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board only 
includes a new drug into reimbursement by 
the NHI, if the price is reasonable. The 
decision is based on an explicit medical 
evaluation: Since 1997, therapeutic value and 
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PH2    Thinking about the introduction of new medicines:  
Is the Price or the Coverage by the Health Care System of a new medicine based on a 
evaluation of its medical efficacy and degree of innovation compared to existing medicines? 
cost effectiveness must be demonstrated. 
France 1995: 
Price and coverage are based on an 
evaluation of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The efficacy is compared to existing 
medicines. Depending on the therapeutic 
value, and substitutability, the reimbursement 
rate is 100, 65 or 35% 
2004: 
Price and coverage are based on an evaluation 
of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The efficacy is compared to existing 
medicines. Depending on the therapeutic 
value, and substitutability, the reimbursement 
rate is 100, 65 or 35% 
Germany 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Factually not 
Remark: 
While price and coverage are only indirectly 
based on medical efficacy, by assigning them 
to classes of products, which determines 
whether the product is reimbursed by the 
HIFs and at what price.  
Greece 1995: 
No, neither 
Remark: 
Prices are highly regulated, but the regulation 
follows financial aspects. 
2004: 
Coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy; since 1997 
Remark: 
Prices are highly regulated, but the regulation 
follows financial aspects. 
Hungary 1995: 
Coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Remark: 
“coverage” concerns the subsidy paid to the 
patient, which varies according to the class of 
the medicine 
2004: 
Coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Remark: 
“coverage” concerns the subsidy paid to the 
patient, which varies according to the class of 
the medicine 
Ireland 1995:  
Coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
2004: 
Coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Italy 1995: 
Coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The Comissione Unica per if Farmaco, 
consisting of scientists, decides on public 
funding of a new drug. The price also 
influences the decision on coverage. 
2004: 
Coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The Comissione Unica per if Farmaco, 
consisting of scientists, decides on public 
funding of a new drug. The price also 
influences the decision on coverage. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No  
 
2004: 
Yes, coverage is based on medical efficacy 
Netherlands 1995:  
Yes, the coverage is based on an evaluation 
of medical efficacy 
 
2004: 
Coverage, i.e. whether it is reimbursed by the 
HCS, is based on medical efficacy  
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PH2    Thinking about the introduction of new medicines:  
Is the Price or the Coverage by the Health Care System of a new medicine based on a 
evaluation of its medical efficacy and degree of innovation compared to existing medicines? 
New Zealand 1995: 
Yes, the coverage and price of a new 
medicine is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy and cost effectiveness 
2004: 
Yes, the coverage and the price 
(reimbursement price) of a new medicine is 
based on an evaluation of medical efficacy 
and cost effectiveness 
Remark: 
The PHARMAC is in charge of evaluating 
medicines and recommending price and 
coverage 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, the price is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The Norwegian Medicines Agency is in 
charge of controlling most aspects of the 
pharmaceutical sector, including coverage, 
pricing and reimbursement classification. 
2004: 
Yes, the price is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The Norwegian Medicines Agency is in 
charge of controlling most aspects of the 
pharmaceutical sector 
Portugal 1995: 
Yes, price and coverage is based on an 
evaluation of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
The INFARMED can request cost-
effectiveness studies to justify coverage by 
the NHS. This institute also determines, the 
percentage to which the medicine is 
reimbursed by the NHS 
2004: 
Yes, price and coverage are based on an 
evaluation of medical efficacy;  
Remark: 
The INFARMED can request cost-
effectiveness studies to justify coverage by 
the NHS. This institute also determines, the 
percentage to which the medicine is 
reimbursed by the NHS 
Poland 1995 
No, neither price and coverage is based on an 
evaluation of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
Before a drug is registered, the manufacturer 
has to prove its efficacy. The reimbursement 
price is compared to the prices of existing 
products. The whole process is however not 
formally based on a medical evaluation. 
2004: 
No, neither price and coverage is based on an 
evaluation of medical efficacy 
Remark: 
Before a drug is registered, the manufacturer 
has to prove its efficacy. The reimbursement 
price is compared to the prices of existing 
products. The whole process is however not 
formally based on a medical evaluation. 
Spain 1995: 
Yes, the coverage is based on an evaluation 
of medical efficacy 
2004: 
Yes, the coverage is based on an evaluation of 
medical efficacy 
Sweden 1995: 
Coverage, i.e. whether it is reimbursed by the 
HCS, is based on efficacy and price 
2004: 
Coverage, i.e. whether it is reimbursed by the 
HCS, is based on efficacy and price 
Remark:  
The reimbursement price is negotiated 
between the Producer and the National Social 
Insurance Board 
Switzerland 1995: 
Price and coverage of new medicines are 
based on an evaluation of medical efficacy 
2004: 
Price and coverage of new medicines are 
based on an evaluation of medical efficacy 
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PH2    Thinking about the introduction of new medicines:  
Is the Price or the Coverage by the Health Care System of a new medicine based on a 
evaluation of its medical efficacy and degree of innovation compared to existing medicines? 
Remark: 
The Inter-Cantonal Office for the Control of 
Medicines and the Federal Office of Social 
Insurance decide on the coverage – i.e. the 
inclusion in the positive list. 
Remark: 
The Inter-Cantonal Office for the Control of 
Medicines and the Federal Office of Social 
Insurance decide on the coverage – i.e. the 
inclusion in the positive list. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The coverage (“licensing”) is based loosely 
on an evaluation of efficacy 
2004: 
The coverage (“licensing”) is based loosely 
on an evaluation of efficacy 
Remark:  
NICE makes recommendations, but 
prescribers are free to abide to them. 
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PH3   Generic products are medicines which are chemically identical to a branded medicine, 
but sold in a different dosage, form and under a different name. In some countries, branded 
medicines can be substituted by cheaper generic products, in others, this is forbidden.  
How is Generic Substitution regulated in [Country]?  
Austria 1995:  
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
2004:  
Generic substitution is encouraged by setting 
financial incentives 
Belgium 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed. 
 
Remark: 
Factually it was still forbidden, since the 
legal basis to do so was not completely 
defined in a way which would allow generic 
substitution to be implemented 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged but 
voluntary 
Remark: 
In 2000, the share of generics was only about 
1% - partly, because the price difference to 
the branded products is small and there are 
only few generics substitutes available.  
Canada 1995: 
Generic substitution is encouraged  
Remark: 
The situation differs among provinces. In 
some, it is compulsory. In all of them, there 
is a financial incentive to use generics. 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged  
Remark: 
The situation differs among provinces. In 
some, it is compulsory. In all of them, there is 
a financial incentive to use generics. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
Remark: 
There is a financial incentive to use generics, 
since they do not require out-of pocket 
payments.  
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
Remark: 
There is a financial incentive to use generics, 
since they do not require out-of pocket 
payments. 
Denmark 1995:  
Generic substitution is encouraged 
Remark: 
Doctors are encouraged by the Government 
to prescribe generics, 46% of the 
pharmaceutical consumption are generics  
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged, if generic 
substitution is possible, it is compulsory 
unless the Prescriber indicates otherwise 
Finland 1995: 
Generic substitution is forbidden 
Remark: 
The Prescriber had to give the brand name of 
the medicine. Factually, there were no 
possibilities for substitution. 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
Remark: 
While generic substitution is now possible, 
the volume of generic substitution is still 
small. 
France 1995: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
Remark:  
Factually, there was no generic market up to 
1997 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
Remark: 
The necessary classification of groups of 
equivalent products has been made 
Germany 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
 
Remark: 
There is some financial encouragement 
addressing the patients 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
 
Remark: 
There is some financial encouragement 
addressing the patients 
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PH3   Generic products are medicines which are chemically identical to a branded medicine, 
but sold in a different dosage, form and under a different name. In some countries, branded 
medicines can be substituted by cheaper generic products, in others, this is forbidden.  
How is Generic Substitution regulated in [Country]?  
Greece 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
Remark: 
There is factually no generic market. There is 
however the distinction among a branded 
original and a product from an alternative 
producer.  
2004: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary  
Remark: 
There is factually no generic market. There is 
however the distinction among a branded 
original and a product from an alternative 
producer. 
Hungary 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
2004: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
Ireland 1995: 
Generic substitution is voluntary, but 
encouraged 
2004: 
Generic substitution is voluntary but 
encouraged 
Italy 1995: 
Factually no generic substitution 
Remark: 
The term “generic” was introduced in the 
health legislation in 1995 for the first time 
2004:  
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary. 
Remark: 
It is however factually encouraged since the 
patient has to pay the difference in prices. 
Some regions are quite active in promoting 
the usage of generics by providing 
information on substitutes to GPs. Still, in 
2001, generics accounted only for about 3% 
of the market. 
Luxembourg 1994 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
2004: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
Netherlands 1995:  
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
Remark: 
There are financial incentives for the 
pharmacists as well as for the patients to use 
generics 
New Zealand 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged  
Remark:  
The Health system only pays the price of the 
generic of a therapeutic group – the patient 
has to pay the difference, if he wants a 
branded product. This sets a strong incentive. 
Norway 1995: 
Generic substitution allowed but voluntary 
Remark: 
While there are financial incentives to use a 
cheaper product (the patient has to pay the 
difference between the cheapest product and 
the product used), there are no particular 
incentives addressing the usage of generics. 
2004: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
Remark: 
While there are financial incentives to use a 
cheaper product (the patient has to pay the 
difference between the cheapest product and 
the product used), there are no particular 
incentives addressing the usage of generics 
Portugal 1995: 
Generic substitution is forbidden 
2004: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
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PH3   Generic products are medicines which are chemically identical to a branded medicine, 
but sold in a different dosage, form and under a different name. In some countries, branded 
medicines can be substituted by cheaper generic products, in others, this is forbidden.  
How is Generic Substitution regulated in [Country]?  
Remark: 
Generic substitution was forbidden till 2003 
Remark: 
If both the prescribing physician and the 
patient don’t oppose to it; the pharmacist can 
substitute, if the prescriber has indicated so. 
There are financial incentives addressing the 
patient to choose a generic. The pharmacists 
doesn’t have an incentive to substitute. The 
role of generics is nevertheless substantial. 
Poland 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
Remark: 
There were no incentives in place to 
encourage doctors to prescribe generics.  
2004: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
Remark: 
There are still no incentives in place to 
encourage doctors to prescribe generics. But 
there is some discussion to introduce such. 
Spain 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
2004: 
Generic substitution is compulsory, unless the 
patient pays the difference 
Sweden 1995: 
Generic substitution is encouraged by 
financial incentives 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged by 
financial incentives 
Switzerland 1995: 
Generic substitution is allowed but voluntary 
 
2004: 
Generic substitution is now actively 
encouraged by introducing incentives 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
2004: 
Generic substitution is encouraged 
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PH4   If generic substitution is possible, who decides actually, whether a generic substitute 
of a branded medicine is used or not? 
Austria 1995:  
Prescriber, e.g. physician by indicating that 
the pharmacists may substitute or by 
prescribing a certain active chemical entity, 
no product name 
2004:  
Prescriber  
Belgium 1995: 
Prescriber;  
The pharmacists;  
The patient can tell whether he wants to 
substitute or not 
Remark: 
While the legal possibility to substitute was 
given, the substitution as such was not 
possible 
2004: 
Prescriber;  
The pharmacists;  
The patient can tell whether he wants to 
substitute or not 
Canada 1995: 
Prescriber;  
The pharmacists  
The patient can tell whether he wants to 
substitute or not 
2004: 
Prescriber;  
The pharmacists  
The patient can tell whether he wants to 
substitute or not 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Prescriber;  
The patient can tell whether he wants to 
substitute or not 
Remark: 
The patient has an incentive to demand a 
generic, which is available without co-
payments. 
2004: 
Prescriber;  
The patient can tell whether he wants to 
substitute or not 
Remark: 
The patient has an incentive to demand a 
generic, which is available without co-
payments. 
Denmark 1995: 
Prescriber; i.e. Physician can exclude generic 
substitution by indicating so 
The pharmacists can substitute, if the 
prescriber has not indicated otherwise 
The patient can tell, that he wants a more 
expensive product, but he has to pay the 
difference between the cheapest generic (the 
price of which is covered by the health 
system) and the price of the product he chose
2004:  
Prescriber; i.e. Physician can exclude generic 
substitution by indicating so 
The pharmacists must substitute, if the 
prescriber has not indicated otherwise (since 
1997) 
The patient can tell, that he wants a more 
expensive product, but he has to pay the 
difference between the cheapest generic ( the 
price of which is covered by the health 
system) and the price of the product he chose 
Finland 1995: 
Generic substitution was forbidden 
2004: 
The patient can tell whether he wants to 
substitute or not 
France 1995:  
Pharmacists; unless the physician forbids it 
explicitly 
2004: 
The physician can prescribe a generic name 
(since 2002)  
Pharmacists; unless the physician forbids it 
explicitly 
Remark:  
There is a “target rate” of substitution 
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PH4   If generic substitution is possible, who decides actually, whether a generic substitute 
of a branded medicine is used or not? 
negotiated between the Pharmacists 
association and the state 
 
Germany 1995: 
The Prescriber in accordance with the 
patient, who can tell, whether he wants a 
generic or not – in the later case, the patient 
has to pay the price difference 
2004: 
The Prescriber in accordance with the patient, 
who can tell, whether he wants a generic or 
not. In the later case, the patient has to pay 
higher costs arising from the price difference. 
Greece 1995: 
The prescriber can choose among branded 
originals and alternative products 
The pharmacist may not substitute without 
explicit authorization. 
2004: 
The prescriber can choose among branded 
originals and alternative products 
The pharmacist may not substitute without 
explicit authorization. 
Hungary 1995: 
Prescriber – by indicating substitution or by 
not prescribing a brand name. 
2004: 
Prescriber – by indicating substitution or by 
not prescribing a brand name. 
Ireland 1995: 
Prescriber – by indicating substitution or by 
not prescribing a name. In the later case, the 
dispensing pharmacist can substitute 
2004: 
Prescriber– by indicating substitution or by 
not prescribing a name. In the later case, the 
dispensing pharmacist can substitute 
Italy 1995: 
Factually no generic substitution 
2004: 
The Prescriber, for positive list drugs only  
The patient can decide, whether he is ready to 
pay the mark up for a branded product  
Luxembourg 1994: 
prescriber 
2004: 
Prescriber 
Netherlands 1995: 
Prescriber, e.g. physician  
Remark: 
The Pharmacists need the approval of the 
physician to substitute 
2004: 
Prescriber 
Remark: 
The patient can insist on a certain product, but 
has to pay the difference among both prices. 
New Zealand 1995: 
Prescriber 
The patient can indicate that he is willing to 
pay the higher price of a branded product 
2004: 
Prescriber 
The patient can indicate that he is willing to 
pay the higher price of a branded product 
Norway 1995: 
Prescriber, the physician can propose 
substitution 
Patient can oppose 
2004: 
Pharmacist can unilaterally chose a generic, 
but Prescriber and Patient can oppose 
Remark: 
Factually, neither patient nor prescriber have 
an incentive to use generics, but the 
pharmacist has. Factually, generic substitution 
is growing.  
Portugal 1995: 
Generic substitution was forbidden 
2004: 
Prescriber can indicate substitution  
The Patient can accept or oppose substitution 
The pharmacists can substitute, if neither the 
prescriber nor the patient oppose. 
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PH4   If generic substitution is possible, who decides actually, whether a generic substitute 
of a branded medicine is used or not? 
Poland 1995: 
The Prescriber can prescribe a branded or a 
generic product and no product name 
The pharmacists can substitute, if it is not 
marked on the prescription, that the product 
may not be substituted 
The patient can ask for a cheaper alternative. 
2004: 
The Prescriber can prescribe a branded or a 
generic product and no product name 
The pharmacists can substitute, if it is not 
marked on the prescription, that the product 
may not be substituted 
The patient can ask for a cheaper alternative. 
Spain 1995: 
Prescriber can indicate 
Patient can opt for a branded product 
Remark: 
If the patient opts for a branded product, he 
has to pay the difference between the prices 
2004: 
Prescriber  
The Pharmacist has to substitute, if a generic 
exists, unless the patient indicates otherwise  
The patient can indicate a preference for the 
original, but has to pay the difference 
Sweden 1995: 
Prescriber, e.g. physician can indicate that 
the pharmacists may not substitute. 
The pharmacist is - as a baseline - is required 
to substitute  
The patient can reject the substitute, but has 
to pay the difference among the prices of the 
branded original and the generic. 
2004: 
Prescriber, e.g. physician can indicate that the 
pharmacists may not substitute. 
The pharmacist is - as a baseline - is required 
to substitute  
The patient can reject the substitute, but has to 
pay the difference among the prices of the 
branded original and the generic. 
Switzerland 1995: 
Patient can tell, whether he wants a generic 
or not 
2004: 
Patient can tell, whether he wants a generic or 
not 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Prescriber 
The Pharmacist may substitute, if the 
physician did not indicate otherwise; since 
1995 
2004: 
Prescriber 
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PH5   Can the patient reduce his costs, e.g. the co-payment for medicines, by choosing a 
generic medicine or the cheapest product of a therapeutic class?  
Austria 1995:  
Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product e.g. a 
generic 
Remark: 
There is a fixed co-payment; prescription fee, 
independent of the price of the product 
2004: 
Co Payments can be reduced  
Remark: 
There is a fixed co-payment; prescription fee, 
independent of the price of the product; this 
co-payment can in some cases be reduced. 
Belgium 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The price of the generic is lower, and the co 
payment is a percentage of the price  
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The price of the generic is lower, and the co 
payment is a percentage of the price 
Canada 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product  
Remark: 
Most of the pharmaceutical expenditure is 
made by the patients themselves, albeit often 
subsidized by the provincial government. 
This sets an incentive to use a cheaper 
alternative. 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product  
Remark:  
Most of the pharmaceutical expenditure is 
made by the patients themselves, albeit often 
subsidized by the provincial government. This 
sets an incentive to use a cheaper alternative. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The generic is not subject to co-payments. 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The generic is not subject to co-payments 
Denmark 1995:  
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
generic substitute or the cheapest product of 
a therapeutic class.  
Remark: 
The level of co-payment depends on the price 
of the medicine, consequentially, it is lower 
for a cheaper product 
2004:  
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive equivalent  
Finland 1995: 
Generic substitution was forbidden 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The co-payment is a certain percentage of the 
price. 
France 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The co-payment is the difference between the 
price and the reimbursement paid by the HIF. 
If the product is cheaper, the co-payment is 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
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PH5   Can the patient reduce his costs, e.g. the co-payment for medicines, by choosing a 
generic medicine or the cheapest product of a therapeutic class?  
lower 
Germany 1995 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product  
Remark: 
For those groups, for which reference prices 
are introduced, the patient would have to pay 
the price difference if choosing a branded 
product 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
For those groups, for which reference prices 
are introduced, the patient would have to pay 
the price difference if choosing a branded 
product 
Greece 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The co-payment is a certain percentage of the 
price, varying among HIFs. Since few 
generics are available, and the price 
regulation results in only small differences 
among substitutes and branded originals, the 
financial incentive to choose a alternative to 
the branded original is weak. 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The co-payment is a certain percentage of the 
price, varying among HIFs. Since few 
generics are available, and the price 
regulation results in only small differences 
among substitutes and branded originals, the 
financial incentive to choose a alternative to 
the branded original is weak. 
Hungary 1995 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
Co payments are a percentage of the price 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
Co payments are a percentage of the price 
Ireland 1995:  
For Medical Card holders, one third of the 
population, there are no co-payments. 
Co-payments for the rest of the population 
cannot be reduced by choosing a less 
expensive but equivalent product 
2004: 
For Medical Card holders, one third of the 
population, there are no co-payments. 
Co-payments for the rest of the population 
cannot be reduced by choosing a less 
expensive but equivalent product  
Italy 1995. 
Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product;  
Factually, generic substitution was not 
possible 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
There is a financial incentive, since the patient 
has to pay the difference between the generic 
product and the branded one. the patient has 
to pay a percentage of the price, which is a 
larger amount if the product is a more 
expensive branded product. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product 
2004: 
Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product 
Netherlands 1995:  
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The patient obtains the average price of the 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The patient obtains the average price of the 
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PH5   Can the patient reduce his costs, e.g. the co-payment for medicines, by choosing a 
generic medicine or the cheapest product of a therapeutic class?  
therapeutic class as a reimbursement. If the 
price of the medicine is above that, the 
patient has to pay the difference 
therapeutic class as a reimbursement. If the 
price of the medicine is above that, the patient 
has to pay the difference 
New Zealand 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark:  
The Prescriber prescribes the cheapest 
product of a therapeutic class. If the patient 
wants a more expensive product, he has to 
pay the difference.  
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark:  
The Prescriber prescribes the cheapest 
product of a therapeutic class. If the patient 
wants a more expensive product, he has to 
pay the difference. 
Norway 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
Since 1993, only the cheapest drug of a 
group is covered – if a more expensive 
product is used, the patient has to cover the 
difference. While there is no incentive to use 
generics, the price incentive is effective.  
2004:  
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
While the patient has to pay the difference 
between the reimbursement price (paid by the 
NIS) and the actual price, there is still no 
specific incentive to use a generic. But the 
price incentive of generics being cheaper still 
works. 
Portugal 1995: 
Generic substitution was forbidden 
 
2004: 
Yes, co-payments can be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The co-payment is a percentage of the price 
and the price difference between the branded 
original and the generic substitute is 
substantial.  
Poland 1995: 
Yes, co-payments can be reduced by 
choosing a less expensive but equivalent 
product 
Remark: 
The co-payment is in some cases a 
percentage of the actual price, in others, its a 
lump sum payment. 
2004: 
Yes, co-payments can be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product 
Remark: 
The co-payment is the difference between the 
reimbursement price and the actual price. 
Spain 1995: 
No, co-payments cannot be reduced 
Remark: 
Since there is a price difference between 
generics and branded products, there is an 
incentive since the co-payment is a 
percentage of the price. Since the price 
difference is not that large, the incentive is 
not strong. 
2004: 
No, co-payments cannot be reduced  
Remark: 
Since there is a price difference between 
generics and branded products, there is an 
incentive since the co-payment is a percentage 
of the price. Since the price difference is not 
that large, the incentive is not strong. 
Sweden 1995: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product. 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product. 
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PH5   Can the patient reduce his costs, e.g. the co-payment for medicines, by choosing a 
generic medicine or the cheapest product of a therapeutic class?  
Remark:  
Agreeing to generic substitution saves 
money, since patients have to pay a certain 
percentage of the price, respectively the 
difference between the price of the generic 
and the branded product 
Remark: 
Agreeing to generic substitution saves money, 
since patients have to pay a certain percentage 
of the price, respectively the difference 
between the price of the generic and the 
branded product 
Switzerland 1995: 
Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product 
2004: 
Co-payments can be reduced by choosing a 
less expensive but equivalent product since 
1996 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product – 
they concern the prescription itself 
2004: 
Co-payments cannot be reduced by choosing 
a less expensive but equivalent product 
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4. The patients 
4.1 “Cost-Reimbursement” and “Services in kind” 
Health Systems differ with regard to how patients are involved in the payment of providers. In 
some countries, medical providers are first paid by the patients, who are later reimbursed by 
the Purchaser (Health Insurance Funds or Health Authority). In others, patients are not 
involved in the payment of the provider at all.   
 
Under service in kind, the patient is not involved in the payment of providers, in particular 
the patient does not receive a bill listing the services provided. 
 
Under cost reimbursement the patient receives the bill from the provider.  
The bill is either paid directly by the patient, and handed in to the Purchaser ( Health 
Insurance Funds / Health Authorities) for reimbursement (“bill paid and reimbursed later”).  
Or it is directly passed on to the Purchaser (“bill passed on”). 
 
CR  Which is the prevailing mode of payments in the Health Care System in [Country]? 
Austria 1995  
Services in kind: 
General Practitioners (GPs) / Primary Care 
Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services (analysis of blood 
samples, tissue analysis) 
Dentists/ Dental Care  
Dentures 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
2004:  
Services in kind: 
General Practitioners / Primary Care 
Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
 
Dentists  
Dentures 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
Belgium 1995: 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later 
GP / primary care 
Ambulatory Specialized services 
Ambulatory Laboratory services  
Hospitals / in-patient services – only a per 
diem is paid, the rest is paid by the HIF 
Dentists (limited reimbursement) 
Dentures (limited reimbursement only) 
Medicines – the patient pays only the 
deductible 
Medical devices (limited reimbursement, no 
reimbursement in some cases ) 
Remark: 
Usually the patient pays and the gets 
reimbursed by the HIF, subject to a 25% 
deductible 
2004: 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later 
GP / primary care 
Ambulatory Specialized services 
Ambulatory Laboratory services  
Hospitals / in-patient services – only a per 
diem is paid, the rest is paid by the HIF 
Dentists (limited reimbursement) 
Dentures (limited reimbursement only) 
Medicines – the patient pays only the 
deductible 
Medical devices (limited reimbursement, no 
reimbursement in some cases ) 
Remark: 
Usually the patient pays and the gets 
reimbursed by the HIF, subject to a 25% 
deductible 
Canada 1995: 
Service in kind for  
GP / Primary Care 
Specialists 
2004: 
Service in kind for  
GP / Primary Care 
Specialists 
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CR  Which is the prevailing mode of payments in the Health Care System in [Country]? 
Laboratory services in Hospitals 
Hospitals / In-patient services 
 
Not covered by the Health System 
Dental care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices like spectacles 
Remark: 
Services not covered are either paid out of 
pocket or by the patient’s supplementary 
insurance 
Laboratory services in Hospitals 
Hospitals / In-patient services 
 
Not covered by the Health System: 
Dental care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices like spectacles 
Remark: 
Services not covered are either paid out of 
pocket or by the patient’s supplementary 
insurance 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Service in kind for 
GPs/Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services  
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
Dentists  
Dentures 
Remark: 
Some dental treatments which are not 
standard, are not covered. Usually, there is a 
co-payment for the usage of better materials 
in dental care 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
GPs/Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services  
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
Dentists  
Dentures 
Remark: 
Some dental treatments which are not 
standard, are not covered. Usually, there is a 
co-payment for the usage of better materials 
in dental care 
Denmark 1995 
Service in kind for:  
GPs, Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services,  
Hospitals and Inpatient services 
Medicines are provided in kind but are 
subject to co-payments 
Medical devices like prostheses are provided 
in kind 
Medical devices like spectacles are paid by 
the patients themselves 
Dental Care and Dentures are predominantly 
paid for by the patients themselves. For some 
groups, elderly with low income, the 
municipality subsidizes dental care  
Remark:  
The bill is directly passed on from the 
provider to the Amter 
2004: 
Service in kind for:  
GPs, Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services,  
Hospitals and Inpatient services 
Medicines are provided in kind but are subject 
to co-payments 
Medical devices like prostheses are provided 
in kind 
Medical devices like spectacles are paid by 
the patients themselves 
Dental Care and Dentures are predominantly 
paid for by the patients themselves. For some 
groups, elderly with low income, the 
municipality subsidizes dental care 
Remark:  
The bill is directly passed on from the 
provider to the Amter 
Finland 1995: 
Service in kind for 
GPs/Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists  
2004: 
Service in kind for 
GPs/Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists  
 182
CR  Which is the prevailing mode of payments in the Health Care System in [Country]? 
Laboratory services 
Dentists – in Health Centers 
Hospitals/In-patient services  
Medicines 
Some Medical devices 
 
CR bill is paid and reimbursed later 
Medicines  
Dental care provided by private providers 
Dentures  
 
Remark: 
Services provided by municipal Health 
Centers and Hospitals are provided in kind, 
but are subject to co-payments. 
Medicines and most of dental care (most of 
which is provided by private providers) is 
first paid for and then partly reimbursed by 
the NHI 
Laboratory services 
Dentists – in Health Centers 
Hospitals/In-patient services  
Medicines 
Some Medical devices 
 
CR bill is paid and reimbursed later 
Medicines  
Dental care provided by private providers 
Dentures  
 
Remark: 
Services provided by municipal Health 
Centers and Hospitals are provided in kind, 
but are subject to co-payments. 
Medicines and most of dental care (most of 
which is provided by private providers) is first 
paid for and then partly reimbursed by the 
NHI 
France 1995: 
CR bill is paid and reimbursed later: 
GPs/Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services,  
Dentists  
Dentures 
Hospitals/In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Remark: 
There was not really a bill, listing the 
services and their price, but a leaflet given to 
the patient which passed it on to the Health 
Insurance Fund. Factually, patients only paid 
for GPs, Specialists and Medicines. The rest 
was paid directly from the Health Insurance 
Funds to the Providers 
2004:  
CR bill is paid and reimbursed later 
GPs/Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services,  
Dentists  
Dentures 
Hospitals/In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Remark:  
Since the diffusion of a special electronic 
system of reimbursement; “carte vitale”, 
linking Mandatory Health Insurance and 
providers directly, third party payment 
concerns about 75% of expenditures 
Germany 1995: 
Services in kind: 
GPs and Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
Dentures 
Remark: 
For some medical devices, e.g. spectacles, 
2004: 
Services in kind: 
GPs and Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
Dentures 
Remark: 
For some medical devices, e.g. spectacles, the 
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the patient pays the bill and gets a 
reimbursement of a certain amount from the 
Health Insurance Fund. In this case, the 
patient has to pay the difference. 
patient pays the bill and gets a reimbursement 
of a certain amount from the Health Insurance 
Fund. In this case, the patient has to pay the 
difference. 
Greece 1995: 
Services in kind: 
GPs and Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Dentures 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for: 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
Remark: 
The handling differs among services 
provided by the ESY as opposed to private 
providers and also among the HIF. There is a 
parallel-system of private provision and 
purchasing of services. The above 
information refers only to services obtained 
from public providers.  
If the service is paid for by the HIF, the 
handling differs among the HIF. Privately 
purchased services have to be paid privately, 
subject to coverage by a Supplementary 
Insurance. Dental care is predominantly 
provided on private terms.  
2004:  
Services in kind: 
GPs and Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Dentures 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for: 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
Remark: 
The handling differs among services provided 
by the ESY as opposed to private providers 
and also among the HIF. There is a parallel-
system of private provision and purchasing of 
services. The above information refers only to 
services obtained from public providers.  
If the service is paid for by the HIF, the 
handling differs among the HIF. Privately 
purchased services have to be paid privately, 
subject to coverage by a Supplementary 
Insurance. Dental care is predominantly 
provided on private terms. 
Hungary 1995: 
Service in kind for 
GPs and Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists  
Laboratory services 
In patient services / Hospitals 
CR: Bill passed on for  
Dental care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Remark: 
Most dental care is not covered by the health 
system. The bills for the dental care, 
medicines and medical devices are passed on 
to the VHI 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
GPs and Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists  
Laboratory services 
In patient services / Hospitals 
CR: Bill passed on for  
Dental care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Remark: 
Most dental care is not covered by the health 
system. The bills for the dental care, 
medicines and medical devices are passed on 
to the VHI 
Ireland 1995: 
Fees paid for  
GPs / Primary Care Physicians – the fees are 
paid completely, payment by the VHI are 
subject to substantial deductibles  
2004: 
Fees paid for  
GPs / Primary Care Physicians – the fees are 
paid completely, payment by the VHI are 
subject to substantial deductibles  
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Service in kind for  
Specialists (provided in hospitals) 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Some laboratory services 
Medicines (subject to co-payment) 
Medical devices (co-payments) 
 
CR bill paid and reimbursed later by the 
Voluntary Health Insurance for 
some Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Dentures 
 
Remark: 
For Medical Card Holders, 1/3 of the 
population, all services are provided in kind 
and usually without co-payments 
 
Service in kind for  
Specialists (provided in hospitals) 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Some laboratory services 
Medicines (subject to co-payment) 
Medical devices (co-payments) 
 
CR bill paid and reimbursed later by the 
Voluntary Health Insurance for 
some Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Dentures 
 
Remark: 
For Medical Card Holders, 1/3 of the 
population, all services are provided in kind 
and usually without co-payments 
Italy 1995: 
Service in kind for 
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Hospital services 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Remark:  
Most dental care and dentures is provided 
and purchased privately; there are 
exemptions for some medical devices and 
medicines 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Hospital services 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Remark:  
Most dental care and dentures is provided and 
purchased privately; there are exemptions for 
some medical devices and medicines 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Service in kind for  
Hospitals / in-patient services  
Medicines 
Laboratory services (since they are provided 
as a part of Hospital treatment either by the 
Hospital’s laboratory itself or by a 
commission of the Hospital to an 
independent provider)  
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
GP / primary care 
Specialized services 
Dentists 
Dentures 
Medical devices 
2004: 
Service in kind for  
Hospitals / in-patient services  
Medicines 
Laboratory services (since they are provided 
as a part of Hospital treatment either by the 
Hospital’s laboratory itself or by a 
commission of the Hospital to an independent 
provider)  
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
GP / primary care 
Specialized services 
Dentists 
Dentures 
Medical devices 
Netherlands 1995: 
Service in kind for  
GPs / Primary Care 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
GPs / Primary Care 
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Specialists 
Laboratory services (in Hospitals) 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices (some) 
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later: 
Dentists 
Dentures 
Medical devices (some) 
Specialists 
Laboratory services (in hospitals) 
Hospital / In-patient services 
Medicines 
Some medical devices 
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later: 
Dentists 
Dentures 
Medical devices (some) 
New Zealand 1995: 
Service in kind for 
Primary Care / GPs – the state pays a 
subsidy, the patient the rest 
Public Specialists 
Laboratory Services 
Hospital services 
Medicines (subject to co-payments) 
Remark: 
Dental care, Dentures, and Medical devices 
are predominantly paid for by the patients 
themselves or their VHI. Visits to specialists 
on private terms have to be paid for privately.
2004: 
Service in kind for 
Primary Care / GPs – the state pays a subsidy, 
the patient the rest 
Public Specialists 
Laboratory Services 
Hospital services 
Medicines (subject to co-payments) 
Remark: 
Dental care, Dentures, and Medical devices 
are predominantly paid for by the patients 
themselves or their VHI. Visits to specialists 
on private terms have to be paid for privately. 
Norway 1995: 
Service in kind for 
GPs / Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
In patient care/ Hospitals 
Medicines 
 
CR: bill passed on for 
Medical devices 
 
Bill paid, since the service is not covered 
Dental Care  
Dentures  
Remark: 
Medicines are paid for by the National 
Insurance Scheme. Medical devices like 
spectacles are not covered. 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
GPs / Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
In patient care/ Hospitals 
Medicines 
 
CR: bill passed on for 
Medical devices 
 
Bill paid, since the service is not covered 
Dental Care  
Dentures 
Remark: 
Medicines are paid for by the National 
Insurance Scheme. Medical devices like 
spectacles are not covered. 
Portugal 1995: 
Service in kind for 
GPs and primary care 
Specialists in public hospitals 
Laboratory services 
Majority of Hospital services 
Medicines (subject to co-payments) 
 
CR: Bill passed on to subsistema / VHI for  
2004: 
Service in kind for 
GPs and primary care 
Specialists in public hospitals 
Laboratory services 
Majority of Hospital services 
Medicines (subject to co-payments) 
 
CR: Bill passed on to subsistema / VHI for  
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Dental care 
Dentures 
Some Hospital services 
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
Medical devices 
Remark: 
If the service is not consumed in a facility of 
the NHS, the bill is usually passed on to the 
HIF (subsistema) or the VHI. The same is 
true for dental care and dentures, which are 
not offered/covered by the NHS. Here the 
patient pays the full amount, unless covered 
by a VHI or a subsistema, a HIF. The HIFs, 
called subsistemas, cover about 25% of the 
population. They are supposed to cover all 
medical care for their insured but factually 
every citizen insured by a HIF can also 
receive services from the NHS. In 1995, the 
patients often did not tell that they were 
member in a subsistema, when receiving 
treatment in a facility operated by the NHS. 
Subsistema patients pay the bills first and are 
then reimbursed by their subsistema. 
Dental care 
Dentures 
Some Hospital services 
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
Medical devices 
Remark: 
If the service is not consumed in a facility of 
the NHS, the bill is usually passed on to the 
HIF (subsistema) or the VHI. The same is true 
for dental care and dentures, which are not 
offered/covered by the NHS. Here the patient 
pays the full amount, unless covered by a VHI 
or a subsistema, a HIF. The HIFs, called 
subsistemas, cover about 25% of the 
population. They are supposed to cover all 
medical care for their insured but factually 
every citizen insured by a HIF can also 
receive services from the NHS. Recently, a 
Patient Identity Card was introduced in order 
to identify the members of the subsistemas, 
when receiving treatment in a facility 
operated by the NHS. Subsistema patients pay 
the bills first and are then reimbursed by their 
subsistema. 
Poland 1995: 
Service in kind for 
Primary Care 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Hospital / in-patient services 
Medicines 
Medical Devices 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
Primary Care 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Hospital / in-patient services 
Medicines 
Medical Devices 
Spain 1995: 
Service in kind for 
Primary Care 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Hospital / in-patient services 
Medicines 
Medical Devices 
Remark: 
Apart from extractions and dental care for 
children, dental care is not covered by the 
health system but purchased on private terms.
Some medical devices – e.g. spectacles and 
hearing aids -  are not covered. 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
Primary Care 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Hospital / in-patient services 
Medicines 
Medical Devices 
Remark: 
Apart from extractions and dental care for 
children, dental care is not covered by the 
health system but purchased on private terms. 
Some medical devices – e.g. spectacles and 
hearing aids -  are not covered. 
Sweden 1995: 2004: 
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Service in kind for 
GPs and Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices 
 
CR: Bill passed on  
Dentists  
Dentures 
Remark:  
Dental care and Dentures for adults, and 
Medical Devices are subsidized with a 
certain amount, the patient has to pay the rest
Service in kind for 
GPs and Primary Care  
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices  
 
CR: Bill passed on  
Dentists  
Dentures 
Remark:  
Dental care and dentures for adults, and 
Medical Devices are subsidized with a certain 
amount, the patient has to pay the rest 
Switzerland 1995: 
Service in kind for 
Hospital / in-patient services 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
GPs/Primary Care  
Specialists / specialized care 
Laboratory services 
Note: For about 50% of all services; the rest 
is service provided in kind 
 
Remark:  
Dental care and dentures are not covered by 
the Health System but are predominantly 
privately purchased 
2004: 
Service in kind for 
Hospital / in-patient services 
Medical devices 
 
 
CR: Bill paid and reimbursed later for 
GPs/ Primary Care 
Specialists / specialized care 
Laboratory services 
Medicines 
 
 
Remark:  
Dental care and dentures are not covered by 
the Health System but are predominantly 
privately purchased 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Services in kind: 
GPs and Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Dentures  
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
Remark: 
Service in kind concerns only those dental 
services and dental devices, which are 
covered by the Health System 
2004: 
Services in kind: 
GPs and Primary Care Physicians 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
Dentists  
Dentures  
Hospital / In-patient services  
Medicines 
Medical devices, like spectacles 
Remark: 
Service in kind concerns only those dental 
services and dental devices, which are 
covered by the Health System 
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CP1  Do patients have to pay a co-payment for the medical services and products listed 
below? If so, is this co-payment a certain amount, independent of the costs of the service or 
is it a percentage of the costs of the service? 
Austria 1995:  
No co-payment for  
Services of GPs/Primary Care 
Specialists/Specialized Services  
Laboratory services (provided by Hospitals) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medical devices e.g. spectacles 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
In patient services/Hospitals (a daily fee) 
Dental care / Dentists 
Dentures / "false teeth" 
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
Members of the Health Insurance Funds for 
the state employees, and self employed, 
about 20% of the population, usually have to 
pay a certain percentage  
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
Services of GPs/Primary Care 
Specialists/Specialized Services  
Laboratory tests(provided by Hospitals) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage 
Medical devices e.g. spectacles  
 
Co-payment of a certain amount  
In patient services/Hospitals (daily fee) 
Dental care / Dentists 
Dentures / "false teeth" 
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
Members of the Health Insurance Funds for 
the state employees, and self employed, about 
20% of the population, usually have to pay a 
certain percentage 
Belgium 1995: 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for:   
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Laboratory services  
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
In-patient services/Hospitals (a daily fee) 
 
Remark: 
The co-payment is a certain percentage, but 
with an upper limit. Thus, the co-payment is 
often a fixed amount, the upper level. 
2004: 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for:   
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Laboratory services  
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
In-patient services/Hospitals (a daily fee) 
 
Remark: 
The co-payment is a certain percentage, but 
with an upper limit. Thus, the co-payment is 
often a fixed amount, the upper level. 
Canada 1995: 
No co-payment for:   
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Hospitals/ Inpatient Services 
Laboratory services in Hospitals 
 
Payment of the price, since the service is not 
2004: 
No co-payment for:   
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Hospitals /Inpatient Services 
Laboratory services in Hospitals 
 
Payment of the price, since the service is not 
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covered by the Health System 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
 
Remark: 
For services not covered there is in some 
cases a system of subsidies at the provincial 
level 
covered by the Health System 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
Medical devices 
 
Remark: 
For services not covered there is in some 
cases a system of subsidies at the provincial 
level 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Inpatient Services/Hospitals 
Laboratory services  
Medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
The standard treatment, i.e. the cheapest 
treatment available is covered completely. 
Only extras, like better materials, incur co-
payments. For instance, the co-payment for 
dental care and dentures concerns mostly the 
usage of better materials. Co-payments for 
medicines concern branded products, while 
generics are free. 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Inpatient Services/Hospitals 
Laboratory services  
Medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
The standard treatment, i.e. the cheapest 
treatment available is covered completely. 
Only extras, like better materials, incur co-
payments. For instance, the co-payment for 
dental care and dentures concerns mostly the 
usage of better materials. Co-payments for 
medicines concern branded products, while 
generics are free. 
Denmark 1995 
No co-payment for 
Services of GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists/Specialists 
In patient services / Hospitals 
Laboratory tests 
 
Co-payment as a certain percentage of the 
price for  
Medicines (depending on the price of the 
medicine, the percentage is 100 to 15%) 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount: 
Medical devices; for spectacles the whole 
price  
 
2004: 
No co-payment for 
Services of GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists/Specialists 
In patient services / Hospitals 
Laboratory tests 
 
Co-payment as a certain percentage of the 
price for  
Medicines (depending on the price of the 
medicine, the percentage is 100 to 15%) 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount: 
Medical devices; for spectacles the whole 
price  
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Remark:  
Dental care and Dentures are paid for by the 
patients themselves or by their 
supplementary insurance 
Remark: 
Dental care and Dentures are paid for by the 
patients themselves or by their supplementary 
insurance 
Finland 1995: 
No co-payment for  
Medical devices (most of them) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines 
Dental Care on private terms – the rest is 
covered by the NHI 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Primary Care / GPs 
Specialized Care – in Hospitals 
In patient services / Hospitals ( daily charge) 
Laboratory services 
Dental care in Health Centers 
 
Payment of the full price for  
Dentures 
 
Remark: 
Usually, the co-payment is a fee per visit. 
Municipalities set the co-payments but a 
maximum level is set by the government. 
2004: 
No co-payment for  
Medical devices (most of them) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines 
Dental Care on private terms – the rest is 
covered by the NHI  
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Primary Care / GPs 
Specialized Care – in Hospitals 
In patient services / Hospitals ( daily charge) 
Laboratory services 
Dental care in Health Centers 
 
Payment of the full price for  
Dentures 
 
Remark: 
Usually, the co-payment is a fee per visit. 
Municipalities set the co-payments but a 
maximum level is set by the government. 
France 1995: 
Co-payment is a certain percentage (“ticket 
moderateur”) plus a certain amount of extra 
billing/fees (dépassement honoraire) for: 
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists 
In patient services / Hospitals 
Dentures / "false teeth" 
Medical devices 
Certain percentage: 
Laboratory tests  
Dental care / Dentists  
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
There are three types of co-payment:  
For those providers, (sector 2) which charge 
higher fees than set in the convention 
between the HIFs and the providers, the 
patient has to pay the difference; 
dépassement honoraire. 
2004: 
Co-payment is a certain percentage (“ticket 
moderateur”) plus a certain amount of extra 
billing/fees (dépassement honoraire) for: 
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists 
In patient services / Hospitals 
Dentures / "false teeth" 
Medical devices 
Certain percentage: 
Laboratory tests  
Dental care / Dentists  
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
There are three types of co-payment:  
For those providers, (sector 2) which charge 
higher fees than set in the convention between 
the HIFs and the providers, the patient has to 
pay the difference; dépassement honoraire. 
For some services, the “ticket moderateur” is 
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is it a percentage of the costs of the service? 
For some services, the “ticket moderateur” is 
a percentage of the price or the difference 
between the payment made form the patient 
to the provider and the reimbursement 
obtained from the HIF. 
Further, there are charges of a fixed amount, 
for instance a daily fee in hospitals 
a percentage of the price or the difference 
between the payment made from the patient to 
the provider and the reimbursement obtained 
from the HIF. 
Further, there are charges of a fixed amount, 
for instance a daily fee in hospitals 
Germany 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs Primary Care 
Specialists and Specialized Care 
Laboratory Services 
Dental Care 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Dentures 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
In Patient services (a daily fee) 
Medicines ( a fixed amount plus the 
difference of the price to the reference price) 
Medical devices; e.g. for spectacles the 
difference between the price and the fixed 
amount reimbursed by the HIFs 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs Primary Care 
Specialists and Specialized Care 
Laboratory Services 
Dental Care 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Dentures (35-50%) 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
In Patient services (a daily fee) 
Medicines ( a fixed amount plus the 
difference of the price to the reference price) 
Medical devices; e.g. for spectacles the 
difference between the price and the fixed 
amount reimbursed by the HIFs 
Greece 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs and Primary Care 
Specialists and Specialized Care 
In Patient services  
Laboratory Services 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Dental Care  
Dentures  
Medicines 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Medical devices 
 
Remark: 
Again, this refers to the public system only. 
Co-payments differ in existence and in 
magnitude among the HIF. 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs and Primary Care 
Specialists and Specialized Care 
In Patient services  
Laboratory Services 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Dental Care  
Dentures  
Medicines (25%; depending on the HIF) 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Medical devices 
 
Remark: 
Again, this refers to the public system only. 
Co-payments differ in existence and in 
magnitude among the HIF. 
Hungary 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs and Primary Care 
Specialists and Specialized Care 
In Patient services  
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs and Primary Care 
Specialists and Specialized Care 
In Patient services  
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is it a percentage of the costs of the service? 
Laboratory Services 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines  
Medical devices 
 
“Co-payment” of the full amount for 
Dental Care  
Dentures  
 
Remark: 
Dental care is not covered by the Health 
system. The price of medicines is subsidized 
by a certain percentage, ranging from zero to 
100% of the price. For medical devices, there 
is also a system of subsidies. 
Laboratory Services 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines  
Medical devices 
 
“Co-payment” of the full amount for 
Dental Care  
Dentures  
 
Remark: 
Dental care is not covered by the Health 
system. The price of medicines is subsidized 
by a certain percentage, ranging from zero to 
100% of the price. For medical devices, there 
is also a system of subsidies.: 
Ireland 1995 
Fees are paid completely -payments for  
GPs/ Primary Care 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
In patient services / Hospitals 
Dental care / Dentists 
Dentures / "false teeth" 
Medicines 
Medical devices e.g. spectacles 
 
Remark:  
Laboratory tests and services by specialists 
are predominantly provided in Hospitals, and 
require not extra co-payment. 
For Medical Card Holders, all services are 
provided in kind and usually without co-
payments (1/3 of the population). 
2004: 
Fees are paid completely -payments for  
GPs/ Primary Care 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
In patient services / Hospitals 
Dental care / Dentists 
Dentures / "false teeth" 
Medicines 
Medical devices e.g. spectacles 
 
Remark: 
Laboratory tests and services by specialists 
are predominantly provided in Hospitals, and 
require not extra co-payment. 
For Medical Card Holders, all services are 
provided in kind and usually without co-
payments (1/3 of the population). 
Italy 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs / Primary Care 
Hospitals / in-patient care 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Some specialized services 
Laboratory services (X-ray etc.) 
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
Most medical devices are paid completely 
out of pocket. Dental care and dentures are 
predominantly purchased privately 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs / Primary Care 
Hospitals / in-patient care 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for  
Some specialized services 
Laboratory services (X-ray etc) 
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
Most medical devices are paid completely out 
of pocket. Dental care and dentures are 
predominantly purchased privately 
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CP1  Do patients have to pay a co-payment for the medical services and products listed 
below? If so, is this co-payment a certain amount, independent of the costs of the service or 
is it a percentage of the costs of the service? 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No co-payment for:  
Laboratory services (provided as a part of 
Hospital treatment) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for:   
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Dental Care 
Medicines 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for  
Hospital/Inpatient Services  
Dentures 
Medical devices – the HIFs reimburse a 
certain price, the patient has to cover the 
difference 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
Laboratory services (provided as a part of 
Hospital treatment) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for:   
GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists / Specialized Care 
Dental Care 
Medicines 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for  
Hospital/Inpatient Services  
Dentures 
Medical devices – the HIFs reimburse a 
certain price, the patient has to cover the 
difference 
Netherlands 1995: 
No co-payment for  
Services of GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists/Specialists 
In patient services / Hospitals 
Laboratory tests 
Dental care / Dentists 
Dentures  
Medicines 
Medical devices (spectacles are paid out of 
pocket) 
 
Remark: 
While existent, co-payments were very 
limited in their magnitude. 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs and Primary Care 
Specialists 
Laboratory services 
In patient services and Hospitals  
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Dental Care 
Dentures  
Some medical devices, e.g. hearing aids 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Medicines (the difference between the 
reference price and the product chosen by the 
patient) 
Medical Devices  
New Zealand 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
Public Hospitals 
Public specialists 
Laboratory services in public hospitals 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Primary Care / GPs (the remainder of the 
GPs fee after the subsidy) 
Medicines 
 
Patients have to pay the full price of 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
Public Hospitals 
Public specialists 
Laboratory services in public hospitals 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Primary Care / GPs (the remainder of the 
GP’s fee after the subsidy) 
Medicines 
 
Patients have to pay the full price of 
Dental Care 
Dentures 
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CP1  Do patients have to pay a co-payment for the medical services and products listed 
below? If so, is this co-payment a certain amount, independent of the costs of the service or 
is it a percentage of the costs of the service? 
Specialized care provided on private terms 
Most medical devices  
Specialized care provided on private terms 
Most medical devices 
Norway 1995: 
No co-payments for  
In patient / Hospital - including all services 
provided 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
GPs / Primary Care Services 
Specialists – also if provided in a hospital’s 
out-patient department 
Laboratory services – e.g. x-rays 
Medicines 
Medical devices  
 
Payment of the total amount, since the 
service is not covered by the Health System 
Dental Care – not covered for adults 
Dentures – not covered for adults 
Medical devices - like spectacles 
2004: 
No co-payments for  
In patient / Hospital - including all services 
provided 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
GPs / Primary Care Services 
Specialists – also if provided in hospitals 
Laboratory services 
Medicines 
Medical devices  
 
Payment of the total amount: 
Dental Care– not covered for adults 
Dentures– not covered for adults 
Medical devices  - like spectacles 
Portugal 1995: 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines (0% to 100%) 
Medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
GPs and primary care services 
Specialized services if provided in a Hospital 
In patient services / Hospitals (charged by the 
hospital) 
Some laboratory services 
 
Dentures and Dental care are not covered by 
the NHS and are paid out of pocket, unless 
covered by a Supplementary Insurance 
2004:  
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines (0% to 100%) 
Medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
GPs and primary care services 
Specialized services if provided in a Hospital 
In patient services / Hospitals (charged by the 
hospital) 
Some laboratory services 
 
Dentures and Dental care are not covered by 
the NHS and are paid out of pocket unless 
covered by a Supplementary Insurance 
Poland 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs/ Primary Care 
Specialists 
Hospitals / in-patient services 
Laboratory services 
Dental Care – only covered standard services 
Dentures 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for 
Medicines  
Medical Devices  
For both, the co-payment is the difference 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs/ Primary Care 
Specialists 
Hospitals / in-patient services 
Laboratory services 
Dental Care - only covered standard services 
Dentures 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for 
Medicines - difference between the 
reimbursement price and the actual price 
Medical Devices – 30-50% of the price 
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CP1  Do patients have to pay a co-payment for the medical services and products listed 
below? If so, is this co-payment a certain amount, independent of the costs of the service or 
is it a percentage of the costs of the service? 
between the reimbursement price and the 
actual price 
 
 
 
Remark: 
Co-payment of a certain amount instead of a 
percentage are in place for some groups e.g. 
chronically ill. Non-standard dental care is 
not covered by the Health System and has to 
be paid out of pocket. 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
Diagnostics – for some diagnostic procedures, 
a flat fee is charged 
 
Remark: 
Co-payment of a certain amount instead of a 
percentage are in place for some groups e.g. 
chronically ill. Non-standard dental care is not 
covered by the Health System and has to be 
paid out of pocket. 
Spain 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs/ Primary Care 
Specialists 
Hospitals / in-patient services 
Laboratory services 
Dental Care (the services which are covered) 
Most medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
Most dental care and dentures are privately 
purchased. Some medical devices are paid 
for out of pocket 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
GPs/ Primary Care 
Specialists 
Hospitals / in-patient services 
Laboratory services 
Dental Care (covered services) 
Most medical devices 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines 
 
Remark: 
Most dental care and dentures are privately 
purchased. Some medical devices are paid for 
out of pocket 
Sweden 1995: 
No co-payment for:  
Laboratory tests (part of hospital treatment) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Dental Care 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
GPs/Primary Care services (consultation fee) 
Specialists 
Hospitals (a daily fee) 
 
Remark:  
Dental care, Dentures, and Medical Devices 
are subsidized with a certain amount, the 
patient has to pay the rest 
2004: 
No co-payment for:  
Laboratory tests (part of hospital treatment) 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for  
Medicines 
Medical devices 
Dental Care 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount for 
GPs/Primary Care services (consultation fee) 
Specialists 
Hospitals(a daily fee) 
 
Remark:  
Dental care, Dentures, and Medical Devices 
are subsidized with a certain amount, the 
patient has to pay the rest 
Switzerland 1995: 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for all 
services 
2004: 
Co-payment of a certain percentage for all 
services 
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CP1  Do patients have to pay a co-payment for the medical services and products listed 
below? If so, is this co-payment a certain amount, independent of the costs of the service or 
is it a percentage of the costs of the service? 
Remark: 
For all medical services, the patient has to 
pay the first 150 SFR arising as medical 
expenditure in a year. Then, he has to pay a 
percentage of the price of the medical service 
up to a certain limit. 
Patients (or their VHI) have to pay the full 
price of Dental Care and Dentures.  
There is only one commercial Insurance 
Company which offers coverage of these 
payments, and there is a discussion to forbid 
this kind of supplementary insurance.  
Remark: 
For all medical services, the patient has to pay 
the first 300 SFR arising as medical 
expenditure in a year. Then, he has to pay a 
percentage (currently 10% ) of the price of the 
medical service up to a certain limit, currently 
700 SFR. 
Patients (or their VHI) have to pay the full 
price of Dental Care and Dentures. 
There is only one commercial Insurance 
Company which offers coverage of these 
payments, and there is a discussion to forbid 
this kind of supplementary insurance. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No co-payment for  
Services of GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists/Specialists 
In patient services / Hospitals 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount of for  
Laboratory services 
Medicines 
Medical devices – some are free 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage  
Dental care / Dentists 
Dentures / "false teeth" – the co-payment is 
80% of the price up to a limit of 250 GBP. 
For dental care not covered by the NHS, the 
patient has to pay the full price 
2004:  
No co-payment for  
Services of GPs / Primary Care 
Specialists/Specialists 
In patient services / Hospitals 
 
Co-payment of a certain amount of for  
Laboratory services 
Medicines 
Medical devices – some are free 
 
Co-payment of a certain percentage  
Dental care / Dentists 
Dentures / "false teeth" – the co-payment is 
80% of the price up to a limit of 250 GBP. 
For dental care not covered by the NHS, the 
patient has to pay the full price 
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CP2  Are there exemptions from co-payments? 
Austria 1995:  
People under a certain income are exempted 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted 
2004:  
People under a certain income are exempted 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted 
Remark: 
People with a certain health status are 
exempted from co-payments, but only subject 
to certain income limits 
Belgium 1995: 
Certain groups, the VIPO group is exempted. 
It consists of widows, orphans, retired and 
disabled.  
Remark: 
There is a wide range of co-payment 
regulations, which cover in an ad hoc fashion 
a wide range of groups. The exemption takes 
the form of an upper limit for the total sum of 
co-payments payable per period 
2004: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments payable per period – for some 
groups only 
People under a certain income are exempted – 
since 1997 
People with a certain health status, disabled 
are exempted 
Certain groups, the “VIPO”, are exempted 
Canada 1995: 
There are basically no exemptions from co-
payments 
Remark: 
Factually, there are exemptions in some 
provinces. For some groups, e.g. 
unemployed, the provincial government pays 
the co-payment. For services not covered 
there is in some cases a system of subsidies 
at the provincial level, which for instance 
cover up to 80% of a medicine’s price or 
cover the expenditure for medicines in the 
case in some circumstances.  
2004: 
There are basically no exemptions from co-
payments 
Remark: 
Factually, there are exemptions in some 
provinces. For some groups, e.g. unemployed, 
the provincial government pays the co-
payment. For services not covered there is in 
some cases a system of subsidies at the 
provincial level, which for instance cover up 
to 80% of a medicine’s price or cover the 
expenditure for medicines in the case in some 
circumstances. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
There are basically no exemptions from co-
payment 
2004: 
There are basically no exemptions from co-
payment 
Denmark 1995:  
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments payable per period; for 
pharmaceuticals 
People under a certain income are exempted 
from co-payments (e.g. people on pensions) 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted from co-
payments; for some indications e.g. 
physiotherapy for patient with muscular-
skeletal diseases 
Certain groups, children, are exempted but 
for certain services only, e.g. dental care 
2004: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments payable per period; for 
pharmaceuticals 
People under a certain income are exempted 
from co-payments (e.g. people on pensions) 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted from co-
payments; for some indications e.g. 
physiotherapy for patient with muscular-
skeletal diseases 
Certain groups, children, are exempted but for 
certain services only, e.g. dental care 
Finland 1995: 
There is a upper limit for co-payments 
2004: 
There is a upper limit for co-payments 
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CP2  Are there exemptions from co-payments? 
People with a certain health status are 
exempted 
Certain groups are exempted 
People with a certain health status are 
exempted 
Certain groups are exempted 
France 1995:  
People under a certain income are exempted 
from co-payments; people under a certain 
income benefit of a “public” VHI in order to 
cover the co-payments. 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted from co-
payments for those health care and services 
which are directly linked to the chronic 
illness 
Certain groups of patients, maternity and 
work accidents, are exempted  
2004: 
People under a certain income are exempted 
from co-payments; people under a certain 
income benefit of a “public” VHI in order to 
cover the co-payments. 
People with a certain health status  
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted from co-
payments for health care and services directly 
linked to the chronic illness 
Certain groups of patients, maternity and 
work accidents, are exempted 
Remark: 
Since 2000, the CMU act extended the share 
of the population, which whom co-payments 
are paid by the state substantially 
Germany 1995: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments payable per period – the limit is a 
certain percentage of the gross-income 
People under a certain income are exempted 
Certain groups – persons under 18 years of 
age and chronically ill - are exempted 
2004: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments payable per period– the limit is a 
certain percentage of the gross-income 
People under a certain income are exempted 
Certain groups – persons under 18 years of 
age and chronically ill - are exempted 
Greece 1995: 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) and certain groups are 
exempted from some co-payments 
2004: 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) and certain groups are 
exempted from some co-payments 
Hungary 1995: 
People under a certain income are exempted 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted 
Dental care for those below 18 years of age is 
covered 
2004: 
People under a certain income are exempted 
People with a certain health status 
(chronically-ill-status) are exempted 
Dental care for those below 18 years of age is 
covered 
Ireland 1995 
People under a certain income are exempted 
from co-payments ( Medical Card Holders). 
This concerns about a third of the population 
2004: 
People under a certain income are exempted 
from co-payments (Medical Card Holders). 
This concerns about a third of the population 
Since 2001, persons over 70 years of age are 
exempted from co-payments irrespective of 
their income 
For Pharmaceuticals and Hospital fees there is 
a upper limit of co-payments per period 
Italy 1995: 
People under a certain income are exempted  
People with a certain health status are 
exempted  
Certain groups, children and elderly, are 
exempted 
2004: 
People under a certain income are exempted  
People with a certain health status are 
exempted from co-payments 
Certain groups, children and elderly, are 
exempted 
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CP2  Are there exemptions from co-payments? 
Remark: 
Parallel to the introduction of co-payments, 
there has been a proliferation of exemptions 
for co-payments. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
People under a certain income are partially 
exempted 
People with a certain health status – 
medicines and treatments concerning chronic 
illnesses are exempted 
Certain groups, children, are exempted in 
some cases from co-payments e.g. in the case 
of hospitalization 
Treatments concerning but also preventive 
care are exempted 
2004: 
People under a certain income are partially 
exempted 
People with a certain health status – 
medicines and treatments concerning chronic 
illnesses are exempted 
Certain groups, children, are exempted in 
some cases from co-payments e.g. in the case 
of hospitalization 
Treatments concerning but also preventive 
care are exempted 
Netherlands 1995: 
While the possibility of a co-payment 
existed, co-payments hardly existed in 
practice  
2004: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments per period 
People under a certain income are exempted  
Certain groups, like children and elderly, are 
exempted 
New Zealand 1995: 
There is a upper limit for the co-payments 
payable per period 
People under a certain income, 
People with a certain Health status, and 
People belonging to certain groups, receive 
higher subsidies. 
Remark: 
The co-payment is the same for all, but the 
subsidy received by the state differs. The co 
payment is the remainder of the price the 
patient has to pay and the subsidy received 
by the health system. The subsidy level - and 
hence the co-payment level - is determined 
and limited by the age and health status. 
2004: 
There is a upper limit for the co-payments 
payable per period 
People under a certain income,  
People with a certain Health status, and 
People belonging to certain groups, receive 
higher subsidies. 
Remark: 
The co-payment is the same for all, but the 
subsidy received by the state differs. The co 
payment is the remainder of the price the 
patient has to pay and the subsidy received by 
the health system. The subsidy level - and 
hence the co-payment level - is determined 
and limited by the age and health status. 
Norway 1995: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments 
Certain groups are exempted (children under 
7 years of age are exempted, dental care for 
persons under 18 is covered) 
2004: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments 
Certain groups are exempted: children under 7 
years of age and people below a certain 
income are exempted. Dental care for persons 
under 18 is covered) 
Portugal 1995: 
People under a certain income are exempted 
Certain groups are exempted  
People with a certain health status are 
exempted 
2004: 
Reduced co-payments for people with a 
certain health status and pensioners 
People under a certain income are exempted 
People with a certain health status are 
exempted 
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CP2  Are there exemptions from co-payments? 
Poland 1995: 
While there are no complete exemptions, 
some groups (chronically ill) pay reduced co-
payments, pay fixed amounts instead of 
percentages or get higher reimbursements for 
their expenses 
2004: 
While there are no complete exemptions, 
some groups (chronically ill) pay reduced co-
payments, pay fixed amount instead of 
percentages or get higher reimbursements for 
their expenses 
Spain 1995: 
People with a certain health status and certain 
groups (retired people) are exempted from 
co-payments or pay only reduced co-
payments 
2004: 
People with a certain health status and certain 
groups (retired people) are exempted from co 
payments or pay only reduced co-payments 
Sweden 1995: 
Upper limit for the total sum of co-payments 
Certain groups are exempted (under 20 years 
of age) 
2004: 
Upper limit for the total sum of co-payments 
Certain groups are exempted 
Switzerland 1995: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments 
Treatments during pregnancy are exempted 
from co-payments 
2004: 
There is a upper limit for the total sum of co-
payments (700 SFR) 
Treatments during pregnancy are exempted 
from co-payments 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, there are exemptions for: 
People under a certain income,  
People with a certain health status  
Certain groups are exempted from co 
payments 
Remark: 
Exemptions also depend on the type of 
service, even for the groups mentioned, the 
exemptions hold for certain services only 
2004: 
Yes, there are exemptions for: 
People under a certain income,  
People with a certain health status  
Certain groups are exempted from co 
payments  
Remark: 
Exemptions also depend on the type of 
service, even for the groups mentioned, the 
exemptions hold for certain services only 
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CP3  Can the patient cover the costs of the co-payments and out-of-pocket payments by an 
Supplementary Insurance?  
Austria 1995:  
Yes, a supplementary insurance may cover 
co-payments, and it may cover the complete 
co-payment 
2004:  
Yes, a supplementary insurance may cover 
co-payments and it may cover the complete 
co-payment 
Belgium 1995: 
Yes, a supplementary insurance may cover 
co-payments 
Remark: 
The HIFs are also the predominant providers 
of VHI, offering their members additional 
coverage on a voluntary basis for services not 
covered by the Health System. The 
Supplementary Insurance for hospital 
treatments usually covers the total co-
payment arising during in-patient treatment. 
The Supplementary Insurance for primary 
care usually covers only part of the co-
payment 
2004:  
Yes, a supplementary insurance may cover 
co-payments 
Remark: 
The HIFs are also the predominant providers 
of VHI, offering their members additional 
coverage on a voluntary basis for services not 
covered by the Health System. The 
Supplementary Insurance for hospital 
treatments usually covers the total co-
payment arising during in-patient treatment. 
The Supplementary Insurance for primary 
care usually covers only part of the co-
payment 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments  
Remark: 
Usually organized and paid for by the 
employer, the Supplementary Insurance 
covers services which are not covered by the 
health system, e.g. dental care and 
expenditure for medicines. The actual 
coverage differs among insurers. 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments  
Remark: 
Usually organized and paid for by the 
employer, the Supplementary Insurance 
covers services which are not covered by the 
health system, e.g. dental care and 
expenditure for medicines. The actual 
coverage differs among insurers. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No, a Supplementary Insurance covering co-
payments is not available 
Remark: 
There is no market for a supplementary 
insurance. 
2004: 
No, an insurance covering co-payments is not 
available 
Remark: 
The role of the supplementary health 
insurance is still very limited and only 
supplementary. For persons, which are not 
eligible to participate in the Mandatory Health 
Insurance, the GHIF is also the supplementary 
insurance.  
Denmark 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments. Usually it does not cover the 
complete co-payment 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments, and usually it covers the 
complete co-payment 
Remark: 
Supplementary Insurance covers medicines, 
dental care, medical devices and the access to 
private hospitals in order to skip waiting times
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CP3  Can the patient cover the costs of the co-payments and out-of-pocket payments by an 
Supplementary Insurance?  
Finland 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments.  
Remark: 
Expenditure for dental care and medicines is 
mostly covered by the NHI which leaves 
only a small role for a VHI, even though the 
NHI does not cover the complete co-
payment. Albeit a VHI to cover the complete 
co-payment is not forbidden, it factually does 
not exist. 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments.  
Remark: 
Expenditure for dental care and medicines is 
mostly covered by the NHI which leaves only 
a small role for a VHI, even though the NHI 
does not cover the complete co-payment. 
Albeit a VHI to cover the complete co-
payment is not forbidden, it factually does not 
exist. 
France 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments, usually it covers the complete 
co-payment.  
Remark: 
These insurance are offered either by for-
profit insurance companies or mutualities. 
They aim in particular at covering the co-
payments which arise.  
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments, usually it covers the complete 
co-payment 
Remark: 
Even after taking into account the coverage of 
the Supplementary Insurance, the share of 
direct payments out-of-pocket is about 11% of 
the total health expenditure. Supplementary 
insurance is often associated with 
employment 
Germany 1995:  
Supplementary Insurance may cover co-
payments, and may cover the complete co-
payment – but usually it doesn’t.  
Remark: 
Most Supplementary Insurance is for extra 
services, e.g. single room, treatment by the 
chief consultant in a Hospital etc. 
2004: 
Supplementary Insurance may cover co-
payments, and may cover the complete co-
payment – but usually it doesn’t.  
Remark: 
Most Supplementary insurance is for extra 
services, e.g. single room, treatment by the 
chief consultant in a Hospital etc. 
Greece 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance covering co-
payments is allowed and usually covers the 
complete co-payments 
Remark: 
Basically, there are three layers of coverage. 
The public system, ESY, the HIF and the 
VHI for services not covered by either of the 
two former.   
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance covering co-
payments is allowed and usually covers the 
complete co-payments 
Remark: 
Basically, there are three layers of coverage. 
The public system, ESY, the HIF and the VHI 
for services not covered by either of the two 
former. 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance covering co-
payments is allowed. Usually it does not 
cover the complete co-payments 
Remark: 
The VHI covers those services, which are not 
or not fully covered by the health system, e.g. 
co-payments and dental care. Its role is very 
limited, in 2000, it only accounted for 0.2% 
of the Health Expenditure. 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance covering co-
payments is allowed. Usually it does not 
cover the complete co-payments 
Remark: 
The VHI covers those services, which are not 
or not fully covered by the health system, e.g. 
co-payments and dental care. Its role is very 
limited, in 2000, it only accounted for 0.2% of 
the Health Expenditure. 
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CP3  Can the patient cover the costs of the co-payments and out-of-pocket payments by an 
Supplementary Insurance?  
Ireland 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments. Usually it covers only a share 
of the co-payment. There is a substantial 
deductible, in particular for GP fees 
Remark: 
The Voluntary Health Insurance Board, VHI, 
is the main Supplementary Insurance, 
covering about a third of the population in 
1995 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments. Usually it covers only a share of 
the co-payment. There is a substantial 
deductible, in particular for GP fees 
Remark: 
The Voluntary Health Insurance, VHI, is the 
main Supplementary Insurance, covering 
about 45% of the population in 2004 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments, but factually does not  
 
2004: 
Yes, a supplementary insurance may cover 
co-payments, but factually does not. 
Remark: 
Of the private payments for health care, 91 % 
are direct out of pocket payments. 
Luxembourg 1994:  
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments. Usually, it covers only a share 
of the co-payments, in some case, e.g. 
dentistry, it may not cover the complete co-
payment. 
Remark: 
The supplementary insurance covering 
dentistry is the most important one 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments. Usually, it covers only a share 
of the co-payments, in some case, e.g. 
dentistry, it may not cover the complete co-
payment 
Remark: 
The supplementary insurance covering 
dentistry is the most important one 
Netherlands 1995:  
No, since co-payments hardly existed, there 
was no necessity for a supplementary 
insurance to cover them 
2004: 
A Supplementary Insurance covering the co-
payments is not forbidden but not offered.  
Remark: 
Those insurance contracts offered cover only 
part of the co-payments and extras, like dental 
care. 
New Zealand 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance /VHI may 
cover co-payments.  
Remark:  
It may cover the complete co-payment, but 
whether it does so, depends on the contract. 
Usually the VHI is used to cover gaps 
between the price and the subsidy or to cover 
services which are not covered by the health 
system, e.g. dental care. 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance / VHI may 
cover co-payments,  
Remark:  
It may cover the complete co-payment, but 
whether it does so, depends on the contract. 
Usually the VHI is used to cover gaps 
between the price and the subsidy or to cover 
services which are not covered by the health 
system, e.g. dental care. 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments, usually it covers only a share 
of the co-payment 
Remark: 
Usually, the National Insurance Scheme, 
NIS, covers most of the out of pocket 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
co-payments, usually it covers only a share of 
the co-payment 
Remark: 
Usually, the National Insurance Scheme acts 
as a Supplementary Health Insurance and 
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Supplementary Insurance?  
payments, in particular for medicines. But 
also for services from providers independent 
of the public system. The NIS is a mandatory 
national level insurance controlled by the 
government, for all persons, covering co-
payments but also income loss during illness. 
There is factually no market for a additional 
VHI apart from insurance which offer extra 
monetary benefits.  
covers most of the out of pocket payments. 
There is no market for a additional VHI apart 
from insurance which offer extra monetary 
benefits. 
Portugal 1995: 
Yes, a supplementary insurance may cover 
the co-payments, but usually doesn’t cover 
them completely  
Remark: 
About 10% of the population have 
supplementary insurance, mostly organized 
and paid for by the employer, who pays the 
largest part of the contribution. There is not 
really a market since co-payments are 
relatively low apart from those for medicines. 
Usually, the VHI does not cover the 
complete co-payment. 
2004: 
Yes, a supplementary insurance may cover 
the co-payments, but usually doesn’t cover 
them completely  
Remark: 
About 10% of the population have 
supplementary insurance, mostly organized 
and paid for by the employer, who pays the 
largest part of the contribution. There is not 
really a market since co-payments are 
relatively low apart from those for medicines. 
Usually, the VHI does not cover the complete 
co-payment. 
Poland 1995: 
There is no Supplementary Insurance 
covering co-payments.  
Remark: 
Existing VHI cover the income loss during 
the time of illness. 
2004: 
There is no VHI covering co-payments.  
Remark: 
Existing VHI cover the income loss during 
the time of illness. 
Spain 1995: 
Supplementary Insurance does not cover co-
payments, but is primarily for covering 
services which are nor covered by the health 
system; e.g. dental care.  
2004: 
Supplementary Insurance does not cover co-
payments, but is primarily for covering 
services which are nor covered by the health 
system; e.g. dental care. 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
the co-payments 
Remark:  
The role of Supplementary Insurance is very 
limited, contributing only about 1% to the 
health expenditure. Usually it is paid partly 
by the employer as a bonus 
2004: 
Yes, a Supplementary Insurance may cover 
the co-payments 
Remark:  
The role of Supplementary Insurance is very 
limited, contributing only about 1% to the 
health expenditure. Usually it is paid partly by 
the employer as a bonus. 
Switzerland 1995: 
A supplementary insurance to cover co-
payments is forbidden 
Remark: 
There is only one commercial Insurance 
Company implicitly offering coverage of the 
co-payments, but it is rarely used. There is a 
debate on whether to forbid this type of 
2004: 
A Supplementary Insurance to cover co-
payments is forbidden 
Remark: 
There is only one commercial Insurance 
Company implicitly offering coverage of the 
co-payments, but it is rarely used. There is a 
debate on whether to forbid this type of 
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supplementary insurance formally. The VHI 
is usually for coverage of dental care or 
superior accommodation in Hospitals. 
supplementary insurance formally. The VHI 
is usually for coverage of dental care or 
superior accommodation in Hospitals. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No supplementary Insurance for co-payments 
is available. 
Remark: 
A Supplementary Insurance is not forbidden, 
but does not exist with the exemption of an 
insurance covering dental care. 
2004: 
No supplementary Insurance for co-payments 
is available. 
Remark: 
A Supplementary Insurance is not forbidden, 
but does not exist with the exemption of an 
insurance covering dental care. 
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4.3. Gatekeeping, Choice and Access to In-Patient-Care, Hospitals and Specialists 
In some countries, the patient can directly visit a Specialist or a Hospital (no gatekeeping).  
In other countries, the patient has to visit his General Practitioner / Primary Care Provider 
before going to a specialist or a Hospital (gatekeeping); see GK1. 
The way the gatekeeping is handled, differs. In some countries, it can be skipped easily, in 
others, it’s binding and either cannot be skipped at all or can only be skipped at substantial 
costs; see GK2.  
In some countries, there are also regulations in place concerning not only whether the patient 
can visit a specialists or a hospital, but also where a patient has to receive treatment; see GK3. 
Apart from the regulations and implementation of gatekeeping regulations, the factual choice 
among providers offering a certain medical service differs. In some countries, while choice is 
formally free, the supply of a provider in a region may be very limited, see GK4. 
Remark: while listed, gatekeeping for dental care does usually not exist, cancel it in the table 
 
GK1  Is there Gatekeeping of General Practitioners for Hospitals, Specialists, or Dentists? 
Austria 1995:  
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
According to law there is some gatekeeping, 
in practice not really executed. 
2004:  
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
According to law there is some gatekeeping, 
in practice not really executed. In recent years 
there is a tendency to enforce existing 
regulations on gatekeeping 
Belgium 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
Canada 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals (unless in case of 
emergencies) and Specialists 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals (unless in case of 
emergencies) and Specialists 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
There are no formal regulations on 
gatekeeping. While most patients visit 
hospitals and specialists upon referral of a 
GP, this is not required. Some specialties are 
usually contacted directly, e.g. eye-doctors, 
gynecologists. 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
There are no formal regulations on 
gatekeeping. While most patients visit 
hospitals and specialists upon referral of a GP, 
this is not required. Some specialties are 
usually contacted directly, e.g. eye-doctors, 
gynecologists. 
Denmark 1995:  
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
With exemption of ear-,nose-, throat and eye 
specialists and dentists 
Remark: 
For 98% of the population, there is 
gatekeeping. The rest, “type 2” insured, has 
more choice in access to providers but has to 
pay higher costs 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
With exemption of ear-,nose-, throat and eye 
specialists and dentists  
Remark: 
For 98% of the population, there is 
gatekeeping. The rest, “type 2” insured, has 
more choice in access to providers but has to 
pay higher costs 
Finland 1995: 
No gatekeeping for specialized services 
provided in the Health Centers  
Gatekeeping for hospitals and specialized 
services provided in Hospitals on an out-
2004: 
No gatekeeping for specialized services 
provided in the Health Centers  
Gatekeeping for hospitals and specialized 
services provided in Hospitals on an out-
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patient basis. 
Remark: 
Health Centers usually are well equipped, 
more sophisticated specialized services are 
predominantly provided in Hospitals 
patient basis. 
Remark: 
Health Centers usually are well equipped, 
more sophisticated specialized services are 
predominantly provided in Hospitals 
France 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
2004:  
Since August 2004 there is gatekeeping for 
specialists and hospitals; for hospitals with 
the exception of the case of emergencies, for 
specialists with the exemption of eye 
specialists, psychiatrist, gynecologist, 
pediatrician where there is a direct access 
with no sanction 
Germany 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals; unless in case of 
emergencies 
Remark: 
For a long time, there was a gatekeeping of 
first contact GPs for Specialists; this was 
abolished mid 90s  
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals; unless in the case 
of emergencies 
No gatekeeping for Specialists 
Greece 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
The patient can access facilities of the ESY.  
The patient has free choice among those 
providers with a contract with his HIF 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
The patient can access facilities of the ESY.  
The patient has free choice among those 
providers with a contract with his HIF 
Hungary 1995 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and for Specialist 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals and polyclinics. The 
gatekeeping for Specialists is subject to many 
exemptions 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and for Specialist 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals and polyclinics. The 
gatekeeping for Specialists is subject to many 
exemptions 
Ireland 1995 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and for Specialist. 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided 
in Hospitals 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and for Specialist. 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided in 
Hospitals 
Italy 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark: 
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided in Hospitals. There are exemptions 
for certain specialties, e.g. gynecologists, eye 
doctors and pediatrics. Dentistry / and 
Dentures is predominantly privately 
purchased 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark:  
Specialized medical care is predominantly 
provided in Hospitals. There are exemptions 
for certain specialties, e.g. gynecologists. 
Dentistry / and Dentures is predominantly 
privately purchased 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No gatekeeping 
 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
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Netherlands 1995:  
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialist 
Remark: 
Patients have to register with a GP as well 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialist 
Remark: 
Patients have to register with a GP as well 
New Zealand 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and public 
specialist 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided 
in Hospitals 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and public 
specialists 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided in 
Hospitals 
Norway 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark:  
Dentistry for adults is not covered by the 
Health System but is privately purchased. 
The patient can in principle opt out of the 
public system, but this incurs substantial 
costs.  
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark: 
Dentistry for adults is not covered by the 
Health System but is privately purchased. The 
patient can in principle opt out of the public 
system, but this incurs substantial costs. 
Portugal 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark  
Dentistry / and Dentures are not covered by 
the Health System but is privately purchased 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark  
Dentistry / and Dentures are not covered by 
the Health System but is privately purchased 
Poland 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark: 
For some specialties, the access is direct, e.g. 
to eye doctors, dentists and gynecologists. 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Remark: 
For some specialties, the access is direct, e.g. 
to eye doctors, dentists and gynecologists. 
Spain 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Dental care is predominantly privately 
purchased 
Remark: 
The choice of the GP is usually also limited 
to those within the health area, as the lowest 
unit of the Health System. 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialists 
Dental Care is predominantly privately 
purchased 
Remark: 
The choice of the GP is usually also limited to 
those within the health area, as the lowest unit 
of the Health System. 
Sweden 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialist 
Remark  
Dentistry / and Dentures for adults are not 
covered by the Health System but is privately 
purchased 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialist 
Remark  
Dentistry / and Dentures for adults are not 
covered by the Health System but is privately 
purchased 
Switzerland 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialist 
No gatekeeping for Dentists, even for those 
services covered by the NHS 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for Hospitals and Specialist 
No gatekeeping for Dentists, even for those 
services covered by the NHS 
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GK2  If there is gatekeeping, how strict is the gatekeeping factually handled?  
Austria 1995:  
Factually no gatekeeping 
2004:  
Factually no gatekeeping 
Belgium 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
Canada 1995: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped 
unless in case of an emergency 
Gatekeeping for specialists cannot be skipped
2004: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped 
unless in case of an emergency 
Gatekeeping for specialists cannot be skipped 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
Denmark 1995  
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped, 
unless in the case of an emergency  
Gatekeeping for specialists cannot be skipped
2004: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped 
unless in case of an emergency 
Gatekeeping for specialists cannot be skipped 
Finland 1995: 
Gatekeeping to hospitals can be skipped, but 
the service is not covered 
2004: 
Gatekeeping can be skipped, but the service is 
not covered 
France 1995:  
No gatekeeping 
2004:  
Gatekeeping to Hospitals and Specialists is 
being introduced but not yet operative 
Germany 1995: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped 
unless in case of an emergency 
As long as the gatekeeping for specialists 
existed, up to the mid 90s, it could not be 
skipped 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped 
unless in case of an emergency 
No gatekeeping for specialists 
Greece 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
The patient can directly access facilities of 
the ESY. For non-ESY providers, the patient 
has free choice among those providers with a 
contract with his HIF. 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
Remark: 
The patient can directly access facilities of the 
ESY. For non-ESY providers, the patient has 
free choice among those providers with a 
contract with his HIF. 
Hungary 1995: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals can be skipped, but 
it incurs higher costs. There are also many 
cases where it can be skipped without higher 
costs  
Gatekeeping for specialists can be skipped, 
but it incurs higher costs. 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals can be skipped, but 
it incurs higher costs. There are also many 
cases where it can be skipped without higher 
costs  
Gatekeeping for specialists can be skipped, 
but it incurs higher costs. 
Ireland 1995: 
Gatekeeping to Hospitals and specialized 
care provided in Hospitals can be skipped, 
but it incurs higher costs  
Remark:  
There is a extra fee if the patient wants to 
receive specialized outpatient services 
without having a referral of a GP 
 
2004: 
Gatekeeping to Hospitals and specialized care 
provided in Hospitals can be skipped, but it 
incurs higher costs 
Remark:  
There is a extra fee if the patient wants to 
receive specialized outpatient services without 
having a referral of a GP 
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Italy 1995: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals and specialists can 
be skipped, but the service is not covered and 
has to be purchased privately or by the 
supplementary insurance 
Remark: 
As a rule, gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be 
skipped unless in case of an emergency. This 
also concerns the access to specialized 
medical services provided in hospitals. 
Gatekeeping for Specialists cannot be 
skipped unless for certain specialists, e.g. 
gynecologists, eye doctors or pediatrics.  
2004: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals and specialists can 
be skipped, but the service is not covered and 
has to be purchased privately or by the 
supplementary insurance 
Remark: 
As a rule, gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be 
skipped unless in case of an emergency. This 
also concerns the access to specialized 
medical services provided in hospitals. 
Gatekeeping for Specialists cannot be skipped 
unless for certain specialists, e.g. 
gynecologists, eye doctors or pediatrics 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No gatekeeping 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
Netherlands 1995: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals and specialists 
cannot be skipped (unless in the case of an 
emergency) 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals and specialists 
cannot be skipped (unless in the case of an 
emergency) 
New Zealand 1995: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped 
unless in case of an emergency 
Gatekeeping for specialists can be skipped, 
but the service is not covered, people can go 
to private specialists and get treatment on 
private terms 
Remark: 
People can self-refer to hospitals in the case 
of an emergency. Factually, they are not 
turned away in non-urgent situations 
2004: 
Gatekeeping for hospitals cannot be skipped 
unless in case of an emergency 
Gatekeeping for specialists can be skipped, 
but the service is not covered, people can go 
to private specialists and get treatment on 
private terms 
Remark: 
People can self-refer to hospitals in the case 
of an emergency. Factually, they are not 
turned away in non-urgent situations 
Norway 1995: 
Both instances of gatekeeping can be 
skipped, but doing so incurs higher costs. 
Remark 
In the case of Hospitals, gatekeeping can be 
skipped even without higher costs.  
In the case of specialists, gatekeeping can be 
skipped, but this incurs higher costs, or the 
service is not covered: The National 
Insurance Scheme reimburses part of the 
expenses, but only if there is a referral. 
2004: 
Both instances of gatekeeping can be skipped, 
but doing so incurs higher costs. 
Remark: 
In the case of Hospitals, gatekeeping can 
sometimes be skipped even without higher 
costs. 
In the case of specialists, gatekeeping can be 
skipped, but this incurs higher costs, or the 
service is not covered 
Portugal 1995: 
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped unless in case of emergencies 
Remark: 
Gatekeeping for specialists can be skipped, 
but this incurs higher costs. The service 
might be purchased from a private provider 
on private terms, the costs of which are 
covered either by the patient, the subsistema 
2004: 
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped unless in case of emergencies 
Remark: 
Gatekeeping for specialists can be skipped, 
but this incurs higher costs. The service might 
be purchased from a private provider on 
private terms, the costs of which are covered 
either by the patient, the subsistema or the 
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or the VHI.  VHI. 
Poland 1995: 
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped unless in case of emergencies 
Remark: 
Some specialties, like eye doctors, are not 
subject to gatekeeping. 
2004: 
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped unless in case of emergencies 
Remark: 
Some specialties, like eye doctors, are not 
subject to gatekeeping. 
Spain 1995: 
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped;  
Remark: 
In the case of hospitals, it can be skipped by 
using the emergency department 
2004: 
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped 
Remark: 
In the case of hospitals, it can be skipped by 
using the emergency department 
Sweden 1995: 
Both instances of gatekeeping can be skipped 
sometimes, but getting a referral from the GP 
grants faster access and is cheaper 
2004: 
Both instances of gatekeeping can be skipped, 
but doing so incurs slightly higher costs. 
Some counties charge higher fees if there is 
no referral from a GP 
Switzerland 1995: 
No gatekeeping 
2004: 
No gatekeeping 
United Kingdom 1995:  
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped 
2004: 
Both instances of gatekeeping cannot be 
skipped 
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GK3  Apart from formal gatekeeping: Has the patient (after the gatekeeper has agreed to the 
referral per se) free choice of the Specialist (eye doctor etc.), the Hospital or the Dentist?  
That is: once the GP has agreed that the patient may visit a Specialist, is the patient free to 
visit a specialist of his own choosing? Or, has the patient to go to a certain Specialist to 
obtain treatment?  
The patient has free choice of the:   
Austria 1995:  
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004:  
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Belgium 1995. 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Canada 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist (privately paid, hence free choice) 
Remark: 
The patients can get treatment in other 
provinces. Availability differs largely among 
the provinces and sometimes patients have to 
travel to get treatment. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist ( privately paid, hence free choice) 
Remark: 
The patients can get treatment in other 
provinces. Availability differs largely among 
the provinces and sometimes patients have to 
travel to get treatment. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist  
Remark: 
The patient can only contact providers, which 
have a contract with the HIF the patient is 
insured with. This usually is no problem.  
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
The patient can only contact providers, which 
have a contract with the HIF the patient is 
insured with. This usually is no problem. 
Denmark 
Specialist  
Hospital (in the region, i.e. county)   
Dentist (privately paid, hence free choice) 
Remark: 
If the waiting time would be to long, or the 
service is unavailable in a county, the patient 
can go to another county  
2004: 
Specialist  
Hospital (in the region)   
Dentist (privately paid, hence free choice) 
Remark: 
If the waiting time would be to long, or the 
service is unavailable in a county, the patient 
can go to another county 
Finland 1995:  
Factually no free choice of specialists and 
hospitals 
Free choice of dentists (if privately paid) 
Remark: 
The citizens have only access to those 
facilities operated by the municipalities or 
the providers contracted by the 
municipalities. Choice of Hospitals (for in-
patient services and most specialized 
services) is limited to the Hospitals in the 
2004: 
Factually no free choice of specialists and 
hospitals 
Free choice of dentists (if privately paid) 
Remark: 
The citizens have only access to those 
facilities operated by the municipalities or the 
providers contracted by the municipalities. 
Choice of Hospitals (for in-patient services 
and most specialized services) is limited to 
the Hospitals in the Hospital District the 
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referral per se) free choice of the Specialist (eye doctor etc.), the Hospital or the Dentist?  
That is: once the GP has agreed that the patient may visit a Specialist, is the patient free to 
visit a specialist of his own choosing? Or, has the patient to go to a certain Specialist to 
obtain treatment?  
The patient has free choice of the:   
Hospital District the municipality belongs to. municipality belongs to. 
France 1995 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dental care is predominantly purchased 
privately, hence the choice is free 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dental care is predominantly purchased 
privately, hence the choice is free 
Germany 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Greece 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual choice is subject to local 
availability, which is sometimes limited. 
Usually patients contact first an ESY 
provider, e.g. health center. Then, if 
necessary, e.g. for a second opinion, a 
provider contracted by their HIF. If they do 
not go to a provider a contracted by their 
HIF, the services might not be covered by the 
HIF. The patient’s choice is limited to those 
providers with a contract with his HIF. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual choice is subject to local 
availability, which is sometimes limited. 
Usually patients contact first an NHS 
provider, then, if necessary, e.g. for a second 
opinion, a provider contracted by their HIF. If 
they do not go to a provider a contracted by 
their HIF, the services might not be covered 
by the HIF. The patient’s choice is limited to 
those providers with a contract with his HIF. 
Hungary 1995: 
Specialist ( limited)  
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist ( limited)  
Hospital  
Dentist 
Ireland 1995: 
Specialist  
Hospital   
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual availability differs regionally, and 
is highest in the Dublin area 
2004: 
Specialist  
Hospital   
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual availability differs regionally, and 
is highest in the Dublin area 
Italy 1995: 
Specialist  
Hospital   
Dentist (privately purchased) 
Remark: 
After the gatekeeper has agreed to the 
referral, the patient can chose a provider, also 
outside of the area of his ASL or in another 
region. There is substantial “medical 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist ( privately paid, hence free choice) 
Remark: 
After the gatekeeper has agreed to the referral, 
the patient can chose a provider, also outside 
of the area of his ASL. There is substantial 
“medical tourism”. 
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referral per se) free choice of the Specialist (eye doctor etc.), the Hospital or the Dentist?  
That is: once the GP has agreed that the patient may visit a Specialist, is the patient free to 
visit a specialist of his own choosing? Or, has the patient to go to a certain Specialist to 
obtain treatment?  
The patient has free choice of the:   
tourism”. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Netherlands 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
New Zealand 1995: 
No free / limited choice of Specialists and 
Hospitals 
Free choice of dentists, since dental care is 
privately purchased. The same is true for 
specialized care purchased on private terms. 
Remark: 
The limited choice is due to the availability 
of providers in the area. While in most areas, 
a Hospital is available, usually only one 
hospital is available in most regions outside 
of the densely populated areas.  
2004: 
No free / limited choice of Specialists and 
Hospitals 
Free choice of dentists, since dental care is 
privately purchased. The same is true for 
specialized care purchased on private terms. 
Remark: 
The limited choice is due to the availability of 
providers in the area. While in most areas, a 
Hospital is available, usually only one 
hospital is available in most regions outside of 
the densely populated areas. 
Norway 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist (because purchased privately) 
Remark: 
Due to differences in population density, the 
factual access and choice among providers 
differs among areas. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist (because purchased privately) 
Remark: 
Due to differences in population density, the 
factual access and choice among providers 
differs among areas 
Portugal 1995: 
No free choice of Hospital or Specialist 
Free choice of the Dentist, since this is paid 
out of pocket 
Remark: 
The availability of providers differs among 
regions and this sets restrictions to the 
choice, in particular outside the coastal area 
and Lisbon. 
2004: 
No free choice of Hospital or Specialist 
Free choice of the Dentist, since this is paid 
out of pocket 
Remark: 
The availability of providers differs among 
regions and this sets restrictions to the choice, 
in particular outside the coastal area and 
Lisbon. 
Poland 1995 
Factually no free choice 
Remark: 
The choice is locally limited to the Hospitals 
and facilities in the municipality or region.  
2004: 
Factually only limited choice, albeit patients 
are since 1999 free to chose any hospital in 
the country. 
Remark: 
The choice of Hospitals is factually still 
locally limited. If patients were referred to a 
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referral per se) free choice of the Specialist (eye doctor etc.), the Hospital or the Dentist?  
That is: once the GP has agreed that the patient may visit a Specialist, is the patient free to 
visit a specialist of his own choosing? Or, has the patient to go to a certain Specialist to 
obtain treatment?  
The patient has free choice of the:   
general hospital but choose a specialized 
hospital, they have to have to cover the 
difference in treatment costs. The choice 
among GPs and Dentists is limited to those 
who are contracted by the National Health 
Insurance Fund. 
Spain 1995: 
Factually no free choice of the Hospital nor 
Specialist even after the gatekeeper agreed to 
the referral 
Free choice of the Dentist, since this is 
privately purchased 
Remark: 
For those dental services which are covered, 
the choice is also limited. The choice of the 
GP is limited to those GPs available in the 
health area as the smallest unit of the Health 
System 
2004: 
Factually no free choice of the Hospital nor 
Specialist even after the gatekeeper agreed to 
the referral 
Free choice of the Dentist, since this is 
privately purchased 
Remark: 
For those dental services which are covered, 
the choice is also limited. The choice of the 
GP is limited to those GPs available in the 
health area as the smallest unit of the Health 
System 
Sweden 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
Choice among Specialists and Hospitals is 
limited to those in a Landsting’s area. All 
three are subject to availability in the 
respective Landsting’s area 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
Choice among Specialists and Hospitals is 
limited to those in a Landsting’s area. All 
three are subject to availability in the 
respective Landsting’s area 
Switzerland 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
Choice of hospital services are usually 
limited to the Kanton the patient is living in. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
Choice of hospital services are usually limited 
to the Kanton the patient is living in. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Even after the gatekeeper has agreed, the 
patient cannot chose freely the specialist or 
hospital. Usually there is only a limited 
choice since both inpatient and specialized 
care is provided by Hospitals. 
2004: 
Even after the gatekeeper has agreed, the 
patient cannot chose freely the specialist or 
hospital. Usually there is only a limited choice 
since both inpatient and specialized care is 
provided by Hospitals. 
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GK4  Independent of gatekeeping regulations. Do patients actually have a choice in the sense 
that there are several providers offering services to choose from?  
Do patients factually have the choice among different Specialists, Hospitals or Dentists?: 
Austria 1995:  
Specialists  
Hospitals 
Dentists 
2004:  
Specialists  
Hospitals 
Dentists 
Belgium 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialists  
Hospitals 
Dentists 
Canada 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
The patient can get treatment in other 
provinces. Availability differs largely among 
the provinces and sometimes patients have to 
travel to get treatment 
2004: 
Specialists  
Hospitals 
Dentists 
Remark: 
The patient can get treatment in other 
provinces. Availability differs largely among 
the provinces and sometimes patients have to 
travel to get treatment 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist  
Remark: 
The patient can only contact providers, which 
have a contract with the HIF the patient is 
insured with. This usually is no problem. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist  
Remark: 
The patient can only contact providers, which 
have a contract with the HIF the patient is 
insured with. This usually is no problem. 
Denmark 1995 
Specialists  
Hospitals 
Dentists 
2004: 
Specialists  
Hospitals 
Dentists 
Finland 1995: 
Factually no free choice of Specialists and 
Hospitals 
Free choice of Dentists (if privately paid) 
Remark: 
The citizens have only access to those 
facilities operated by the municipalities or 
the providers contracted by the 
municipalities. 
2004: 
Factually no free choice of Specialists and 
Hospitals 
Free choice of Dentists (if privately paid) 
Remark: 
The citizens have only access to those 
facilities operated by the municipalities or the 
providers contracted by the municipalities. 
France 1995:  
Factually free choice, of Specialist, Hospital 
and Dentist subject to regional availability of 
providers  
Remark: 
In theory there is no problem of capacity and 
access to care because the number of 
physicians has grown up very rapidly in the 
last decades but there is some problem of 
2004:  
Factually free choice, of Specialist, Hospital 
and Dentist subject to regional availability of 
providers 
Remark: 
There are substantial differences in regional 
availability 
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GK4  Independent of gatekeeping regulations. Do patients actually have a choice in the sense 
that there are several providers offering services to choose from?  
Do patients factually have the choice among different Specialists, Hospitals or Dentists?: 
geographical imbalance which can generate 
tension in some specific areas (rural or 
deprived areas) for some specialty (e.g. eye 
specialists) 
Germany 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Greece 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual choice is subject to local 
availability, which differs substantially 
among regions and specialties. There is a co-
existence of over- and under-capacities in the 
same region for different specialties. Patients 
often travel to bigger cities, e.g. Athens or 
Thessaloniki to get treatment. For some 
services, patients can only choose among 
providers contracted by their HIF. Otherwise,  
the services might not be covered by the HIF. 
The patient’s choice is limited to those 
providers with a contract with his HIF 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual choice is subject to local 
availability, which differs substantially among 
regions and specialties. There is a co-
existence of over- and under-capacities in the 
same region for different specialties. Patients 
often travel to bigger cities, e.g. Athens or 
Thessaloniki to get treatment. For some 
services, patients can only choose among 
providers contracted by their HIF. Otherwise, 
the services might not be covered by the HIF. 
The patient’s choice is limited to those 
providers with a contract with his HIF 
Hungary 1995: 
Specialist (limited choice)  
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist (limited choice)  
Hospital  
Dentist 
Ireland 1995: 
Specialist  
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual availability differs regionally, and 
is highest in the Dublin area 
2004: 
Specialist  
Hospital   
Dentist 
Remark: 
The actual availability differs regionally, and 
is highest in the Dublin area 
Italy 1995. 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist (privately paid, hence free choice) 
Remark: 
The actual availability and also the quality of 
care differs regionally. There is substantial 
“medical tourism” among regions. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist (privately paid, hence free choice)  
Remark: 
The actual availability and also the quality of 
care differs regionally. There is substantial 
“medical tourism” among regions. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
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GK4  Independent of gatekeeping regulations. Do patients actually have a choice in the sense 
that there are several providers offering services to choose from?  
Do patients factually have the choice among different Specialists, Hospitals or Dentists?: 
Netherlands 1995: 
Factually free choice of Specialist, Hospital, 
and Dentist 
2004: 
Factually free choice of Specialist, Hospital, 
and Dentist 
New Zealand 1995: 
Factually no free choice of Specialists and 
Hospitals 
Free choice of Dentists (since privately paid) 
Remark: 
Factual choice depends on local availability 
in an area. Obtaining a certain service may 
require to travel. 
2004: 
Factually no free choice of Specialists and 
Hospitals 
Free choice of Dentists (since privately paid) 
Remark: 
Factual choice depends on local availability in 
an area. Obtaining a certain service may 
require to travel. 
Norway 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist (purchased privately) 
Remark: 
Factual choice is subject to regional 
availability. There are waiting lists, and 
patients which are treated in Hospitals 
operated by other counties. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist (purchased privately) 
Remark: 
Factual choice is subject to regional 
availability. 
Portugal 1995: 
Usually yes for all three 
Remark: 
Whether the patients actually have a choice 
depends on the availability of providers, 
which is higher in more densely populated 
areas; availability varies substantially among 
regions. Usually they have a choice among 
different specialists and dentists, but choice 
among hospitals is more limited. Here, the 
selection of a Hospital is determined by the 
degree of specialization: for basic services, 
the patient is usually referred to the District 
Hospital. There are not many hospitals 
offering highly specialized services in the 
country.  
2004: 
Usually yes for all three; 
Remark: 
Whether the patients actually have a choice 
depends on the availability of providers, 
which is higher in more densely populated 
areas; availability varies substantially among 
regions. Usually they have a choice among 
different specialists and dentists, but choice 
among hospitals is more limited. Here, the 
selection of a Hospital is determined by the 
degree of specialization: for basic services, 
the patient is usually referred to the District 
Hospital. There are not many hospitals 
offering highly specialized services in the 
country. 
Poland 1995: 
Usually, the choice is limited 
2004: 
Usually, the choice is limited 
Remark: 
Since 1999, patients have formally free choice 
among all hospitals in the country. If they 
were referred to a general hospital but choose 
a specialized hospital, they have to have to 
cover the difference in treatment costs. 
Spain 1995: 
Factual no choice among Hospitals, and 
specialists  
Factually choice among dentists, for services 
2004: 
Factual no choice among Hospitals, and 
specialists  
Factually choice among dentists, for services 
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GK4  Independent of gatekeeping regulations. Do patients actually have a choice in the sense 
that there are several providers offering services to choose from?  
Do patients factually have the choice among different Specialists, Hospitals or Dentists?: 
which are privately purchased 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals. The availability differs 
among areas. The choice of dentists is also 
limited if the service is covered by the health 
system, i.e. is consumed in a hospital. 
which are privately purchased 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals. The availability differs 
among areas. The choice of dentists is also 
limited if the service is covered by the health 
system, i.e. is consumed in a hospital. 
Sweden 1995: 
Factually no choice among different 
Hospitals and Specialists, 
Factual choice among Dentists 
Remark: 
All three are subject to availability in the 
respective Landsting’s area 
2004: 
Factually no choice among different Hospitals 
and Specialists, 
Factual choice among Dentists 
Remark: 
All three are subject to availability in the 
respective Landsting’s area 
Switzerland 1995: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
Choice of hospital services are usually 
limited to the Kanton the patient is living in. 
2004: 
Specialist 
Hospital  
Dentist 
Remark: 
Choice of hospital services are usually limited 
to the Kanton the patient is living in. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Due to limits in capacity and availability of 
facilities, there is - apart from the area of 
Greater London - usually no factual choice of 
Hospital or Specialist.  
2004: 
Due to limits in capacity and availability of 
facilities, there is - apart from the area of 
Greater London - usually no factual choice of 
Hospital or Specialist. 
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Part II: Regulations and Institutions to ensure Quality in Medical Treatment 
 
In some countries, there are institutions which define clinical / medical guidelines for standard 
treatments in certain indications. Given a certain diagnosis, what is the most medical effective 
treatment to tackle this condition. These “standard routines” may be defined for several areas 
of medical treatment:  
 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals – When is the usage of a certain medicine appropriate, e.g. 
prescription of anti-hypertension drugs, aspirin for post-infarct treatment. But also which of 
several existing medicines is the most appropriate for treating a certain medical condition? 
Hospital treatments – When is a patient an appropriate candidate for a certain intervention in 
the sense, that the expected outcomes and the medical risks imposed by the intervention are 
acceptable? Which is the most appropriate treatment procedure for a certain medical 
condition, which is usually treated in Hospitals 
Usage of High Technology – when is the usage of a certain technology, in particular for high-
tech-diagnostics, appropriate?  
Out patient treatment – what is the most appropriate treatment procedure for treatments in the 
Primary care sector. 
 
In some countries, these guidelines also take into account which of several possible treatments 
procedures is the most cost effective  
 
Q1 Is there an institution which sets clinical / medical guidelines? 
Austria 1995:  
Yes, a national level institution.  
Remark:  
Medical societies perform this task to some 
degree, but not comparable to Institutions 
such as NICE. The guidelines are 
recommendations only. 
2004:  
Yes, a national level institution.  
Remark: 
Medical societies perform this task to some 
degree, but not comparable to Institutions 
such as NICE. The guidelines are 
recommendations only. 
Belgium 1995: 
Yes, a national as well as regional level 
institutions.  
Remark: 
For instance the technical councils at the 
INAMI, the Comité Remboursement 
Medicaments, Medical Associations. 
However, studies show that there are 
substantial differences in the usage of 
procedures among providers.  
2004: 
Yes, a national as well as regional level 
institutions. 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, national as well as provincial level 
institutions. Several institutions affiliated 
with several professions / specialties.  
Remark: 
Guidelines and their impact differs 
substantially among provinces 
2004: 
Yes, national as well as provincial level 
institutions. Several institutions affiliated with 
several professions / specialties. 
Remark: 
Guidelines and their impact differs 
substantially among provinces 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark: 
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Q1 Is there an institution which sets clinical / medical guidelines? 
There is a Center for Quality at the national 
level, in addition, the professional 
associations (notably the Czech Medical 
Chamber) issue guidelines.  
There is a Center for Quality at the national 
level, in addition, the professional 
associations (notably the Czech Medical 
Chamber) issue guidelines. 
Denmark 1995 
Yes, national level institutions. 
Remark: 
Medical societies issued guidelines for 
specialties. For instance, the Danish College 
of General Practice. There are also county 
based institutions. 
2004: 
Yes, national level institutions. 
Remark: 
The National Board of Health, a national level 
institution, issues reference programs and 
clinical guidelines –but they are not 
mandatory in the judicial sense  
Clinical guidelines may also be issued at 
local, e.g. hospital department level. 
Since 1999, the Institute of Rational 
Pharmacotherapy issues guidelines on the 
usage of Pharmaceuticals  
Finland 1995 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark:  
The Finnish Medical Society sets guidelines, 
but these are rather informal.  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution,  
Remark: 
The Finnish Medical Society (Duodecim) and 
specialist organizations. The usage of 
guidelines has been extended. 
France 1995:  
Yes, a national level institution; HAS (Haute 
Autorité de Santé) and AFSSAPS (for 
medicines) 
2004:  
Yes, a national level institution; HAS (Haute 
Autorité de Santé) and AFSSAPS (for 
medicines) 
Germany 1995:  
No  
2004: 
Yes, several national level institutions 
Remark: 
Among them are Gemeinsamer 
Bundesausschuß (GemBA), Institut für 
Qualität und Wirtschafltichkeit im 
Gesundheitswesen (IQWIG).  
Some are created by the Ministry of Health 
for the development of Disease Management 
Programs. 
Greece 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
There have been some attempts of some HIF 
to introduce guidelines, but these had no 
effect. 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark: 
In 2002, the Ministry of Health issued 
guidelines on how to conduct evaluations of 
treatments, products etc.  
Ireland 1995: 
Yes, regional and local level institutions 
2004: 
Yes, regional and local level institution 
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Q1 Is there an institution which sets clinical / medical guidelines? 
Italy 1995. 
Yes, national and regional level institutions 
Remark:  
There is a strong role of the national as well 
as the regional Ministries of Health 
2004:  
Yes, national and regional level institutions 
Remark:  
There is a strong role of the national as well 
as the regional Ministries of Health 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
There are several; e.g. NIVEL, the 
Netherlands Institute for Health Services 
Research, also professional associations of 
GPs and specialists. 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
There are several; e.g. NIVEL, the 
Netherlands Institute for Health Services 
Research, also professional associations of 
GPs and specialists. 
New Zealand 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
While some institutions were already active 
in 1995, e.g. the National Health Committee, 
there was no systematic approach to issue 
guidelines.  
2004: 
Yes, national and regional level institutions 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, a regional and national level institutions 
Remark: 
The Norwegian Board of Health is active in 
this domain. Mostly other institutions active 
in this domain are professional organizations. 
The guidelines issued are factually not 
effective. 
2004: 
Yes, a regional and national level institutions 
Remark: 
The Norwegian Board of Health is active in 
this domain. Mostly other institutions active 
in this domain are professional organizations. 
The guidelines issued are factually not 
effective. Further, there is the “Knowledge 
Center for Health Services”, created in 2004. 
Portugal 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark:  
The INFARMED issues guidelines for the 
economic usage of pharmaceuticals and their 
evaluation. They are addressing the GPs as 
the main prescribers but are not mandatory. 
Since 1994, the scope of the INFRAMED 
was widened, to cover also the evaluation of 
medical technology.  
While the Portuguese Medical Association is 
entitled to set clinical guidelines, it does not 
do so or only rarely; e.g. there is a guideline 
for the treatment of stroke. Some hospitals 
have internal guidelines.  
While there are some guidelines, these are 
not effective. 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark:  
The INFARMED for the economic usage of 
pharmaceuticals and for the evaluation of 
medical equipment. 
While the Portuguese Medical Association is 
entitled to set clinical guidelines, it does not 
do so or only rarely; e.g. there is a guideline 
for the treatment of stroke. Some hospitals 
have internal guidelines.  
While there are some guidelines, these are not 
effective. 
Poland 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
 223
Q1 Is there an institution which sets clinical / medical guidelines? 
Several scientific associations issue 
guidelines, which are however not 
obligatory. 
Several scientific associations issue 
guidelines, which are however not obligatory. 
Spain 1995. 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
The guidelines are only recommendations 
2004: 
Yes, national level institution as well as 
regional level institutions 
Remark: 
The guidelines are only recommendations 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, national and regional level institutions 
Remark: 
For instance the National Board of Health 
and Welfare; there is further an extensive 
system of disease-based quality registries, 
which collected data on treatments and issue 
advisory information on treatment options. 
2004: 
Yes, national and regional level institutions 
Remark: 
For instance the National Board of Health and 
Welfare; there is further an extensive system 
of disease-based quality registries, which 
collected data on treatments and issue 
advisory information on treatment options 
Switzerland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, national level institutions 
Remark: 
While NICE is the predominant one, there is 
for instance also the National Prescribing 
Centre 
2004: 
Yes, several national level institutions 
Remark: 
While NICE is the most important one, there 
is for instance also the National Prescribing 
Centre for pharmaceuticals. 
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Q2 For which of the following sectors do clinical guidelines exist in [Country]? 
Austria 1995:  
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology (CAT Scans, 
MRI etc.);  
Out patient treatment.  
Remark: 
The guidelines for pharmaceuticals concern  
in particular for the economic usage. All 
guidelines are subject to the remark 
mentioned in Q1. 
2004:  
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology  
Out patient treatment.  
Remark: 
The guidelines for pharmaceuticals concern  
in particular for the economic usage 
All guidelines are subject to the remark 
mentioned in Q1. 
Belgium 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatment  
Remark: 
Guidelines exist, but are not compulsory 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatment  
Remark: 
Guidelines exist, but are not compulsory 
Canada 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatment 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatment 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals  
Hospital treatments  
Usage of High Technology  
Out patient treatment 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals  
Hospital treatments  
Usage of High Technology  
Out patient treatment 
Denmark 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
Finland 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatment 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals  
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
France 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology  
Out patient treatment 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology  
Out patient treatment 
Germany 1995 
None, see Q1 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
Greece 1995: 2004: 
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Q2 For which of the following sectors do clinical guidelines exist in [Country]? 
None, see Q1 
Remark: 
There has been substantial activity in 
influencing the usage of pharmaceuticals, 
which had the effect of guidelines. This 
however was not based on guidelines. 
None, see Q1 
Remark: 
There has been substantial activity in 
influencing the usage of pharmaceuticals, 
which had the effect of guidelines. This 
however was not based on guidelines. 
Hungary 1995: 
Usage of pharmaceuticals 
Remark: 
Since pharmaceuticals are a substantial part 
of health expenditure, governmental activity 
aims at rationalizing the usage of 
pharmaceuticals by addressing the 
prescribers via guidelines and the consumers 
by financial incentives 
2004: 
Usage of pharmaceuticals 
Ireland 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments; 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments; 
Italy 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatment 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology; 
Out patient treatment 
Luxembourg 1994: 
None, see Q1 
2004: 
None, see Q1 
Netherlands 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
New Zealand 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Remark: 
The usage of pharmaceuticals was one 
domain for which guidelines existed already 
in 1995. Since 1993, the PHARMAC is in 
charge of decisions on listing, subsidy levels 
and grouping. This also resulted in guidelines 
for the usage of pharmaceuticals. 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
Norway 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
Remark: 
Mostly these are professional organizations, 
the guidelines issued are factually not 
effective. For Pharmaceuticals and 
Technology, guidelines are issued by 
national level institutions, like the Norwegian 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
Remark: 
Mostly these are professional organizations, 
the guidelines issued are factually not 
effective. For Pharmaceuticals and 
Technology, guidelines are issued by national 
level institutions, like the Norwegian Board of 
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Q2 For which of the following sectors do clinical guidelines exist in [Country]? 
Board of Health. Health, or the Norwegian Centre of Health 
Technology Assessment at the SINTEF 
Unimed. 
Portugal 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Remark:  
Subject to the limitations in Q1. 
The guidelines in question are issued from 
the INFRAMED to the GPs and concern the 
economic usage of medicines. They are not 
mandatory 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Remark: 
The guidelines are issued from the 
INFRAMED to the GPs and concern the 
economic usage of medicines. They are not 
mandatory 
Poland 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
Remark: 
The guidelines are recommendations only 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals 
Hospital treatments 
Usage of High Technology 
Out patient treatment 
Remark: 
The guidelines are recommendations only 
Spain 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Remark: 
The guidelines are only recommendations 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Remark: 
The guidelines are only recommendations 
Sweden 1995: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology  
Out patient treatment. 
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology  
Out patient treatment 
Switzerland 1995: 
None of these, see Q1  
2004: 
None of these, see Q1 
United Kingdom 1995 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatments  
2004: 
Usage of Pharmaceuticals;  
Hospital treatments;  
Usage of High Technology;  
Out patient treatments 
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Q3  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on Medical Efficacy of 
different treatments for the same illness? 
Austria 1995:  
National level institutions in some fields, but 
not as a single institution 
Remark: 
E.g. the Institut für 
Technikfolgenabschätzung, several 
Departments on Evidence based Medicine, 
also Health Insurance Funds 
2004:  
National level institutions in some fields, but 
not as a single institution 
Remark: 
E.g. the Institut für 
Technikfolgenabschätzung, several 
Departments on Evidence based Medicine, 
also Health Insurance Funds 
Belgium 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark:  
The HIFs, the INAMI and several technical 
advisory councils affiliated with the INAMI 
are engaged in technology assessment. This 
takes into account the medical efficacy and 
effectiveness of treatments and technologies 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, national level as well as provincial level 
institutions 
Remark: 
e.g. Canadian Coordinating Office for Health 
Technology Assessment, since 1989 
2004: 
Yes, national level as well as provincial level 
institutions 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, a national institution 
Remark: 
The Drug and Technology Control Institute, 
attached to the Ministry of Health, evaluates 
different treatments with regard to efficacy 
Denmark 1995:  
Several national level institutions 
Remark: 
The National Board of Health and the 
Institute for Evaluation and Health 
Technology Assessment, but there no 
formalized approach, neither are the 
evaluations binding 
2004: 
Yes, several institutions at various levels 
Remark: 
The Nordic Cochrane Center; a supra-national 
organization.  
At national level the Danish Medicines 
Agency; the National Board of Health, the 
Danish Institute of Evaluation and Health 
Technology Assessment 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
The Finnish Office of Health Technology 
Assessment at the STAKES Institute, 
beginning in 1995. 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution,  
Remark: 
The Finnish Office of Health Technology 
Assessment at the STAKES Institute. The 
STAKES supports HTA and distributes the 
results of national as well as international 
studies in HTA. 
France 1995:  
Yes, national level institutions 
Remark: 
2004: 
Yes, national level institutions 
Remark: 
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Q3  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on Medical Efficacy of 
different treatments for the same illness? 
The CEPS, HAS and AFSSAPS HAS and AFSSAPS. Since 1997 also the 
ANAES. They are mostly concerned with 
issues of safety, not efficacy or costs 
Germany 1995: 
No 
2004:  
Yes, a national level institution, the IQWiG 
Greece 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
There are National Institutes of Health for 
several specialties 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
There are National Institutes of Health for 
several specialties 
Ireland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, the National Medicines Information 
Center 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, a national level institutions, in some 
regions also regional level institutions.  
Remark:  
There is a strong role of the national as well 
as the regional Ministries of Health  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institutions, in some 
regions also regional level institutions 
Remark:  
There is a strong role of the national as well 
as the regional Ministries of Health 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
2004: 
No  
Netherlands 1995:  
Yes, a national level institution 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
New Zealand 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark: 
The National Health Committee was created 
to identify the most cost-effective treatment 
for certain illnesses, in order to exclude sub-
optimal treatments. However, the resulting 
recommendations were was not actually 
implemented. 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark: 
There are studies by the National Agency of 
Health and Social Affairs, the Norwegian 
Board of Health, and the Sosial- og 
helsedirektoratet, at the Ministry of Health.  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark: 
There are studies by the National Agency of 
Health and Social Affairs, the Norwegian 
Board of Health, and the Directorate for 
Health and Social Affairs, Sosial- og 
helsedirektoratet, at the Ministry of Health. 
Portugal 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
To some degree, the coverage of a new 
medicine is based on the evaluation of the 
medical efficacy of a new drug.  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark: 
Since 1998, the INFARMED is also in charge 
to evaluate the medical efficacy and the cost 
effectiveness of new technologies. There are 
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health on 
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Q3  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on Medical Efficacy of 
different treatments for the same illness? 
how to conduct evaluations of medical 
technology and treatments.  
Poland 1995 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark:  
The scientific associations, usually of 
specialties, which issue guidelines also 
evaluate medical efficacy of different 
treatments. 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution; 
Remark:  
The scientific associations, usually of 
specialties, which issue guidelines also 
evaluate medical efficacy of different 
treatments. 
Spain 1995: 
No 
2004:  
No 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution; e.g. the 
Swedish council on Technology Assessment, 
SBU. 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution; e.g. the 
Swedish council on Technology Assessment, 
SBU 
Switzerland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, national level as well as local level 
institutions, NICE the most important one at 
national level 
2004: 
Yes, national level as well as local level 
institutions, NICE the most important one at 
national level 
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Q4  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on the Cost Effectiveness 
of different treatments for the same illness? 
Austria 1995:  
No 
2004:  
No.  
Remark: 
There is no institution with formal or binding 
competence, but several Departments on 
evidence-based Medicine, and also Health 
Insurance Funds are active in this area 
Belgium 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
The INAMI and several Technical Advisory 
Boards associated with it. 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution; Canadian 
Institute for Health Information, CIHI, since 
1994 
Remark: 
A non-governmental institution, the 
Canadian Council on Health Services 
Accreditation, is engaged in reviewing and 
assessing hospitals, giving them advice on 
how to improve performance. This is 
however done on bilateral basis. 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution; CIHI 
 
 
Remark: 
A non-governmental institution, the Canadian 
Council on Health Services Accreditation, is 
engaged in reviewing and assessing hospitals, 
giving them advice on how to improve 
performance. This is however done on 
bilateral basis. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, a national institution 
Remark: 
The Drug and Technology Control Institute, 
attached to the Ministry of Health, evaluates 
different treatments with regard to cost and 
effectiveness. 
Denmark 1995:  
Yes, the institutions listed in Q3.  
Remark: 
The evaluation based on cost-effectiveness is 
not the main issue, is not done systematically 
and binding way 
2004: 
Yes, the institutions listed in Q3.  
Remark: 
The evaluation based on cost-effectiveness is 
not the main issue, is not done systematically 
and binding way 
Finland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, national level institution 
Remark:  
The Finnish office of Health Technology 
Assessment at the STAKES Institute 
France 1995:  
Yes, the national level institutions listed in 
Q3. 
Remark: 
The focus is safety, not cost effectiveness 
and the outcomes are but of marginal 
relevance  
2004:  
Yes, the national level institutions listed in 
Q3. 
Remark: 
The focus is safety, not cost effectiveness and 
the outcomes are but of marginal relevance 
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Q4  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on the Cost Effectiveness 
of different treatments for the same illness? 
Germany 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution, the IQWiG 
Remark: 
The impact is marginal  
Greece 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
There are National Institutes of Health for 
several specialties 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Ireland 1995: 
Yes, for pharmaceuticals  
Remark: 
The General Medical Services Board issues a 
bulletin on different medicines for treating 
the same illnesses. The impact is estimated to 
be limited 
 
2004: 
Yes, for pharmaceuticals 
Remark:  
The National Center for Pharmacoeconomics 
and the General Medical Services Board – 
which issues a bulletin on different medicines 
for treating the same illnesses. The impact is 
estimated to be limited 
Italy 1995. 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark:  
There is a strong role of the national as well 
as the regional Ministries of Health 
2004:  
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark:  
There is a strong role of the national as well 
as the regional Ministries of Health 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
2004: 
No  
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, national and regional level institutions  
2004: 
Yes, national and regional level institutions 
New Zealand 1995:  
Yes, national level institutions  
Remark: 
Apart from a national level institution, 
involved in grouping of pharmaceuticals to 
classes of therapeutical equivalents, 
PHARMAC,. The National Health 
Committee was created to identify the most 
cost-effective treatment for certain illnesses, 
in order to exclude sub-optimal treatments. 
To some degree, this involved an evaluation 
of health technology or procedures and the 
comparison of cost effectiveness. However, 
the results were not implemented. 
2004: 
Yes, national level institutions for several 
domains 
 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, national as well as regional/local level 
institutions 
Remark: 
There are studies on cost effectiveness for 
products and treatments conducted by the 
National Agency of Health and Social 
2004: 
Yes, national as well as regional/local level 
institutions 
Remark: 
Cost effectiveness studies are conducted e.g. 
by the National Agency of Health and Social 
Affairs, the Sosial- og helsedirektoratet, 
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Q4  Is there an institution gathering and distributing information on the Cost Effectiveness 
of different treatments for the same illness? 
Affairs, the Directorate for Health and Social 
Affairs, Sosial- og helsedirektoratet, of the 
Ministry of Health, and several publicly 
funded research institutions. 
within the Ministry of health, and several 
publicly funded research institutions. The 
evaluation of pharmaceuticals is done by the 
Norwegian Medicines Agency. 
Portugal 1995: 
No  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution  
Remark: 
Since 1998, the INFARMED is also in charge 
to evaluate the medical efficacy and the cost 
effectiveness of new technologies. 
There exist official guidelines, issued by the 
Ministry of Health, for economic evaluation 
of medicines. Results of evaluation studies 
should be handed over to the regulatory 
agency, INFARMED. Results are however 
not published and have no influence on the 
practice. 
Poland 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
While there are scientific associations 
associated with medical specialties, cost 
effectiveness is not an issue in their 
evaluations. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
While there are scientific associations 
associated with medical specialties, cost 
effectiveness is not an issue in their 
evaluations. The newly created Health 
Technology Assessment Agency, a national 
level institution, is expected to cover this 
aspect. 
Spain 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution, Spanish 
Office of Technology Assessment; in several 
regions there are similar institutions as well 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution, Spanish 
Office of Technology Assessment; in several 
regions there are similar institutions as well 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution, the SBU and 
the National Board of Health and Welfare 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution, the SBU and 
the National Board of Health and Welfare 
Switzerland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
United Kingdom 1995; 
Yes, national level as well as local level 
institutions; NICE and NIHCE 
2004: 
Yes, national level institutions; NICE / 
NIHCE 
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Q5  Is there an institution gathering information on the Quality of Providers of medical 
services?  
For instance is there institution performing an evaluation of hospitals, comparable to the star-
rating in the UK? Or, is there an institution issuing reports of the occurrence of medical 
failures etc. in different Hospitals or for GPs? 
Austria 1995:  
No 
2004:  
No, there is no institution with formal 
competence to do so 
Remark:  
The Österreichische Gesellschaft für 
Qualitätssicherung und Qualitätsmanagement 
is involved in this task and does evaluations 
of the GPs. 
Belgium 1995. 
No  
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
In 1997, evaluation committees for Hospitals 
were established, their task was to help the 
hospitals to increase their quality of care but 
also the financial performance. The data is 
collected in a database, which allows 
hospitals to compare their performance with 
others. The Health Insurance Funds provide 
some information on extra-payments charged 
by different hospitals. Occasionally, they also 
collect information on the quality of 
treatments 
Canada 1995: 
No 
 
Remark: 
A non-governmental institution, the 
Canadian Council on Health Services 
Accreditation, is engaged in reviewing and 
assessing hospitals, giving them advice on 
how to improve performance. This is 
however done on bilateral basis. 
2004: 
Yes, several national as well as provincial 
level institutions, e.g. the Quality Health Care 
network 
Remark: 
In some provinces there is an extensive 
system of provider evaluations, covering 
quality, outcomes and financial matters. 
Further, there is still Canadian Council on 
Health Services Accreditation. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
There is a National Reference Center founded 
by the HIF which gathers and evaluates the 
cost effectiveness of health facilities. The 
Ministry of Health is also active in evaluating 
treatment quality. 
Denmark 1995:  
No 
2004:  
Yes, at the national level the Ministry of the 
Interior and Health and institutes handling 
patient errors and medical maltreatment 
 
 234
Q5  Is there an institution gathering information on the Quality of Providers of medical 
services?  
For instance is there institution performing an evaluation of hospitals, comparable to the star-
rating in the UK? Or, is there an institution issuing reports of the occurrence of medical 
failures etc. in different Hospitals or for GPs? 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution affiliated with 
the STAKES /CHESS, conducts a 
Benchmarking on a voluntary basis 
France 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
There are rankings done by newspapers 
2004:  
No 
Remark: 
There are rankings done by newspapers 
Germany 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No  
Remark:  
There are some voluntary initiatives and also 
comparisons done by the press  
Greece 1995: 
No  
2004: 
No 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
The NPHMOS and the Information Center 
for Health Care at the Ministry of Health are 
formally in charge of quality control 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
The NPHMOS and the Information Center for 
Health Care at the Ministry of Health are 
formally in charge of quality control 
Ireland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, a national level institution; but it does 
not perform rankings and has no formalized 
approach. Further, the media performs some 
rankings 
Remark: 
Many contracts between the SSN and 
independent providers specify quality 
requirements and also measures to ensure 
that these are met in practice 
2004:  
Yes, a national level institution; but it does 
not perform rankings and has no formalized 
approach. Further, the media performs some 
rankings  
Remark: 
Many contracts between the SSN and 
independent providers specify quality 
requirements and also measures to ensure that 
these are met in practice 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No  
2004: 
No 
Netherlands 1995. 
No 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
New Zealand 1995: 
No  
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
The purchasers are required to evaluate the 
contracting partners, but this is more in the 
sense of an auditing. Further there is the 
“Quality Health New Zealand”, an agency in 
charge of assessing medical providers, also to 
improve their performance 
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Q5  Is there an institution gathering information on the Quality of Providers of medical 
services?  
For instance is there institution performing an evaluation of hospitals, comparable to the star-
rating in the UK? Or, is there an institution issuing reports of the occurrence of medical 
failures etc. in different Hospitals or for GPs? 
Norway 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, a national level institution 
Remark: 
The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, 
Sosial- og helsedirektoratet. The Norwegian 
Board of Health is also active in supervising 
health professionals and the delivery of health 
services. 
Portugal 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes.  
Remark: 
Since 2000, an Institute for Quality in Health 
was founded, which is responsible for quality 
assessment of Hospitals 
Poland 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
There are rankings of providers published in 
professional journals and the press. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
There are rankings of providers published in 
professional journals and the press. 
Spain 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, for some specialties and by the counties 
which are conducting a quality control of 
their Hospitals  
2004: 
Yes, for some specialties and by the counties 
which are conducting a quality control of their 
Hospitals 
Remark:  
In addition, a more systematic collection of 
data on quality is now introduced by the 
National Board of Health and Welfare and the 
Association of Local Authorities, SKL 
Switzerland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, several national level institutions.  
Remark:  
The star-ranking done by the NHS is the 
most important public evaluation of hospital 
trusts. There is also internal quality control 
exercised by the NHS over the providers 
holding contracts with DHA 
2004: 
Yes, several national level institutions.  
Remark: 
The star-ranking done by the NHS is the most 
important public evaluation of Hospital trusts. 
There is also internal quality control exercised 
by the NHS over the providers holding 
contracts with DHA 
 
 236
 
Q6  If collected: is the information on the Quality of Providers published or made 
available?  
E.g. are evaluations, rankings or performance indicators of Hospitals published to the public 
or only to the providers themselves? 
Austria 1995:  
Not applicable; see Q5 
2004:  
Not applicable; see Q5 
Belgium 1995: 
No; see Q5 
2004: 
Yes, but only to the providers themselves 
Remark: 
This concerns the data base on quality and 
(financial) performance for hospitals. 
Hospitals can access the data to compare their 
own performance in issues of quality and 
financial issues 
Canada 1995: 
No – information on quality was not 
collected in a systematic way 
2004: 
Yes, information on provider quality is 
published to everybody 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No such information is collected, see Q5 
2004: 
Yes, information on provider quality is 
published to everybody 
Remark: 
Ministry of Health is also active in evaluating 
treatment quality, and has published the 
results, which are however debated for 
methodological reasons. There are various 
research projects, which evaluate health 
facilities. 
Denmark 1995:  
No; see Q5 
2004: 
Yes, from 2004 on, quality reports are made 
public via www.sundhet.dk 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, some information is published to 
everybody, but the information on quality 
assessment is published only to the providers 
themselves.  
Remark: 
Information on costs, outputs, treatment 
practice and to some extent on the outcomes 
is collected and distributed 
2004: 
Yes, some information is published to 
everybody, but the information on quality 
assessment is published only to the providers 
themselves.  
Remark: 
Information on costs, outputs, treatment 
practice and to some extent on the outcomes 
is collected and distributed 
France 1995:  
No 
2004:  
No 
Germany 1995: 
No; see Q5 
2004: 
No, see Q5. 
Remark: 
There are some comparisons in the press, in 
particular for Hospitals 
Greece 1995: 
No, see Q5 
2004: 
No; see Q5 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, but the information on quality 
2004: 
Yes, but the information on quality 
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Q6  If collected: is the information on the Quality of Providers published or made 
available?  
E.g. are evaluations, rankings or performance indicators of Hospitals published to the public 
or only to the providers themselves? 
assessment is published only to the providers 
themselves. 
assessment is published only to the providers 
themselves. 
Ireland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Italy 1995: 
Yes; information on provider quality is 
published to everybody. Rankings and 
evaluations made by the mass media are 
published. 
2004: 
Yes, information on provider quality is 
published to everybody. Rankings and 
evaluations made by the mass media are 
published.   
Luxembourg 1994: 
No; see Q5 
2004: 
No; see Q5 
Netherlands 1995: 
No  
2004: 
Yes, the information is published.  
Remark: 
The information is usually published to the 
providers themselves only, in some cases it is 
published to everybody 
New Zealand 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, the information on provider quality is 
published to everybody  
Norway 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
No such information is gathered  
2004: 
Yes, the information is published to 
everybody 
Portugal 1995: 
Not applicable; see Q5 
2004: 
Yes, but the information is published to the 
providers themselves only. 
Poland 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
While there is no formal ranking or 
evaluation done, the rankings done by 
professional journals and the press are 
publicly available. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
While there is no formal ranking or evaluation 
done, the rankings done by professional 
journals and the press are publicly available. 
Spain 1995: 
No; see Q5 
2004: 
No; see Q5 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, but the information is published to the 
providers themselves only; it is collected and 
published within the different specialties and 
used within the Local/ Hospital 
administration only  
2004: 
Yes, but the information is published to the 
providers themselves only; it is collected and 
published within the different specialties and 
used within the Local/ Hospital administration 
only 
Since 2004, mortality of infarct treatment in 
Hospitals is published 
Switzerland 1995: 
No 
 
2004: 
No 
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Q6  If collected: is the information on the Quality of Providers published or made 
available?  
E.g. are evaluations, rankings or performance indicators of Hospitals published to the public 
or only to the providers themselves? 
United Kingdom 1995:  
Yes; evaluations are published to everybody, 
Remark: 
The most prominent example is the star 
rating. Only in some cases, the evaluation is 
only given to the providers 
2004: 
Yes; evaluations are published to everybody  
Remark: 
The most prominent example is the star 
rating, available in the internet. Only in some 
cases, the evaluation is only given to the 
providers. 
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Q7  Do General Practitioners / Physicians have to renew their approbation or licence to 
provide medical services from time to time (Recertification) ? 
Austria 1995:  
No, once GPs / Physicians have obtained 
their licence, the don’t have to renew it 
(No recertification) 
2004:  
No, once GPs / Physicians have obtained their 
licence, the don’t have to renew it 
(No recertification) 
Belgium 1995. 
No recertification  
Remark 
In 1994, a system of accreditation was 
introduced as a mean of quality assurance. In 
order to get accreditation the physician must 
meet certain requirements, e.g. engage in 
continuous training. However, while 
accreditation leads to higher reimbursement, 
it is not compulsory 
2004: 
No recertification  
Remark: 
The accreditation system is still operative 
Canada 1995: 
No recertification  
2004: 
No recertification 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No recertification 
Remark: 
There is however an obligatory system of 
life-long education, which requires each 
physician to participate in a certain number 
of educational activities. 
2004: 
No recertification 
Remark: 
There is however an obligatory system of life-
long education, which requires each physician 
to participate in a certain number of 
educational activities. 
Denmark: 1995:  
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
Finland 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
France 1995:  
No recertification 
2004:  
No recertification 
Germany 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
no recertification 
Greece 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, medical providers have to renew their 
licence periodically 
2004: 
Yes, medical providers have to renew their 
licence periodically 
Ireland 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
Italy 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
no recertification 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, medical providers have to renew their 
licence periodically 
2004: 
Yes, medical providers have to renew their 
licence periodically 
New Zealand 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
Yes, medical providers have to renew their 
licence periodically 
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Q7  Do General Practitioners / Physicians have to renew their approbation or licence to 
provide medical services from time to time (Recertification) ? 
Norway 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
Renewal of a specialty license leads to higher 
income, the right to practice is not subject to 
recertification. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
Renewal of a specialty license leads to higher 
income, the right to practice is not subject to 
recertification. 
Portugal 1995:  
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
Poland 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification  
Remark: 
There is no formal recertification obligation, 
but a system of continual education is being 
introduced. Only some providers have to 
renew their license in intervals of five years. 
Spain 1995. 
No recertification  
2004: 
No recertification 
Sweden 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
Switzerland 1995: 
No recertification  
2004: 
No recertification 
Remark: 
Physicians have to attend to further education 
for a certain number of hours. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No recertification 
2004: 
No recertification 
Remark: 
Recertification is currently introduced but not 
yet fully operational in 2004 
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Part III: Role of Government for the Health Care System 
 
This section is about the role of the Government for the operation of the Health System, its 
timing and the degree to which it is actually involved in decisions made in the Health System. 
The term “Government” refers to a politically responsible, i.e. elected actor, be it the national, 
the regional or local government. 
 
Governmental control .... 
In some countries, the Government has encompassing and direct control over the Health Care 
System or can intervene substantially by other means – e.g. by setting annual budgets for 
health care.  
In other countries, the Government restrains itself more, leaving the day-to-day operation of 
the Health Care System to societal, non-state-actors, like Health Insurance Funds, and 
Organizations of Medical Providers.  
 
... or negotiations as central decision making mode. 
In the case that decisions are made by societal actors, for instance by negotiations among 
purchasers and providers of medical care, the government can retain some influence in these 
negotiations. It can, for instance retain the right to approve or disapprove decisions reached in 
a binding way or by acting as an arbitrator in the case of persisting disagreement.  
 
 
 
CG0  Which level of government is most important for control and interventions of the state 
in the Health Care System? 
Austria 1995:  
Central government; but on the hospital 
sector it only designed basic legislation 
The regional governments (Bundesländer) 
are most important for the Hospital sector 
Remark: 
Factually, the Central Government sets a 
frame, in which HIFs and Providers 
negotiate. The Regional Governments have 
direct influence on the hospital sector, 
usually by direct ownership 
2004:  
Central government; but in the hospital sector 
only it designed basic legislation.  
The regional governments ( Bundesländer) 
are most important for the Hospital sector) 
Remark: 
Factually, the Central Government sets a 
frame, in which HIFs and Providers negotiate. 
The Regional Governments have direct 
influence on the hospital sector, usually by 
direct ownership 
Belgium 1995: 
Central government 
Remark: 
The regional governments are involved, but 
mainly execute the plans set up by the central 
government 
2004: 
Central Government 
Canada 1995:  
Provincial Governments 
Remark:  
The federal government sets some limits, but 
most of the financing and organizing is done 
by the Provincial governments. While the 
provincial governments have the option to 
determine unilaterally many of the aspects 
2004: 
Provincial Governments 
Remark:  
The federal government sets some limits, but 
most of the financing and organizing is done 
by the Provincial governments. While the 
provincial governments have the option to 
determine unilaterally many of the aspects 
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CG0  Which level of government is most important for control and interventions of the state 
in the Health Care System? 
listed in the following, they only rarely do so. 
Most often, the decisions are made in 
negotiations with the providers of medical 
services. Further, they have abide to certain 
restraints set by the central Government, in 
particular on coverage.  
listed in the following, they only rarely do so. 
Most often, the decisions are made in 
negotiations with the providers of medical 
services. Further, they have abide to certain 
restraints set by the central Government 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Central government 
 
2004: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
Regional governments have gained some 
importance during the decentralization 
process of the last decade: Ownership of 
Hospitals and Health Centers but also the 
execution of policy and decision by the 
central government were transferred to them 
and they have substantial leeway in doing 
this. Depending on the political orientation of 
the regional government, the usage of market 
mechanisms is very strong in some regions. 
Denmark 1995:  
Local government: Municipalities 
“Kommuner” and Counties “Amter”; the 
later are in charge of the Hospitals  
2004:  
Local government: Municipalities,  
“Kommuner”, and Counties “Amter””; the 
later are in charge of the Hospitals 
Finland 1995: 
Local Government (Municipalities and 
counties)  
2004: 
Local Government (Municipalities and 
Counties) 
France 1995:  
Central government 
2004:  
Central Government 
Germany 1995: 
Central government, which sets frames for 
other actors 
The Regional Governments are most 
important for Hospitals with a formal 
planning competence 
2004: 
Central government, which sets frames for 
other actors 
The Regional Governments are most 
important for Hospitals with a formal 
planning competence 
Greece 1995: 
Central Government 
2004: 
Central Government 
Hungary 1995: 
Central Government 
2004: 
Central Government 
Ireland 1995: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The central government exercises influence 
either directly via the Department of Health 
or via the Health Boards. The control is 
stronger for the domain of services provided 
to medical card holder, and less strict for the 
remaining 2/3 of the population. 
2004: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The central government exercises influence 
either directly via the Department of Health or 
via the Health Boards. The control is stronger 
for the domain of services provided to 
medical card holder, and less strict for the 
remaining 2/3 of the population. 
Italy 1995: 
Central Government 
2004:  
Central Government; 
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CG0  Which level of government is most important for control and interventions of the state 
in the Health Care System? 
The regional government 
Remark:  
There is an increased role for the Regional 
Government as a consequence of 
decentralization in the 90s. Powers are shared 
between the regional and the national 
government, organizational and 
administrative powers are located at the 
regional level. Regions obtain funds from the 
central government and execute the health 
policy set by the national government.  
Luxembourg 1994: 
Central Government 
2004: 
Central Government 
Netherlands 1995: 
Central Government 
2004: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The competencies for Hospitals are held at the 
Provincial Level 
New Zealand 1995: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
Regional Health Authorities have an 
important role and leeway, but they are 
appointed by the Central Government. 
2004: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The District Health Boards have an important 
role and some leeway, but they are under 
strong control of the Central Government and 
part of their executive is appointed by the 
Central Government. 
Norway 1995. 
County councils and Central Government 
Remark: 
County Councils are in charge of hospital 
care, they own and operate most hospitals; 
Municipalities are in charge of primary care, 
by running health centers. 
2004: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
Control was transferred from the counties to 
the central government. The division of 
responsibilities for primary and inpatient care 
remained unchanged. Most of the primary 
care is now provided by self employed GPs 
working in private practice. 
Portugal 1995: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The control is exercised directly on the 
hospitals and indirect, via the Regional 
Health Authorities, Administração Regionais 
de Saúde, on the health Centers providing 
primary care. 
2004: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The control is exercised directly on the 
hospitals and indirect, via the Regional Health 
Authorities, Administração Regionais de 
Saúde, on the health Centers providing 
primary care. The sub regional level as the 
tier between the RHA and the Health Centers 
has lost importance and is disappearing. 
Poland 1995: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The municipalities/gminas and regional 
2004: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
The municipalities/gminas and regional 
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CG0  Which level of government is most important for control and interventions of the state 
in the Health Care System? 
governments/ voivodships have substantial 
influence on the hospitals, since they are 
owning and operating most of them. 
governments/ voivodships have substantial 
influence on the hospitals, since they are 
owning and operating most of them. With the 
introduction of the NHF, political actors are 
involved in controlling the NHF at their level. 
Spain 1995: 
Central Government 
Remark: 
Some regions were quite autonomous by 
then. Most control was exercised by the 
INSALUD, which was directly under control 
of the central government  
2004: 
The regional Governments of the 
Autonomous Communities 
Remark: 
The decentralization process of devolving 
competencies to the Regions was completed 
in 2002. The control is exercised by the 
Regional Health Authorities, Servicio 
Regional de Salud, SRS, which is under direct 
control of the regional government. 
Sweden 1995: 
Regional Government: Landsting, county 
councils 
2004: 
Regional Government (Landsting, county 
councils) 
Switzerland 1995: 
Central (Federal) Government and Regional 
Government (Kanton) 
Remark: 
The Central (Federal) Government is in 
charge of coordinating and setting a common 
frame for the Cantons, e.g. the basic service 
package. It is also in charge of deciding on 
the market authorization and the coverage of 
pharmaceuticals.  
The Cantons, Regional Governments, control 
most of the Hospital sector and can approve / 
disapprove the results of negotiations among 
providers and HIFs in the Canton. 
2004: 
Central (Federal) Government and Regional 
Government (Kanton) 
Remark: 
The Central (Federal) Government is in 
charge of coordinating and setting a common 
frame for the Cantons, e.g. the basic service 
package. It is also in charge of deciding on the 
market authorization and the coverage of 
pharmaceuticals.  
The Cantons, Regional Governments, control 
most of the Hospital sector and can approve / 
disapprove the results of negotiations among 
providers and HIFs in the Canton. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Central Government 
2004: 
Central Government 
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1. Role of the Central Government 
 
Thinking about the role of the Central Government vis-à-vis of societal actors.  
CG1    Are there are negotiations among Providers of medical services on the one side and 
Health Insurance Funds/ Health Authorities on the other side, in which e.g. issues of level of 
remuneration, fees or coverage are negotiated?  
Or, does the Central government determine these issues unilaterally?  
If there are negotiations, what is the timing and the role of the Central Government’s 
participation in these negotiations?   
Austria 1995:  
There are Negotiations, but the Central 
Government has no role in the negotiations;  
Remark: 
Only in the case of no agreement, there is 
some role of the Government 
2004:  
There are Negotiations, but the Central 
Government has no role in the negotiations; 
Remark: 
Only in the case of no agreement, there is 
some role of the Government 
Belgium 1995: 
There are negotiations among medical 
providers and the HIF on catalogues of 
services and fees. The Central Government 
participates after the negotiations. The 
Governments approval is required for any 
negotiation outcome reached by the HIF and 
the Providers. It can unilaterally change the 
results and set results unilaterally, if 
negotiations fail to reach an outcome, and 
has done so in the past.  
2004: 
There are negotiations among medical 
providers and the HIF on catalogues of 
services and fees. The Central Government 
participates after the negotiations. The 
Governments approval is required for any 
negotiation outcome reached by the HIF and 
the Providers. It can unilaterally change the 
results and set results unilaterally, if 
negotiations fail to reach an outcome, and has 
done so in the past. 
Canada 1995: 
There are negotiations, the provincial 
governments participate in the negotiations, 
either directly or via the Regional Health 
Authorities, RHA. Fees are negotiated with 
providers, budgets are negotiated with the 
hospitals.  
2004: 
There are negotiations, the provincial 
governments participate in the negotiations, 
either directly or via the Regional Health 
Authorities, RHA. Fees are negotiated with 
providers, budgets are negotiated with the 
hospitals. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
There are negotiations, and the Central 
Government supervises the negotiations. It 
has to approve the outcomes, which have to 
be in accordance with the public interest. 
Further, it can unilaterally change the results 
and set results unilaterally, if negotiations fail 
to reach an outcome 
Remark: 
Most negotiations are among individual HIF 
and providers / provider associations. Via the 
direct control over the largest HIF, the GHIF, 
which sets a benchmark for the negotiations 
of other HIF, the central government also is 
participating. 
2004: 
There are negotiations, and the Central 
Government supervises the negotiations. It 
has to approve the outcomes, which have to 
be in accordance with the public interest. 
Further, it can unilaterally change the results 
and set results unilaterally, if negotiations fail 
to reach an outcome 
Remark: 
Most negotiations are among individual HIF 
and providers / provider associations. Via the 
direct control over the largest HIF, the GHIF, 
which sets a benchmark for the negotiations 
of other HIF, the central government also is 
participating. 
Denmark 1995:  
There are negotiations, and the central 
2004:  
There are negotiations, and the central 
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CG1    Are there are negotiations among Providers of medical services on the one side and 
Health Insurance Funds/ Health Authorities on the other side, in which e.g. issues of level of 
remuneration, fees or coverage are negotiated?  
Or, does the Central government determine these issues unilaterally?  
If there are negotiations, what is the timing and the role of the Central Government’s 
participation in these negotiations?   
government participates mostly after the 
negotiations 
Grants from the Central government to the 
Amter are negotiated among both 
Negotiation outcomes reached between the 
Amter and the Providers of medical care 
need the approval of the central Government 
government participates mostly after the 
negotiations 
Grants from the Central government to the 
Amter are negotiated among both 
Negotiation outcomes reached between the 
Amter and the Providers of medical care need 
the approval of the central Government 
Finland 1995: 
There are negotiations among the 
municipalities and the providers, but the 
Central Government has no role in these 
2004: 
There are negotiations among the 
municipalities and the providers, but the 
Central Government has no role in these 
France 1995:  
There are negotiations among HIF and the 
providers and the Central Government can 
approve or disapprove of the results 
Remark:  
Health Insurance Funds and the providers 
negotiate the catalogue of medical services 
covered ( nomenclature) and the price of the 
services. The state can approve or disapprove
2004:  
There are negotiations among HIF and the 
providers and the Central Government can 
approve or disapprove of the results. 
Remark:  
Health Insurance Funds and the providers 
negotiate the catalogue of medical services 
covered ( nomenclature) and the price of the 
services. The state can approve or disapprove 
Germany 1995: 
There are negotiations among providers and 
Health Insurance Funds 
Remark: 
While the Central Government sets a broad 
frame for these negotiations, it has no role in 
the negotiations unless they fail to reach an 
outcome. It can however disapprove of the 
results, in which case the Health Insurance 
Funds and the Providers have to renegotiate. 
However, this never happens 
2004: 
There are negotiations among providers and 
Health Insurance Funds 
Remark: 
While the Central Government sets a broad 
frame for these negotiations, it has no role in 
the negotiations unless they fail to reach an 
outcome. It can however disapprove of the 
results, in which case the Health Insurance 
Funds and the Providers have to renegotiate. 
However, this never happens 
Greece 1995: 
There are negotiations, the Central 
Government participates during the 
negotiations 
Remark: 
Negotiations take place between the 
government and other actors, e.g. the 
hospitals, the HIF etc. Many issues 
concerning contracts made by the HIF are 
also influenced by the government, since it 
controls closely the largest HIF – the IKA 
and OGA, covering 80% of the population. 
2004: 
There are negotiations, the Central 
Government participates during the 
negotiations 
Remark: 
Negotiations take place between the 
government and other actors, e.g. the 
hospitals, the HIF etc. Many issues 
concerning contracts made by the HIF are 
also influenced by the government, since it 
controls closely the largest HIF – the IKA and 
OGA, covering 80% of the population. 
Hungary 1995: 
There are no negotiations, the Central 
2004: 
There are no negotiations, the Central 
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CG1    Are there are negotiations among Providers of medical services on the one side and 
Health Insurance Funds/ Health Authorities on the other side, in which e.g. issues of level of 
remuneration, fees or coverage are negotiated?  
Or, does the Central government determine these issues unilaterally?  
If there are negotiations, what is the timing and the role of the Central Government’s 
participation in these negotiations?   
Government controls all aspects of the 
Health System 
Remark: 
It does so by directly setting sectorial budgets 
and by controlling the NHIFA, which 
negotiates contracts with the providers 
Government controls all aspects of the Health 
System 
Ireland 1995: 
There are negotiations on many aspects of 
the Health System, the Government 
participates during these negotiations and has 
a strong position. 
2004: 
There are negotiations on many aspects of the 
Health System, the Government participates 
during these negotiations and has a strong 
position. 
Italy 1995: 
There are negotiations, e.g. between the ASL 
and the providers, the Central Government 
participates during the negotiations but also 
has possibilities to intervene after the 
negotiations 
2004:  
There are negotiations at several levels 
The Central Government participates during 
the negotiations with the Regions, but also 
has possibilities to intervene after the 
negotiations that have taken place at lower 
levels. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
There are Negotiations among HIFs and the 
providers; while the Central Government has 
no direct role in the negotiations, it 
participates nevertheless, since one member 
of the HIF association, the UCM, is 
determined by the government and the 
decisions of the UCM require the approval of 
the government 
2004: 
There are Negotiations among HIFs and the 
providers; while the Central Government has 
no direct role in the negotiations, it 
participates nevertheless, since one member 
of the HIF association UCM, is determined by 
the government and the decisions of the UCM 
require the approval of the government 
Netherlands 1995:  
There are negotiations, and in some domains 
the Central Government participates during 
the negotiations. It can also set results 
unilaterally, if the negotiations failed to reach 
an outcome. Usually, outcomes reached are 
subject to approval of the Government 
2004: 
There are negotiations, and in some domains 
the Central Government participates during 
the negotiations. It can also set results 
unilaterally, if the negotiations failed to reach 
an outcome. Usually, outcomes reached are 
subject to approval of the Government 
New Zealand 1995: 
There are negotiations among the Regional 
Health Authorities and providers of medical 
services on fees, services and costs.  
Remark: 
The four Regional Health Authorities (RHA), 
which are purchasing health services, are 
negotiating contracts with providers, here the 
central government does not participate. The 
RHA administration is appointed by the 
central government, which also sets the 
2004: 
There are negotiations among the District 
Health Boards and the providers of medical 
services on costs and services. The central 
government can afterwards approve or 
disapprove of the results.  
Remark: 
This does however, not have consequences 
for the outcomes. The central government sets 
the budgets of the DHBs. During the period of 
1996 and 2000, the then four Regional Health 
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CG1    Are there are negotiations among Providers of medical services on the one side and 
Health Insurance Funds/ Health Authorities on the other side, in which e.g. issues of level of 
remuneration, fees or coverage are negotiated?  
Or, does the Central government determine these issues unilaterally?  
If there are negotiations, what is the timing and the role of the Central Government’s 
participation in these negotiations?   
budgets of the RHA. Authorities were replaced by the Health 
Funding Authority, which centrally managed 
all purchasing. 
Norway 1995: 
The central government as well as the county 
governments are in charge of the Health 
system. 
Remark: 
There is little negotiating and contracting 
between the state and independent providers, 
since only primary care is contracted. 
Hospital care and specialized care provided 
by hospitals are under close control of the 
state, counties and the national government.  
2004: 
The competencies are still split among the 
counties and the central government. 
Remark: 
The role of the central government has 
increased. Most elements of the health system 
are still under control of the state. 
Portugal 1995: 
There are no negotiations. The Government 
controls most aspects of the Health System 
Remark: 
The Central government sets the prices of the 
NHS, remuneration of professionals and 
decides on the coverage of medical services 
by providing the funds for them. If there are 
negotiations, it is the Central Government, 
i.e. the Ministry of Health, which is leading 
the negotiations. Instances of negotiations are 
the setting of hospital budgets, the retail 
margins for pharmacies or prices of 
medicines. The allocation of funds to the 
Regional Health Authorities, Administração 
Regionais de Saúde, which is going into the 
Health Centers providing primary care is set 
by the government. The central government 
has also some, but less control over the 
private sector. The subsistemas have relative 
autonomy, and so have the providers of 
privately purchased care, e.g. private 
specialists or dentists. 
Societal groups, e.g. providers and patients, 
are heard, but have an advisory role only. 
2004: 
There are no negotiations, the government 
controls all aspects of the public NHS system. 
Remark:  
The Central government sets the prices of the 
NHS, remuneration of professionals and 
decides on the coverage of medical services 
by providing the funds for them. If there are 
negotiations, it is the Central Government, i.e. 
the Ministry of Health, which is leading the 
negotiations. Instances of negotiations are the 
setting of hospital budgets, the retail margins 
for pharmacies or prices of medicines. The 
allocation of funds to the Regional Health 
Authorities, Administração Regionais de 
Saúde, which is going into the Health Centers 
providing primary care is set by the 
government. The central government has also 
some, but less control over the private sector. 
The subsistemas have relative autonomy, and 
so have the providers of privately purchased 
care, e.g. private specialists or dentists. 
Societal groups, e.g. providers and patients, 
are heard, but have an advisory role only. 
Poland 1995: 
There are no negotiations, the government 
controls all elements of the health care 
system. 
Remark: 
Both, provision and financing, were public. 
2004: 
There are negotiations among the National 
Health Fund and providers of medical 
services. 
The Central government participates directly 
in the negotiations and can also set results 
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CG1    Are there are negotiations among Providers of medical services on the one side and 
Health Insurance Funds/ Health Authorities on the other side, in which e.g. issues of level of 
remuneration, fees or coverage are negotiated?  
Or, does the Central government determine these issues unilaterally?  
If there are negotiations, what is the timing and the role of the Central Government’s 
participation in these negotiations?   
The municipalities/gminas and the 
regions/voivodships were in charge of 
providing primary and secondary care. They 
were financed by allocations from the central 
government’s budget. 
unilaterally, if the negotiations fail. 
Remark: 
In 2004, questions of services, remuneration 
level and remuneration mode are negotiated 
among providers and the NHF. The 
contracting is done by a competitive 
tendering: the NHF puts out a defined bundle 
of services and costs to tender. Providers can 
apply for this tender. Specifics of the contract 
are then negotiated among the NHF and the 
applicant. Providers have hence some 
influence, but the influence of the NHF is 
much stronger. Since the government closely 
controls the NHF, this gives the government a 
strong role 
Spain 1995: 
There are negotiations among the INSALUD 
and the provider organizations, the Central 
Government participates in these by 
controlling the INSALUD 
There are also negotiations among the 
Central Government and the Regional 
Governments on the Funding  
2004: 
There are Negotiations among the Regional 
health Authorities, SRS, and the provider 
organizations. The regional Government of 
the autonomous community participates by 
controlling the SRS 
There are also negotiations among the Central 
Government and the Regional Governments 
on the Funding 
Sweden 1995: 
There are no Negotiations, the Landsting 
(regional Government) controls all aspects of 
the Health System.  
Remark: 
Only the salaries of the physicians employed 
are negotiated between the Landstings and 
the Physicians 
2004: 
There are no Negotiations, the Landsting 
(regional government) controls all aspects of 
the Health System 
Remark: 
Only the salaries of the physicians employed 
are negotiated between the Landstings and the 
Physicians 
Switzerland 1995: 
There are negotiations among medical 
providers and the Health Insurance Funds. 
The Regional (cantonal) government 
participates after the negotiations – it can set 
results unilaterally, if the negotiations failed 
to reach an outcome. 
2004: 
There are negotiations among medical 
providers and the Health Insurance Funds. 
The Regional (cantonal) government 
participates after the negotiations – it can set 
results unilaterally, if the negotiations failed 
to reach an outcome. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
There are no negotiations as an instrument of 
setting the basic elements of the Health 
system; the Government can set the elements 
of the health system almost unilaterally.  
Remark: 
2004: 
There are no negotiations as an instrument of 
setting the basic elements of the Health 
system; the Government can set the elements 
of the health system almost unilaterally.  
Remark: 
 250
CG1    Are there are negotiations among Providers of medical services on the one side and 
Health Insurance Funds/ Health Authorities on the other side, in which e.g. issues of level of 
remuneration, fees or coverage are negotiated?  
Or, does the Central government determine these issues unilaterally?  
If there are negotiations, what is the timing and the role of the Central Government’s 
participation in these negotiations?   
The national Governments sets the overall 
budget and negotiates the budgets assigned to 
the District Health Authorities. These then 
negotiate contracts with the Hospitals. The 
contract with the GPs is negotiated directly 
between the Department of Health and the 
GPs’ association, the General Medical 
Services Committee. Overall the system is a 
strong command and control system, in 
which the national level institutions, the NHS 
and the Department of Health, can exert 
substantial control and supervision. 
The national Governments sets the overall 
budget and negotiates the budgets assigned to 
the District Health Authorities. These then 
negotiate contracts with the Hospitals. The 
contract with the GPs is negotiated directly 
between the Department of Health and the 
GPs’ association, the General Medical 
Services Committee. Overall the system is a 
strong command and control system, in which 
the national level institutions, the NHS and 
the Department of Health, can exert 
substantial control and supervision. 
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2. Unilateral competencies of the Government 
The following questions concern the competencies of the central government: Which 
elements of the Health Systems can be set by the central government unilaterally?  
Unilaterally refers to whether the Central Government has currently the legal possibility to 
determine the aspect, e.g. by making directive or issuing a decree etc.  
Not, whether the Central Government actually does exert the competence, but has the formal 
right to do so under the current laws.   
 
CG2  Which elements of the Primary Care Sector can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally? 
Austria 1995:  
None;  
Remark: 
Everything its negotiated among Health 
Insurance Funds and the Provider 
Organizations. The central government can 
influence the way providers of primary care 
are organized, i.e. on regional or national 
level 
2004:  
None   
Remark: 
Everything its negotiated among Health 
Insurance Funds and the Provider 
Organizations. The central government can 
influence the way providers of primary care 
are organized, i.e. on regional or national 
level 
Belgium 1995: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
Primary Care Physicians per capita or in a 
region)– by controlling access to the medical 
education; for GPs this access control is quite 
weak 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care – sectorial target budget 
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the amount of fees – 
disapproval of the fees negotiated between 
the HIF and the Provider 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-
level organization 
Remark: 
While the government can in theory set all 
these elements, it does so only rarely in a 
unilateral way. Most often, the issues are 
negotiated among the HIF and the Providers 
with influence by the government 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity, since 1996 there is 
extensive human resources planning, using a 
numerus clausus to contain the number of 
physicians 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care – sectorial target budget 
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the amount of fees - disapproval 
of the fees negotiated between the HIF and 
the Provider 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-level 
organization 
 
Remark: 
While the government can in theory set all 
these elements, it does so only rarely in a 
unilateral way. Most often, the issues are 
negotiated among the HIF and the Providers 
with influence by the government 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Government controls: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
Primary Care Physicians per capita or in a 
region) 
2004: 
Provincial Government controls: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of Primary 
Care Physicians per capita or in a region) 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
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CG2  Which elements of the Primary Care Sector can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally? 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. 
fee for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-
level organization. 
Remark: 
The catalogue – according to the constraint 
set by the federal government - must cover 
everything that is medically necessary. The 
provincial governments could act 
unilaterally, but usually, these issues are 
negotiated with the physician associations  
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. 
fee for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-level 
organization. 
Remark: 
The catalogue – according to the constraint 
set by the federal government - must cover 
everything that is medically necessary. The 
provincial governments could act unilaterally, 
but usually, these issues are negotiated with 
the physician associations 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Central Government:  
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
physicians per capita or in a region) 
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Most negotiations of these 
issues are among individual HIF and 
providers, the Central government has 
influence on the results.  
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
and the number of points a service is worth, 
is set by the Ministry of Health. 
2004: 
Central Government 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
 
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Most negotiations of these 
issues are among individual HIF and 
providers, the Central government has 
influence on the results. 
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
and the number of points a service is worth, is 
set by the Ministry of Health. 
Denmark 1995:  
Competencies at County “Amter” Level 
The overall budget for Primary Care services 
Questions of capacity - by controlling the 
access to the medical education, it can also 
indicate, where providers have to be located 
but does not do so 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care is 
negotiated with the providers 
 
Competencies of the Central Government 
The Central Government is involved in the 
way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. fee 
for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The central Government can recommend 
levels of overall health spending at the Amter 
level 
2004: 
Competencies at County “Amter” Level 
The overall budget for Primary Care services 
Questions of capacity - by controlling the 
access to the medical education, it can also 
indicate, where providers have to be located 
but does not do so 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care is 
negotiated with the providers 
 
Competencies of the Central Government 
The Central Government is involved in the 
way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. fee for 
service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The central Government can recommend 
levels of overall health spending at the Amter 
level 
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CG2  Which elements of the Primary Care Sector can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally? 
 
Remarks:  
There is no positive catalogue of primary 
care services covered by the Health System 
but some treatments are excluded. 
 
Remarks:  
There is no positive catalogue of primary care 
services covered by the Health System but 
some treatments are excluded. 
Finland 1995: 
Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of primary care services covered 
Questions of capacity – employment in the 
health centers operated by the Municipalities 
Overall budget for primary care 
Determine the top-level management of the 
organizations of providers of primary care 
Remark: 
The central Government has some say on the 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the National Health Insurance, but this 
concerns only private services. 
2004: 
Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of primary care services covered 
Questions of capacity – employment in the 
health centers operated by the Municipalities 
Overall budget for primary care 
Determine the top-level management of the 
organizations of providers of primary care 
Remark: 
The central Government has some say on the 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the National Health Insurance, but this 
concerns only private services. 
France 1995:  
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system, is subject to approval 
Questions of capacity - the number of 
Primary Care Physicians entering the job: by 
a national numerus clausus (access in 2 years 
of medical study) and repartition by specialty 
by decree. The government sets a 
“concours”, i.e. determines how many 
students may pass the exams and proceed in 
their education 
Remark: 
The catalogue of services, (nomenclature) 
and the tariffs for each service listed in the 
nomenclature (convention) is negotiated 
between the HIFs and the Providers, but 
subject to approval of the government 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system, is subject to approval  
Questions of capacity - the number of Primary 
Care Physicians entering the profession by a 
“concours” procedure) and repartition by 
specialty by decree 
The overall budget for Primary Care services  
is set by parliamentary vote, since 1996 
 
 
Remark 
The catalogue of services, (nomenclature) and 
the tariffs for each service listed in the 
nomenclature (convention) is negotiated 
between the HIFs and the Providers, but 
subject to approval of the government 
Germany 1995: 
None 
Remark: 
While the Government could by law 
influence many aspects, its actual role is very 
limited, and it never exerts its rights 
2004: 
None 
Remark: 
While the Government could by law influence 
many aspects, its actual role is very limited, 
and it never exerts its rights 
Greece 1995  
The central government controls: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity – by deciding on 
employment in the ESY 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care provided by the ESY 
2004:  
The central government controls: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity – by deciding on 
employment in the ESY 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care provided by the ESY 
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The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of primary care – 
the salaries of GPs employed in the ESY 
The way, providers of Primary Care are 
organized 
Remark: 
This concerns only the public part of the 
system, there is a private system operating 
parallel to the public system, with little or no 
control by the government. Many issues 
concerning contracts made by the HIF are 
also influenced by the government, since it 
controls closely the largest HIF IKA, OGA. 
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of primary care – 
the salaries of GPs employed in the ESY 
The way, providers of Primary Care are 
organized 
Remark: 
This concerns only the public part of the 
system, there is a private system operating 
parallel to the public system, with little or no 
control by the government. Many issues 
concerning contracts made by the HIF are 
also influenced by the government, since it 
controls closely the largest HIF IKA, OGA. 
Hungary 1995: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity – there is a system o 
practice rights. In order to be allowed to 
practice, a GP needs a “practice right”, the 
number of which is set by the government 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care – sectorial budget 
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services – the capitation 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity – by the practice right 
system (i.e. a licensing) 
 
 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care – sectorial budget 
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services - the level of the capitation 
Ireland 1995: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity - the number of 
Primary Care Physicians who are providing 
services for medical card holders 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
primary care – the budget for medical care 
for the medical card holders 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services 
Remark: 
The capitation for the GPs who treat medical 
card holders as well as the catalogue and the 
fees for GPs treating non-medical card 
holders are negotiated 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity - the number of Primary 
Care Physicians who are providing services 
for medical card holders 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
primary care – the budget for medical care for 
the medical card holders 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services 
Remark: 
The capitation for the GPs who treat medical 
card holders as well as the catalogue and the 
fees for GPs treating non-medical card 
holders are negotiated 
Italy 1995: 
Central Government controls 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system – no defined catalogue, 
but minimum requirements of what the 
regions have to provide 
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
2004: 
Central Government controls 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system – no defined catalogue, 
but minimum requirements of what the 
regions have to provide 
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
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Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the fees and salaries 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the fees and salaries 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Central Government controls 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system – subject to advice of 
the providers and the HIFs 
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
2004: 
Central Government controls 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system – subject to advice of the 
providers and the HIFs 
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
Netherlands 1995: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care – the tariffs for services are set 
in a way that expenditure targets are met  
The way Primary Care is remunerated; by the 
WTG law and a commission controlled by 
the Ministry of health   
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the amount of fees; ; by the 
WTG law and a commission controlled by 
the Ministry of health   
Remark: 
There is no defined positive catalogue of 
services covered, instead, some services are 
classified as less necessary and excluded 
from the basic package, they are covered by 
VHI 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care – the tariffs for services are set 
in a way that the government’s expenditure 
targets are met  
The way Primary Care is remunerated; by the 
WTG law and a commission controlled by the 
Ministry of health   
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, e.g. the amount of fees; by the WTG 
law and a commission controlled by the 
Ministry of health   
Remark: 
There is no defined positive catalogue of 
services covered, instead, some services are 
classified as less necessary and excluded from 
the basic package, they are covered by VHI  
New Zealand 1995: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care 
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services – the government sets the level of 
subsidies for Primary Care  
The way the providers of primary care are 
organized – in the early 90s, GPs negotiated 
contracts individually. The creation of larger 
organizations for conducting negotiations 
with the RHA was encouraged by law 
 
Remark: 
The government sets the level of the subsidy, 
GPs can set their own fees, i.e. can charge 
higher fees and also extra bills, which have to 
be paid for by the patients themselves 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services – the government can set the amount 
of the subsidy component 
The way the providers of primary care are 
organized 
 
Remark: 
The government sets the level of the subsidy, 
GPs can set their own fees, i.e. can charge 
higher fees and also extra bills, which have to 
be paid for by the patients themselves. 
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Norway 1995: 
Catalogue of primary care services covered 
by the Health system 
Questions of capacity 
Overall budget for primary care 
The level of remuneration of primary care 
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
The way providers of primary care are 
organized ( regional or national level) 
Remark: 
The central government sets a frame and the 
municipalities set the details. They are free to 
employ GPs or to contract independent 
providers. Some elements are also negotiated 
with the GP association. Capacity is 
controlled by limiting access to the medical 
education. 
2004: 
Catalogue of primary care services covered by 
the Health system 
Questions of capacity 
Overall budget for primary care 
The level of remuneration of primary care 
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
The way providers of primary care are 
organized ( regional or national level) 
Remark: 
The central government sets a frame and the 
municipalities set the details. They are free to 
employ GPs or to contract independent 
providers. Increasingly, contracts are in use 
and elements thus negotiated with the GP 
association. Capacity is controlled by limiting 
access to the medical education. 
Portugal 1995: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services - the salaries of the GPs 
Remark: 
Private providers are largely free to set their 
own fees. This however concerns only a 
minor share of the health care provided and 
consumed 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services - the salaries of the GPs 
Remark: 
Private providers are largely free to set their 
own fees. This however concerns only a 
minor share of the health care provided and 
consumed 
Poland 1995: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services 
Remark: 
While the government always had a strong 
role, factually many issues were negotiated 
with the providers. 
2004: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services 
Remark: 
Most of these items are negotiated by the 
National Health Fund and the providers. The 
former is effectively controlled by the 
government. 
Spain 1995: 
The Central Government controls  
The catalogue of Primary Care services 
covered by the health system 
2004: 
The Central Government controls  
The catalogue of Primary Care services 
covered by the health system 
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Questions of capacity – employment in the 
INSALUD 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated 
 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, salaries in the INSALUD 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-
level organization. 
The Autonomous Communities control 
Questions of capacity – employment in the 
regional SRS 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. 
fee for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, salaries 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-level 
organization. 
Sweden 1995: 
Competencies are held at the level of the 
Landstings 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
physicians per capita or in a region) 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. 
fee for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, the salaries 
2004: 
Competencies are held at the level of the 
Landstings 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
physicians per capita or in a region) 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated (e.g. 
fee for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, the salaries 
Switzerland 1995: 
The Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system; in the sense of a 
negative list, enumerating services which are 
not covered 
Fees are negotiated between providers and 
HIFs at cantonal level subject to approval of 
the Regional Government (Kanton) 
The mode primary care is remunerated 
2004: 
The Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of Primary Care services covered 
by the health system; in the sense of a 
negative list, enumerating services which are 
not covered 
Fees are negotiated between providers and 
HIFs at cantonal level subject to approval of 
the Regional Government (Kanton) 
The mode primary care is remunerated 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Catalogue of primary care services covered 
by the health system  -  while there is no 
“official” catalogue of primary care services 
covered by the NHS, but the government 
determines some things e.g. immunization 
programs, which have to be included 
Questions of capacity – this is subject to 
influence by planning but not unilateral 
control. 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
Primary Care - in 1995 there was a separate 
budget for Primary Care provision 
The way Primary Care is remunerated – 
2004: 
Catalogue of primary care services covered by 
the health system  -  while there is no 
“official” catalogue of primary care services 
covered by the NHS, but the government 
determines some things e.g. immunization 
programs, which have to be included 
Questions of capacity – this is subject to 
influence by planning but not unilateral 
control 
The overall budget for expenditure for health 
care including Primary Care -  there is no 
longer a separate budget for Primary Care  
The way Primary Care is remunerated – while 
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while the main remuneration is by capitation, 
there are also elements of activity based 
funding, this is negotiated, as noted above 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, level of the capitation a GP receives 
– this is subject to negotiations, as noted as 
above 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-
level organization 
Remark: 
While there is substantial leeway for the 
lower levels in the NHS administration, the 
government sets the overall budget which is 
the effective limit to health service provision 
the main remuneration is by capitation, there 
are also elements of activity based funding, 
this is negotiated, as noted above 
The level of remuneration of Primary Care 
services, level of the capitation a GP receives 
– this is subject to negotiations, as noted as 
above 
The way, the providers of Primary Care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-level 
organization 
Remark: 
While there is substantial leeway for the 
lower levels in the NHS administration, the 
government sets the overall budget which is 
the effective limit to health service provision 
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Austria 1995:  
None 
Remark:  
The Central Government has some influence 
on how the providers of specialized medical 
care are organized (regional or national level)
2004:  
None  
Remark: 
The Central Government has some influence 
on how the providers of specialized medical 
care are organized ( regional or national level)
Belgium 1995. 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
specialists per capita or in a region) – the 
access to medical education is controlled and 
compared to GPs the control exercised on the 
number of specialists is stricter 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care – sectorial target budget, 
also a target budget for Laboratory services 
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services - disapproval of the fees negotiated 
between the HIF and the Provider 
The way, the providers of specialized care 
are organized, e.g. regional level or national-
level organization 
Remark: 
While the government can in theory set all 
those elements, it does so only rarely in a 
unilateral way. Most often, the issues are 
negotiated among the HIF and the Providers 
with influence by the government 
2004:  
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
specialists per capita or in a region) - since 
1996 there is extensive human resources 
planning, using a numerus clausus to contain 
the number of physicians 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care – sectorial target budget, also 
a target budget for Laboratory services 
The way specialized services are remunerated 
 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services - disapproval of the fees negotiated 
between the HIF and the Provider 
The way, the providers of specialized care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-level 
organization 
Remark: 
While the government can in theory set all 
those elements, it does so only rarely in a 
unilateral way. Most often, the issues are 
negotiated among the HIF and the Providers 
with influence by the government 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Governments control 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
 
Remark: 
The federal government exerts influence by 
setting standards the provincial governments 
have to meet to obtain federal subsidies. For 
instance, the catalogue – according to the 
2004: 
Provincial Governments control 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
 
 
Remark: 
The federal government exerts influence by 
setting standards the provincial governments 
have to meet to obtain federal subsidies. For 
instance, the catalogue – according to the 
 260
CG3  Which elements of the sector providing Specialized Medical Services (orthopedics, 
eye doctors, radiologists etc.) can be controlled by the Central Government unilaterally? 
constraint set by the federal government – 
must cover everything that is medically 
necessary.  
Within the limits set by the federal 
government, the provincial governments 
could act unilaterally, but usually, these 
issues are negotiated with the physician 
associations.  
A substantial share of outpatient specialized 
services, in particular those requiring heavy 
equipment, is provided in hospitals, but by 
self-employed specialists which use the 
hospitals facilities. 
 
constraint set by the federal government – 
must cover everything that is medically 
necessary.  
Within the limits set by the federal 
government, the provincial governments 
could act unilaterally, but usually, these issues 
are negotiated with the physician associations. 
A substantial share of outpatient specialized 
services, in particular those requiring heavy 
equipment, is provided in hospitals, but by 
self-employed specialists which use the 
hospitals facilities. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Most negotiations of these 
issues are among individual HIF and 
providers, the Central government has 
influence on the results. 
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
and the number of points a service is worth, 
is set by the Ministry of Health. 
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
 
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Most negotiations of these 
issues are among individual HIF and 
providers, the Central government has 
influence on the results. 
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
and the number of points a service is worth, is 
set by the Ministry of Health. 
Denmark 1995:  
Competencies at County level, Amter 
The overall budget for specialized services 
provided outside of hospitals 
Questions of capacity – by licensing self-
employed specialized providers 
The way specialized services are 
remunerated – negotiated with providers 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services – negotiated with providers 
Remark:  
Specialized medical services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals, and most 
control of the Amter is exercised by 
operating the Hospitals 
The catalogue of specialized services covered 
2004:  
Competencies at County level, Amter 
The overall budget for specialized services 
provided outside of hospitals 
Questions of capacity – by licensing self-
employed specialized providers 
The way specialized services are remunerated 
– negotiated with providers 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services– negotiated with providers 
Remark:  
Specialized medical services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals, and most control 
of the Amter is exercised by operating the 
Hospitals 
The catalogue of specialized services covered 
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is negotiated between the Amter association 
and the specialists’ association 
is negotiated between the Amter association 
and the specialists’ association 
Finland 1995: 
Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered 
Overall budget for specialized medical 
services 
Determine the top-level management of the 
organization of providers of specialized care 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided 
by Hospitals and the Hospital District has 
substantial influence on these issues. 
2004: 
Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered 
Overall budget for specialized medical 
services 
Determine the top-level management of the 
organization of providers of specialized care 
Remark: 
Specialized care is predominantly provided by 
Hospitals and the Hospital District has 
substantial influence on these issues. 
The central Government has some say on: 
the Catalogue of specialized services covered. 
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
All three elements apply to the private 
services covered by the National Sickness 
Insurance only. 
Specialized Health Care is predominantly 
provided by Hospitals  
France 1995:  
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system – the nomenclature is 
negotiated between the HIFs and the 
Provider but subject to approval 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services– the convention negotiated between 
the HIFs and providers, but subject to 
approval 
Questions of capacity - the number of 
specialists entering the job and repartition by 
specialty by decree (concours procedure).  
Remark: 
In a concours-procedure, the Ministry of 
health sets the number of students which may 
pass an examination and proceed to the next 
step of the medical education 
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system – the nomenclature is 
negotiated between the HIFs (i.e. the 
UNCAM) and the Provider but subject to 
approval 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services– the convention negotiated between 
the HIFs and providers, but subject to 
approval 
Questions of capacity - the number of 
specialists entering the job and repartition by 
specialty by decree (concours procedure).  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care is set by vote of parliament 
since 1996 
Germany 1995: 
None, see the remarks to CG2 
2004: 
None, see the remarks to CG2 
Greece 1995: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care provided by the ESY 
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care provided by the ESY 
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration for specialized 
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The level of remuneration for specialized 
services 
The way, providers of specialized care are 
organized 
Remark: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by hospitals; there the 
government has much control. Specialized 
care provided by the private sector is under 
little or no control of the government 
services 
The way, providers of specialized care are 
organized 
 
Remark: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by hospitals; there the 
government has much control. Specialized 
care provided by the private sector is under 
little or no control of the government 
Hungary 1995:  
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity – there is a system of 
specialist consultation hours for out-patient 
treatment, the number of which is specified 
in the contract of the hospital providing these 
services and the NHIFA 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care – sectorial budget 
The way specialized services are 
remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services - the amount of fees 
Remark: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals  
 
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity  
 
 
 
 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care – sectorial budget 
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services - the amount of fees 
 
Remark: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals 
 
Ireland 1995: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees  
Remark: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by hospitals; there the 
government has much control. The providers 
of specialized services are paid on a fee for 
service basis; catalogue and fees are 
negotiated. 
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees  
Remark: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by hospitals; there the 
government has much control. The providers 
of specialized services are paid on a fee for 
service basis; catalogue and fees are 
negotiated. 
Italy 1995: 
Central Government controls 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system – no defined catalogue, but 
minimum requirements of what the regions 
2004: 
Central Government controls 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system – no defined catalogue, but 
minimum requirements of what the regions 
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have to provide 
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
Remark: 
Specialized health services are 
predominantly provided in hospitals 
have to provide 
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided by hospitals 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated 
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
Netherlands 1995: 
The catalogue of specialized services covered 
by the Health System 
The overall budget for specialized services 
covered by the Health System 
Questions of capacity  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services 
Remark:  
Specialized Care is provided predominantly 
by Hospitals. 
The government exerts influence by a 
commission, which ensures that tariffs for 
services are set in a way that the 
government’s intended expenditure targets 
are met.  
There is no defined positive catalogue of 
services covered, instead, some services are 
classified as less necessary and excluded 
from the basic package, they are covered by 
VHI 
2004: 
The catalogue of specialized services covered 
by the Health System 
The overall budget for specialized services 
Questions of capacity  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services 
 
 
Remark:  
Specialized Care is provided predominantly 
by Hospitals 
The government exerts influence by a 
commission, which ensures that tariffs for 
services are set in a way that the 
government’s intended expenditure targets are 
met.  
There is no defined positive catalogue of 
services covered, instead, some services are 
classified as less necessary and excluded from 
the basic package, they are covered by VHI 
 
New Zealand 1995: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services – by setting the subsidy level 
Remark:  
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services – by setting the subsidy level 
 
Remark:  
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eye doctors, radiologists etc.) can be controlled by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Specialized medical services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals.  
Specialized medical services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals 
Norway 1995: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated 
The level of remuneration for specialized 
services 
The way, the providers of specialized care 
are organized, e.g. regional level or national-
level organization. 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. Hospitals are owned 
and operated by the Counties, which control 
most of these elements. Capacity is 
controlled by limiting access to the medical 
education. 
2004:  
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration for specialized 
services 
The way, the providers of specialized care are 
organized, e.g. regional level or national-level 
organization. 
 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. Hospitals are now 
Health Enterprises, but factually controlled by 
Regional Health Authorities, which are part of 
the central government. These control most of 
the elements. Capacity is controlled by 
limiting access to the medical education.. 
Portugal 1995: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. Control is exercised 
by controlling the Hospitals. There is no 
explicit distinction among in-patient / 
Hospital care and out-patient specialized care 
as far as the provision of care is concerned 
Private providers – private specialists, 
specialists providing services on private 
terms and private hospitals are relatively free 
in setting their own terms. 
2004: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system 
Remark: 
Specialized services are predominantly 
provided by Hospitals. Control is exercised by 
controlling the Hospitals. There is no explicit 
distinction among in-patient / Hospital care 
and out-patient specialized care as far as the 
provision of care is concerned.  
Private providers – private specialists, 
specialists providing services on private terms 
and private hospitals are relatively free in 
setting their own terms. 
Poland 1995: 
The Central government controls 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated 
Remark: 
Specialized care is provided predominantly 
in hospitals, and control is exercised by 
2004: 
The Central government controls 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care – the share of the NHF 
budget going into specialized care contracts 
The way specialized services are remunerated 
Remark: 
Specialized care is still provided 
predominantly in hospitals.  
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eye doctors, radiologists etc.) can be controlled by the Central Government unilaterally? 
controlling the hospitals. 
Spain 1995: 
The central government controls  
The Catalogue of specialized services 
covered by the health system 
Remark: 
Specialized medical services are provided by 
Hospitals, and control is exercised by 
controlling the hospitals. 
2004: 
The central Government controls  
The Catalogue of specialized services covered 
by the health system 
The Autonomous Communities control many 
aspects of specialized control, since 
specialized medical services are provided by 
Hospitals, and control is exercised by 
controlling the hospitals. 
Sweden 1995: 
The control rests with the Landstings; 
specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals operated by the 
Landstings 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity  
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are 
remunerated  
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
2004: 
The control rests with the Landstings; 
specialized services are predominantly 
provided in Hospitals operated by the 
Landstings 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity 
The overall budget for expenditure for 
specialized care  
The way specialized services are remunerated 
The level of remuneration of specialized 
services, e.g. the amount of fees 
Switzerland 1995: 
The Central government controls: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system; in the sense of a negative 
list, enumerating services which are not 
covered 
Fees are negotiated between providers and 
HIFs at cantonal level subject to approval of 
the Regional Government 
The mode specialized care is remunerated 
2004: 
The Central government controls: 
Catalogue of specialized services covered by 
the health system; in the sense of a negative 
list, enumerating services which are not 
covered 
Fees are negotiated between providers and 
HIFs at cantonal level subject to approval of 
the Regional Government 
The mode specialized care is remunerated 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals. Control is hence 
exercised by controlling the Hospitals  
2004: 
Specialized services are provided 
predominantly by Hospitals. Control is hence 
exercised by controlling the Hospitals 
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CG4  Which elements of the sector providing Dental Care can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally? 
Austria 1995:  
None 
Remark: 
Dental Care, in particular dentures, is 
predominantly privately purchased. 
The Central Government has some influence 
on how the providers of dental medical care 
are organized ( regional or national level). 
2004:  
None 
Remark: 
Dental Care, in particular dentures, is 
predominantly privately purchased. 
The Central Government has some influence 
on how the providers of dental medical care 
are organized ( regional or national level). 
Belgium 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
care – sectorial target budget 
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
dentists per capita or in a region)- by 
controlling access to medical education 
The way dental care is remunerated (e.g. fee 
for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. 
the amount of fees - disapproval of the fees 
negotiated between the HIF and the Provider 
Remark: 
While the government can in theory set all 
those elements, it does so only rarely in a 
unilateral way. Most often, the issues are 
negotiated among the HIF and the Providers 
with influence by the government 
2004:  
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
care – sectorial target budget 
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of dentists 
per capita or in a region)  
 
The way dental care is remunerated (e.g. fee 
for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. 
the amount of fees - disapproval of the fees 
negotiated between the HIF and the Provider 
Remark: 
While the government can in theory set all 
those elements, it does so only rarely in a 
unilateral way. Most often, the issues are 
negotiated among the HIF and the Providers 
with influence by the government 
Canada 1995: 
For those dental services covered by the 
Health Systems, Provincial Governments 
control 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care 
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of 
dentists per capita or in a region) 
The way dental care is remunerated (e.g. fee 
for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
Remark: 
Only dental care which requires in-patient 
treatment is covered by the health system. 
Dental care is predominantly paid for by the 
patients themselves, the sector providing 
dental care is hence not under control of the 
provincial government. The fees are set by 
the dentists themselves and are paid for by 
the patients or the VHI. 
2004: 
For those dental services covered by the 
Health Systems, Provincial Governments 
control 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care 
Questions of capacity (e.g. number of dentists 
per capita or in a region) 
The way dental care is remunerated (e.g. fee 
for service or a per-capita budget etc.) 
Remark: 
Only dental care which requires in-patient 
treatment is covered by the health system. 
Dental care is predominantly paid for by the 
patients themselves, the sector providing 
dental care is hence not under control of the 
provincial government. The fees are set by the 
dentists themselves and are paid for by the 
patients or the VHI. 
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Government unilaterally? 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care 
Questions of capacity  
The way dental care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. 
the amount of fees 
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Most negotiations of these 
issues are among individual HIF and 
providers, the Central government has 
influence on the results. 
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care 
Questions of capacity  
The way dental care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. 
the amount of fees 
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Most negotiations of these 
issues are among individual HIF and 
providers, the Central government has 
influence on the results. 
Denmark 1995:  
Competencies at county Level, Amter 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – or rather not covered 
The way dental care is remunerated 
Remark:  
Dental care for adults is not covered by the 
Health System. The tariffs are however 
negotiated between the Amter and the 
Dentists’ organization 
2004: 
Competencies at county Level, Amter 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – or rather not covered 
The way dental care is remunerated 
Remark:  
Dental care for adults is not covered by the 
Health System. The tariffs are however 
negotiated between the Amter and the 
Dentists’ organization 
Finland 1995: 
The Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of dental care covered by the 
Health System  
The way dental care is remunerated 
Remark: 
The Municipalities control what is offered 
for whom in the Health Centers operated by 
the Municipalities. Dental care is 
predominantly paid either by the patients 
themselves or by the NHI. For the NHI, the 
central government has some say on what is 
covered, how it is paid and how much is 
paid. 
2004: 
The Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of dental care covered by the 
Health System  
The way dental care is remunerated 
Remark: 
The Municipalities control what is offered for 
whom in the Health Centers operated by the 
Municipalities. Dental care is predominantly 
paid either by the patients themselves or by 
the NHI. For the NHI, the central government 
has some say on what is covered, how it is 
paid and how much is paid. 
France 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – negotiated between the HIFs 
and the dentists’ organization, it is subject to 
approval 
 
Remark: 
About 2/3 of the dental care is purchased 
privately and covered by the VHI 
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system; - while negotiated between the 
HIFs Organization (UNCAM) and the 
dentists’ organization, it is subject to approval
The overall budget for those dental services 
covered by the Health system is set by 
parliamentary vote since 1996 
Remark: 
About 2/3 of the dental care is purchased 
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privately and covered by the VHI 
Germany 1995: 
None 
Remark: 
A limit to the growth rate of dental care was 
set, but was not effective 
2004: 
None 
Greece 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system 
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care for those services 
provided by the Health System 
The level of remuneration for dental care – 
for those employed by the ESY 
The way dental care is remunerated  
Remark: 
This concerns only dental care provided by 
the ESY or based on contracts between the 
ESY and providers. Dental care is 
predominantly paid for by the patients 
themselves, the sector providing dental care 
is hence not under control of the government 
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system 
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care for those services 
provided by the Health System 
The level of remuneration for dental care – for 
those employed by the ESY 
The way dental care is remunerated  
Remark: 
This concerns only dental care provided by 
the ESY or based on contracts between the 
ESY and providers. Dental care is 
predominantly paid for by the patients 
themselves, the sector providing dental care is 
hence not under control of the government 
Hungary 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
They way dental care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration for dental care 
Remark:  
Dental services are predominantly paid by 
the patients themselves. Only the dental care 
for some groups is covered. Only for this 
small domain, the items mentioned above are 
under governmental control 
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
They way dental care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration for dental care 
Remark:  
Dental services are predominantly paid by the 
patients themselves. Only the dental care for 
some groups is covered. Only for this small 
domain, the items mentioned above are under 
governmental control 
Ireland 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – for medical card holders 
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care for those services 
provided by the Health System – for medical 
card holders  
Remark: 
Dental services are predominantly paid by 
the patients themselves and hence not under 
political control. Catalogues and fees are 
negotiated 
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – for medical card holders 
The overall budget for expenditure for dental 
services and dental care for those services 
provided by the Health System – for medical 
card holders  
Remark: 
Dental services are predominantly paid by the 
patients themselves and hence not under 
political control. Catalogues and fees are 
negotiated 
Italy 19995: 
Central Government controls 
The catalogue of dental services covered by 
the health system 
2004: 
Central Government controls 
The catalogue of dental services covered by 
the health system 
 269
CG4  Which elements of the sector providing Dental Care can be controlled by the Central 
Government unilaterally? 
The way dental care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of dental care  
Remark:  
This concerns only dental services provided 
in the SSN. Dental services are 
predominantly paid by the patients 
themselves, where the state has neither 
control over the fees nor the coverage of 
services. 
The way dental care is remunerated  
The level of remuneration of dental care 
 
Remark:  
This concerns only dental services provided in 
the SSN. Dental services are predominantly 
paid by the patients themselves, where the 
state has neither control over the fees nor the 
coverage of services. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The way dental care is remunerated  
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system  
The way dental care is remunerated  
Netherlands 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – that is included in the basic 
package 
The level of remuneration of dental care, the 
amount of fees – for those included in the 
basic package 
 
Remark:  
Dental services are predominantly paid by 
the patients themselves; the influence of the 
Government in this area is factually very 
limited 
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – that is included in the basic 
package 
Overall budget of dental services provided by 
the Health Insurance system 
The way dental care is remunerated 
The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. 
the amount of fees – for those included in the 
basic package 
 
Remark:  
The elements listed concern the services 
provided by the Health Insurance System. 
Dental services are predominantly paid by the 
patients themselves; the influence of the 
Government in this area is factually very 
limited 
New Zealand 1995: 
The way dental care is remunerated 
The level of remuneration of dental care  
Remark:  
This concerns only the small share of dental 
care provided by the public health system. 
The Central government can set the budget 
for publicly funded dental care. Most of the 
dental care is paid for by the patients 
themselves or their VHI. 
2004:  
The way dental care is remunerated 
The level of remuneration of dental care  
Remark:  
This concerns only the small share of dental 
care provided by the public health system. 
The Central government can set the budget 
for publicly funded dental care. Most of the 
dental care is paid for by the patients 
themselves or their VHI. 
Norway 1995: 
Questions of capacity  
Remark:  
Dental care is not covered by the Health 
System and predominantly paid for by the 
patients themselves. It is thus not under the 
control of the state. The issue of capacity 
concerns those dentists employed to provide 
2004: 
Questions of capacity 
Remark:  
Dental care is not covered by the Health 
System and predominantly paid for by the 
patients themselves. It is thus not under the 
control of the state. The issue of capacity 
concerns those dentists employed to provide 
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dental care for patients under 18 years of age. dental care for patients under 18 years of age. 
Portugal 1995: 
Dental services are not covered by the Health 
System but are predominantly paid by the 
patients themselves or by their VHI 
Remark: 
The dentists is, within limits set by the 
national dental association, free to set his 
own fees. Dental care is not explicitly 
excluded, but not provided by the NHS. 
2004: 
Dental services are not covered by the Health 
System but are predominantly paid by the 
patients themselves or by their VHI 
Remark: 
The dentists is, within limits set by the 
national dental association, free to set his own 
fees. Dental care is not explicitly excluded, 
but not provided by the NHS. 
Poland 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system 
Overall budget of dental services covered by 
the National Health Fund  
Questions of capacity 
The way dental care is remunerated 
Remark: 
These issues refer only to the dental care 
covered by the health system. Dental care is 
predominantly paid for by the patients 
themselves.  
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system 
Overall budget of dental services covered by 
the National Health Fund  
Questions of capacity 
The way dental care is remunerated 
Remark: 
These issues refer only to the dental care 
covered by the health system, i.e. by the NHF. 
Dental care is predominantly paid for by the 
patients themselves. 
Spain 1995: 
The Central Government controls  
The Catalogue of dental services covered by 
the health system  
Questions of capacity – employment of 
dentists in the INSALSUD 
 
Remark:  
Dental services are predominantly paid by 
the patients themselves, and hence outside of 
the central government’s control 
2004: 
The Central Government controls  
The Catalogue of dental services covered by 
the health system  
The Autonomous Communities control 
Questions of capacity – employment of 
dentists in the SRS 
Remark:  
Dental services are predominantly paid by the 
patients themselves, and hence outside of the 
regional government’s control 
Sweden 1995: 
The competencies rests with the Landstings 
All aspects are controlled for the services 
provided for patients under 20 years of age.  
Remark: 
Dental care is predominantly paid for by the 
patients themselves, and is hence not under 
control of the Landstings 
2004: 
The competencies rests with the Landstings 
All aspects are controlled for the services 
provided for patients under 20 years of age.  
Remark: 
Dental care is predominantly paid for by the 
patients themselves, and is hence not under 
control of the Landstings 
Switzerland 1995: 
Dental care is not covered by the health 
system and hence not subject to government 
regulation 
2004: 
Dental care is not covered by the health 
system and hence not subject to government 
regulation 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – i.e. paid for by the NHS 
Questions of capacity e.g. number of dentists 
2004: 
Catalogue of dental services covered by the 
health system – i.e. paid for by the NHS 
Questions of capacity e.g. number of dentists 
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in a region - the government can only 
influence this e.g. by financial incentives. 
The way dental care is remunerated – for 
those services covered by the NHS 
The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. 
the amount of fees – for those services 
covered by the NHS 
Remark:  
There are contracts between the NHS and the 
Dentist association, in which the services and 
the remuneration of dental care within the 
NHS is settled. Apart from this, patients may 
get treatment on private terms. Most of 
dental care is privately purchased 
in a region - the government can only 
influence this e.g. by financial incentives. 
The way dental care is remunerated – for 
those services covered by the NHS 
The level of remuneration of dental care, e.g. 
the amount of fees – for those services 
covered by the NHS 
Remark:  
There are contracts between the NHS and the 
Dentist association, in which the services and 
the remuneration of dental care within the 
NHS is settled. Apart from this, patients may 
get treatment on private terms. Most of dental 
care is privately purchased  
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Austria 1995:  
For Public Hospitals, the majority, regional 
governments (Bundesländer) can set: 
The overall budget for in-patient services – 
for the Region 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
The actual remuneration - hospital’s overall 
budget 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated (e.g. 
remuneration by per-diem instead of DRG)  
Organizational questions (e.g. how the 
Hospitals are organized and administered) 
The usage of technology in Hospitals  
 
The Central Government controls 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system 
2004:  
For Public Hospitals, the majority, regional 
governments (Bundesländer) can set: 
The overall budget for in-patient services – 
for the Region 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
The actual remuneration - hospital’s overall 
budget 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated (e.g. remuneration 
by per-diem instead of DRG)  
Organizational questions (e.g. how the 
Hospitals are organized and administered) 
The usage of technology in Hospitals  
 
The Central Government controls 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
Belgium 1995: 
The Central Government controls 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services- since 1986, the national 
government sets a budget for running costs of 
the infrastructure; since services provided are 
paid on a fee for service basis, this does not 
limit the overall expenditure for in-patient 
care, there is also a sectorial target budget 
The number of Hospitals in a region – by 
accreditation and planning 
The size of Hospitals in a region – by 
accreditation and planning 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals – by subsidizing investments and 
determining, which investments can be paid 
for from the hospital’s income 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational questions (e.g. how the 
Hospitals are organized and administered) – 
the Government sets the size of the Hospital 
and the number of different department it 
must have.  
2004: 
The Central Government controls 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services – running costs for the infrastructure  
and a sectorial target budget  
 
 
 
 
The number of Hospitals in a region– by 
accreditation and planning 
The size of Hospitals in a region– by 
accreditation and planning 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals – by subsidizing investments and 
determining, which investments can be paid 
for from the hospital’s income 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational questions (e.g. how the 
Hospitals are organized and administered) – 
the Government sets the size of the Hospital 
and the number of different department it 
must have.  
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by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Remark: 
While not determining the size of a hospital, 
the hospitals require accreditation by the 
Ministry of Public Health, and this is granted 
only if the hospital does meet certain 
requirement, among them a certain size, and 
not exceed the planned capacity in the region 
which is set by the government 
Remark: 
While not determining the size of a hospital, 
the hospitals require accreditation by the 
Ministry of Public Health, and this is granted 
only if the hospital does meet certain 
requirements, among them a certain size, and 
not exceed the planned capacity in the region 
which is set by the government  
Canada 1995: 
The Provincial Governments, which are 
operating most Hospitals, control 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region  
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals – the provincial government 
allocated grants for investments 
Employment decisions in Hospitals - 
Hospitals have leeway, but the provincial 
government sets limits 
Actual remuneration level for Hospitals ( the 
budgets are negotiated) 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated (e.g. 
remuneration by DRGs instead of budgets)  
Organizational / administrative questions 
(e.g. how the Hospitals are organized and 
administered- e.g. one province abolished the 
individual Hospital boards and replaced them 
by regionally defined governing bodies) 
The usage of medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Remark: 
Despite formal competence, there are 
extensive negotiations among the provincial 
governments and the Hospitals 
2004: 
The Provincial Governments, which are 
operating most Hospitals, control 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region  
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals; Hospitals 
have leeway, but the provincial government 
sets limits 
Actual remuneration level for Hospitals ( the 
budgets are negotiated) 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated (e.g. remuneration 
by DRGs instead of budgets)  
Organizational / administrative questions (e.g. 
how the Hospitals are organized and 
administered) 
The usage of medical technology in Hospitals 
 
Remark: 
Despite formal competence, there are 
extensive negotiations among the provincial 
governments and the Hospitals 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals 
Remark: 
The government defined a basic package of 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals 
Remark: 
The government defined a basic package of 
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by the Central Government unilaterally? 
health services by law. Most negotiations of 
these issues are among individual HIF and 
Hospitals, the Central government has 
influence on the results. In Hospitals owned 
by the Central Government / Ministry of 
Health, the Government can set salaries, 
make investment decisions and decide 
organizational questions. In regional 
hospitals, the Central government can 
influence salaries, management and 
investments in technology. 
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
and the number of points a service is worth, 
is set by the Ministry of Health. 
health services by law. Most negotiations of 
these issues are among individual HIF and 
Hospitals, the Central government has 
influence on the results. In Hospitals owned 
by the Central Government / Ministry of 
Health, the Government can set salaries, make 
investment decisions and decide 
organizational questions. In regional 
hospitals, the Central government can 
influence salaries, management and 
investments in technology. 
The remuneration is based on a point system, 
and the number of points a service is worth, is 
set by the Ministry of Health. 
Denmark 1995:  
Competencies at the county level, Amter: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system – mainly by excluding 
services  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
Actual remuneration level – the hospital’s 
overall budget 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational / administrative questions 
The usage of medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Remark:  
Hospitals are directly operated by the Amter  
2004:  
Competencies at the county level, Amter: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system – mainly by excluding 
services  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
Actual remuneration level – the hospital’s 
overall budget 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational / administrative questions 
The usage of medical technology in Hospitals 
 
Remark:  
Hospitals are directly operated by the Amter 
Finland 1995:  
Municipalities control:  
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
Influence on the way, hospitals are 
administered  
Remark: 
These issues are negotiated between the 
Hospital District and the Municipalities. 
Here, the Hospital Districts have substantial 
say on all issues. 
2004: 
Municipalities control:  
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
Influence on the way, hospitals are 
administered  
Remark: 
These issues are negotiated between the 
Hospital District and the Municipalities. Here, 
the Hospital Districts have substantial say on 
all issues. 
France 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system; influence also by the 
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
The number of Hospitals in a region; at 
Central level and ARH 
The size of Hospitals in a region; at central 
level and ARH 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals; at Central level and ARH 
Employment decisions in Hospitals (number 
and type of staff employed); there are 
national references and guidelines in order to 
obtain an accreditation (by HAS) 
Questions of actual remuneration (Hospital’s 
overall budget) at Central level and ARH. 
This concerns also the salary of the 
physicians employed in Hospitals 
The mode how in patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated (e.g. 
remuneration by per-diem instead of DRG) : 
Central level 
The usage of technology in Hospitals; at 
Central level and ARH 
The investment in technology in Hospitals : 
Central level and ARH 
Remark: 
The central government sets a central, 
national level frame of planning, which is 
elaborated by the ARH, which are 
negotiating with the individual hospitals 
within this frame. 
UNCAM  
The overall budget for in-patient services; 
vote by parliament since 1996 
The number of Hospitals in a region; at 
Central level and ARH 
The size of Hospitals in a region; at: Central 
level and ARH 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals; at Central level and ARH 
Employment decisions in Hospitals (number 
and type of staff employed); there are national 
references and guidelines in order to obtain an 
accreditation (by HAS) 
Questions of actual remuneration (e.g. level of 
remuneration; Hospital’s overall budget); at 
central level and ARH 
The mode how in patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated; at Central level 
The usage of technology in Hospitals; at 
central level and ARH 
The investment in technology in Hospitals : 
Central level and ARH 
Remark: 
The central government sets a central, 
national level frame of planning, which is 
elaborated by the ARH, which are negotiating 
with the individual hospitals within this 
frame. 
Germany 1995: 
Regional Government (Bundesland) controls, 
by ownership of the Hospital as well as by a 
formal planning competence: 
Number of Hospitals in a region 
Size of Hospitals in a region 
Investments in medical technology 
Organizational questions 
None at the level of the Central Government 
Remark: 
The planning competence of the regional 
government also holds for hospitals owned 
and operated by municipalities 
2004: 
Regional Government (Bundesland) controls, 
by ownership of the Hospital as well as by a 
formal planning competence:: 
Number of Hospitals in a region 
Size of Hospitals in a region 
Investments in medical technology 
Organizational questions 
None at the level of the Central Government 
Remark: 
The planning competence of the regional 
government also holds for hospitals owned 
and operated by municipalities 
Greece 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region  
The investments in medical technology in 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region  
The investments in medical technology in 
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals 
Actual remuneration level – budgets of the 
hospitals and the per diem paid by HIF 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational / administrative questions  
Usage of technology in hospitals 
Remark: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by 
the ESY, which is part of the public 
administration and under governmental 
control. 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals 
Actual remuneration level – budgets of the 
hospitals and the per diem paid by HIF 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational / administrative questions  
Usage of technology in hospitals 
Remark: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
ESY, which is part of the public 
administration and under governmental 
control. 
Hungary 1995: 
The Central government controls  
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services – sectorial budget 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
Actual remuneration level – the point values 
on which the DRG system is based 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated  
 
The Municipalities and Counties control: 
Organizational / administrative questions  
The usage of medical technology  
The size of Hospitals in a region (number of 
beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals (number 
and type of staff employed) 
Remark: 
Hospitals are predominantly operated by 
Municipalities and Counties. They have more 
control over the practical questions of how 
the hospital is administered 
2004: 
The Central government controls: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services sectorial budget 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
Actual remuneration level – the point values 
on which the DRG system is based 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated  
 
The Municipalities and Counties control: 
Organizational / administrative questions  
The usage of medical technology in Hospitals 
The size of Hospitals in a region (number of 
beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals (number 
and type of staff employed) 
Remark: 
Hospitals are predominantly operated by 
Municipalities and Counties. They have more 
control over the practical questions of how the 
hospital is administered 
Ireland 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
Investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
Investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions in Hospitals 
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Actual remuneration level – the budgets 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated 
Remark: 
About half of the hospitals are owned and 
operated by the Health Boards / national 
government. Here the state’s control is 
substantial. The control over the non-state 
hospitals ( run by charities) is weaker. 
Actual remuneration level – the budgets 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated 
Remark: 
About half of the hospitals are owned and 
operated by the Health Boards / national 
government. Here the state’s control is 
substantial. The control over the non-state 
hospitals ( run by charities) is weaker. 
Italy 1995: 
Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system – no defined catalogue, 
only minimum requirements, which have to 
be provided by the Regions  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services – no earmarked budget, but the 
overall budget 
The number of Hospitals in a region – set by 
the regional government by accreditation 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated – the mode is 
set by law  
Remark: 
For those hospitals owned and operated by 
the ASL. The ASL decides on medical 
technology, employment, but does so within 
limits set by the regional Government. 
Regional Governments operate the Hospitals 
within the limits set by the central 
government 
2004:  
Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system – no defined catalogue, only 
minimum requirements, which have to be 
provided by the Regions  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services – no earmarked budget, but the 
overall budget 
The number of Hospitals in a region – set by 
the regional government by accreditation 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated – the mode is set 
by law  
Remark: 
For those hospitals owned and operated by the 
ASL. The ASL decides on medical 
technology, employment, but does so within 
limits set by the regional Government. 
Regional Governments operate the Hospitals 
within the limits set by the central 
government 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology  
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated (per-diem 
instead of DRG)  
Organizational questions, how Hospitals are 
organized ad administered 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology  
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated (per-diem instead 
of DRG)  
Organizational questions, how Hospitals are 
organized ad administered 
Netherlands 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
The investments in medical technology 
The actual remuneration level 
The mode how in patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated  
Remark: 
Usually, the provincial governments plan and 
propose, the central government approves. 
The investments in medical technology  
The actual remuneration level 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated  
Remark: 
Usually, the provincial governments plan and 
propose, the central government approves. 
New Zealand 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
hospitals - procurement of technology has to 
be reported to and approved by the Ministry 
of Health 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated – usually by 
budgets 
Organizational questions; how the Hospitals 
are organized and administered 
Remark: 
While the hospitals were quite independent, 
the central government did merge them and 
split the mergers back again.  
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The national overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology in 
hospitals - procurement of technology has to 
be reported to and approved by the Ministry 
of Health 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated – usually by 
budgets 
Organizational questions; how the Hospitals 
are organized and administered 
 
 
Norway 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology  
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated 
Organizational questions; how the Hospitals 
are organized and administered 
 
Remark: 
The county councils as owner of the hospitals 
could determine these issues. The Hospitals 
usually received a block grant and had 
substantial autonomy. 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology  
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated 
Organizational questions; how the Hospitals 
are organized and administered 
 
Remark: 
Hospitals are now legally independent Health 
Enterprises and supposed to be self governed. 
Factually, they are seen as to be factually 
controlled by Regional Health Authorities, 
which in turn are part of the national 
government. 
Remuneration – the share of block grant and 
DRG based funding -  is annually decided by 
the parliament. 
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Portugal 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region  
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals – the ratio of heavy equipment per 
population is set by law 
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
The actual remuneration – the hospital’s 
budget 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated – share of the 
budget which is calculated using a DRG 
system 
Organizational questions; how the Hospitals 
are organized and administered 
The usage of technology in Hospitals 
 
 
 
Remark: 
While private hospitals have much more 
leeway, the government has also some 
control over them, in particular on capacities 
and available technology. 
Control is directly exercised by negotiations 
between the hospital and the Ministry of 
health. 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region  
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals – the ratio of heavy equipment per 
population is set by law 
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
The actual remuneration – the hospital’s 
budget 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated – share of the 
budget which is calculated using a DRG 
system 
Organizational questions; how the Hospitals 
are organized and administered – some 
hospitals have been transformed into public 
enterprises 
The usage of technology in Hospitals 
 
Remark: 
While private hospitals have much more 
leeway, the government has also some control 
over them, in particular on capacities and 
available technology. 
Control is directly exercised by negotiations 
between the hospital and the Ministry of 
health. 
Poland 1995: 
The Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals – the government can give a grant 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated  
 
Competencies for hospitals also rest with the 
municipalities and regions, which can exert 
some influence on: 
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region 
2004: 
The Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals – the government can give a grant 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated  
 
Competencies for hospitals also rest with the 
municipalities and regions, which can exert 
some influence on: 
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region 
Remark: 
Factually, many issues are negotiated with the 
hospitals 
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Spain 1995: 
The Central Government controls  
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system 
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology  
Employment decisions in Hospitals (number 
and type of staff employed) 
Actual remuneration level (i.e. the hospital’s 
budget) 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated - i.e. the way 
the hospitals budget is determined, e.g. based 
on historical budgets or on a DRG system 
Organizational / administrative questions 
(e.g. how the Hospitals are organized and 
administered 
 
Remark: 
About half of the hospital beds are operated 
by the INSALUD, which is directly under 
control of the Central Government. Here, the 
Central Government can control these 
elements. For the remaining half, the control 
only concerns the remuneration levels for the 
hospitals, which are contracted by the 
INSALUD. 
2004: 
The Central Government controls  
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system 
The Autonomous Communities control: 
The overall budget for in-patient services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region (beds) 
The investments in medical technology  
Employment decisions in Hospitals (number 
and type of staff employed) 
Actual remuneration level (i.e. the hospital’s 
overall budget) 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated - i.e. the way the 
hospitals budget is determined, e.g. based on 
historical budgets or on a DRG system 
Organizational / administrative questions (e.g. 
how the Hospitals are organized and 
administered) 
Remark: 
About half of the hospital beds are operated 
by the SRS, which are directly under control 
of the respective Regional Government. Here, 
the Regional Government can control these 
elements. For the remaining half, the control 
only concerns the remuneration levels for the 
hospitals, which are contracted. 
Sweden 1995: 
The competencies rests with the Landstings, 
which are owning and operating them 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The regional overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region 
The investments in medical technology  
Employment decisions in Hospitals  
Actual remuneration level of Hospitals 
The mode how in-patient services provided 
by Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational / administrative questions  
Usage of medical technology in Hospitals  
2004: 
The competencies rests with the Landstings, 
which are owning and operating them 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered by 
the health system  
The regional overall budget for in-patient 
services 
The number of Hospitals in a region 
The size of Hospitals in a region 
The investments in medical technology  
Employment decisions in Hospitals 
Actual remuneration level of Hospitals 
The mode how in-patient services provided by 
Hospitals are remunerated  
Organizational / administrative questions 
Usage of medical technology in Hospitals  
Switzerland 1995: 
The Central Government controls 
The catalogue of in-patient services covered 
by the Health System in the sense of an 
2004: 
The Central Government controls 
The catalogue of in-patient services covered 
by the Health System in the sense of an 
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CG5  Which of the following elements of the in-patient / hospital sector can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
enumeration of services which are excluded 
from coverage 
 
The Regional Government (Kanton) controls 
The number of Hospitals in a region; Kanton 
The size of Hospitals in a region (Kanton) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals  
Employment decisions of Hospitals 
enumeration of services which are excluded 
from coverage 
 
The Regional Government (Kanton) controls 
The number of Hospitals in a region; Kanton 
The size of Hospitals in a region (Kanton) 
The investments in medical technology in 
Hospitals 
Employment decisions of Hospitals 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered 
Remuneration level of in-patient services 
The regional overall budget for in-patient 
services – by setting the budget of a DHA 
The number of hospitals in a region 
Employment decisions - this answer applies 
to pay structure for staff 
Organizational questions, how hospitals are 
organized and administered  
 
Remark: 
Most questions are negotiated locally by 
NHS trusts and the District Health 
Authorities: the remuneration level, the 
services covered and the way the hospital is 
remunerated (e.g. a budget, or case-based 
remuneration). The central government 
exercises overall budget control, sets the 
DHA’s budget and exerts supervision over 
the DHAs. The government will have 
influence – but no deterministic control 
2004: 
Catalogue of in-patient services covered 
Remuneration level of in-patient services 
The regional overall budget for in-patient 
services – by setting the budget of a DHA 
The number of hospitals in a region 
Employment decisions - this answer applies to 
pay structure for staff 
Organizational questions, how hospitals are 
organized and administered – by creating new 
organizational forms like foundation trusts 
Remark: 
Most questions are negotiated locally by NHS 
trusts and the District Health Authorities: the 
remuneration level, the services covered and 
the way the hospital is remunerated (e.g. a 
budget, or case-based remuneration). The 
central government exercises overall budget 
control, sets the DHA’s budget and exerts 
supervision over the DHAs. The government 
will have influence – but no deterministic 
control 
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CG6  Which of the following elements of the Pharmaceutical Sector can be controlled by 
the Central Government unilaterally?  
Austria 1995:  
Central Government can control:  
the price of a medicine – price levels are set 
by a commission, factually they are 
negotiated. 
 
2004:  
Central Government can control: 
the price of a medicine 
The number of pharmacies in a region 
Remark: 
Inclusion and reimbursement price of a 
medicine is negotiated between the 
manufacturer and the HIFs. Mark ups, for 
distributors, are also negotiated. 
Belgium 1995. 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals – sectorial target budget 
Pharmaceutical budget for individual 
prescribers (Hospitals, Physicians) 
Number of Pharmacies in a region – since 
1986 
2004:  
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals – sectorial target budget 
Pharmaceutical budget for individual 
prescribers (Hospitals, Physicians) 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Governments control 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals – the total amount of 
subsidies paid 
Pharmaceutical budget for Hospitals, albeit 
not for Physicians 
Federal Government controls 
Prices of medicines 
 
Remark: 
Apart form subsidies, most of the 
pharmaceutical expenditure is paid for 
directly by the patients or their VHI 
2004: 
Provincial Governments control 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals– the total amount of 
subsidies paid 
Pharmaceutical budget for Hospitals, albeit 
not for Physicians 
Federal Government controls 
Prices of medicines 
 
Remark: 
Apart form subsidies, most of the 
pharmaceutical expenditure is paid for 
directly by the patients or their VHI 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine  
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine  
Pharmaceutical Budget for individual 
prescribes 
 
Remark:  
Since 1999, the HIFs set limits for 
prescriptions issued by physicians. The 
government exerts influence via control over 
the HIFs. 
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CG6  Which of the following elements of the Pharmaceutical Sector can be controlled by 
the Central Government unilaterally?  
Denmark 1995:  
Competencies of the Central Government:  
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine – by price caps 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Competencies at county level; Amter:  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals in the region 
Pharmaceutical budget for individual 
prescribers (Hospitals, Physicians) 
2004: 
Competencies of the Central Government:  
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine – by price caps 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Competencies at county level; Amter:  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals in the region 
Pharmaceutical budget for individual 
prescribers (Hospitals, Physicians) 
Finland 1995:  
The Central Government controls: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceutical Budgets for individual 
prescribers 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
2004: 
The Central Government controls: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceutical Budgets for individual 
prescribers 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
France 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine – reimbursement price in 
negotiations with the Manufacturer 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine – reimbursement price in 
negotiations with the Manufacturer 
Number of Pharmacies in a region  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals; by vote of parliament since 
1996 
Germany 1995: 
Number of pharmacies in a region  
Remark: 
There have been various attempts of 
spending caps and regional budgets, 
however, not effective 
2004: 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Greece 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine 
Number of pharmacies in a region 
Remark 
There are attempts to budget pharmaceutical 
expenditure, but they are not effective. 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine 
Number of pharmacies in a region 
Remark 
There are attempts to budget pharmaceutical 
expenditure, but they are not effective. 
Hungary 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
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CG6  Which of the following elements of the Pharmaceutical Sector can be controlled by 
the Central Government unilaterally?  
pharmaceuticals – sectorial budget, which is 
however, not really binding 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
pharmaceuticals – sectorial budget, which is 
however, not really binding 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Ireland 1995: 
Price of a medicine – negotiated with the 
industry, the price shall not be above the 
price in the UK 
 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System - introduction of a Drug 
Payment System in 1999 
Price of a medicine – negotiated with the 
Industry 
Italy 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System 
Price of a medicine 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals- there is a budget, but it’s 
impact is weak 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System 
Price of a medicine  
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals- there is a budget, but it’s 
impact is weak 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Price of a medicine  
Number of Pharmacies in a region – new 
pharmacies need the approval of the Ministry 
of health 
2004: 
Price of a medicine  
Number of Pharmacies in a region – new 
pharmacies need the approval of the Ministry 
of health 
Netherlands 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine – by setting maximum 
prices for reimbursement 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals – by setting expenditure 
targets 
New Zealand 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine – by grouping and 
reference pricing 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals  
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine – by grouping and 
reference pricing 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals  
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Norway 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System 
Price of a medicine 
Number of Pharmacies in a region – 
licensing system by the Norwegian Board of 
Health 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System 
Price of a medicine 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Portugal 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive lists) 
Price of a medicine – the price is negotiated 
with the manufacturer and depends on the 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive lists) 
Price of a medicine– the price is negotiated 
with the manufacturer and depends on the 
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CG6  Which of the following elements of the Pharmaceutical Sector can be controlled by 
the Central Government unilaterally?  
price of the drug in other countries 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals – for 
those paid for by the NHS 
Number of Pharmacies in a region – the 
Ministry of Health decides, whether there is a 
need for a pharmacy in a region 
price of the drug in other countries 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals – for 
those paid for by the NHS 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Remark: 
There was a spending cap for pharmaceuticals 
in 1997, but it was not really effective 
Poland 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System 
Price of a medicine 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System 
Price of a medicine 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals – the 
budget of the NHF for pharmaceuticals 
Spain 1995: 
The Central Government controls 
Inclusion of drugs; via Positive/Negative 
Lists 
The price of a medicine 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
2004: 
The Central Government controls 
Inclusion of drugs; via Positive/Negative Lists
The price of a medicine 
The Autonomous Communities control 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals  
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
Sweden 1995: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (positive/negative lists)
Price of a medicine – by negotiation 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceutical budget for Hospitals 
Number of Pharmacies in a region 
2004: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (positive/negative lists) 
Price of a medicine – by negotiation 
Overall Budget for expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals   
Pharmaceutical budget for Hospitals 
Number of Pharmacies in a region  
Switzerland 1995: 
The Central Government controls: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement 
by the Health System (Positive lists) 
Price of a medicine; is negotiated with the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
Remark: 
The Inter-Cantonal Office for the Control of 
Medicines and the Federal Office of Social 
Insurance decide on the coverage – i.e. the 
inclusion in the positive list. 
2004: 
The Central Government controls: 
Inclusion of new drugs into reimbursement by 
the Health System (Positive lists) 
Price of a medicine; negotiated with the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
Remark: 
The Inter-Cantonal Office for the Control of 
Medicines and the Federal Office of Social 
Insurance decide on the coverage – i.e. the 
inclusion in the positive list. 
United Kingdom 1995:  
Inclusion of drugs; via a Negative List, 
which excludes some pharmaceuticals from 
reimbursement by the NHS 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals – in the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, 
PPRS, the overall profit the Pharmaceutical 
industry is allowed to make from selling 
drugs to the NHS is negotiated 
2004: 
Inclusion of drugs; via a Negative List, which 
excludes some pharmaceuticals from 
reimbursement by the NHS 
Overall budget for pharmaceuticals – in the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, 
PPRS, the overall profit the Pharmaceutical 
industry is allowed to make from selling 
drugs to the NHS is negotiated 
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the Central Government unilaterally?  
 
 
Remark: 
All drugs have to be licensed, but not all 
licensed products are also reimbursed by the 
NHS 
Budget for pharmaceutical expenditure for 
individual GPs – since 1999 
Remark: 
All drugs have to be licensed, but not all 
licensed products are also reimbursed by the 
NHS 
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CG7  Which of the following elements of the Health System as a whole can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Austria 1995:  
The central Government controls 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
HIFs are set by law, but factually negotiated 
between the government and the HIF 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
(e.g. negotiation at national or regional level 
etc.) 
2004:  
Central Government can set  
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
HIFs are set by law, but factually negotiated 
between the government and the HIF 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
(e.g. negotiation at national or regional level 
etc.) 
Belgium 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – negotiated between the HIF 
and the providers, but subject to government 
approval 
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
by setting the contribution level and the level 
of subsidies going into health care. The 
subsidies to the INAMI, Institute National 
d’Assurance Maladie Invalidité, cover the 
difference between the set overall budget of 
health expenditure by the HIF-system and the 
funds obtained from contributions 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – while this is formally 
negotiated among the trade unions and the 
employers, the government’s approval is 
required  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, (Medical 
Providers and Health Insurance Funds) are 
conducted (e.g. whether negotiations take 
place at national or regional level etc.) 
Remark: 
The decision making on all the issues is very 
consensual. However, since 1993, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs can take unilateral 
action and has done so in the past, for 
instance, in 1995, it reduced the fees 
negotiated by the HIF and the Providers by 
3% 
2004:  
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – negotiated between the HIF 
and the providers, but subject to government 
approval 
The overall budget for health expenditure - by 
setting the contribution level and the level of 
subsidies going into health care. The subsidies 
to the INAMI cover the difference between 
the set overall budget of health expenditure by 
the HIF-system and the funds obtained from 
contributions 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system- – while this is formally 
negotiated among the trade unions and the 
employers, the government’s approval is 
required  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, (Medical 
Providers and Health Insurance Funds) are 
conducted (e.g. whether negotiations take 
place at national or regional level etc.) 
 
Remark: 
The decision making on all the issues is very 
consensual. However, since 1993, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs can take unilateral 
action and has done so in the past. 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Governments control 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
at the provincial level 
2004: 
Provincial Governments control 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
provincial budget 
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CG7  Which of the following elements of the Health System as a whole can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system ( e.g. amount of premiums or 
the percentage of income going into the 
Health financing) 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, like Medical 
Providers and the Regional Health 
Authorities, are conducted  
 
Federal Government controls 
The federal government defined the 
catalogue of services covered as all services 
which are medically necessary.  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – federal taxes 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, like Medical 
Providers and the Provincial Health 
Authorities, are conducted. 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system ( e.g. amount of premiums or 
the percentage of income going into the 
Health financing) 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, like Medical 
Providers and the Regional Health 
Authorities, are conducted  
 
Federal Government controls 
The federal government defined the catalogue 
of services covered as all services which are 
medically necessary.  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – federal taxes 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, like Medical 
Providers and the Provincial Health 
Authorities, are conducted. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System (Medical 
Providers and HIF) are conducted. 
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Based on this, most 
negotiations of these issues are among 
individual HIF and providers, hospitals etc. 
The central government has influence on the 
results and can disapprove or replace the 
outcomes, if they are not in the public 
interest. The central government decided, 
that the HIF negotiate individually with the 
provider associations, leading to different 
remuneration levels for different HIF. 
However, most HIF orient their contracts on 
what the GHIF as the largest HIF, negotiated.
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System (Medical 
Providers and HIF) are conducted. 
Remark: 
The government defines a basic package of 
services by law. Based on this, most 
negotiations of these issues are among 
individual HIF and providers, hospitals etc. 
The central government has influence on the 
results, can disapprove and replace the results. 
The central government decided, that the HIF 
negotiate individually with the provider 
associations, leading to different remuneration 
levels for different HIF. However, most HIF 
orient their contracts on what the GHIF as the 
largest HIF, negotiated. 
Denmark 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – by excluding services 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – local taxes are set by the 
Amter 
The way negotiations among Societal Actors 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – by excluding services 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – local taxes are set by the 
Amter 
The way negotiations among Societal Actors 
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CG7  Which of the following elements of the Health System as a whole can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
in the Health System are conducted; whether 
at national or Amter level ) 
Remark: 
While the Amter are autonomous, the central 
government recommends levels of local taxes 
going into health care, as well as the overall 
expenditure for health 
in the Health System are conducted; whether 
at national or Amter level ) 
Remark: 
While the Amter are autonomous, the central 
government recommends levels of local taxes 
going into health care, as well as the overall 
expenditure for health 
Finland 1995: 
Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
at local level 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – local taxes 
The Central government controls 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
National Health Insurance – setting the 
payroll tax level  
The maximum level of co-payments  
2004: 
Municipalities control: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure – at 
local level 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – local taxes 
The Central government controls 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
National Health Insurance – setting the 
payroll tax level 
The maximum level of co-payments 
France 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; negotiated between the HIFs 
and the Providers, but subject to approval  
 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – the percentage of income 
going to the HIFs is set by the parliament 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
(e.g. negotiation at national or regional level 
etc.): government and parliament 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; negotiated between the HIFs 
(UNCAM) and the Providers, but subject to 
approval 
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure; set by parliament since 
1996 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – the percentage of income 
going to the HIFs is set by the parliament 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
(e.g. negotiation at national or regional level 
etc.) is set by the government and parliament 
Germany 1995: 
The central government sets a loose frame, in 
which HIFs and Provider negotiated – 
factually autonomously. 
It can influence the way negotiations among 
the Societal Actors in the Health System are 
conducted 
2004: 
The central government sets a loose frame, in 
which HIFs and Provider negotiated – 
factually autonomously. 
It can influence the way negotiations among 
the Societal Actors in the Health System are 
conducted 
Greece 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – offered by the ESY 
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
only the public expenditure, however, the 
budgeting is not binding 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – offered by the ESY 
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
only the public expenditure, however, the 
budgeting is not binding 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
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CG7  Which of the following elements of the Health System as a whole can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
health system - taxation and the contributions 
to the HIF 
health system - taxation and the contributions 
to the HIF 
Hungary 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system  
Remark: 
Payment methods and the levels of the 
remuneration are set either by the 
government by decree or by the NHIFA. 
There are national level budgets for 20 
sectors of the health system. A sectorial 
budget is usually capped, and the payment 
modes are chosen in a way which ensures, 
that the budget is met, e.g. by discounted 
payments if the quantity of services has 
reached a certain level. 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system  
Remark: 
Payment methods and the levels of the 
remuneration are set either by the government 
by decree or by the NHIFA. There are 
national level budgets for 20 sectors of the 
health system. A sectorial budget is usually 
capped, and the payment modes are chosen in 
a way which ensures, that the budget is met, 
e.g. by discounted payments if the quantity of 
services has reached a certain level. 
Ireland 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system (taxation) 
Remark: 
Catalogues and remuneration are negotiated 
for all citizens. The overall budget mainly 
concerns the provision of health to medical 
card holders and subsidies to non-medical 
card holders 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system (taxation) 
Remark: 
Catalogues and remuneration are negotiated 
for all citizens. The overall budget mainly 
concerns the provision of health to medical 
card holders and subsidies to non-medical 
card holders 
Italy 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – there is no defined catalogue, 
but only minimum requirements, which have 
to be met by the Regions. 
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure (i.e. the SSN budget) 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – by taxation 
Remark: 
While there is a budget, the regions spend 
more than the allocated budget, financing 
additional expenditure by incurring debts. 
These are later covered by additional funds 
extracted from the national government 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – there is no defined catalogue, 
but only minimum requirements, which have 
to be met by the Regions. 
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure (i.e. the SSN budget) 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – by taxation 
Remark: 
While there is a budget, the regions spend 
more than the allocated budget, financing 
additional expenditure by incurring debts. 
These are later covered by additional funds 
extracted from the national government 
Luxembourg 1994:  
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – subject to advice from HIFs 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – subject to advice from HIFs 
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by the Central Government unilaterally? 
and providers 
The way negotiations among the HIFs and 
the Providers are conducted (e.g. negotiation 
at national or regional level etc.) 
and providers 
The way negotiations among the HIFs and the 
Providers are conducted (e.g. negotiation at 
national or regional level etc.) 
Netherlands 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – by excluding services 
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure  - by setting tariffs 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – the percentage of income 
going to the HIFs 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – by excluding services 
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure  - by setting tariffs 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – the percentage of income 
going to the HIFs 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
New Zealand 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall public budget for medical 
services and health expenditure – by setting 
the budget for publicly funded health care 
The level of citizen’s contribution to the 
health system – while there is no earmarked 
tax, the government sets the tax levels  
The way negotiations among providers and 
Purchasers are conducted   
Remark:  
The Health system works by subsidizing, the 
level of subsidies determines how much the 
government pays for health. apart from that, 
there is a large area of payments going 
directly from patients /VHI to providers 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall public budget for medical services 
and health expenditure – by setting the budget 
for publicly funded health care 
The level of citizen’s contribution to the 
health system – while there is no earmarked 
tax, the government sets the levels of taxation 
The way negotiations among providers and 
Purchasers are conducted   
Remark:  
The Health system works by subsidizing, the 
level of subsidies determines how much the 
government pays for health. apart from that, 
there is a large area of payments going 
directly from patients /VHI to providers  
Norway 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contribution to the 
health system  
Remark: 
The central government controls these 
questions. The Health system is financed 
from general taxation, but there are no 
earmarked taxes for health. The budget is 
usually binding, at least in the short run. 
There have been efforts by the government, 
to increase acitity. 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system  
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contribution to the 
health system  
Remark: 
The central government controls these 
questions. The Health system is financed from 
general taxation, but there are no earmarked 
taxes. All public services must be provided 
within this budget. The leeway of the county 
councils in implementing the organization of 
health care was reduced.  
Portugal 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; there is no official catalogue, 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; there is no official catalogue, 
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CG7  Which of the following elements of the Health System as a whole can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
but the government has influence on what is 
actually offered  
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure – the budget is explicitly 
set by the Ministry of Finance 
The level of contributions – the funding is 
from the general taxation 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted – 
the NHS – the RHA - but also Hospitals 
negotiate contracts with private providers 
which are offering services for which they 
don’t have the facilities.  
but the government has influence on what is 
actually offered  
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure – the budget is explicitly 
set by the Ministry of Finance 
The level of contributions – the funding is 
from the general taxation 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted – 
the NHS – the RHA - but also Hospitals 
negotiate contracts with private providers 
which are offering services for which they 
don’t have the facilities. 
Poland 1995: 
The Central government controls 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; there is no official catalogue, 
but the government has influence on what is 
actually offered  
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure – the health budget is 
determined by the Government 
The level of contributions – the tax levels, 
however there was no earmarked tax going 
into health care 
The way negotiations among the Purchasers 
(municipalities/regions) and the providers are 
conducted – while there was some 
contracting, most services were provided 
directly by the municipalities and regions in 
own facilities and by employed staff 
2004: 
The Central government controls  
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; there is no official positive 
catalogue, but the government has excluded 
some services and has influence on what is 
actually offered by the NHF 
The overall budget for medical services and 
health expenditure – the NHF budget is 
implicitly determined by setting the 
contribution rate and subsidies going into 
health funding 
The level of contributions – the contributions 
to the National Health Fund are set by the 
parliament 
The way negotiations among medical 
providers of and the National Health Fund are 
conducted – the government gave the NHF a 
very strong position vis-a-vis the providers 
Spain 1995: 
The Central Government controls  
The Catalogue of medical services covered 
by the health system  
The overall budget for health expenditure -  
the funding going into the INSALUD 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system ( i.e. amount of taxes going 
into the Health financing) 
The way negotiations among the INSALUD 
and contracted providers of medical services 
are conducted 
2004: 
The Central Government controls  
The Catalogue of medical services covered by 
the health system – the Regional 
Governments have some leeway 
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system (i.e. amount of taxes going into 
the Health financing)  
The Autonomous Communities control 
The overall budget for health expenditure in 
their Region – they can increase the budgets 
allocated from the Central Government by 
raising additional funds 
The way negotiations among the SRS and 
contracted providers of medical services are 
conducted 
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CG7  Which of the following elements of the Health System as a whole can be controlled 
by the Central Government unilaterally? 
Sweden 1995. 
The Central government controls: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – by excluding services 
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system ( e.g. amount of premiums or 
the percentage of income going into the 
Health financing) 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, Landstings and 
Medical Providers, are conducted 
Remark: 
The central government influences the Health 
expenditure by setting national levels of 
taxation and by influencing regional levels of 
taxation 
2004: 
The Central government controls: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system – by excluding services 
The overall budget for health expenditure  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system ( e.g. amount of premiums or 
the percentage of income going into the 
Health financing) 
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, Landstings and 
Medical Providers, are conducted 
Remark: 
The central government influences the Health 
expenditure by setting national levels of 
taxation and by influencing regional levels of 
taxation 
Switzerland 1995: 
The Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; by excluding services  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
(e.g. negotiation at national or regional, i.e. 
Kanton, level etc.) 
The amount of co-payments 
2004: 
The Central Government controls: 
Catalogue of medical services covered by the 
health system; by excluding services  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System are conducted 
(e.g. negotiation at national or regional, i.e. 
Kanton, level etc.) 
The amount of co-payments 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Catalogue of medical services which have to 
be covered by the health system – while there 
is no “positive” catalogue, the central 
government has a strong (albeit not absolute) 
influence over what is provided 
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
by an explicit budget set annually by the 
Department of health  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – by setting the taxation, albeit 
there is no earmarked tax for health care  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, like Medical 
Providers and District Health Authorities, are 
conducted (e.g. whether negotiations take 
place at national or regional level etc.) 
2004: 
Catalogue of medical services which have to 
be covered by the health system – while there 
is no “positive” catalogue, the central 
government has a strong (albeit not absolute) 
influence over what is provided 
The overall budget for health expenditure – 
by an explicit budget set annually by the 
Department of health  
The level of citizen’s contributions to the 
health system – by setting the taxation, albeit 
there is no earmarked tax for health care  
The way negotiations among the Societal 
Actors in the Health System, like Medical 
Providers and District Health Authorities, are 
conducted (e.g. whether negotiations take 
place at national or regional level etc.) 
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CG8   In some countries, the Organizations of Medical Providers, Health Insurance Funds 
and Health Authorities internally decide on the composition of the top level administration 
(the executive board etc.) of the organization.  
In other countries, the head of these organizations is determined externally by the Central 
Government.  
How are these positions determined in [Country]? 
Austria 1995:  
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
2004:  
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
Belgium 1995: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
2004: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
Canada 1995:  
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The main purchasers are the Provincial 
Governments, which are elected by the 
citizens at a provincial level  
2004: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The main purchasers are the Provincial 
Governments, which are elected by the 
citizens at a provincial level 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level management 
 
Remark: 
The Executive Board of a HIF consists of 
representatives of the employers, the trade 
unions, and the state. In the most important 
HIF, the General Health Insurance Fund, the 
Executive Board is determined by the state. 
2004: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level management 
 
Remark: 
The Executive Board of a HIF consists of 
representatives of the employers, the trade 
unions, and the state. In the most important 
HIF, the General Health Insurance Fund, the 
Executive Board is determined by the state 
Denmark 1995:  
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The Amter government, which is the main 
purchaser, is elected by the citizens living in 
the county 
2004: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The Amter government, which is the main 
purchaser, is elected 
Finland 1995: 
Medical provider organizations determine 
their own top-level executive. 
The municipal governments determine the 
top-level executives of the municipal health 
authorities 
The municipal government itself is elected. 
 
2004: 
Medical provider organizations determine 
their own top-level executive. 
The municipal governments determine the 
top-level executives of the municipal health 
authorities 
The municipal government itself is elected. 
France 1995: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The HIFs are determining their top-level 
management which is negotiating with the 
provider organizations 
2004: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The central government appoints the director 
of the UNCAM, which is the association of 
the Mandatory Health Insurance Funds. The 
UNCAM is negotiating with the provider 
organizations 
 295
CG8   In some countries, the Organizations of Medical Providers, Health Insurance Funds 
and Health Authorities internally decide on the composition of the top level administration 
(the executive board etc.) of the organization.  
In other countries, the head of these organizations is determined externally by the Central 
Government.  
How are these positions determined in [Country]? 
Germany 1995: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
2004: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
Greece 1995: 
Provider organizations determine their top-
level management 
The top-level management of the health 
authorities i.e. the ESY and Health Insurance 
Funds are determined by the Central 
Government 
2004: 
Provider organizations determine their top-
level management 
The top-level management of the health 
authorities i.e. the ESY and Health Insurance 
Funds are determined by the Central 
Government 
Hungary 1995: 
Provider organizations determine their top-
level Management 
The top-level Management of the health 
authorities at county level is determined by 
the County Government.  
The top-level management of the National 
Health Insurance Fund Administration is 
determined by the Central Government 
2004: 
Provider organizations determine their top-
level Management 
The top-level Management of the health 
authorities at county level is determined by 
the County Government.  
The top-level management of the National 
Health Insurance Fund Administration is 
determined by the Central Government 
Ireland 1995: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management  
The central government determines the top 
level administration of the Health Boards 
2004: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The Central Government determines the top 
level administration of the Health Service 
Executive 
Italy 1995: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The head of the local ASL is determined by 
the regional government 
2004: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The head of the local ASL is determined by 
the regional government 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
Remark: 
The Members of the HIF’s executive board 
are elected by the insured employees and the 
employers. One Representative is determined 
by the Government 
2004: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level Management 
Remark: 
The Members of the HIF’s executive board 
are elected by the insured employees and the 
employers. One Representative is determined 
by the Government 
Netherlands 1995: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level management 
2004: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level management 
New Zealand 1995: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The Central Government appoints the top 
2004:  
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
The Central Government appoints part of the 
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level management of the Regional Health 
Authority. 
top level management of the District Health 
Board. 
Remark:  
The Central Government appoints the 
Chairperson of the District Health Board. The 
Chairperson then appoints the Chief 
Executive Officer of the District Health 
Board, who is in charge of the day-to-day 
operation of the District Health Board. Part of 
the executive of the DHB is elected locally. 
Norway 1995 
The top level management for health care 
provision both at the county level and the 
municipality is determined by the County 
Council respectively the Municipality. 
Apart from professional associations, 
provider organizations do not exist. 
The administration of the National Insurance 
Scheme is determined by the government 
2004: 
The top level management for health care 
provision both at the County level and the 
municipality is determined by the County 
Council respectively the Municipality. 
Apart from professional associations, provider 
organizations do not exist. 
The administration of the National Insurance 
Scheme is determined by the government 
Portugal 1995: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
Top Level Management of the Regional 
Health Administration, Administração 
Regionais de Saúde, is determined by the 
Central Government 
The Central Government determines the top-
level management of the “subsistemas” 
(Health Insurance Funds) for civil servants 
and military; 
The other “subsistemas” determine their top-
level management  
2004: 
Provider Organizations determine their top 
level management 
Top Level Management of the Regional 
Health Administration, Administração 
Regionais de Saúde, is determined by the 
Central Government 
The Central Government determines the top-
level management of the “subsistemas” 
(Health Insurance Funds) for civil servants 
and military; 
The other “subsistemas” determine their top-
level management 
Poland 1995: 
The medical providers determine the top-
level management of their organization. 
The local Health Administration was 
determined by the local government (gmina, 
voivodship) 
2004: 
The medical providers determine the top-level 
management of their organization. 
The Central Government determines the top-
level management of the National Health 
Fund 
Spain 1995: 
Medical provider organizations determine 
their top-level management; 
The senior management of the Health 
authority INSALUD acting as a purchaser, is 
determined by the Central Government  
 
2004: 
Medical provider organizations determine 
their top-level management; 
The senior management of the Health 
authorities SRS acting as a purchaser, is 
determined by the Regional Government  
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Sweden 1995: 
Medical Provider organizations determine 
their top-level management 
The Landsting government is elected locally 
2004: 
Medical Provider organizations determine 
their top-level management 
The Landsting government is elected locally  
Switzerland 1995: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level management 
2004: 
Provider organizations and Health Insurance 
Funds determine their top-level management 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Medical provider organizations determine 
their top-level management; 
The District Health Authorities are directed 
by a chairperson determined by the Central 
Government (Department of Health). There 
is also a board of executive and non-
executives directors . 
2004: 
Medical provider organizations determine 
their top-level management 
The District Health Authorities are directed 
by a chairperson determined by the Central 
Government (Department of Health). There is 
also a board of executive and non-executives 
directors. 
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Austria 1995:  
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this. The contribution rate 
(percentage of income) is then set by law 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
2004:  
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this. The contribution rate 
(percentage of income) is then set by law 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Belgium 1995. 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/Premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this – in order to get more funds 
from the INAMI 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Fund 
Remark: 
Supervision is exercised by the INAMI. 
Health Insurance Funds are organized 
according to a law, by changing this law, the 
government can change the type and degree 
of control exercised 
2004: 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/Premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this – in order to get more funds 
from the INAMI 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Fund 
Remark: 
Supervision is exercised by the INAMI. 
Health Insurance Funds are organized 
according to a law, by changing this law, the 
government can change the type and degree 
of control exercised 
Canada 1995: 
Main Purchasers of Health are the Provincial 
Governments, which fulfill the insurance 
function 
Provincial Governments are obliged to 
produce an annual report for the Central 
government or a government agency, in 
which all costs (administrative costs, 
expenditure for health services purchased) 
are listed 
Administrative costs of the Provincial 
Government must be published 
Provincial Governments must apply with the 
Central Government for a formal approval of 
an increase of contribution/Premiums and 
must deliver reasons for this 
Funding of Provincial Government by the 
Central Government is conditional on the 
province’s abidance to the frame set by the 
federal government  
2004: 
Main Purchasers of Health are the Provincial 
Governments, which fulfill the insurance 
function 
Provincial Governments are obliged to 
produce an annual report for the Central 
government or a government agency, in 
which all costs (administrative costs, 
expenditure for health services purchased) are 
listed 
Administrative costs of the Provincial 
Government must be published 
Provincial Governments must apply with the 
Central Government for a formal approval of 
an increase of contribution/Premiums and 
must deliver reasons for this 
Funding of Provincial Government by the 
Central Government is conditional on the 
province’s abidance to the frame set by the 
federal government  
Czech Republic 1995: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
2004: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
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Budget plans of the HIF must be endorsed by 
the Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/Premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this 
The government can replace part of the top 
level administration of a HIF.  
Remark: 
For the GHIF, the largest HIF, the 
government appoints the director-general, 
and basically all decisions are subject to 
parliamentary approval. 
Budget plans of the HIF must be endorsed by 
the Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contribution/Premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this 
The government can replace part of the top 
level administration of a the HIF 
Remark: 
For the GHIF, the largest HIF, the 
government appoints the director-general, and 
basically all decisions are subject to 
parliamentary approval. 
Denmark 1995: 
Health Authorities, Amter, are obliged to 
produce an annual report in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed - each county, 
Amter, issues a health plan annually to be 
commented on by the National Board of 
Health 
Remark: 
Central Government and the Amter negotiate 
annual budgets for health care. The central 
Government sets an overall budget ceiling 
for Amter activities, including health care. it 
recommends levels of local taxes and overall 
expenditure. The central Government 
influences the activities of the Amter by 
giving grants for certain projects. 
2004:  
Health Authorities, Amter, are obliged to 
produce an annual report in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed - each county, 
Amter, issues a health plan annually to be 
commented on by the National Board of 
Health 
Remark: 
Central Government and the Amter negotiate 
annual budgets for health care. The central 
Government sets an overall budget ceiling for 
Amter activities, including health care. it 
recommends levels of local taxes and overall 
expenditure. The central Government 
influences the activities of the Amter by 
giving grants for certain projects 
Finland 1995: 
Municipal governments are autonomous 
Remark: 
Apart from the Municipalities, the National 
Health Insurance is a second purchaser of 
health – in charge of covering 
pharmaceuticals, private procurement of 
health and payments for the time of illness – 
is under the control and supervision of the 
Finnish Parliament.  
2004: 
Municipal governments are autonomous 
Remark: 
Apart from the Municipalities, the National 
Health Insurance is a second purchaser of 
health – in charge of covering 
pharmaceuticals, private procurement of 
health and payments for the time of illness – 
is under the control and supervision of the 
Finnish Parliament. 
France 1995: 
The Health insurance Funds are formally 
independent, but since the government would 
cover the deficit, it also retains control 
The government sets the contribution rates, it 
has to approve the contracts negotiated 
between the HIFs and the providers 
2004:  
The Health insurance Funds are formally 
independent, but since the government would 
cover the deficit, it also retains control 
The government sets the contribution rates, it 
has to approve the contracts negotiated 
between the HIFs and the providers 
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The central government has substantial and 
extensive financial and administrative control 
over the HIFs 
The central government has substantial and 
extensive financial and administrative control 
over the HIFs 
The government appoints the director and can 
replace the top level administration of a the 
Health Insurance fund - with the agreement of 
2/3 of Director Council of Sickness Fund, 
representing the insurers) 
Germany 1995: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs are 
listed. 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds have to apply for a 
formal approval of an increase in the 
contributions and must deliver reasons for 
this 
2004: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs are 
listed. 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds have to apply for a 
formal approval of an increase in the 
contributions and must deliver reasons for this
Greece 1995: 
With regard to the ESY:  
ESY is obliged to produce an annual report 
for the government, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
ESY 
ESY must apply for a formal approval of an 
increase of the allocated budget and must 
deliver reasons for this.  
The government can replace the 
administration of the ESY 
With regard to the HIF, i.e. the IKA, OGA  
HIF must submit an annual report to the 
government or a government agency, in 
which all costs (administrative costs, 
expenditure for health services purchased) 
are listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs  
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contribution levels and must deliver reasons 
for this - contribution rates are set by the 
state but in negotiations with the HIF 
The government can replace the top level 
2004: 
With regard to the ESY:  
ESY is obliged to produce an annual report 
for the government, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
ESY 
ESY must apply for a formal approval of an 
increase of the allocated budget and must 
deliver reasons for this.  
The government can replace the 
administration of the ESY 
With regard to the HIF, i.e. the IKA, OGA  
HIF must submit an annual report to the 
government or a government agency, in 
which all costs (administrative costs, 
expenditure for health services purchased) are 
listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs  
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of contribution 
levels – the contribution level is set by the 
state but in negotiations with the HIF 
The government can replace the top level 
administration of the HIF 
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administration of the HIF 
Remark: 
The ESY is not really an entity of its own, 
but is controlled directly by the Central 
Government. The Central Government also 
controls the largest HIF, which cover most of 
the population. Some smaller HIF have more 
autonomy.  
 
Remark: 
The ESY is not really an entity of its own, but 
is controlled directly by the Central 
Government. The Central Government also 
controls the largest HIF, which cover most of 
the population. Some smaller HIF have more 
autonomy. 
Hungary 1995: 
Regarding the county governments: 
The county governments must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Regarding the National Health Insurance 
Fund Administration  
The NHIFA must submit an annual report to 
the government, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans of the NHIFA must be 
endorsed by Government and the parliament 
The government can replace the top level 
administration of the NHIFA 
2004: 
Regarding the county governments: 
The county governments must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Regarding the National Health Insurance 
Fund Administration  
The NHIFA must submit an annual report to 
the government, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans of the NHIFA must be endorsed 
by the Government and the parliament 
The government can replace the top level 
administration of the NHIFA 
Ireland 1995: 
A Health Board is obliged to produce an 
annual report for the government, in which 
all costs (administrative costs, expenditure 
for health services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans of the Health Boards must be 
endorsed by the Government 
The government can replace the top level 
administration of the Health Board 
Remark: 
The budget of a Health Board is negotiated 
between the Department of Health and the 
Health Board. The Department of Health can 
earmark funds for certain activities 
2004: 
A Health Board is obliged to produce an 
annual report for the government, in which all 
costs (administrative costs, expenditure for 
health services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans of the Health Boards must be 
endorsed by the Government 
The government can replace the top level 
administration of the Health Board 
Remark: 
The budget of a Health Board is negotiated 
between the Department of Health and the 
Health Board. The Department of Health can 
earmark funds for certain activities 
Italy 1995: 
Health authorities, the Azienda Sanitaria 
Locale, ASLs, must submit an quarterly 
report to the regional government, in which 
all costs (administrative costs, expenditure 
for health services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans of the ASL must be endorsed 
by the Government 
The regional government can replace the 
administration of the USL 
2004: 
Health authorities, the ASLs, must submit an 
quarterly report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans of the ASL must be endorsed by 
the Government 
The regional government can replace the 
administration of the ASL 
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Luxembourg 1994: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contributions (percentage of income) and 
must deliver reasons for this 
While the government cannot replace the top 
level administration of a Health Insurance 
Fund, it determines one member thereof. 
Remark: 
Every decision of the HIF and the HIF 
Association is subject to governments 
approval. The contribution rate to the HIFs is 
set by the government and is unitary for all. 
2004: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the government or a 
government agency, in which all costs 
(administrative costs, expenditure for health 
services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contributions (percentage of income) and 
must deliver reasons for this 
While the government cannot replace the top 
level administration of a Health Insurance 
Fund, it determines one member thereof. 
Remark: 
Every decision of the HIF and the HIF 
Association is subject to governments 
approval. The contribution rate to the HIFs is 
set by the government and is unitary for all. 
Netherlands 1995: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the Health Care Insurance 
Board, a government agency, in which all 
costs (administrative costs, expenditure for 
health services purchased) are listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
2004: 
Health Insurance Funds must submit an 
annual report to the Health Care Insurance 
Board, a government agency, in which all 
costs (administrative costs, expenditure for 
health services purchased) are listed 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government Publication of the administrative 
costs of the Health Insurance Funds 
The Government can replace the top level 
administration of the Health Insurance Fund 
New Zealand 1995: 
The Regional Health Authorities are obliged 
to produce an annual report for the 
government or a government agency, in 
which all costs (administrative costs, 
expenditure for health services purchased) 
are listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Regional Health Authorities 
The government can replace the 
administration (governing board) of the 
Regional Health Authority  
 
2004: 
Health Authorities (District Health Boards) 
are obliged to produce an annual report for the 
government or a government agency, in 
which all costs (administrative costs, 
expenditure for health services purchased) are 
listed. 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
District Health Board – the annual plans as 
well as the funding agreements have to be 
published 
The government can replace the 
administration (governing board) of the 
District Health Board) – it can replace the 
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chief executive 
Remark: 
The DHB have to ensure, that the public, i.e. 
the population in the area covered, is 
consulted when decisions on coverage, 
budgeting etc. are made. The DHB has to 
apply for funding of investments.  
Norway 1995: 
The Ministry of Local Government and 
Local Authorities at the national level 
exercises a supervision over the activities of 
the County Councils and the Municipalities: 
All costs and budget plans are published. 
Budget plans of the counties and 
municipalities are subject to control by the 
central government 
 
The National Insurance Scheme is under the 
direct control of the central government 
 
Remark: 
Counties and municipalities are funded by 
block grants from the central government. 
The grants oriented at the needs, but are not 
earmarked. 
2004: 
The Ministry of Local Government and Local 
Authorities exercises a supervision over the 
activities of the Municipalities: 
All costs and budget plans are published. 
Budget plans of the municipalities are subject 
to control by the central government  
 
 
 
The National Insurance Scheme is under the 
direct control of the central government 
 
Remark: 
Municipalities are funded by block grants 
from the central government. The grants 
oriented at the needs, but are not earmarked. 
The functions of organizing hospital care 
were transferred from the counties to the 
Regional Health Authorities, which are part of 
the national government.  
Portugal 1995: 
Regarding the Regional Health 
Administrations; Administração Regionais de 
Saúde:  
Regional Health Administrations are obliged 
to produce an annual report for the 
government in which all costs and all 
activities are listed 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government – the funding is allocated from 
the Ministry of Health to the RHA 
The Government can replace the 
administration of the RHA 
 
Regarding the subsistemas (HIFs): 
The subsistemas for civil servants and 
military staff are treated like Regional Health 
Administrations 
The other subsistemas have complete 
autonomy but must publish the 
administrative costs and budget plans. 
2004: 
Regarding the Regional Health 
Administrations; Administração Regionais de 
Saúde:  
Regional Health Administrations are obliged 
to produce an annual report for the 
government in which all costs and all 
activities are listed 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government– the funding is allocated from 
the Ministry of Health to the RHA 
Publication of the administrative cost  
The Government can replace the 
administration of the RHA 
Regarding the subsistemas (HIFs): 
The subsistemas for civil servants and 
military staff are treated like Regional Health 
Administrations 
The other subsistemas have complete 
autonomy but must publish the administrative 
costs and budget plans. 
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Poland 1995: 
Regarding the Local Health Authorities at the 
municipal and regional level 
The Health Authorities are obliged to 
produce an annual report for the government 
in which all costs and all activities are listed 
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative cost  
The central government can replace the 
administration of the local health authority 
2004: 
Regarding the National Health Fund (NHF) 
The NHF is obliged to produce an annual 
report for the government in which all costs 
and all activities are listed 
NHF budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
Publication of the administrative cost of the 
NHF 
The level of the contributions to the NHF is 
set by the parliament 
The government can replace the top level 
administration of the NHF 
Remark: 
The NHF is closely monitored and controlled 
by the Government. The Fund Council, which 
is supervising the NHF is appointed by the 
Government. The Ministry of Health sets 
plans which the NHF has to abide to. These 
contain overall policy targets as well as the 
volume and the costs of health services. 
Spain 1995: 
The Central Government can replace the top-
level Management of the Health authorities 
(INSALUD) and its regional branches 
The INSALUD is under close control of the 
Central Government, comparable to an 
integral part of the central public 
administration 
2004: 
The Regional Government can replace the 
top-level Management of the regional Health 
Authorities SRS. The SRS is basically 
integral part of the regional governments 
public administration. 
Sweden 1995: 
The Central Government can set ceilings for 
local taxes. 
Part of a Landsting’s Budget is a grant from 
the Central Government, this gives the 
Central government some control 
The Landsting has to publish annual reports 
listing income and expenditure, albeit not 
explicitly for the Central government but to 
everybody 
2004: 
The Central Government can set ceilings for 
local taxes. 
Part of a Landsting’s Budget is a grant from 
the Central Government, this gives the 
Central government some control 
The Landsting has to publish annual reports 
listing income and expenditure, albeit not 
explicitly for the Central government but to 
everybody 
Switzerland 1995: 
Health Insurance Funds are obliged to 
produce an annual report for the Government 
in which all costs are listed 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contributions/ premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this 
2004: 
Health Insurance Funds are obliged to 
produce an annual report for the Government 
in which all costs are listed 
Publication of the administrative costs of the 
Health Insurance Funds 
Health Insurance Funds must apply for a 
formal approval of an increase of 
contributions/ premiums and must deliver 
reasons for this. 
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Remark: 
HIFs are not allowed to make profit. If they 
have a surplus, this surplus has to be used 
either to increase the reserves until the level 
set by the Central Government is reached or 
to lower the contribution levels 
Remark: 
HIFs are not allowed to make profit. If they 
have a surplus, this surplus has to be used 
either to increase the reserves until the level 
set by the Central Government is reached or 
to lower the contribution levels 
United Kingdom 1995: 
District Health Authorities are obliged to 
produce an annual report for the Government 
in which all costs are listed  
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
The Government can replace the chairperson 
of the District Health Authority 
Remark: 
The funding of a DHA is based on the budget 
plan the DHA developed and negotiated 
between the DHA and the Department of 
Health, apart from this, the Department of 
Health and the NHS executive exert 
substantial control, e.g. by setting priorities 
for activities and by monitoring the 
performance of the various DHAs 
2004: 
District Health Authorities are obliged to 
produce an annual report for the Government 
in which all costs are listed  
Budget plans must be endorsed by the 
Government 
The Government can replace the chairperson 
of the District Health Authority 
Remark: 
The funding of a DHA is based on the budget 
plan the DHA developed and negotiated 
between the DHA and the Department of 
Health, apart from this, the Department of 
Health and the NHS executive exert 
substantial control, e.g. by setting priorities 
for activities and by monitoring the 
performance of the various DHAs. Since 
1998, the DHAs are the only tier of the NHS 
administration below the national level 
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Part IV: Administration and Operation of the Health Care System 
1. Purchasers of Health: Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities 
 
HIF1/HA1  What is the predominant status of the Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities? 
Austria 1995:  
Non-profit Insurance Funds under public law 
In addition, there are several private for 
profit insurance companies offering 
supplementary insurance 
2004:  
Non-profit Insurance Funds under public law 
In addition, there are several private for profit 
insurance companies offering supplementary 
insurance  
Belgium 1995: 
Public non-profit Health Insurance Funds 
under public law 
Remark: 
The HIF are affiliated with political parties 
2004: 
Public non-profit Health Insurance Funds 
under public law 
Remark: 
The HIF are affiliated with political parties 
Canada 1995: 
Provincial Governments are the main 
purchaser of health. They fulfill the insurance 
function, and act either directly (e.g. 
negotiate fees with providers) or via the 
Regional Health Authorities. 
2004: 
Provincial Governments are the main 
purchaser of health. They fulfill the insurance 
function, and act either directly (e.g. negotiate 
fees with providers) or via the Regional 
Health Authorities. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Public non-profit Health Insurance Funds 
2004: 
Public non-profit Health Insurance Funds 
Denmark 1995:  
Health Authorities are part of the county 
government (Amter) respectively 
Municipality (Kommuner) 
2004:  
Health Authorities are part of the county 
government (Amter); respectively part of the 
local government (Kommuner) 
Finland 1995. 
The Health Authorities are part of the 
municipal government. The Municipal 
government determines a committee which is 
in charge of organizing health care in the 
municipality, the political responsibility rests 
with the municipal government.  
Remark:  
Municipalities organize most of the health 
care and finance about two thirds of the 
overall expenditure. They raise their own 
taxes and provide or contract most of the 
health services. 
The National Health Insurance, NHI, is a 
second, complementary purchaser of health 
in charge of covering pharmaceutical 
expenditure, privately provided health care 
and payments during times of illness. It is a 
national level institution, is financed from 
pay roll taxes and under direct control of the 
national government, which decides on the 
level of the contributions and the coverage of 
2004: 
The Health Authorities are part of the 
municipal government. The Municipal 
government determines a committee which is 
in charge of organizing health care in the 
municipality, the political responsibility rests 
with the municipal government. 
Remark:  
Municipalities organize most of the health 
care and finance about two thirds of the 
overall expenditure. They raise their own 
taxes and provide or contract most of the 
health services. 
The National Health Insurance, NHI, is a 
second, complementary purchaser of health in 
charge of covering pharmaceutical 
expenditure, privately provided health care 
and payments during times of illness. It is a 
national level institution, is financed from pay 
roll taxes and under direct control of the 
national government, which decides on the 
level of the contributions and the coverage of 
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Authorities? 
services. services. 
France 1995: 
Mandatory Health Insurance Funds are under 
extensive supervision of the state  
Voluntary Health Insurance ( non profit or 
for profit) is independent from the state 
2004: 
Mandatory Health Insurance Funds are under 
extensive  supervision of the state  
Voluntary Health Insurance ( non profit or for 
profit) is independent from the state 
Germany 1995: 
Non-profit Health Insurance Funds under 
public law (“Krankenkassen”) 
2004: 
Non-profit Health Insurance Funds under 
public law (“Krankenkassen”) 
Greece 1995: 
The Health Insurance Funds are public non 
profit Insurance Funds,  
The ESY, i.e. the Health Authorities of the 
NHS, are under direct control of the Central 
Government 
2004: 
The Health Insurance Funds are public non 
profit Insurance Funds,  
The ESY, i.e. the Health Authorities of the 
NHS, are under direct control of the Central 
Government 
Hungary 1995: 
The National Health Insurance Fund 
Administration, NHIFA, is only formally 
independent of the Central Government and 
the public administration 
2004: 
The National Health Insurance Fund 
Administration, NHIFA, is only formally 
independent of the Central Government and 
the public administration 
Ireland 1995: 
Health Boards are under direct control of the 
Central Government; i.e. the Department of 
Health 
2004: 
The Health Boards were combined into the 
Health Service Executive, which is under 
control of the Central Government 
Italy 1995: 
The Health Authorities, ASL, are part of the 
regional government 
Remark: 
Up to the 1992 Reforms, the then Unita 
Sanitaria Locale, were part of the local 
government, operated by the municipal 
administration.  
2004: 
The Health Authorities, ASL, are part of the 
regional government, albeit they have gained 
more autonomy 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Non-profit Insurance Funds under public law 
and supervision 
Remark: 
Basically every decision of the HIFs is 
subject to government approval 
2004: 
Non-profit Insurance Funds under public law 
and supervision 
Remark: 
Basically every decision of the HIFs is subject 
to government approval 
Netherlands 1995: 
Non-profit Insurance Funds like public 
Insurance Funds, mutualities etc. 
Some for profit Insurance Funds for VHI 
 
Remark: 
There is the AWBZ for social care, mental 
care and long term care, but not actually 
involved in the financing of health services. 
the following concerns those HIFs which are 
in charge of financing the health services 
2004: 
Non-profit Insurance Funds like public 
Insurance Funds, mutualities etc. 
Some for profit Insurance Funds for VHI 
 
Remark: 
There is the AWBZ for social care, mental 
care and long term care, but not actually 
involved in the financing of health services. 
the following concerns those HIFs which are 
in charge of financing the health services 
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Authorities? 
New Zealand 1995: 
The Regional Health Boards are under direct 
control of the Central Government, they are 
basically part of the national administration 
Remark: 
Factually, the Regional Health Boards had a 
high degree of autonomy 
2004: 
The District Health Boards are under direct 
control of the Central Government, they are 
basically part of the national administration  
Norway 1995: 
County Councils and Municipalities in 
charge of providing Hospital and Primary 
Care are political entities; elected by the 
citizens 
 
The National Insurance Scheme is the second 
purchaser in the health system. It is funded 
from payroll contributions and controlled by 
the government. It finances medicines, and 
services in addition to the payments made by 
the Municipalities. Most of all, it covers 
financial losses arising during illness.  
2004: 
Municipalities in charge of providing Primary 
Care. They are political entities; elected by 
the citizens.  
The role of the Central government has 
increased, by acquiring control over Hospitals
The National Insurance Scheme is the second 
purchaser in the health system. It is funded 
from payroll contributions and controlled by 
the government. It finances medicines, and 
services in addition to the payments made by 
the Municipalities. Most of all, it covers 
financial losses arising during illness. 
Portugal 1995: 
Regional Health Administrations, 
Administraçãos Regionais de Saúde, are 
under direct control of the Central 
Government, and basically part of the 
national administration. 
 
 
Remark: 
The role of the subsistemas, the HIFs, and 
the VHI is very limited. 
2004: 
Regional Health Administrations, 
Administraçãos Regionais de Saúde, are still 
under direct Control of the Central 
Government, and basically part of the national 
administration. They have however gained 
some autonomy in the last years. The 
importance of the sub-regions is disappearing.
Remark: 
The role of the subsistemas, the HIFs, and the 
VHI is very limited.  
Poland 1995: 
The municipalities/gmina and 
regions/voivoda were most important for the 
provision of care. They are locally elected 
governments. The administration in charge of 
organizing health care is determined by the 
municipal and regional government (gmina 
and voivodship). 
It receives funding from the central 
government 
2004: 
The National Health Fund (NHF) is the main 
purchaser of health services. It is under close 
control of the national government 
Remark: 
There was a short period in which 16 HIFs 
were created, but they were merged in 2003 to 
only one Fund, the National Health Fund. The 
NHF is supervised by a Fund Council, which 
in turn is appointed by the Government.  
Spain 1995: 
The Health Authority, the INSALUD, and its 
regional branches are under direct control of 
the Central Government 
Remark: 
Even in the mid 90s, the devolution had 
begun and in some of the Regions, the 
regional government was already in charge 
2004: 
The regional Health Authorities, Servicios 
Regional de Salud, in the Autonomous 
Communities are under direct control of the 
Government of the respective Autonomous 
Community 
Remark: 
With the completion of the decentralization 
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Authorities? 
of operating the regional branch of the NHS. process, the regional governments are in 
charge of the NHS in all regions. The 
competencies have basically shifted to the 
regional governments, but have not changed 
otherwise. 
Sweden 1995: 
Health Authorities are the regional 
government; the Landsting is in charge of 
organizing and providing Health Care 
2004: 
Health Authorities are the regional 
government; the Landsting is in charge of 
organizing and providing Health Care 
Switzerland 1995: 
Non-profit Health Insurance Funds 
Remark: 
The non-profit funds are in charge of the 
basic coverage – the VHI is offered by 
commercial insurance companies. 
2004: 
Non-profit Health Insurance Funds 
Remark: 
The non-profit funds are in charge of the basic 
coverage – the VHI is offered by commercial 
insurance companies. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
District Health Authorities are under the 
direct control of the Central Government; 
albeit not on a day-by-day basis and not in 
every detail 
2004: 
Health Authorities are under the direct control 
of the Central Government; albeit not on a 
day-by-day basis and not in every detail 
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HIF2  How many Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities, that can offer the full 
coverage of a health insurance, exist in [Country]? 
Austria 1995:  
27 Health Insurance Funds 
2004:  
20 Health Insurance Funds 
Belgium 1995: 
6 Health Insurance Funds cover most of the 
population 
Remark: 
The 6 national level organizations comprise 
about 100 local Health Insurance Funds. The 
HIF act as a unitary actor vis-a-vis the 
providers of medical services. 
2004: 
6 Health Insurance Funds cover most of the 
population 
Remark: 
The 6 national level organizations comprise 
about 100 local Health Insurance Funds. The 
HIF act as a unitary actor vis-a-vis the 
providers of medical services. 
Canada 1995: 
13 Provinces with their own health insurance 
programs  (10 provinces, 3 territories) are 
acting as purchasers and providers of health 
services for their population. 
2004: 
13 Provinces with their own health insurance 
programs  (10 provinces, 3 territories) are 
acting as purchasers and providers of health 
services for their population. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
23 in 1995 
Remark: 
Some HIF went bankrupt, since they offered 
more services in addition to the basic 
packaged without having the financial means 
to cover them. Their clients were transferred 
to the General Health Insurance Fund. 
2004: 
9 
Remark: 
The biggest HIF is the General Health 
Insurance Fund GHIF, covering 68% of the 
population. It has a regional structure. It acts 
as a fall-back insurance, if a HIF – as has 
happened- goes bankrupt. 
Denmark: 
16; 14 counties; plus the Copenhagen and 
Frederiksberg municipalities which have 
county status.  
273 municipalities 
2004:  
Currently 16; 14 counties; plus the 
Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities 
which have county status  
273 municipalities 
Finland 1995: 
455 Local communities and municipalities in 
charge of organizing health care provision 
Remark:  
The National Health Insurance, NHI, is a 
second, complementary purchaser of health 
in charge of covering pharmaceutical 
expenditure, privately provided health care 
and payments during times of illness. It is a 
national level institution, is financed from 
pay roll taxes and under direct control of the 
national government, which decides on the 
level of the contributions and the coverage of 
services.  
2004:  
432 Local communities and municipalities in 
charge of organizing health care provision 
Remark:  
The National Health Insurance, NHI, is a 
second, complementary purchaser of health in 
charge of covering pharmaceutical 
expenditure, privately provided health care 
and payments during times of illness. It is a 
national level institution, is financed from pay 
roll taxes and under direct control of the 
national government, which decides on the 
level of the contributions and the coverage of 
services. 
France 1995: 
About 2/3 of all citizens are member in the 
régime général, CNAMTS, covering 
employed citizens. The régime général itself 
consists of 16 regional and 129 local 
branches, which are however only regional 
2004: 
About 84% of the population are member of 
the régime général; CNAMTS. The régime 
général itself consists of regional and local 
branches, which are however only regional 
representations of the same HIF. 
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HIF2  How many Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities, that can offer the full 
coverage of a health insurance, exist in [Country]? 
representations of the HIF. 
Further, there are health insurance funds for 
special occupational groups like farmers, 
miners, or those employed by the railway. 
There still exist funds for special occupations 
like farmers, covering about 7% of the 
population 
Germany 1995: 
About 500 Health Insurance Funds  
Remark: 
In earlier years, there were even about 1200 
HIFs, many of them associated with 
individual enterprises, covering the employed 
of this enterprise. 
2004: 
292 Health Insurance Funds ( January 2004) 
Greece 1995: 
About 6-7 major Health Insurance Funds, 
many smaller mutualities for special 
occupations. In 1996 in total 239 HIF.  
The two main funds, IKA and OGA, cover ¾ 
of the population 
Many local health authorities as local 
representation of the ESY, which is one 
administrative entity. 
2004: 
About 6-7 major Health Insurance Funds, 
many smaller mutualities for special 
occupations.  
The two main funds, IKA and OGA, cover ¾ 
of the population 
Many local health authorities as local 
representation of the ESY, which is one 
administrative entity. 
Hungary 1995: 
There is only one fund, the NHIFA, acting as 
purchaser of health services for the whole 
population 
2004: 
There is only one fund, the NHIFA, acting as 
purchaser of health services for the whole 
population 
Ireland 1995: 
8 Health Boards 
2004: 
The Health Boards were combined to the 
Health Service Executive 
Italy 1995: 
228 ASL 
2004: 
183 ASL 
Remark: 
In some regions, the number of ASL was 
reduced.  
Luxembourg 1994: 
One 
Remark: 
While there are formally 9 branches of the 
HIF for certain occupational classes, all act 
together as a unitary actor, the Union des 
Caisses de Maladie, UCM 
2004: 
One 
Remark: 
While there are formally 9 branches of the 
HIF for certain occupational classes, all act 
together as a unitary actor, the Union des 
Caisses de Maladie, UCM 
Netherlands 1995: 
About 28 Health Insurance Funds 
2004: 
22 Health Insurance Funds;  
Remark: 
5 of them cover 70% of the population 
New Zealand 1995: 
4 Regional Health Authorities acting as 
purchasers of health services;  
Remark: 
In addition there were 23 public Hospital 
Organizations. In 96/97 the purchaser 
2004: 
21 District Health Boards acting as regional 
purchasers but also providing health services  
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coverage of a health insurance, exist in [Country]? 
function was merged to one institution, the 
Health Funding Authority 
Norway 1995: 
19 Counties in charge of hospitals, which are 
combined to five Hospital Regions. 
435 Municipalities in charge of primary care 
provision 
The National Insurance Scheme is a second, 
national level purchaser.  
2004: 
5 five Hospital Regions, which are effectively 
controlled by the government. 
435 Municipalities in charge of primary care 
provision  
The National Insurance Scheme is a second, 
national level purchaser. 
Remark: 
The role of the central government in the 
provision of health care has increased 
substantially. 
Portugal 1995: 
5 Regions - Administração Regionais de 
Saúde - in mainland Portugal;  
Remark: 
The Administraçãos Regionais de Saúde are 
the most important tier. Below that level are 
20 subregions including Madeira and the 
Azores as 2 of the subregions 
There are several HIFs and VHI acting as 
purchasers, but their role is very limited 
2004: 
5 Regions - Administração Regionais de 
Saúde - in mainland Portugal 
 
Remark: 
The 20 subregions, including Madeira and 
Azores as subregions, are still existent, but 
not relevant as a level. 
There are several HIFs and VHI acting as 
purchasers, but their role is very limited 
Poland 1995: 
49 regional units.  
Remark: 
The number depends on the kind of care. 
Basic care is provided by the municipalities, 
more specialized care is provided by larger 
administrative units.  
2004: 
One 
Remark: 
There was a short period in which 16 HIFs 
were created, but they were merged in 2003 to 
only one Fund, the National Health Fund, 
NHF. 
Spain 1995: 
In 7 Regions, the regional Health Authorities, 
SRS, were acting as purchaser of health 
For the remaining 10 Regions, the INSALUD 
was in charge of purchasing and providing 
health care 
Remark: 
The Purchasers, the INSALUD as well as the 
SRS, are both, providers of health services in 
facilities operated directly by them, and 
purchasing health services from independent 
providers.  
2004: 
17 autonomous communities with own Health 
Authorities SRS in charge of organizing 
health care by either providing it in own 
facilities ore by contracting it from 
independent providers 
Sweden 1995: 
21 in total: 18 Landstings, 2 Regions and one 
Municipality with the same status as a 
Landsting 
2004: 
21 in total: 18 Landstings, 2 Regions and one 
Municipality with the same status as a 
Landsting 
Switzerland 1995: 
About 200 Health Insurance Funds 
 
2004: 
87 Health Insurance Funds 
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coverage of a health insurance, exist in [Country]? 
United Kingdom 1995: 
About 200 District Health Authorities in 
charge of organizing health care 
Remark: 
Previously, there were 14 Regional Health 
Authorities as an intermediate level in the 
NHS administration. They were combined in 
the NHS Executive 
2004: 
In England alone more than 50 Health 
Authorities in charge of organizing health 
care. 
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HIF3  Which of the following medical services can be provided by the Health Insurance 
Fund / Health Authority itself?  
Austria 1995:  
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
in a few selected fields 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Insurance Funds, albeit only in 
selected fields (injuries) 
2004:  
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments in 
a few selected fields 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Insurance Funds, albeit only in 
selected fields (injuries) 
Belgium 1995. 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health 
Insurance Funds 
2004: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health Insurance 
Funds 
Canada 1995: 
Hospitals are operated by the provincial 
governments; these provide in-patient as well 
as out patient services 
2004: 
Hospitals are operated by the provincial 
governments; these provide in-patient as well 
as out patient services 
Czech Republic 1995: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the HIF 
2004: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the HIF 
Denmark 1995:  
All services can be and often are provided by 
the Amter or the municipality;  
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Authority; Amter 
Remark: 
If not available in the county, the patient will 
bet treated in another county (e.g. receive 
highly specialized service from a university 
hospital). The home county will pay the other 
county according to pre-determined rates; 
based on a DRG system 
2004:  
All services can be and often are provided by 
the Amter or the municipality;  
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Authority; Amter 
Remark: 
If not available in the county, the patient will 
bet treated in another county (e.g. receive 
highly specialized service from a university 
hospital). The home county will pay the other 
county according to pre-determined rates 
based on a DRG system 
Finland 1995: 
The Municipalities can provide: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Authorities (i.e. Municipalities) 
Remark: 
The Municipalities can provide the services, 
but can also contract them from independent 
providers 
2004: 
The Municipalities can provide: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Authorities (i.e. Municipalities) 
Remark: 
The Municipalities can provide the services, 
but can also contract them from independent 
providers 
France 1995:  
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health 
2004:  
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health Insurance 
 315
HIF3  Which of the following medical services can be provided by the Health Insurance 
Fund / Health Authority itself?  
Insurance Funds. The later are forbidden to 
provide services 
Funds. The later are forbidden to provide 
services 
Germany 1995. 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health 
Insurance Funds 
2004: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health Insurance 
Funds 
Greece 1995: 
Some of the Health Insurance Funds, the 
IKA and the OPAD, provide primary care 
and operate own Hospitals and Laboratories. 
The smaller HIF have contracts with the IKA 
and OPAD, to use their hospitals. 
The ESY provides primary care in Health 
Centers and operates Hospitals   
2004: 
Some of the Health Insurance Funds, the IKA 
and the OPAD, provide primary care and 
operate own Hospitals and Laboratories. The 
smaller HIF have contracts with the IKA and 
OPAD, to use their hospitals. 
The ESY provides primary care in Health 
Centers and operates Hospitals 
Hungary 1995: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the NHIFA 
Remark: 
Providers of services may be independent 
and private, but also publicly owned, e.g. 
hospitals and polyclinics owned and operated 
by municipalities and counties 
2004: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the NHIFA 
Remark: 
Providers of services may be independent and 
private, but also publicly owned, e.g. hospitals 
and polyclinics owned and operated by 
municipalities and counties 
Ireland 1995: 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Boards 
Remark: 
Since Hospitals also offer primary care and 
specialized outpatient care on an ambulatory 
basis, the Health Boards also offer these 
services  
2004: 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Service Executive 
Remark: 
Since Hospitals also offer primary care and 
specialized outpatient care on an ambulatory 
basis, the Health Executive also offer these 
services 
Italy 1995: 
The ASL can provide 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
ASL 
Remark: 
The ASL also provides services hired staff 
and owned facilities, but also by making 
contracts with independent providers 
2004: 
The ASL can provide 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
ASL 
Remark: 
The ASL also provides services hired staff 
and owned facilities, but also by making 
contracts with independent providers 
Luxembourg 1994: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health 
Insurance Funds. 
2004: 
None, all services are contracted from 
providers independent of the Health Insurance 
Funds. 
Netherlands 1995: 
All services are contracted from providers 
independent of the Health Insurance Funds 
Remark: 
2004: 
All services are contracted from providers 
independent of the Health Insurance Funds 
Remark: 
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Fund / Health Authority itself?  
By law, the Health Insurance Funds can offer 
services, but they do not 
By law, the Health Insurance Funds can offer 
services, but they do not. 
New Zealand 1995: 
None, the Regional Health Authorities were 
part of a strict purchaser provider split. 
2004: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Authority (District Health Boards) 
Remark: 
The 1996 and 2000 reforms cancelled the 
Purchaser-Provider split, and the public 
Hospitals were integrated into the District 
Health Boards, which also contract services 
from independent providers.  
Norway 1995: 
County Councils are in charge of hospitals 
and in patient care 
Municipalities are in charge of primary care 
provision 
The NIS contracts all services 
Remark: 
Both can either provide the services in own 
facilities ( mostly done for specialized care 
and in patient services) or by contracting 
independent providers (mostly done for 
primary care) 
2004: 
Hospital regions are in charge of hospitals and 
in patient care since the centralization. 
Municipalities are in charge of primary care 
provision 
The NIS contracts all services 
Remark: 
Hospitals are more or less directly controlled 
by the government. Municipalities can either 
employ or contract GPs, the tendency is to 
contract. 
Portugal 1995: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments  
in-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Regional Health Administrations; 
Administraçãos Regionais de Saúde 
Remark: 
The Hospitals are not directly operated by the 
Regional Health Administration but are 
under the control of the Ministry of Health. 
The HIFs and VHI are contracting most 
services. 
2004: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
provided by the Primary Health Centers 
operated by the RHA; Administraçãos 
Regionais de Saúde 
Remark: 
The Hospitals are not directly operated by the 
Regional Health Administration but are under 
the control of the Ministry of Health. 
The HIFs and VHI are contracting most 
services. 
Poland 1995: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza 
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Health Authority  
Remark: 
The municipalities and regional governments 
were in charge of organizing health care, 
either by providing it in own facilities, like 
2004: 
None, the National Health Fund has to 
contract all services from independent 
providers. 
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Fund / Health Authority itself?  
health centers or hospitals or by contracting it 
from providers. 
Spain 1995: 
The purchaser – either the INSALUD or the 
SRS, can provide services: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
in-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the INSALUD or the SRS 
Remark: 
Parallel to the provision in own facilities, like 
Health Centers and Hospitals, health services 
are also contracted from independent 
providers 
2004: 
The purchasers, the SRS, can provide 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
in-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the regional Health Authorities (Servicios 
Regional de Salud) 
Remark: 
Parallel to the provision in own facilities, like 
Health Centers and Hospitals, health services 
are also contracted from independent 
providers 
Sweden 1995: 
The Landsting provides: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments 
in Primary Care Centers 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Landsting 
2004: 
The Landsting provides: 
Primary Care for minor treatments like 
immunization against influenza  
Primary Care also for substantial treatments in 
Primary Care Centers 
In-patient services by Hospitals operated by 
the Landsting 
Switzerland 1995: 
None, everything is contracted from 
independent providers 
2004: 
None, everything is contracted from 
independent providers 
United Kingdom 1995: 
None, everything is contracted from 
independent providers 
Remark: 
Since the creation of the internal market, 
there is a purchaser / provider spilt, with 
regional bodies of the public administration 
acting as purchasers. The DHA negotiate 
contracts with the hospitals, the Department 
of Health negotiates the national contract 
with the GPs 
2004: 
None, everything is contracted from 
independent providers 
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HIF4  In some Health Care Systems, citizens are free to choose the Health Insurance Fund/ 
Health Authority. In others, they are assigned by law, e.g. all self employed / public 
employees are members of a certain Health Insurance Fund/ Health Authority. Or, all people 
living in a certain area are members of a certain local Health Insurance Fund / Health 
Authority. How is the situation in [Country]? 
Austria 1995:  
Citizens are assigned by occupation and by 
place of living to a certain Health Insurance 
Fund – to the regional branch of a certain 
HIF, which is covering persons of this 
occupation 
2004:  
Citizens are assigned by occupation and by 
place of living to a certain Health Insurance 
Fund – to the regional branch of a certain 
HIF, which is covering persons of this 
occupation 
Belgium 1995: 
Citizens have free choice 
2004: 
Citizens have free choice 
Canada 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living - the 
province they are living in 
Remark: 
The province they are living in acts as the 
purchaser of health care. Citizens are free to 
chose a VHI 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living- the 
province they are living in 
Remark: 
The province they are living in acts as the 
purchaser of health care. Citizens are free to 
chose a VHI 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Citizens have free choice of the HIF 
Remark: 
Since the level of remuneration a provider 
receives differ among funds, providers 
encourage patients to change to HIF which 
pay higher prices for treatment. 
2004: 
Citizens have free choice of the HIF 
Remark: 
Since the level of remuneration a provider 
receives differ among funds, providers 
encourage patients to change to HIF which 
pay higher prices for treatment. 
Denmark:  
Citizens are assigned by place of living – to 
the county, Amter, or municipality, where 
they are living 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living – to 
the county, Amter, or municipality, where 
they are living 
Finland 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living; i.e. 
to the municipality, where they are living 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living; i.e. to 
the municipality, where they are living 
France 1995:  
Citizens are assigned by occupation; three 
Mandatory Health Insurance Funds for 
employees, farmers and self-employed; 
Free choice of the VHI 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by occupation; three 
Mandatory Health Insurance Funds for 
employees, farmers and self-employed; 
Free choice of the VHI 
Germany 1995: 
Up to 1996 free choice for white collar 
employees only. 
2004: 
Free choice among all health insurance funds 
for all citizens 
Greece 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by occupation to a 
certain Health Insurance Fund 
Citizens are “assigned” by place of living to 
the regional branch of the ESY 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by occupation to a 
certain Health Insurance Fund 
Citizens are “assigned” by place of living to 
the regional branch of the ESY 
Hungary 1995: 
There is only one HIF, the National Health 
Insurance Fund Administration 
2004: 
There is only one HIF, the National Health 
Insurance Fund Administration 
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HIF4  In some Health Care Systems, citizens are free to choose the Health Insurance Fund/ 
Health Authority. In others, they are assigned by law, e.g. all self employed / public 
employees are members of a certain Health Insurance Fund/ Health Authority. Or, all people 
living in a certain area are members of a certain local Health Insurance Fund / Health 
Authority. How is the situation in [Country]? 
Ireland 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
Health Board covering the area they are 
living in. 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living.  
Italy 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
ASL respectively the region 
The assignment to supplementary health 
insurance funds, is by occupation, since it is 
usually organized as a group insurance policy 
by the employer. 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
ASL respectively the region 
The assignment to supplementary health 
insurance funds, is by occupation, since it is 
usually organized as a group insurance policy 
by the employer. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Citizens are assigned by occupation to a 
certain branch of the Health Insurance Fund 
 
Remark: 
Since all HIFs are united in one association, 
the UCM, the assignment does not matter 
from the perspective of the citizen 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by occupation to a 
certain branch of the Health Insurance Fund 
 
Remark: 
Since all HIFs are united in one association, 
the UCM, the assignment does not matter 
from the perspective of the citizen 
Netherlands1995:  
Citizens have free choice among the HIFs 
since 1991 
2004: 
Citizens have free choice among the HIFs 
New Zealand 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living; i.e. 
to the Regional Health Board covering the 
Region where they are living 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living; i.e. to 
the District Health Board, covering the 
District where they are living 
Norway 1995: 
Citizens are assigned to the County Council / 
Municipality they are living in 
The NIS is mandatory for all employed 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned to the Hospital Region/  
Municipality they are living in.  
The NIS is mandatory for all employed 
Portugal 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
Regional Health Administration. 
Citizens are assigned by occupational sector 
to the subsistemas (Health Insurance Funds). 
 
Remark:  
The subsistemas basically cover only public 
employees, with the various subsistemas 
covering certain groups of public employees: 
post, military, health staff etc. Membership is 
usually compulsory. 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
Regional Health Administration. 
Citizens are assigned by occupational sector 
to the subsistemas (Health Insurance Funds).  
 
Remark:  
The subsistemas basically cover only public 
employees, with the various subsistemas 
covering certain groups of public employees: 
post, military, health staff etc. Membership is 
usually compulsory. 
Poland 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
municipality and regional government they 
are living in. 
2004: 
There is only one Health Insurance Fund, the 
National Health Fund. 
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HIF4  In some Health Care Systems, citizens are free to choose the Health Insurance Fund/ 
Health Authority. In others, they are assigned by law, e.g. all self employed / public 
employees are members of a certain Health Insurance Fund/ Health Authority. Or, all people 
living in a certain area are members of a certain local Health Insurance Fund / Health 
Authority. How is the situation in [Country]? 
Spain 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living 
Remark: 
This concerns the assignment to a regional 
branch of the INSALUD or the SRS of the 
Region where the person is living in the case 
that the region already is in charge of 
organizing health care 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
Region /SRS  
Sweden 1995. 
Citizens are assigned by place of living – to 
the Landsting 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
Landsting 
Switzerland 1995: 
Citizens are assigned, also by the criterion of 
place of living i.e. to the HIF in the Kanton.  
Remark: 
Some Health Insurance Funds operate only in 
certain regions; Kanton. Many elements of 
the health system as well as the contributions 
to the HIF, differ among cantons. 
2004: 
Citizens have free choice. 
 
Remark: 
Some Health Insurance Funds operate only in 
certain regions; Kanton. Many elements of the 
health system as well as the contributions to 
the HIF, differ among cantons.  
United Kingdom 1995: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living to the 
DHA covering the area 
2004: 
Citizens are assigned by place of living 
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HIF5  Is it possible that the citizen’s contributions (premiums, percentage of income, tax 
rates) to the Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority vary, or are the contributions the same 
for all Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities in [Country]?  
Do different Health Insurance Funds charge different contributions? 
Do different Health Authorities, e.g. in different regions, charge different contributions? 
Austria 1995:  
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
actually differ.  
Remark:  
The rates are fixed by the central government 
for the different branches of the Health 
Insurance 
2004:  
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
actually differ.  
Remark:  
The rates are fixed by the central government 
for the different branches of the Health 
Insurance 
Belgium 1995. 
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
are not allowed to differ 
Remark:  
The contribution levels are set by law, 
contributions are collected by the INAMI, 
which also receives subsidies from the 
central government, and then distributed to 
the individual HIF based on a 
demographically adjusted capitation system. 
This precludes different contribution levels. 
2004:  
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
are not allowed to differ 
Remark:  
The contribution levels are set by law, 
contributions are collected by the INAMI 
which also receives subsidies from the central 
government, and then distributed to the 
individual HIF based on a demographically 
adjusted capitation system. This precludes 
different contribution levels. However, in 
some cases, the members of a HIF have to pay 
a small extra contribution directly to the HIF, 
in the magnitude of about 10 Euros. 
Canada 1995: 
Contributions, i.e. taxes, actually differ 
among provinces 
Remark: 
Contributions differ substantially among 
provinces: Premiums can differ, and so can 
the mode in which contributions are raised: 
premiums, percentage of income, additional 
earmarked taxes  
2004: 
Contributions, i.e. taxes, actually differ 
among provinces 
Remark: 
Contributions differ substantially among 
provinces: Premiums can differ, and so can 
the mode in which contributions are raised: 
premiums, percentage of income, additional 
earmarked taxes 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
may differ, but factually all charge the same 
rates 
Remark: 
Factually, contribution levels are set by the 
state by law, the employee pays 4,5% the 
employer 9% of the contribution  
2004: 
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
may differ, but factually all charge the same 
rates 
Remark: 
Factually, contribution levels are set by the 
state by law, the employee pays 4,5% the 
employer 9% of the contribution. 
Denmark:  
The local taxes from which Health Care is 
paid, differ among the Amter. The taxes are 
however not earmarked for health spending. 
Remark: 
The central government and the local 
governments negotiate recommended 
2004:  
The local taxes from which Health Care is 
paid, differ among the Amter. The taxes are 
however not earmarked for health spending. 
Remark: 
The central government and the local 
governments negotiate recommended 
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HIF5  Is it possible that the citizen’s contributions (premiums, percentage of income, tax 
rates) to the Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority vary, or are the contributions the same 
for all Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities in [Country]?  
Do different Health Insurance Funds charge different contributions? 
Do different Health Authorities, e.g. in different regions, charge different contributions? 
maximum levels for local taxes. maximum levels for local taxes. 
Finland 1995: 
Contributions actually differ among 
Municipalities – the level of local taxes 
differs among municipalities, but the local 
taxes are not earmarked 
2004: 
Contributions actually differ among 
Municipalities – the level of local taxes 
differs among municipalities, but the local 
taxes are not earmarked 
France 1995  
Contributions to the mandatory HIFs actually 
differ.  
Remark: 
The contributions are set by the government 
2004: 
Contributions to the mandatory HIF may 
differ, but factually all charge the same rates 
Remark: 
The contributions are set by act of parliament. 
Currently it is for the employed 13,5 %, of 
which 12,8% is paid by the employer. The 
rate is 6,5% for self-employed and 8,13 % for 
farmers  
Germany 1995: 
Yes, contributions factually differ among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
Since the insured pay only half of the 
contribution and the difference among the 
contribution rates is small, there is little 
incentive to switch to the cheapest HIF 
2004: 
Yes, contributions factually differ among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
Since the insured pay only half of the 
contribution and the difference among the 
contribution rates is small, there is little 
incentive to switch to the cheapest HIF 
Greece 1995: 
Yes, contributions factually differ among 
health insurance funds 
The ESY is financed from general taxation, 
hence, there are no contributions to the 
regional branches 
2004: 
Yes, contributions factually differ among 
health insurance funds 
The ESY is financed from general taxation, 
hence, there are no contributions to the 
regional branches 
Hungary 1995: 
No, contributions cannot differ.  
Remark: 
The contributions are a percentage of the 
income, and are collected by the Health 
Insurance. The level of the contribution is set 
by the parliament 
2004: 
No, contributions cannot differ.  
Remark: 
The contributions – percentage of income -are 
now collected by the state, i.e. by the tax 
authority. The level of the contribution is set 
by the parliament 
Ireland 1995: 
No, financing is by general taxation 
2004: 
No, financing is by general taxation 
Italy 1995: 
Contributions are not allowed to differ, since 
the main financing is by general taxation 
Remark: 
In theory, regions can charge higher regional 
taxes and introduce additional co-payments 
at regional level to cover the deficits due to 
the provision of health in the region. But they 
2004: 
Contributions are not allowed to differ, since 
the main financing is by general taxation 
Remark: 
In theory, regions can charge higher regional 
taxes and introduce additional co-payments at 
regional level to cover the deficits due to the 
provision of health in the region. But they do 
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HIF5  Is it possible that the citizen’s contributions (premiums, percentage of income, tax 
rates) to the Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority vary, or are the contributions the same 
for all Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities in [Country]?  
Do different Health Insurance Funds charge different contributions? 
Do different Health Authorities, e.g. in different regions, charge different contributions? 
do not not 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
are not allowed to differ 
Remark: 
Despite the 9 different branches, these are 
not really different HIFs and they are not 
competing over contribution rates. The rates 
are set by the government. 
2004: 
Contributions to the Health Insurance Funds 
are not allowed to differ 
Remark: 
Despite the 9 different branches, these are not 
really different HIFs and they are not 
competing over contribution rates, the rates 
are set by the government 
Netherlands 1995: 
Contributions to Health Insurance Funds are 
allowed to differ, but do only little in practice
Remark: 
The contribution consists of a flat rate, set by 
the HIFs and a percentage of income, set by 
the state. The contribution differs only for the 
flat rate charged by the HIFs  
2004: 
Contributions to Health Insurance Funds 
differ, but do so only very little 
Remark: 
The contribution consists of a flat rate, set by 
the HIFs and a percentage of income, set by 
the state. The contribution differs only for the 
flat rate charged by the HIFs 
New Zealand 1995: 
The health system is financed from general 
taxation; funds are allocated from the central 
government to the Regional Health Boards. 
there are no contributions from citizens to the 
Regional Health Boards and hence 
differences 
2004: 
The health system is financed from general 
taxation; funds are allocated from the central 
government to the District Health Boards. 
There are no contributions from citizens to the 
District Health Boards and hence differences 
Norway 1995: 
The health system is predominantly financed 
from general taxation; there are no 
earmarked contributions and no differences. 
Co payments are set at the national level, and 
so is the contribution level to the NIS. 
2004: 
The health system is predominantly financed 
from general taxation; there are no earmarked 
contributions and no differences. 
Co payments are set at the national level, and 
so is the contribution level to the NIS. 
Portugal 1995: 
The health system is tax-funded.  
The Regional Health Administrations are 
financed by an allocated budget from the 
Central Government, which is taken from the 
general taxation. There are no identifiable 
contributions going from citizens to the 
Regional Health Administrations. 
Remark: 
The contributions to the subsistema differ, 
and are mostly paid for by the employer. 
2004: 
The health system is tax-funded.  
The Regional Health Administrations are 
financed by an allocated budget from the 
Central Government, which is taken from the 
general taxation. There are no identifiable 
contributions going from citizens to the 
Regional Health Administrations. 
Remark: 
The contributions to the subsistema differ, 
and are mostly paid for by the employer. 
Poland 1995: 
Contributions to health care were not allowed 
to differ 
Remark: 
The municipalities and regions received 
2004: 
Contributions to health care cannot differ, 
since there is only one Health Insurance Fund.
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rates) to the Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority vary, or are the contributions the same 
for all Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities in [Country]?  
Do different Health Insurance Funds charge different contributions? 
Do different Health Authorities, e.g. in different regions, charge different contributions? 
government grants, there were no 
contributions. 
Spain 1995: 
Contributions are not allowed to differ. 
Remark:  
The Health System in financed from general 
taxation at the level of the Central 
Government so there are no contributions 
comparable to a insurance premium. Funds 
are collected by the Central government and 
allocated to the Regions (Autonomous 
Communities). The regions can however 
raise additional funds by taxation. 
2004: 
Contributions are not allowed to differ. 
Remark:  
The Health System in financed from general 
taxation at the level of the Central 
Government so there are no contributions 
comparable to a insurance premium. Funds 
are collected by the Central government and 
allocated to the Regions (Autonomous 
Communities). The regions can however raise 
additional funds by taxation. 
Sweden 1995: 
Contributions – local tax levels and patient 
fees - actually differ among Landstings 
Remark: 
Patients pay fees for medical services, in 
particular for outpatient services. Each 
Landsting is free to set its own fee schedule 
within upper limits set by the central 
government. 
2004: 
Contributions - local tax levels and patient 
fees - actually differ among Landstings 
Remark: 
Patients pay fees for medical services, in 
particular for outpatient services. Each 
Landsting is free to set its own fee schedule 
within upper limits set by the central 
government. 
Switzerland 1995: 
Contributions actually differ among HIFs 
Remark: 
Contributions differ among different HIFs 
and among the Kanton, i.e. among the 
regional branches of a HIF. 
2004: 
Contributions actually differ among HIFs 
Remark: 
Contributions differ among different HIFs and 
among the Kanton, i.e. among the regional 
branches of a HIF. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The funding is by general taxation,  
Remark: 
The funding is by general taxation with no 
earmarked taxes. There are no contributions 
going to the District Health Authorities 
2004: 
The funding is by general taxation, thus 
contributions cannot differ among Health 
Authorities 
 
 325
 
HIF6  Is it possible that the catalogues of benefits and medical services covered or offered 
vary among different Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities? 
Does for instance a certain Health Insurance Fund cover medical services which are not 
covered by another Health Insurance Fund?  
Does the Health Authority in one region offer medical services, which are not offered in 
another region? 
Austria 1995:  
Catalogues of services covered may differ, 
but factually all cover the same basic medical 
services. The differences concern extras like 
spa-treatments 
2004:  
Catalogues of services covers may differ, but 
factually all cover the same basic medical 
services. Some cover additional services like 
spa-treatments 
Belgium 1995. 
The catalogue of medical services covered is 
not allowed to differ among Health Insurance 
Funds. 
Remark: 
The convention, consisting of the catalogue 
and the fees, is negotiated among the HIF 
association and the provider and is valid at 
the national level. 
2004: 
The catalogue of medical services covered is 
not allowed to differ among Health Insurance 
Funds 
Remark: 
The convention, consisting of the catalogue 
and the fees, is negotiated among the HIF 
association and the provider and is valid at the 
national level. 
Canada 1995: 
The range of services offered factually differ 
among the provinces, also due to availability 
Remark: 
While the federal government determined, 
that all medically services have to be 
covered, the provinces have leeway in what 
services to cover, what services to subsidizes 
and to what degree. The access to services 
also differs due to availability. 
2004: 
The range of services offered factually differ 
among the provinces  
Remark: 
While the federal government determined, 
that all medically services have to be covered, 
the provinces have leeway in what services to 
cover, what services to subsidizes and to what 
degree. The access to services also differs due 
to availability. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
The catalogue of services covered actually 
differ among HIF 
Remark: 
While a minimum package is set by the state, 
the HIF can offer additional services and 
conveniences. Some did so, without having 
the financial capacities to do so, and went 
bankrupt. 
2004: 
The catalogue of services covered actually 
differ among HIF 
Remark: 
While a minimum package is set by the state, 
the HIF can offer additional services and 
conveniences. The possibility to do so was 
limited given the experiences of HIF going 
bankrupt due to covering too many services. 
Denmark 1995:  
There is no formal catalogues of services, 
instead some services are excluded.  
The capacity to provide a certain type of 
medical treatment may not be established in a 
county or the waiting time may be longer 
2004:  
There is no formal catalogues of services, 
instead some services are excluded.  
The capacity to provide a certain type of 
medical treatment may not be established in a 
county or the waiting time may be longer 
Finland 1995: 
The medical services offered actually differ 
among municipalities – mainly due to 
availability of facilities and providers. The 
coverage of dental care differs largely among 
2004: 
The medical services offered actually differ 
among municipalities – mainly due to 
availability of facilities and providers. The 
coverage of dental care differs largely among 
 326
HIF6  Is it possible that the catalogues of benefits and medical services covered or offered 
vary among different Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities? 
Does for instance a certain Health Insurance Fund cover medical services which are not 
covered by another Health Insurance Fund?  
Does the Health Authority in one region offer medical services, which are not offered in 
another region? 
municipalities. Some provide only very basic 
services to the whole population.  
municipalities. There is a trend to extend the 
number of people for which dental care is 
covered. 
France 1995:  
For the Mandatory Health Insurance Funds, 
the catalogue of services covered is not 
allowed to differ. The nomenclature, the list 
of services covered, is identical for all France
Packages offered by the VHI differ 
2004:  
For the Mandatory HIFs, the catalogue of 
services covered is not allowed to differ. The 
nomenclature, the list of services covered, is 
identical for all France 
Packages offered by the VHI differ 
Germany 1995: 
There is no positive catalogue of services, 
and basically all HIFs cover the same basic 
services. They differ in that some Health 
Insurance Funds also cover some extras like 
homeopathic treatments and spa-treatments  
2004: 
There is no positive catalogue of services, and 
basically all HIFs cover the same basic 
services. They differ in that some Health 
Insurance Funds also cover some extras like 
homeopathic treatments and spa-treatments 
Greece 1995: 
The catalogue of medical services covered 
differs among Health Insurance Funds 
The catalogue of services offered and 
covered by the regional branches of the ESY 
is not allowed to differ 
Remark: 
The differences in coverage among HIF 
concern e.g. dental care, gatekeeping 
regulations and co-payments. Basically, the 
HIF determine their own catalogue 
2004: 
The catalogue of medical services covered 
differs among Health Insurance Funds 
The catalogue of services offered and covered 
by the regional branches of the ESY is not 
allowed to differ 
Remark: 
The differences in coverage among HIF 
concern e.g. dental care, gatekeeping 
regulations and co-payments. Basically, the 
HIF determine their own catalogue 
Hungary 1995: 
No, there is only one HIF, the NHIFA, which 
covers the same catalogue of medical 
services for the whole population 
2004: 
No, there is only one HIF, the NHIFA, which 
covers the same catalogue of medical services 
for the whole population 
Ireland 1995: 
The catalogues of services covered may 
differ among regions/districts, since Health 
Boards negotiate with the Hospitals and 
providers. But factually all Health Boards 
cover the same medical services 
Remark:  
Availability may differ substantially among 
areas 
2004: 
The catalogues of services covered may differ 
among regions, since some elements are 
negotiated at a regional level. While the 
coverage does differ in a legal sense, 
availability may differ substantially among 
areas 
Italy 1995: 
The catalogues of services covered may 
differ among regions and ASLs; but factually 
all cover and offer the same services since 
the national government set minimum 
requirements 
2004: 
The catalogues of services covered may differ 
among regions and ASLs; but factually all 
cover and offer the same services since the 
national government set minimum 
requirements 
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Remark: 
Availability and quality differs substantially 
among regions. 
Remark: 
Availability and quality differs substantially 
among regions. 
Luxembourg 1994: 
The catalogue of services covered by the 
Health Insurance Funds is not allowed to 
differ, it is set by the Ministry of Health 
2004: 
The catalogue of services covered by the 
Health Insurance Funds is not allowed to 
differ, it is set by the Ministry of Health 
Netherlands 1995: 
The basic catalogue of medical services 
covered is not allowed to differ among 
Health Insurance Funds 
An exemption are Supplementary Insurance 
2004: 
The basic catalogue of medical services 
covered is not allowed to differ among Health 
Insurance Funds 
An exemption are Supplementary Insurance 
New Zealand 1995: 
The catalogue of medical services covered is 
not allowed to differ 
Remark: 
The medical services covered differ among 
Regional Health Authorities due to 
availability 
2004: 
While the overall catalogue of services is 
similar, the medical services covered and 
offered actually differ among District Health 
Boards due to availability. 
Norway 1995: 
The medical services covered actually differ 
among counties and municipalities due to 
availability of infrastructure. If the service 
cannot be provided in one county/ 
municipality, the patient is sent in a 
neighboring district 
2004: 
The medical services covered actually differ 
among counties and municipalities due to 
availability of infrastructure. If the service 
cannot be provided in one county/ 
municipality, the patient is sent in a 
neighboring district 
Portugal 1995: 
There is no official catalogues of medical 
services covered. What services are actually 
available may differ among regions, but 
factually all RHA cover the same medical 
services 
Remark: 
The coverage of the subsistemas varies, but 
there citizens have only a choice as to 
participate or not. If they become member, 
they are assigned to a subsistema by 
occupation. 
2004: 
There is no official catalogues of medical 
services covered. What services are actually 
available may differ among regions, but 
factually all RHA cover the same medical 
services 
Remark: 
The coverage of the subsistemas varies, but 
there citizens have only a choice as to 
participate or not. If they become member, 
they are assigned to a subsistema by 
occupation. 
Poland 1995: 
The catalogue of services covered is not 
allowed to differ among municipalities and 
regions. 
Remark: 
There was no official catalogue, availability 
could differ. 
2004: 
The catalogue of services covered cannot 
differ, since there is only one Health 
Insurance Fund 
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Does for instance a certain Health Insurance Fund cover medical services which are not 
covered by another Health Insurance Fund?  
Does the Health Authority in one region offer medical services, which are not offered in 
another region? 
Spain 1995: 
Catalogues of covered services are not 
allowed to differ among regions. Factually, 
the availability differs among regions 
2004: 
While not allowed to differ, catalogues of 
covered services still differ to some degree 
among regions due to differences in 
availability 
Sweden 1995: 
The medical services covered and covered 
actually differ among the Landstings; but 
only to a small degree and due to availability 
and waiting times 
2004: 
The medical services covered and covered 
actually differ among the Landstings; but only 
to a small degree and due to availability and 
waiting times 
Switzerland 1995: 
The catalogue of medical services covered is 
allowed to differ among HIFs 
Remark: 
The government set a minimum catalogue, 
the HIF had some leeway to cover more 
services. 
2004: 
The catalogue of medical services covered is 
not allowed to differ 
Remark: 
Since 1996, the catalogues of services 
covered are no longer allowed to differ among 
HIFs 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The medical services offered by the Health 
Authorities differ but for minor services only. 
Usually, the contracts between the DAH and 
the individual Hospital specify no positive 
list of services 
Remark: 
There occur differences in availability and 
waiting times among different DHA 
2004: 
The medical services offered by the Health 
Authorities differ but for minor services only. 
Usually, the contracts between the DAH and 
the individual Hospital specify no positive list 
of services 
Remark: 
There occur differences in availability and 
waiting times among different DHA 
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HIF7  Is it possible that the same Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority offers different 
packages of contributions and covered services to the insured?  
An example would be that the patient agrees to go to the general practitioner first, before 
visiting a specialists and pays a lower contribution in return.  
Another example would be, that the patient agrees to pay out of pocket for certain services 
and has to pay a lower contribution in return. 
Austria 1995:  
No; citizens do not have the choice among 
different packages of services and 
contributions 
2004:  
No; citizens do not have the choice among 
different packages of services and 
contributions 
Belgium 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No  
Canada 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Czech Republic 1995 
No 
2004: 
No 
Denmark 1995:  
Yes, people can chose having more choice 
and no gatekeeping at a higher price ( type 2 
insured, about 2 % of the population) 
2004:  
Yes, people can chose having more choice 
and no gatekeeping at a higher price ( type 2 
insured, about 2 % of the population) 
Finland 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
There are no packages of contributions and 
services covered. 
2004: 
No  
Remark: 
There are no packages of contributions and 
services covered. 
France 1995:  
Not for the Mandatory Health Insurance 
2004:  
Since 2004, accepting gatekeeping leads to 
lower contributions for the insured 
Germany 1995: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, some Health Insurance Funds offer 
models with a deductible and gatekeeping in 
exchange for lower contributions 
Greece 1995: 
No; neither the Health Insurance Funds nor 
the ESY offer different packages of 
contributions and services to choose from 
Remark: 
Only the VHI does offer different packages, 
but this does not concern the main health 
system 
2004: 
No; neither the Health Insurance Funds nor 
the ESY offer different packages of 
contributions and services to choose from 
Hungary 1995: 
No; the NHIFA does not offer different 
packages of contributions and services to 
choose from 
2004: 
No; the NHIFA does not offer different 
packages of contributions and services to 
choose from 
Ireland 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
The system is tax financed, there is no 
package of coverage and contribution, apart 
from the supplementary insurance (VHI) 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
The system is tax financed, there is no 
package of coverage and contribution, apart 
from the supplementary insurance by the VHI
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HIF7  Is it possible that the same Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority offers different 
packages of contributions and covered services to the insured?  
An example would be that the patient agrees to go to the general practitioner first, before 
visiting a specialists and pays a lower contribution in return.  
Another example would be, that the patient agrees to pay out of pocket for certain services 
and has to pay a lower contribution in return. 
Italy 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Netherlands 1995:  
No 
2004:  
Yes, the patient can chose varying amounts of 
co-payments.  
New Zealand 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
The system is tax-financed, there is no 
individual level bundle of contribution and 
coverage 
2004:  
No 
Remark: 
The system is tax-financed, there is no 
individual level bundle of contribution and 
coverage  
Norway 1995:  
No 
Remark: 
There are no identifiable contributions going 
into health care. There are no “packages” of 
services and contributions. 
2004:  
No 
Remark: 
There are no identifiable contributions going 
into health care. There are no “packages” of 
services and contributions. 
Portugal 1995. 
No  
 
Remark: 
The health system is funded from general 
taxation and publicly provided to all 
residents. There are no identifiable 
contributions going to the RHA or in the 
health system.  
2004: 
No  
 
Remark: 
The health system is funded from general 
taxation and publicly provided to all residents. 
There are no identifiable contributions going 
to the RHA or in the health system. 
Poland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Spain 1995: 
No for the INSALUD 
Remark: 
The health system is tax financed, there are 
no individual contributions comparable to a 
health insurance premium or an earmarked 
tax. 
2004: 
No for the NHS 
Remark: 
The health system is tax financed, there are no 
individual contributions comparable to a 
health insurance premium or an earmarked 
tax. 
Sweden 1995. 
No 
 
Remark: 
While there is a range of patient fees payable, 
for which exemptions are granted, there is no 
system of e.g. accepting gatekeeping and 
paying lower contributions and co-payments. 
2004: 
No 
 
Remark: 
While there is a range of patient fees payable, 
for which exemptions are granted, there is no 
system of e.g. accepting gatekeeping and 
paying lower contributions and co-payments 
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HIF7  Is it possible that the same Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority offers different 
packages of contributions and covered services to the insured?  
An example would be that the patient agrees to go to the general practitioner first, before 
visiting a specialists and pays a lower contribution in return.  
Another example would be, that the patient agrees to pay out of pocket for certain services 
and has to pay a lower contribution in return. 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, a Health Insurance Fund may offer 
different packages to the Insured 
Remark: 
This concerns in particular the deductible. 
Patients may agree to pay out of pocket for 
health up to a higher limit, and pay lower 
contribution in exchange. Some HIF also 
offer additional packages on private terms. 
2004: 
Yes, a Health Insurance Fund may offer 
different packages  
Remark: 
Since the catalogue of services may no longer 
differ, this concerns only the deductible. 
Patients may agree to pay out of pocket for 
health up to a higher limit, and pay lower 
contribution in exchange. Some HIF also 
offer additional packages on private terms. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
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HIF8  In some countries, the citizen can obtain a bonus if they participate in preventive 
health checks on a regular basis.  
Examples of such bonus programs are a reduced contribution rate, a repayment or lower co-
payments. Are there bonus / malus programs? 
Austria 1995:  
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
related to the participation in preventive 
health checks etc.  
2004:  
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
related to the participation in preventive 
health checks etc. 
Belgium 1995. 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
related to the participation in preventive 
health checks etc. 
2004:  
Yes, there is a bonus if the patient participates 
in preventive check-ups, for instance in dental 
care 
Canada 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Denmark 1995:  
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004:  
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Finland 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
France 1995:  
Yes, a bonus system for dental care for 
children and adolescents up to 18 years 
2004:  
Yes, a bonus system for dental care for 
children and adolescents up to 18 years 
Germany 1995 
Yes, there is a bonus system but only for 
dental care 
2004: 
Yes, for dental care. More recently there are 
some programs addressing weight reduction 
and smoking behavior 
Greece 1995: 
No, neither Health Insurance Funds nor the 
ESY have bonus nor malus regulations 
related to the participation in preventive 
health checks etc. 
2004: 
No, neither Health Insurance Funds nor the 
ESY have bonus nor malus regulations related 
to the participation in preventive health 
checks etc. 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, there is a malus, if the patient does not 
participate in preventive health checks 
2004: 
Yes, there is a malus, if the patient does not 
participate in preventive health checks 
Ireland 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Italy 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Yes, a bonus system for dental care leading 
to a lower co-payment 
2004: 
Yes, a bonus system for dental care leading to 
a lower co-payment 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, since 1995 for dental care  
2004: 
Yes, for dental care 
New Zealand 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Norway 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Portugal 1995:  
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
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HIF8  In some countries, the citizen can obtain a bonus if they participate in preventive 
health checks on a regular basis.  
Examples of such bonus programs are a reduced contribution rate, a repayment or lower co-
payments. Are there bonus / malus programs? 
Poland 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Spain 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus in related to the 
participation to preventive health checks etc 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus in related to the 
participation to preventive health checks etc 
Sweden 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
Switzerland 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
2004: 
No, neither bonus nor malus regulations 
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HIF9   Is there a Financial Equalization among different Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities?  
E.g. are Funds are taken from one Health Insurance Fund/ Health Authority and given to 
another one? Or are state subsidies and budgets distributed according to need? 
Austria 1995:  
Yes, but not substantial 
2004:  
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
the Health Insurance Funds 
Belgium 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
the Health Insurance Funds;  
Remark: 
The Equalization is done via the INAMI, 
which collects the contributions and 
distributes them to the HIF according to a 
capitation system. This system takes into 
account the structure of persons insured by 
the HIF, but is still strongly based on the 
historical budget and needs.  
Before 1994, the equalization was even 
stronger, based on the need, i.e. the expenses 
of the funds. The socialist HIFs (mainly 
workers) usually received more funds, the 
Christian HIFs (mainly while collar 
employees) less 
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
the Health Insurance Funds;  
Remark: 
The Equalization is done via the INAMI, 
which collects the contributions and 
distributes them to the HIF according to a 
capitation system. This system takes into 
account the structure of persons insured by 
the HIF. While still based on funds required 
in the past, the equalization is increasingly 
based on the demographic structure of the 
HIFs. 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization 
Remark: 
There is an equalization among the provinces 
by way of central government grants. There 
is also an equalization among RHA within a 
province by allocating funds from the 
provincial government to the RHA according 
to need 
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization 
Remark: 
There is an equalization among the provinces 
by way of central government grants. There is 
also an equalization among RHA within a 
province by allocating funds from the 
provincial government to the RHA according 
to need 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
60% of the allocation of funds is based on 
age-based capitation. The General Health 
Insurance Fund receives 3 times the standard 
capitation for an insured aged over 60.  
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
The allocation of funds is based on age-based 
capitation. The General Health Insurance 
Fund receives 3 times the standard capitation 
for an insured aged over 60. 
Denmark 1995:  
Yes 
Remark: 
Government subsidies to counties, Amter, 
depend on objective criteria like the taxable 
income of the citizens and the “need” of an 
Amter 
2004:  
Yes 
Remark: 
Government subsidies to counties, Amter, 
depend on objective criteria like the taxable 
income of the citizens and the “need” of an 
Amter 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, there is some equalization among the 
2004: 
Yes, there is some equalization among the 
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HIF9   Is there a Financial Equalization among different Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities?  
E.g. are Funds are taken from one Health Insurance Fund/ Health Authority and given to 
another one? Or are state subsidies and budgets distributed according to need? 
municipalities.  
Remark: 
The equalization operates by a system of 
state subsidies from the central government 
to the municipalities. 
In addition to this, the joint financing of 
Hospitals by several municipalities has an 
equalizing effect. 
municipalities.  
Remark: 
The equalization operates by a system of state 
subsidies from the central government to the 
municipalities. 
In addition to this, the joint financing of 
Hospitals by several municipalities has an 
equalizing effect. 
France 1995:  
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
2004:  
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
Germany 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
Funds are take from one HIF, and transferred 
via the Risk Equalization Fund to other HIFs 
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds;  
Remark: 
Funds are take from one HIF, and transferred 
via the Risk Equalization Fund to other HIFs 
Greece 1995: 
No, there is no financial equalization among 
HIF, but since the contributions may differ, a 
HIF can apply at the Government for higher 
contribution rates to cover higher 
expenditure. 
Regarding the ESY, there is no equalization 
among the regional branches of the ESY. The 
funds are funds allocated from the central 
government to the ESY 
2004: 
No, there is no financial equalization among 
HIF, but since the contributions may differ, a 
HIF can apply at the Government for higher 
contribution rates to cover higher expenditure.
Regarding the ESY, there is no equalization 
among the regional branches of the ESY. The 
funds are funds allocated from the central 
government to the ESY 
Hungary 1995: 
No, there no equalization, since there is only 
one HIF 
2004: 
No, there no equalization, since there is only 
one HIF 
Ireland 1995: 
No, there is no formal financial equalization 
among the Health Boards 
Remark: 
The budgets are negotiated between the 
Department of Health and the Health Board. 
Here, need and the previous budget is 
important 
2004: 
No, there is no formal financial equalization 
within the Health Service Executive 
Remark: 
The budgets are negotiated between the 
Department of Health and the Health Board. 
Here, need and the previous budget is 
important 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, there is a substantial financial 
equalization.  
Remark: 
There is a equalization among regions, by 
allocating funds from the national level to the 
regional level and by a National Solidarity 
Fund, which is distributing additional 
subsidizes to the regions. At the lower level, 
2004: 
Yes, there is a substantial financial 
equalization.  
Remark: 
There is a equalization among regions, by 
allocating funds from the national level to the 
regional level and by a National Solidarity 
Fund, which is distributing additional 
subsidizes to the regions. At the lower level, 
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HIF9   Is there a Financial Equalization among different Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities?  
E.g. are Funds are taken from one Health Insurance Fund/ Health Authority and given to 
another one? Or are state subsidies and budgets distributed according to need? 
there is an equalization between the ASL: a 
risk adjustment takes into account the age 
composition covered by the different ASLs 
there is an equalization between the ASL: a 
risk adjustment takes into account the age 
composition covered by the different ASLs 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
Remark: 
Despite the different branches, there is 
basically just one HIF. The insurance 
contributions are paid to the Association of 
the HIFs, the UCM, which is paying the 
patients back their expenses.  
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
Despite the different branches, there is 
basically just one HIF. The insurance 
contributions are paid to the Association of 
the HIFs, the UCM, which is paying the 
patients back their expenses. 
Netherlands 1995:  
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
The equalization operates via a central fund 
which is administering about 2/3rds of the 
contributions and distributes these funds to 
the individual HIF according to their risk-
structure. 
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
The equalization operates via a central fund 
which is administering about 2/3rds of the 
contributions and distributes these funds to 
the individual HIF according to their risk-
structure. 
New Zealand 1995: 
Yes, there is financial equalization among the 
Regional Health Authorities  
Remark: 
The allocation of funds to the Regional 
Health Authorities was based on historical 
budgets and need 
2004: 
Yes, there is a financial equalization among 
the District Health Boards. 
Remark: 
While the allocation of funds to the District 
Health Boards is getting more population-
based, it is still adapted to the need. 
Norway 1995: 
Yes, there is a substantial equalization among 
the counties and municipalities 
Remark: 
Counties and municipalities are financed by 
the central government. The grants are not 
earmarked and are allocated according to 
need.  
2004: 
Yes, there is a substantial equalization among 
the counties and municipalities 
Remark: 
Counties and municipalities are financed by 
the central government. The grants are not 
earmarked and are allocated according to 
need. The equalization takes into account 
characteristics of the population. 
Portugal 1995: 
No, there is no financial equalization among 
the Regional Health Administrations.  
Remark: 
Funds are not allocated to the RHA 
according to risks. The budget allocated to a 
RHA is based on the historical budget, with 
some elements of capitation 
2004: 
Yes, there is some financial equalization 
among the Regional Health Administrations, 
but not substantial 
Remark: 
Since 1995, the capitation component in the 
allocation of funds to the RHA was extended 
and was also based on factors like age, sex 
and disease burden. The magnitude of this 
equalization is small. In the late 90s, there 
was a small episode of risk based allocation of 
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HIF9   Is there a Financial Equalization among different Health Insurance Funds / Health 
Authorities?  
E.g. are Funds are taken from one Health Insurance Fund/ Health Authority and given to 
another one? Or are state subsidies and budgets distributed according to need? 
funds to Regional Health Administrations, but 
it was short lived 
Poland 1995 
No, there is no financial equalization among 
the Local / Regional Health Administrations. 
Remark: 
The allocation of funds to the local / regional 
administrations in charge of organizing 
health care was based on needs. 
2004: 
There is only one Health Insurance Fund, and 
equalization takes place within this Fund, 
among regional branches 
Spain 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
the regional branches of the INSALUD 
Remark:  
The Allocation of funds is oriented at the 
need and the past budgets. The funding of the 
Regions (Autonomous Communities) which 
were already in charge of health provision, 
was basically negotiated between the Central 
Government and the Autonomous 
Communities.  
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
the Autonomous communities. 
Remark: 
The allocation of funds for the Regions 
(Autonomous Communities) is based on 
population, insularity etc. Budgets are 
assigned accordingly. It is still much of a 
bargaining. A Cohesion Fund, funded by the 
Central Government, is installed to subsidize 
the flow of patients among regions. 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
the Landstings 
Remark: 
The grants by the central government are 
allocated according to need 
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
the Landstings 
Remark: 
The grants by the central government are 
allocated according to need 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization among 
health insurance funds 
Remark: 
Funds are transferred from HIF with a 
favorable risk structure to funds with a 
unfavorable risk structure.  
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization by 
budget allocation from the Department of 
Health to the District Health Authorities, 
which is based on past budgets and need 
2004: 
Yes, there is substantial equalization by 
budget allocation from the Department of 
Health to the Health Authorities which is 
based on past budgets and need 
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HIF10   If a Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority realizes a surplus, who decides on 
what is done with the surplus? 
Austria 1995:  
The Health Insurance Fund itself 
2004:  
The Health Insurance Fund itself 
Belgium 1995: 
The Health Insurance Fund itself; a surplus is 
bound to cover previous deficits.  
Remark: 
The state sets requirements for minimum 
reserves. If these requirements are not met, 
surplus goes into the reserves.  
2004: 
The Health Insurance Fund itself; a surplus is 
bound to cover previous deficits.  
Remark: 
The state sets requirements for minimum 
reserves. If these requirements are not met, 
surplus goes into the reserves. 
Canada 1995: 
The Provincial Government itself decides on 
the usage of a surplus.  
The RHA itself decides on the usage of a 
surplus 
2004: 
The Provincial Government itself decides on 
the usage of a surplus.  
The RHA itself decides on the usage of a 
surplus 
Czech Republic 1995: 
The Health Insurance Fund itself 
 
Remark: 
This is a formality only. By law, each HIF 
must put a surplus in a “Reserve Fund”.  
2004: 
The Health Insurance Fund itself 
 
Remark: 
This is a formality only. By law, each HIF 
must put a surplus in a “Reserve Fund”. 
Denmark 1995:  
The Health Authority, Amter, itself 
Remark:  
This is never the case 
2004:  
The Health Authority, i.e. the Amter  
Finland 1995: 
The Municipality, of which the Health 
Authority is part 
2004: 
The Municipality, of which the Health 
Authority is part 
France 1995: 
The state 
2004: 
The state 
Germany 1995: 
The Health Insurance Fund 
 
Remark:  
By law, a surplus has to be used to lower the 
contributions or to repay debts incurred in 
earlier periods. Further, persisting surpluses 
are transferred to Health Insurance Funds 
which are indebted via the Risk-
Equalization-Fund 
2004: 
The Health Insurance Fund  
 
Remark:  
By law, a surplus has to be used to lower the 
contributions or to repay debts incurred in 
earlier periods. Further, persisting surpluses 
are transferred to Health Insurance Funds 
which are indebted via the Risk-Equalization 
Fund 
Greece 1995: 
If the HIF realizes a surplus, the HIF may 
decide on its usage, but the state, i.e. the 
Central Government, has also influence. 
The state decides on the usage of a surplus of 
the regional branches of the ESY 
Remark: 
This is hypothetical, there never is any 
surplus 
2004: 
If the HIF realizes a surplus, the HIF may 
decide on its usage, but the state, i.e. the 
Central Government, has also influence. 
The state decides on the usage of a surplus of 
the regional branches of the ESY 
Remark: 
This is hypothetical, there never is any surplus
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HIF10   If a Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority realizes a surplus, who decides on 
what is done with the surplus? 
Hungary 1995: 
If the NHIFA realizes a surplus, it is formally 
entitled to decide on its usage, but the state, 
i.e. the Central Government, has also 
influence. 
2004: 
If the NHIFA realizes a surplus, it is formally 
entitled to decide on its usage, but the state, 
i.e. the Central Government, has also 
influence. 
Ireland 1995: 
The Health Board, but the Central 
Government has some say 
2004: 
The Health Board, but the Central 
Government has some say 
Italy 1995: 
The Heath Authority, i.e. the ASL, itself 
2004:  
The Heath Authority, i.e. the ASL, itself 
Luxembourg 1994: 
The HIF has to use the surplus to lower the 
contribution level 
Remark:  
The HIFs annual budget has to be balanced. 
There is a financial reserve required, which 
may fluctuate from 10 to 20% of the annual 
expenditure. If current expenditure levels 
make the reserve drop out of this range, the 
HIFs have either to increase the contributions 
ore to restrict the provision of services 
2004: 
the HIF has to use the surplus to lower the 
contribution level  
Remark:  
The HIFs annual budget has to be balanced. 
There is a financial reserve required, which 
may fluctuate from 10 to 20% of the annual 
expenditure. If current expenditure levels 
make the reserve drop out of this range, the 
HIFs have either to increase the contributions 
ore to restrict the provision of services 
Netherlands 1995:  
The Health Insurance Fund itself 
2004: 
The Health Insurance Fund itself 
New Zealand 1995: 
The Regional Health Board but in 
consultation with the Ministry of Health 
2004: 
The District Health Board but in consultation 
with the Ministry of Health 
Norway 1995:  
The county council / municipality would 
decide, but this is never the case.  
2004: 
The central government would decide, but 
this is never the case. 
Portugal 1995: 
The Central Government which is controlling 
the RHA  
2004: 
The Central Government which is controlling 
the RHA 
Poland 1995: 
The local Health Authority itself. 
Remark: 
Within a fiscal year, the Health Authority 
was free to decide on how to use funds not 
yet used. By the end of the year, a surplus 
had to be transferred back to the central 
government  
2004: 
The National Health Fund can decide but only 
subject to approval of the Minister of Finance 
Spain 1995 
The central government controlling the 
INSALUD would decide on the usage, 
however, this situation does not occur 
2004: 
The regional government controlling the SRS 
would decide on the usage, however, this 
situation does not occur 
Sweden 1995: 
The Landstings themselves 
2004: 
The Landstings themselves 
Switzerland 1995: 
The Health Insurance Fund itself,  
Remark:  
2004: 
The Health Insurance Fund 
Remark:  
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what is done with the surplus? 
A surplus has to be used to lower the 
contributions, to repay debts incurred in 
earlier periods or to increase the reserves up 
to the limit set by the Central Government. 
A surplus has to be used to lower the 
contributions, to repay debts incurred in 
earlier periods or to increase the reserves up 
to the limit set by the Central Government. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The District Health Authority itself  
Remark:  
Factually, this is never the case 
2004: 
The Health Authority itself 
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HIF11   If a deficit arises for a Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority (because the 
available funds are not sufficient to cover the expenditure in a period.)  
Is this deficit covered? For instance by the state or some other institution? 
Austria 1995:  
Formally no 
Remark: 
The deficit is covered to some extent by a 
steering institution of the Health Insurance 
Funds 
2004:  
Formally no 
Remark:  
To some extent, a deficit is covered by a 
steering institution of the Health Insurance 
Funds 
Belgium 
Yes, the deficit is factually covered by the 
INAMI 
Remark: 
Despite more financial responsibility of the 
funds introduced in 1995, deficits are 
covered by the INAMI; if the overall deficit 
is larger than 2% of the HIF’s budget, it is 
covered completely by the social security 
2004: 
Yes, the deficit is factually covered by the 
INAMI 
Remark 
While financial responsibility was further 
increased, the HIF has not to cover the deficit, 
if it is “not responsible” for the deficit. At 
maximum, it has to cover 2% of the deficit. 
Canada1995: 
Deficits of the Provinces are not covered, 
they have to be equalized by other forms of 
income, higher taxation or become a debt 
The deficit of a RHA is covered by the 
provincial government. Some RHA are 
explicitly allowed to run debts 
2004: 
Deficits of the Provinces are not covered, they 
have to be equalized by other forms of 
income, higher taxation or become a debt 
The deficit of a RHA is covered by the 
provincial government. Some RHA are 
explicitly allowed to run debts 
Czech Republic 1995: 
The state covers the deficit of the General 
Health Insurance Fund. Deficits of the other 
HIF are not covered. 
Remark: 
Smaller HIF which go bankrupt are dissolved 
and their insured are transferred to the 
General Health Insurance Fund (covering 
68% of the population). The state covers the 
deficits of this HIF. 
2004: 
The state covers the deficit of the General 
Health Insurance Fund. Deficits of the other 
HIF are not covered. 
Remark: 
Smaller HIF which go bankrupt are dissolved 
and their insured are transferred to the 
General Health Insurance Fund. The state 
covers the deficits of this HIF. 
Denmark 1995:  
While the deficit of an Amter isn’t covered, 
the grant from the central government will be 
adapted in the next period to cover the 
expenses 
2004: 
While the deficit of an Amter isn’t covered, 
the grant from the central government will be 
adapted in the next period to cover the 
expenses 
Finland 1995: 
The Municipality, of which the Health 
Authority is part, covers the deficit. The 
Municipalities’ deficit in turn is not covered 
2004: 
The Municipality, of which the Health 
Authority is part, covers the deficit. The 
Municipalities’ deficit in turn is not covered 
France 1995:  
The state covers the deficit of HIF 
2004: 
The state covers the deficit of HIF 
Germany 1995: 
No, deficits are not covered, the Health 
Insurance Fund either have to make debts or 
have to increase the level of contributions. 
2004: 
No, deficits are not covered, the Health 
Insurance Fund either have to make debts or 
have to increase the level of contributions. 
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available funds are not sufficient to cover the expenditure in a period.)  
Is this deficit covered? For instance by the state or some other institution? 
Remark:  
In the long run, the deficit will either be 
covered by transfers from the Risk-
Equalization Fund or the Health Insurance 
Fund will merge with another one 
Remark:  
In the long run, the deficit will either be 
covered by transfers from the Risk-
Equalization Fund or the Health Insurance 
Fund will merge with another one 
Greece 1995: 
If the ESY or a regional branch of the ESY 
or a Health Insurance Fund realizes a deficit, 
the state, i.e. the Central Government, will 
cover the deficit  
Remark: 
This will take the form of a subsidy, a higher 
budget or the approval to increase the 
contribution levels in the case of the HIF. 
Deficits may persist for a long time. 
2004: 
If the ESY or a regional branch of the ESY or 
a Health Insurance Fund realizes a deficit, the 
state, i.e. the Central Government, will cover 
the deficit 
Remark: 
This will take the form of a subsidy, a higher 
budget or the approval to increase the 
contribution levels in the case of the HIF. 
Deficits may persist for a long time. 
Hungary 1995: 
Yes, a deficit of the NHIFA is covered by the 
state 
2004: 
Yes, a deficit of the NHIFA is covered by the 
state 
Ireland 1995:  
Yes, it is covered by the state 
2004: 
Yes, it is covered by the state 
Italy 1995: 
A deficit of a ASL is covered by the regional 
government, but there are conditions attached 
to this, which aim at avoiding another deficit 
in the future 
 
Remark: 
The ASL, as well as Hospital-trusts, may to 
some degree contract loans. The coverage of 
the deficit is by allocating larger budgets in 
the next period. The region itself does not use 
its own resources, but extracts money from 
the national government 
2004: 
A deficit of a ASL is covered by the regional 
government, but there are conditions attached 
to this, which aim at avoiding another deficit 
in the future 
 
Remark: 
The ASL, as well as Hospital-trusts, may to 
some degree contract loans. The coverage of 
the deficit is by allocating larger budgets in 
the next period. The region itself does not use 
its own resources, but extracts money from 
the national government 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No, deficits are not covered 
 
Remark:  
The HIFs annual budget has to be balanced. 
There is a financial reserve required, which 
may fluctuate from 10 to 20% of the annual 
expenditure. If current expenditure levels 
make the reserve drop out of this range, the 
HIFs have either to increase the contributions 
ore to restrict the provision of services 
2004: 
No, deficits are not covered 
 
Remark:  
The HIFs annual budget has to be balanced. 
There is a financial reserve required, which 
may fluctuate from 10 to 20% of the annual 
expenditure. If current expenditure levels 
make the reserve drop out of this range, the 
HIFs have either to increase the contributions 
ore to restrict the provision of services 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, the difference between a HIFs income 
and its expenditure it is covered by the 
Central Fund 
2004: 
Yes, the difference between a HIFs income 
and its expenditure it is covered by the 
Central Fund 
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available funds are not sufficient to cover the expenditure in a period.)  
Is this deficit covered? For instance by the state or some other institution? 
New Zealand 1995: 
The deficit of a RHA is covered by the state 
Remark: 
Usually, this is done by allocating a larger 
budget in the long run 
2004: 
No the deficit is not covered; the DHB may 
obtain a loan from the Government, which has 
to be repaid later on 
Norway 1995: 
Deficits of counties and municipalities are 
covered by the central government. 
Remark: 
Deficits of hospitals operated by the counties 
are factually covered by the Central 
Government. The grants from the central 
government are not earmarked. If they are 
not sufficient, the grant usually will be 
increased to cover the expenditure.  
2004: 
Deficits of counties and municipalities are 
covered by the central government. 
Remark: 
Deficits of hospitals are factually covered by 
the Central Government, which is now in 
charge of them. The same is true for deficits 
of a municipality. The grants from the central 
government to lower levels of government are 
not earmarked. If they are not sufficient, the 
grant usually will be increased to cover the 
expenditure. 
Portugal 1995: 
Deficits of Regional Health Administrations 
are covered by the Central Government 
2004: 
Deficits of Regional Health Administrations 
are covered by the Central Government 
Poland 1995: 
A deficit of a Local Health Authority would 
be covered by the state 
Remark: 
Deficits in the form of a loan were forbidden.
2004: 
A deficit of the National Health Fund would 
be covered by the state 
Spain 1995 
Deficits of Regional INSALUD branches are 
covered by the Central Government 
2004: 
Deficits of Servicios Regional de Salud the 
regional health authorities are covered by the 
government of the Autonomous 
Communities; in part by regional extra taxes   
Sweden 1995. 
A Landsting’s deficit is not covered 
Remark: 
It has to increase local taxes. 
2004: 
A Landsting’s deficit is not covered 
Remark: 
It has to increase local taxes. 
Switzerland 1995: 
No, deficits are not covered, the Health 
Insurance Funds either have to make debts or 
have to increase the level of contributions. 
Remark: 
Each HIF has to have a reserve fund up to a 
level set by the Central Government, which 
are for covering deficits.  
2004: 
No, deficits are not covered, the Health 
Insurance Funds either have to make debts or 
have to increase the level of contributions. 
Remark: 
Each HIF has to have a reserve fund up to a 
level set by the Central Government, which 
are for covering deficits. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, the deficit of a Health Authority is 
covered. 
Remark: 
It is covered by the state by allocating a 
larger budget in the next period. 
2004: 
Yes, the deficit of a Health Authority is 
covered. 
Remark: 
It is covered by the state by allocating a larger 
budget in the next period. 
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HIF12   How is the top level administration of the Health Insurance Fund /Health Authority 
determined? The term “top-level management” in particular refers to who represents the 
Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority to the outside and conducts negotiations. 
Austria 1995: 
The top-level management is determined by 
the Health Insurance Fund itself 
2004:  
By the Health Insurance Fund itself  
 
Belgium 1995: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
2004:  
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
Canada 1995: 
The administration of the Regional Health 
Authority is determined by the Provincial 
Government.  
The Provincial Government itself is elected 
on provincial level. 
2004: 
The administration of the Regional Health 
Authority is determined by the Provincial 
Government 
The Provincial Government itself is elected 
on provincial level. 
Czech Republic 1995:  
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
Remark: 
Factually, by the state. In all HIF, the state is 
represented directly or by appointed 
representatives in the boards which make 
plans or execute them.  
The supervisory board of a HIF is composed 
of representatives of the state, the employers 
and the trade unions. The Board then 
appoints the top-level management, i.e. the 
director.  
For the GHIF, the biggest HIF the 
Government appoints the Director General.  
2004: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
Remark: 
Factually, by the state. In all HIF, the state is 
represented directly or by appointed 
representatives in the boards which make 
plans or execute them.  
The supervisory board of a HIF is composed 
of representatives of the state, the employers 
and the trade unions. The Board then appoints 
the top-level management, i.e. the director.  
For the GHIF, the biggest HIF the 
Government appoints the Director General 
directly. 
Denmark 1995:  
The Health Authority is the county council, 
Amter, which consists of elected politicians 
2004:  
The Health Authority is the county 
government, Amter, consisting of elected 
politicians 
Finland 1995: 
The Municipality, of which the Health 
Authority is part, determines the top level 
executive of the Health Authority. The 
Municipalities’ government itself is elected 
2004: 
The Municipality, of which the Health 
Authority is part, determines the top level 
executive of the Health Authority. The 
Municipalities’ government itself is elected 
France 1995:  
By the state 
Remark: 
Some members of an individual HIF’s 
executive board are determined by the state, 
others are determined by the employers and 
the employees. 
2004:  
By the state. In particular the director of the 
UNCAM, in charge of negotiating with 
providers, is determined by the state 
Remark: 
Some members are determined by the state, 
others are determined by the employers and 
the employees. 
Germany 1995: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself, formally 
by elections of the insured 
Remark:  
The insured determine some members by 
2004: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself, formally 
by elections of the insured 
Remark:  
The insured determine some members by 
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determined? The term “top-level management” in particular refers to who represents the 
Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority to the outside and conducts negotiations. 
elections, others are determined by the 
employer organizations and trade unions. 
elections, others are determined by the 
employer organizations and trade unions. 
Greece 1995: 
The top level executive of the ESY as well of 
the Health Insurance Funds is determined by 
the Central Government 
2004: 
The top level executive of the ESY as well of 
the Health Insurance Funds is determined by 
the Central Government 
Hungary 1995: 
The top level executive of the NHIFA is 
determined by the Government 
2004: 
The top level executive of the NHIFA is 
determined by the Government 
Ireland 1995: 
By the state  
2004: 
By the State (Central Government) 
Italy 1995: 
By the regional government 
Remark: 
The general manager of an ASL is appointed 
by the regional government for a five year 
term. The general manager in turn appoints 
the two senior managers, one of them is in 
charge of administrative questions, the other 
in charge of health matters 
2004:  
By the regional government 
Remark: 
The general manager of an ASL is appointed 
by the regional government for a five year 
term. The general manager in turn appoints 
the two senior managers, one of them is in 
charge of administrative questions, the other 
in charge of health matters  
Luxembourg 1994: 
The top level administration of the HIFs is 
determined partly internally, partly by the 
state 
Remark: 
The insured determine some members of the 
top-level administration by elections, others 
are determined by the employer 
organizations. One delegate is determined by 
the state. 
2004: 
The top level administration of the HIFs is 
determined partly internally, partly by the 
state 
Remark: 
The insured determine some members of the 
top-level administration by elections, others 
are determined by the employer organizations. 
One delegate is determined by the state. 
Netherlands 1995: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
2004: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
New Zealand 1995: 
The top-level executive of the Regional 
Health Authorities was appointed by the 
Central Government   
2004: 
The Central Government appoints the 
Chairperson of the District Health Board. The 
Chairperson then appoints the Chief 
Executive Officer of the District Health 
Board, who is in charge of the day-to-day 
operation.  
Remark: 
The board of a DHB consists of 7 members 
elected by the population of the district, and 4 
members appointed by the Central 
Government 
Norway 1995: 
Municipal Governments consist of locally 
elected politicians; and the Regional Health 
Authorities are part of the local government. 
2004: 
Municipal Governments consist of locally 
elected politicians; and the Regional Health 
Authorities are part of the local government. 
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determined? The term “top-level management” in particular refers to who represents the 
Health Insurance Fund / Health Authority to the outside and conducts negotiations. 
The NIS is controlled by the national 
government 
The NIS is controlled by the national 
government 
Portugal 1995: 
By the Central Government 
Remark: 
The national government determines the top-
administration of the Regional Health 
Administrations in the different regions.  
2004: 
By the Central Government 
Remark: 
The national government determines the top-
administration of the Regional Health 
Administrations in the different regions. 
Poland 1995: 
The administration of the Local Health 
Authority is determined by the municipal or 
regional government (gmina or voivodship) 
2004: 
The top level administration of the National 
Health Fund is determined by the state. 
Spain 1995: 
The top level administration of the 
INSALUD is appointed by the Central 
Government 
2004: 
The top level administration of the Servicio 
Regional de Salud is determined by the 
governments of the Autonomous 
Communities 
Sweden 1995: 
By the Landsting itself 
Remark: 
The Landsting itself is a politically elected 
body. It determines the board in charge of 
health provision in the Landsting 
2004: 
By the Landsting itself; the Landsting itself is 
a politically elected body 
Switzerland 1995: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
2004: 
By the Health Insurance Fund itself 
United Kingdom 1995: 
By the central government 
Remark: 
The Department of Health determines the 
chairperson of the DHA, which is in charge 
of the general direction of the DHA.  
2004: 
By the central government 
Remark: 
The Department of Health determines the 
chairperson of the DHA, which is in charge of 
the general direction of the DHA.  
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2. Purchasers and Providers of Medical Care 
 
CO1  Can the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities identify individual providers, e.g. 
individual GPs or Hospitals, who overspend? 
Austria 1995:  
Yes, for Hospitals but with no consequences; 
Yes, for GPs  
Remark: 
Further, the Physician’s association can 
identify providers and exert pressure. It does 
so, since overspending of one provider 
impacts negatively on the other providers’ 
income 
2004:  
Yes, for Hospitals but with no consequences;  
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
Further, the Physician’s association can 
identify providers and exert pressure. It does 
so, since overspending of one provider 
impacts negatively on the other providers’ 
income 
Belgium 1995. 
Yes, for Hospitals  
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
There is an extensive system of cost-
reimbursement, where bills are handed in by 
the patients. In these bills, services are listed. 
This also holds true for Hospitals, since the 
services provided there are also remunerated 
on a fee for service basis. 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals  
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
There is an extensive system of cost-
reimbursement, where bills are handed in by 
the patients. In these bills, services are listed. 
This also holds true for Hospitals, since the 
services provided there are also remunerated 
on a fee for service basis. 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals  
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
While operating costs of hospitals are 
financed by global budgets, the services 
provided in the Hospitals by independent 
providers are paid for on a fee for service 
basis. The Provincial Government receives 
bills from providers for services. 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
While operating costs of hospitals are 
financed by global budgets, the services 
provided in the Hospitals by independent 
providers are paid for on a fee for service 
basis. The Provincial Government receives 
bills from providers for services. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
The remuneration is done by an invoice 
system: each provider sends an invoice, 
listing all services and the sum of points to 
the HIF. The HIF then pays the financial 
value of a point to the provider. The system 
is identical for out-patient and in-patient care.
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
The remuneration is done by an invoice 
system: each provider sends an invoice, 
listing all services and the sum of points to the 
HIF. The HIF then pays the financial value of 
a point to the provider. The system is identical 
for out-patient and in-patient care 
Denmark 1995 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark:  
Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
Amter, which have cost control. GPs are 
contracted on a fee for service and capitation 
2004:  
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark:  
Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
Amter, which have cost control. GPs are 
contracted on a fee for service and capitation 
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individual GPs or Hospitals, who overspend? 
basis.  basis. 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
The Municipalities can identify GPs 
employed in the municipal health centers 
which overspend. In theory they can identify 
more expensive Hospitals, but in practice it is 
difficult to compare the prices and services 
offered by different hospitals. 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals;  
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
The Municipalities can identify GPs 
employed in the municipal health centers 
which overspend. In theory they can identify 
more expensive Hospitals, but in practice it is 
difficult to compare the prices and services 
offered by different hospitals. 
France 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
There is a system of billing for most services 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
There is a system of billing for most services 
Germany 1995: 
No for GPs; the Health Insurance Funds have 
only overall contracts with the regional 
Provider Organizations; it can identify 
regions which overspend. 
Yes for hospitals; the Health Insurance Funds 
see the per diem charged by a Hospital and 
can identify expensive hospitals 
Remark: 
The Physician’s association in charge of 
distributing the funds obtained by the HIFs 
can identify providers and exert pressure. It 
does so, since overspending of one provider 
impacts negatively on the other providers’ 
income 
2004: 
No for GPs; the Health Insurance Funds have 
only overall contracts with the regional 
Provider Organizations; it can identify regions 
which overspend. 
Yes for hospitals; the Health Insurance Funds 
see the per diem charged by a Hospital and 
can identify expensive hospitals 
Remark: 
The Physician’s association in charge of 
distributing the funds obtained by the HIFs 
can identify providers and exert pressure. It 
does so, since overspending of one provider 
impacts negatively on the other providers’ 
income 
Greece 1995 
No for GPs - neither the Health Insurance 
Funds nor the ESY can identify GPs which 
overspend. 
Yes for hospitals; the ESY, which is 
operating the hospitals, can identify hospitals 
which require more resources. 
2004: 
No for GPs - neither the Health Insurance 
Funds nor the ESY can identify GPs which 
overspend. 
Yes for hospitals, the ESY, which is operating 
the hospitals, can identify hospitals which 
require more resources. 
Hungary 1995: 
No, neither for GPs nor for Hospitals 
Remark: 
The NHIFA has the right to monitor 
performance reports. But the remuneration 
mode– capitation for GPs respectively the 
providers usually report the sum of the points 
for the services provided - give, little 
information to do so 
2004: 
No, neither for GPs nor for Hospitals 
Remark: 
The NHIFA has the right to monitor 
performance reports. But the remuneration 
mode– capitation for GPs respectively the 
providers usually report the sum of the points 
for the services provided - give, little 
information to do so 
Ireland 1995: 
Yes for hospitals 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
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individual GPs or Hospitals, who overspend? 
No for GPs 
Remark: 
This holds true for independent Hospitals as 
well as for Hospitals operated by the Health 
boards. Services by GPs are only subsidized, 
there is no billing.  
No for GPs 
Remark: 
This holds true for independent Hospitals as 
well as for Hospitals operated by the Health 
boards. Services by GPs are only subsidized, 
there is no billing. 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals  
Remark:  
In particular for those Hospitals operated by 
the ASL 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals  
Remark:  
In particular for those Hospitals operated by 
the ASL 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
2004: 
Yes, for GPs 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
New Zealand 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
There is an institution, the Health Benefits 
Limited, which collects and monitors data on 
payments made as subsidies to providers. It 
allows a control against frauds.  
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
There is an institution, the Health Benefits 
Limited, which collects and monitors data on 
payments made as subsidies to providers. It 
allows a control against frauds. 
Norway 1995: 
Yes for Hospitals 
Yes for GPs  
Remark: 
Hospitals are operated by the counties but 
receive a block grant. The counties can see if 
a hospital runs a deficit. GPs are contracted 
and receive a fee for service payment from 
the NIS. 
2004: 
Yes for Hospitals 
Yes for GPs  
Remark: 
Hospital’s remuneration is partly based on a 
DRG system, and the Hospital is giving 
information on the activity to the state, 
respectively the Regional Health Authorities. 
GPs are contracted and receive a fee for 
service payment by the NIS 
Portugal 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals – if a deficit accrues 
Yes for GPs and Health Centers 
Remark: 
Since there is no real purchaser provider split 
between the ARS and the providers, the 
control is internal, not operating by services 
billed by the provider. However, the 
information is treated just as a piece of 
information and usually has no consequences 
for the provider. 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals – e.g. if a deficit accrues 
Yes for GPs and Health Centers 
Remark: 
Since there is no real purchaser provider split, 
the control is internal, not operating by 
services billed by the provider. However, the 
information is treated just as a piece of 
information and usually has no consequences 
for the provider. 
Poland 1995: 
Most GPs were employed 
Gminas (municipalities) and Voivodships 
(regional governments) could identify 
hospitals which overspent. 
2004: 
The National Health Fund can identify both 
Hospitals and GPs who overspend 
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individual GPs or Hospitals, who overspend? 
Spain 1995: 
The INSALUD can identify both, Hospitals 
and GPs 
Remark: 
Only for those Hospitals, which are directly 
operated by the INSALUD and those GPs 
which are working for the INSALUD (the 
majority) 
2004: 
The Servicio Regional de Salud, SRS, can 
identify both, Hospitals and GPs 
Remark: 
Only for those Hospitals, which are directly 
operated by the SRS and those GPs which are 
working for the SRS (the majority) 
Sweden 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals (operated by the 
Landstings) 
Yes, for GPs (employed by the Landstings) 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals (operated by the 
Landstings) 
Yes, for GPs (employed by the Landstings) 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, for GPs 
2004: 
Yes, for GPs 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
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CO2   Do the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities have the possibility to exclude 
individual providers of medical services (individual physicians, Hospitals etc.) from the 
provision of medical services, if they significantly oversupply medical services, provide 
insufficient quality or work in an inefficient way?  
Austria 1995:  
No, neither hospitals nor GPs can be 
excluded 
Remark: 
Hospitals cannot be excluded; doctors can 
loose their treatment contracts only by 
offering insufficient quality. 
2004:  
Basically no; neither hospitals nor GPs can be 
excluded 
Remark: 
Hospitals cannot be excluded; doctors can 
loose their treatment contracts only by 
offering insufficient quality. 
Belgium 1995. 
No; neither Hospitals nor GPs can be 
excluded 
2004: 
No; neither Hospitals nor GPs can be 
excluded 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can be excluded.  
Remark: 
Hospitals however never are excluded, 
instead they get instructions on how to 
change their management. 
2004: 
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can be excluded.  
Remark:  
Hospitals however never are excluded, instead 
they get instructions on how to change their 
management. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can be excluded 
Remark: 
The HIF contract with providers, and 
factually not with all providers. Usually 
however, the contract is negotiated with the 
association of the provider for all members. 
2004: 
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can be excluded 
Remark: 
The HIF contract with providers, and 
factually not with all providers. Usually 
however, the contract is negotiated with the 
association of the provider and binding for all 
members. Selective contracting is being 
introduced, but not yet operative. 
Denmark 1995: 
No, neither Hospitals nor GPs can be 
excluded 
Remark:  
Physicians working in private practice can be 
excluded, but only under very extreme 
circumstances. Their turnover is monitored. 
Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
Amter, and cannot be excluded. 
2004:  
No, neither Hospitals nor GPs can be 
excluded 
Remark:  
Physicians working in private practice can be 
excluded, but only under very extreme 
circumstances. Their turnover is monitored. 
Hospitals are owned and operated by the 
Amter, and cannot be excluded. 
Finland 1995: 
Yes for hospitals 
Yes for GPs – if contracted 
Remark: 
The majority of GPs are employed by the 
municipal Health Centers, they can be given 
notice that they cause to high expenditure. 
Only contracted GPs can be excluded.  
The Municipality has some choice in which 
hospital district to join. 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals;  
Yes for GPs – if contracted 
Remark: 
The majority of GPs are employed by the 
municipal Health Centers, they can be given 
notice that they cause to high expenditure. 
Only contracted GPs can be excluded.  
Since 1999, the Municipality has some choice 
in which hospital district to join. However, 
there are limitations to do so due to 
geographical constraints.  
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individual providers of medical services (individual physicians, Hospitals etc.) from the 
provision of medical services, if they significantly oversupply medical services, provide 
insufficient quality or work in an inefficient way?  
France 1995:  
No  
2004:  
No  
Germany 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
GPs are not contracted individually, but the 
contract is between the GP association and 
the HIF. Since 1988, the HIFs can de-
contract Hospitals, but never did so.  
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
GPs are not contracted individually, but the 
contract is between the GP association and the 
HIF. Since 1988, the HIFs can de-contract 
Hospitals, but never did so. 
Greece 1995: 
No, neither the Health Insurance Funds nor 
the ESY can exclude GPs or public Hospitals 
from the provision of services 
Remark: 
Private Hospitals / providers or provider 
offering services on private terms can be 
excluded 
2004: 
No, neither the Health Insurance Funds nor 
the ESY can exclude GPs or public Hospitals 
from the provision of services 
Remark: 
Private Hospitals / providers or provider 
offering services on private terms can be 
excluded 
Hungary 1995: 
No for hospitals 
Yes, GPs can be excluded by decontracting 
Remark: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities or at County Level, by the 
county governments 
2004: 
No for hospitals 
Yes, GPs can be excluded by decontracting 
Remark: 
Most Hospitals are owned and operated by 
Municipalities or at County Level, by the 
county governments 
Ireland 1995: 
Yes, contracted Hospitals can be excluded 
Yes for GPs which are contracted 
Remark: 
Only contracted hospitals can be de-
contracted; about half of the hospitals are run 
by the health boards and cannot be excluded. 
About 2/3 of all GPs have a contract with the 
Health Boards to provide treatment of 
Medical Card holders (1/3 of the population) 
For the remaining majority of the population, 
the patients pay for services.  
2004: 
Yes, contracted Hospitals can be excluded  
Yes for GPs which are contracted 
Remark: 
Only contracted hospitals can be de-
contracted; about half of the hospitals are run 
by the health boards and cannot be excluded. 
About 2/3 of all GPs have a contract with the 
Health Boards to provide treatment of 
Medical Card holders (1/3 of the population) 
For the remaining majority of the population, 
the patients pay for services. 
Italy 1995: 
No for most services, since hospitals are 
predominantly operated by the ASL and staff 
is predominantly employed. 
Remark: 
Independent providers can be excluded, by 
not renewing their contracts. 
2004: 
No for most services, since hospitals are 
predominantly operated by the ASL and staff 
is predominantly employed. 
Remark: 
Independent providers can be excluded, by 
not renewing their contracts 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
2004: 
No  
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
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CO2   Do the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities have the possibility to exclude 
individual providers of medical services (individual physicians, Hospitals etc.) from the 
provision of medical services, if they significantly oversupply medical services, provide 
insufficient quality or work in an inefficient way?  
Yes, for GPs Yes, for GPs  
New Zealand 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
The strict purchaser-provider split with 
contracting allowed a de-contracting by the 
RHA, but usually, there was no alternative 
provider for hospital services.  
2004: 
No 
Norway 1995: 
No, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
The county cannot exclude a hospital it owns 
and operates. Contracted GPs and other 
providers can be excluded. 
2004: 
No, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
The Regional Health Authority cannot 
exclude a hospital it basically owns and 
operates. Contracted GPs and other providers 
can be excluded. 
Portugal 1995:  
No  
Remark: 
While information on supply and oversupply 
of services is collected and available, it is not 
used to evaluate the providers and has no 
consequences for them. 
2004:  
No  
Remark: 
While information on supply and oversupply 
of services is collected and available, it is not 
used to evaluate the providers and has no 
consequences for them. 
Poland 1995: 
Yes for GPs, if they were contracted 
No for Hospitals and employed providers. 
 
Remark: 
Hospitals were owned and operated by the 
gminas and voivodships. They could 
intervene. Only if the purchaser had 
contracted services, providers could be 
excluded.  
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
 
Remark: 
Hospitals and GPs are now predominantly 
contracted by the National Health Fund. De-
contracting is hence possible, but seldom used 
in practice. It has never happened to hospitals.
Spain 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
Most GPs are employed, can be controlled, 
but not really excluded. The INSALUD can 
exclude Hospitals which are contracted, but 
not those Hospitals operated by the 
INSALUD 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
Most GPs are employed, can be controlled, 
but not really excluded. The Servicio 
Regional de Salud can exclude Hospitals 
which are contracted – but not Hospitals 
which are operated by the SRS 
Sweden 1995: 
Hospitals are operated by the Landstings and 
Physicians are usually employed, so neither 
can be excluded. 
Only independent providers can be excluded 
– a minority of providers 
2004: 
Hospitals are operated by the Landstings and 
Physicians are usually employed, so neither 
can be excluded. 
Only independent providers can be excluded – 
a minority of providers 
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CO2   Do the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authorities have the possibility to exclude 
individual providers of medical services (individual physicians, Hospitals etc.) from the 
provision of medical services, if they significantly oversupply medical services, provide 
insufficient quality or work in an inefficient way?  
Switzerland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark:  
While the option of de-contracting is existent 
for both cases, this option is only theoretical. 
GPs can only be excluded from providing 
services by the professional organization, and 
only in the case of serious misbehavior 
relating to treatment quality, not to cost-
effectiveness of treatment. 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark:  
While the option of de-contracting is existent 
for both cases, this option is only theoretical. 
GPs can only be excluded from providing 
services by the professional organization, and 
only in the case of serious misbehavior 
relating to treatment quality, not to cost-
effectiveness of treatment. 
 
 
 355
 
CO3   Do the Health Insurance Funds / the Health Authority usually receive a detailed bill 
from an individual provider, e.g. a Hospital or a GP, which lists all medical services and 
medical goods which were provided in an individual case? 
Austria 1995:  
There is a per diem charged by Hospitals 
Yes for GPs, where the billing takes place 
between the GP and the HIF  
2004:  
There is a per diem charged by Hospitals 
Yes for GPs, where the billing takes place 
between the GP and the HIF 
Belgium 1995. 
Yes, from Hospitals and from GPs 
Remark: 
There is an extensive system of cost-
reimbursement, where bills are handed in by 
the patients 
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals and from GPs 
Remark: 
There is an extensive system of cost-
reimbursement, where bills are handed in by 
the patients 
Canada 1995: 
Yes, from Hospitals and from GPs 
Remark: 
There are various billing systems between 
the provinces and the GPs. The provinces run 
the hospitals, and have cost control.  
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals and from GPs 
Remark: 
There are various billing systems between the 
provinces and the GPs. The provinces run the 
hospitals, and have cost control. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Yes, from Hospitals and from GPs 
Remark: 
The remuneration of all services is done by 
an invoice system, in which bills listing all 
services are sent from the provider to the HIF
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals and from GPs 
Remark: 
The remuneration of all services is done by an 
invoice system, in which bills listing all 
services are sent from the provider to the HIF 
Denmark 1995:  
Yes, for Hospitals. Hospitals receive a global 
budget, but in the case that a patient is treated 
outside of his county, the home county 
receives a bill. 
Yes for GPs who are billing their services to 
the Amter 
2004: 
Yes, for Hospitals. Hospitals receive a global 
budget, but in the case that a patient is treated 
outside of his county, the home county 
receives a bill. 
Yes for GPs who are billing their services to 
the Amter 
Finland 1995: 
Yes, from Hospitals 
No for GPs 
Remark: 
Payment of Hospitals is activity based. 
Hospitals bill the services provided to 
citizens of a municipality to the municipality 
according the terms set in the (informal) 
agreement between the Hospital District and 
the Municipality. GPs are predominantly 
salaried by the Municipalities’ health centers.
2004:  
Yes, from Hospitals 
No for GPs 
Remark: 
Payment of Hospitals is activity based. 
Hospitals bill the services provided to citizens 
of a municipality to the municipality 
according the terms set in the (informal) 
agreement between the Hospital District and 
the Municipality. GPs are predominantly 
salaried by the Municipalities’ health centers. 
France 1995: 
Yes, from Hospitals 
Yes, from GPs  
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals 
Yes, from GPs 
Germany 1995: 
Yes for Hospitals, via the per diem 
No for GPs  
Remark: 
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals via the DRG system 
No for GPs  
Remark: 
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CO3   Do the Health Insurance Funds / the Health Authority usually receive a detailed bill 
from an individual provider, e.g. a Hospital or a GP, which lists all medical services and 
medical goods which were provided in an individual case? 
The HIF pays a lump sum to the Physicians 
organization, which is distributing the money 
internally according to a fee schedule.  
The HIF pays a lump sum to the Physicians 
organization, which is distributing the money 
internally according to a fee schedule. 
Greece 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
The Health Insurance Fund’s payments to a 
Hospital are based on a per diem. 
The ESY operating the Hospital does not 
receive a detailed bill listing the medical 
services provided in a case from Hospitals. 
Only in few cases of specific services 
provided by laboratories or x-ray facilities, 
the services are explicitly billed. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
The Health Insurance Fund’s payments to a 
Hospital are based on a per diem. 
The ESY operating the Hospital does not 
receive a detailed bill listing the medical 
services provided in a case from Hospitals. 
Only in few cases of specific services 
provided by laboratories or x-ray facilities, 
the services are explicitly billed. 
Hungary 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
GP payment is by capitation.  
Payment of Hospitals and specialists is based 
on the sum of the points resulting for the 
services delivered. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
GP payment is by capitation.  
Payment of Hospitals and specialists is based 
on the sum of the points resulting for the 
services delivered. 
Ireland 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
Hospitals receive a budget, and GPs 
providing services to medical card holders 
receive a capitation 
2004: 
No  
Remark: 
Hospitals receive a budget, and GPs providing 
services to medical card holders receive a 
capitation 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, from Hospitals, which have to deliver 
the DRG of a case  
No for GPs – because of capitation as the 
predominant remuneration, there is little data 
for monitoring them. Bills concern only the 
additional services which are remunerated on 
a fee for service basis 
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals, which have to deliver 
the DRG of a case  
No for GPs – because of capitation as the 
predominant remuneration, there is little data 
for monitoring them. Bills concern only the 
additional services which are remunerated on 
a fee for service basis 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Yes, from hospitals 
Remark: 
To get reimbursement by the state or the 
HIFs, the hospital needed to hand in a bill. 
2004: 
No 
Netherlands1995: 
Yes, from hospitals and from GPs 
2004: 
Yes, from hospitals and from GPs 
New Zealand 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
The contracting arrangements stated, that the 
Hospitals should deliver information on what 
services were provided. This was not done on 
2004:  
No 
Remark: 
The GP receive a subsidy per consultation, 
there is no billing. 
The Hospitals receive price-volume based 
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CO3   Do the Health Insurance Funds / the Health Authority usually receive a detailed bill 
from an individual provider, e.g. a Hospital or a GP, which lists all medical services and 
medical goods which were provided in an individual case? 
the basis of individual cases. A monitoring 
was however usually not performed. 
The GP receive a subsidy per consultation, 
there is no billing. 
budgets, there is also no billing done. 
Norway 1995: 
No for Hospitals 
Partly from GPs and independent providers 
Remark: 
The Municipality pays the provider (GPs 
etc.) a block grant; the services of the 
provider are then partly paid for by the NIS 
on a fee for service basis. 
Hospitals receive a block grant.  
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals 
Partly for GPs and independent providers 
Remark 
The Municipality pays the provider (GPs etc.) 
a block grant; the services of the provider are 
then partly paid for by the NIS on a fee for 
service basis. 
Part of the Hospitals remuneration is activity 
based and the Hospital provides the necessary 
information. 
Portugal 1995:  
No 
Remark: 
In the NHS usually, the GP is salaried and 
the Hospital is operating on a budget, and 
there is no billing for a case.  
Billing occurs only, if services are provided 
by contracted providers. But most of these 
services are not paid for by the NHS but from 
the patients or their VHI 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
In the NHS usually, the GP is salaried and the 
Hospital is operating on a budget, and there is 
no billing for a case.  
Billing occurs only, if services are provided 
by contracted providers. But most of these 
services are not paid for by the NHS but from 
the patients or their VHI  
Poland 1995: 
No, neither hospitals nor GPs 
Remark: 
Hospitals received a budget; GPs receive a 
capitation per enrolled patient 
2004: 
Yes, from Hospitals 
No for GPs 
Remark: 
Hospitals are now remunerated on a DRG 
basis. GPs receive a capitation per enrolled 
patient. 
Spain 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
The INSALUD provides services by staff 
which is employed. Only in the case of 
contracted services, there is some billing. 
However, in the case of contracted services 
from Hospitals, remuneration is 
predominantly done on a per diem basis. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
The SRS provides services by staff which is 
employed. Only in the case of contracted 
services, there is some billing. 
However, in the case of contracted services 
from Hospitals, remuneration is 
predominantly done on a per diem basis. 
Sweden 1995: 
No. The Landstings operate the Hospitals and 
employ the GPs.  
 
Remark: 
Billing occurs only, if a citizen is treated 
outside of his Landsting 
2004: 
No. The Landstings operate the Hospitals and 
employ the GPs.  
 
Remark: 
Billing – based on DRGs - occurs only, if a 
citizen is treated outside of his Landsting 
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CO3   Do the Health Insurance Funds / the Health Authority usually receive a detailed bill 
from an individual provider, e.g. a Hospital or a GP, which lists all medical services and 
medical goods which were provided in an individual case? 
Switzerland 1995: 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
Hospitals were paid for on a per diem basis, 
which did not list the services provided. 
2004: 
Yes, for GPs 
Remark: 
Since for some in-patient treatments DRGs 
have been introduced, the HIF gets a bill for 
these from the Hospitals. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
Hospitals have a bloc contract with a DHA, 
so there is no billing for the majority of 
services. GPs are predominantly remunerated 
on a capitation basis per enrolled patient, so 
there is no billing either. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
Hospitals have a bloc contract with a DHA, so 
there is no billing for the majority of services. 
GPs are predominantly remunerated on a 
capitation basis per enrolled patient, so there 
is no billing either. 
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CO4   Can the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authority force the providers (Hospitals / 
Physicians) to abide by clinical guidelines?  
Austria 1995:  
Factually, neither Hospitals nor Physicians 
can be forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
2004:  
Yes, Hospitals and Physicians can be forced 
to abide by clinical guidelines 
Belgium 1995: 
No, neither Hospitals nor Physicians can be 
forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
2004: 
No, neither Hospitals nor Physicians can be 
forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
Remark: 
There is a system of accreditation.  
Hospitals need accreditation to receive funds 
from the HIFs. In order to get accreditation, 
they have to meet certain standards, 
concerning the financial administration but 
also practice. This does however not 
determine how medical services are provided. 
Since 1995, GPs may gain accreditation, 
which is voluntary and means that they 
receive a higher income. The accreditation 
requirements encompass abidance to certain 
rules of good therapeutical practices. Again, 
this does not determine the way medical 
services are provided and the whole system is 
voluntary. 
Canada 1995:  
No, neither Hospitals nor Physicians can be 
forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
Remark: 
Following guidelines can be encouraged, but 
not enforced. The medical professions exert 
pressure to abide by good practice. 
2004: 
No, neither Hospitals nor Physicians can be 
forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
Remark: 
Following guidelines can be encouraged, but 
not enforced. The medical professions exert 
pressure to abide by good practice. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
No, neither Hospitals nor Physicians can be 
forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
Remark: 
While some pressure can be exercised, the 
factual enforcement is limited to quality 
standards 
2004: 
No, neither Hospitals nor Physicians can be 
forced to abide by clinical guidelines 
Remark: 
While some pressure can be exercised, the 
factual enforcement is limited to quality 
standards. Selective contracting is being 
introduced, but not yet operative. 
Denmark 1995: 
Yes, Hospitals can be forced. 
No for GPs;  
Remark: 
In the case of GPs, there may be sanctions if 
guidelines are violated, but these sanctions 
are exerted by the medical societies, which 
issued the guidelines. 
2004:  
Yes, Hospitals can be forced. 
No for GPs 
Remark:  
There may be sanctions if guidelines are 
violated, but these sanctions are exerted by 
the medical societies, which issued the 
guidelines 
Finland 1995: 
No  
2004: 
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can in principle be 
forced to abide by clinical guidelines; 
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CO4   Can the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authority force the providers (Hospitals / 
Physicians) to abide by clinical guidelines?  
however, this is not current practice 
France 1995:  
No, neither Hospitals nor GPs 
Remark: 
The usage of guidelines usually can be 
encouraged, some are mandatory, but with no 
sanction in case of non-abidance 
2004: 
No, neither Hospitals nor GPs 
Remark: 
The usage of guidelines usually can be 
encouraged, some are mandatory, but with no 
sanction in case of non-abidance. 
The ANAES started creating and distributing 
guidelines in 1997 for cost consciousness, 
good medical practice and rational use of 
pharmaceuticals. The conventions contains 
also agreements on the abidance to guidelines, 
but the impact is weak 
Germany 1995: 
Basically no, albeit Hospitals can be forced 
to some degree 
2004: 
Basically no, albeit Hospitals can be forced to 
some degree 
Greece 1995: 
No, neither Health Insurance Funds nor the 
ESY can force Hospitals or Physicians to 
abide by clinical guidelines 
Remark: 
There are no medical guidelines. There are 
some restrictions, on how often certain 
services can be provided to a patient in a 
period. These can be enforced by economic 
sanctions. 
2004: 
No, neither Health Insurance Funds nor the 
ESY can force Hospitals or Physicians to 
abide by clinical guidelines 
Remark: 
There are no medical guidelines. There are 
some restrictions, on how often certain 
services can be provided to a patient in a 
period. These can be enforced by economic 
sanctions. 
Hungary 1995: 
No 
Remark: 
The Hungarian Medical Chamber and the 
NPHMOS are in charge of quality control, 
but not the NHIFA 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
The Hungarian Medical Chamber and the 
NPHMOS are in charge of quality control, but 
not the NHIFA 
Ireland 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Italy 1995: 
Yes, Hospitals can be forced 
Remark: 
Hospitals operated by the ASL are under 
direct control. Independent hospitals -  like 
the Hospital Trusts – need an accreditation 
by the regional government as a precondition 
to get public funding. This accreditation is 
conditional on accepting certain measures of 
quality control and financial accountability. 
2004: 
Yes, Hospitals can be forced 
Remark: 
Hospitals operated by the ASL are under 
direct control. Independent hospitals -  like 
the Hospital Trusts – need an accreditation by 
the regional government as a precondition to 
get public funding. This accreditation is 
conditional on accepting certain measures of 
quality control and financial accountability 
Luxembourg 1994: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Netherlands 1995: 
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can be forced to 
abide by clinical guidelines  
2004: 
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can be forced to abide 
by clinical guidelines 
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CO4   Can the Health Insurance Funds / Health Authority force the providers (Hospitals / 
Physicians) to abide by clinical guidelines?  
New Zealand 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
While contracts between the RHA and the 
Hospitals usually contained clauses on 
quality and also the abidance to guidelines, 
no such information on abidance was 
collected and control was performed. 
2004: 
No. 
Remark: 
Guidelines may be recommended, but the 
providers retain leeway for clinical 
judgements. 
Norway 1995: 
No  
Remark: 
The Norwegian Board of Health exercises 
some control also on quality, but does not 
implement guidelines. 
2004: 
No 
Remark: 
The Norwegian Board of Health exercises 
some control, also on quality. Still, guidelines 
are recommendations only and not part of the 
contracts. 
Portugal 1995: 
No 
2004:  
No 
Poland 1995: 
No, insofar guidelines exist, they are only 
recommendations. 
Remark:  
Yes, Hospitals and GPs can be forced to 
abide by quality standards. Hospitals are 
operated by the municipalities and the 
regional governments, which have direct 
control, GPs are employed 
2004: 
No, insofar guidelines exist, they are only 
recommendations. 
Remark: 
The National Health Fund can de-contract the 
providers. The NHF only contracts with 
providers – both hospitals and GPs – which 
meet the requirements on quality. 
Spain 1995: 
No 
2004: 
No 
Sweden 1995: 
In principle yes, factually, it is not possible 
2004: 
In principle yes, factually, it is not possible 
Switzerland 1995: 
No  
2004: 
No  
United Kingdom 1995: 
No 
Remark:  
While there is no formal system, the Health 
Authority can exercise some influence on 
hospitals and the professional organizations 
can exercise pressure on individual providers 
2004: 
No  
Remark:  
While there is no formal system, the Health 
Authority can exercise some influence on 
hospitals and the professional organizations 
can exercise pressure on individual providers 
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3. Parameters of the Health Care System  
 
N1  How and by whom is the Catalogue of Medical Services covered by the Health System 
determined? The term “catalogue” refers to which medical services are covered in the Health 
Care System, and which have to be purchased by the patients themselves. 
Austria 1995:  
Negotiations among Purchasers (Health 
Insurance Funds) and Providers of medical 
services 
2004:  
Negotiations among HIFs and Providers of 
medical services 
Belgium 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The HIF Association and the Provider 
negotiate fees and the catalogue of services, 
the nomenclature, the central government can 
approve or disapprove, but also replace the 
outcome. The nomenclature is a defined list 
of services, encompassing about 6000 
medical services and is quite stable over time
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The HIF Association and the Provider 
negotiate fees and the catalogue of services, 
the nomenclature, the central government can 
approve or disapprove, but also replace the 
outcome. 
Canada 1995:  
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Provincial governments and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The Federal Government determined in the 
Canada Health Act that all medically 
necessary services provided by hospitals, 
physicians and surgical dental care, which 
requires in-patient treatment in hospitals is 
covered. This sets a kind of minimum 
catalogue, to which all provinces have to 
abide. Within this limit, the Provincial 
Governments negotiate contracts with 
providers, in which fees and services are set. 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Provincial governments and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The Federal Government determined in the 
Canada Health Act that all medically 
necessary services provided by hospitals, 
physicians and surgical dental care, which 
requires in-patient treatment in hospitals is 
covered. This sets a kind of minimum 
catalogue, to which all provinces have to 
abide. Within this limit, the Provincial 
governments negotiate contracts with 
providers, in which fees and services are set. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the HIF and the Providers  
Remark: 
While the minimum catalogue is set by the 
government, the providers and the HIF 
negotiate contracts based on this. The Central 
Government supervises the negotiations. 
Outcomes need governmental approval and 
have to be in accordance with the public 
interest. The central government has further 
influence by controlling the largest HIF and 
by being represented in the Executive Boards 
of the other HIF. The government controlled 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the HIF and the Providers  
Remark: 
While the minimum catalogue is set by the 
government, the providers and the HIF 
negotiate contracts based on this. The Central 
Government supervises the negotiations. 
Outcomes need governmental approval and 
have to be in accordance with the public 
interest. The central government has further 
influence by controlling the largest HIF and 
by being represented in the Executive Boards 
of the other HIF. The government controlled 
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N1  How and by whom is the Catalogue of Medical Services covered by the Health System 
determined? The term “catalogue” refers to which medical services are covered in the Health 
Care System, and which have to be purchased by the patients themselves. 
GHIF sets a benchmark for the negotiations 
of other HIF. If results are not in the public 
interest, the government can unilaterally 
change the results. It can set results 
unilaterally, if negotiations fail to reach an 
outcome. Most negotiations are among 
individual HIF and providers / provider 
associations. 
GHIF sets a benchmark for the negotiations of 
other HIF. If results are not in the public 
interest, the government can unilaterally 
change the results. It can set results 
unilaterally, if negotiations fail to reach an 
outcome. Most negotiations are among 
individual HIF and providers / provider 
associations. 
Denmark 1995:  
Negotiations among the Amter and Providers 
Remark:  
There is no defined catalogue, but some 
services are excluded 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Amter and Providers 
Remark:  
There is no defined catalogue, but some 
services are excluded 
Finland 1995: 
The Municipal Government decides 
unilaterally on most issues; some issues of 
what can be provided are negotiated with the 
providers 
Remark: 
Some restraints are set by the Central 
Government which also has control over 
what services are covered by the National 
Health Insurance. The central Government 
only sets the basic framework, the details are 
decided on by the municipalities 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the Municipal 
Government; some elements of what services 
are provided are negotiated among the 
Municipal Government and the providers of 
medical care 
Remark: 
Some restraints are set by the Central 
Government which also has control over what 
services are covered by the National Health 
Insurance. The central Government only sets 
the basic framework, the details are decided 
on by the municipalities 
France 1995:  
Unilateral decision of the Health Insurance 
Funds, but with advice form the government, 
a High Health Authority and professional 
representatives 
The Purchasers and the Providers negotiate a 
nomenclature, as a list of services covered by 
the Health system. This nomenclature has to 
be approved by the state.  
2004: 
Unilateral decision of the Health Insurance 
Funds, but with advice form the government, 
a High Health Authority and professional 
representatives 
The Purchasers and the Providers negotiate a 
nomenclature, as a list of services covered by 
the Health system. This nomenclature has to 
be approved by the state. 
Germany 1995: 
Negotiations among Purchasers 
(Krankenkassen) and Associations of 
Medical Providers; albeit within loose limits 
set by the State by law  
2004: 
Negotiations among Purchasers 
(Krankenkassen) and Associations of Medical 
Providers; albeit within loose limits set by the 
State by law 
Greece 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
The decision is made by the ESY, but this is 
factually part of the state. This concerns the 
catalogue of services covered by the ESY. 
Apart from a basic catalogue, the HIF have 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
The decision is made by the ESY, but this is 
factually part of the state. This concerns the 
catalogue of services covered by the ESY. 
Apart from a basic catalogue, the HIF have 
 364
N1  How and by whom is the Catalogue of Medical Services covered by the Health System 
determined? The term “catalogue” refers to which medical services are covered in the Health 
Care System, and which have to be purchased by the patients themselves. 
some leeway on what services to cover some leeway on what services to cover 
Hungary 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Ireland 1995:  
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
Some elements are negotiated, but the role of 
the government is strongest 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
Some elements are negotiated, but the role of 
the government is strongest 
Italy 1995: 
The state 
Remark: 
There are negotiations among the central and 
the regional Government; the central 
government sets a catalogue of minimum 
requirements, the regions have to provide. 
There was no strictly defined catalogue, 
rather, everything that was feasible and 
medically necessary was covered. 
2004: 
The state 
Remark: 
There are negotiations among the central and 
the regional Government; the central 
government sets a catalogue of minimum 
requirements, the regions have to provide 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Formally a unilateral decision of the state, 
which sets the nomenclature by law. 
Factually, negotiations among the Central 
Government, the Health Insurance Funds and 
the Providers of Medical Services.  
Remark: 
The catalogue of covered services, the 
nomenclature, is a defined list set by the 
Ministry of Health. It is however developed 
and updated with advice from the providers 
and the HIF Association, UCM. 
The nomenclature lists all services and the 
level of the fee for each service with 
reference to a standard fee, which is 
negotiated among the providers and the 
UCM 
2004: 
Formally a unilateral decision of the state, 
which sets the nomenclature by law. 
Factually, negotiations among the Central 
Government, the Health Insurance Funds and 
the Providers of Medical Services. 
Remark: 
The catalogue of covered services, the 
nomenclature, is a defined list set by the 
Ministry of Health. It is however developed 
and updated with advice from the providers 
and the HIF Association, UCM. 
The nomenclature lists all services and the 
level of the fee for each service with reference 
to a standard fee, which is negotiated among 
the providers and the UCM 
Netherlands 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services. The results are then set 
by law. There is no formal catalogue, but 
some services are excluded form the basic 
package and transferred to the VHI 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services. The results are then set 
by law. There is no formal catalogue, but 
some services are excluded form the basic 
package and transferred to the VHI 
New Zealand 1995: 
The state by law  
Remark: 
The National Health Committee was 
2004: 
The state by law  
Remark: 
Factually, it is still a multilevel decision: the 
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commissioned in the early 90s to develop a 
catalogue. This resulted in the exclusion of 
some services only. Actually it was a 
multilevel decision. The Regional Health 
Authorities which had substantial leeway, 
decided what services to buy from Providers, 
this was set in a negotiated contract between 
the RHA and the Providers which set broad 
categories of medical services which were to 
be supplied. The central government could 
intervene, if the RHA did not purchase some 
services and the Providers had some leeway 
on what services were provided in a 
category. Factually, the RHA had most say 
on what services were covered. 
District Health Boards decided what services 
to buy from Providers or to provide in 
hospitals operated by themselves. Again, the 
Central Government can intervene, e.g. if 
certain services are not purchased. 
Norway 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government 
and the County Councils / Municipalities 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government 
and the County Councils / Municipalities. 
Portugal 1995: 
Unilateral decision the Central Government 
Remark: 
There are no services explicitly excluded, but 
some, like dental care, are not provided by 
the NHS.  
2004: 
Unilateral decision the Central Government 
Remark: 
There are no services explicitly excluded, but 
some, like dental care, are not provided by the 
NHS. 
Poland 1995: 
Unilateral decision the Central Government 
Remark: 
The list of what has to be covered is 
determined in consensus with the providers. 
2004: 
Unilateral decision the Central Government 
Remark: 
There is no defined positive catalogue, but a 
list of services excluded from coverage. The 
catalogue of services, i.e. what is factually 
provided is also influenced by the National 
Health Fund and the providers, which 
negotiate the contracts. 
Spain 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government sets a frame of a minimum 
package for the INSALUD, which 
determines the details. 
The Regional governments, to which the 
control over the Health service provision was 
already devolved, had some leeway. 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government and the Regional Government of 
the Autonomous Community sets the frame of 
a minimum package. The Regional 
Governments have some leeway. 
Sweden 1995: 
Formally, there is no such Catalogue 
Some services are excluded form the basic 
package  
2004: 
Formally, there is no such Catalogue 
Some services are excluded form the basic 
package 
Switzerland 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the Health Insurance 
Funds 
2004:  
Unilateral decision by the State (e.g. by law or 
decree) 
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Remark: 
The Central government did set a minimum 
catalogue of services, but the HIFs had some 
leeway on what to cover in the basic 
package. The minimum catalogue is set on a 
national level. 
Remark: 
The HIF do no longer have leeway to cover 
additional services as part of the basic 
package – if they do, this is done in an 
additional private contract. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The state 
Remark:  
There is no “official” catalogue, but the 
Government can determine which services 
must be covered in the contracts of the DHA 
with Hospitals and in the contract negotiated 
between the Department of Health and the 
GP association 
2004: 
The state 
Remark:  
There is no “official” catalogue, but the 
Government can determine which services 
must be covered in the contracts of the DHA 
with Hospitals and in the contract negotiated 
between the Department of Health and the GP 
association 
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Austria 1995:  
Negotiations among HIFs (Krankenkassen) 
and Providers of medical services; with some 
influence of the state 
Negotiations among HIFs and Providers of 
medical services for out patient medical care 
Negotiations among the Regional 
Governments, HIFs and Providers of medical 
services for in-patient medical care 
2004:  
Negotiations among HIFs (Krankenkassen) 
and Providers of medical services; with some 
influence of the state 
Negotiations among HIFs and Providers of 
medical services for out patient medical care 
Negotiations among the Regional 
Governments, HIFs and Providers of medical 
services for in-patient medical care 
Belgium 1995: 
Negotiations among the Health Insurance 
Funds and the Providers of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The HIF Association and the Provider 
negotiate the fees, the central government 
can approve or disapprove, but also replace 
the outcome. The Central government 
controls the overall budget, this sets a limit to 
what the HIF and Providers can negotiate. It 
has, in the past, reduced the fees negotiated 
among the HIFs and the Providers 
unilaterally. 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Health Insurance 
Funds and the Providers of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The HIF Association and the Provider 
negotiate fees and services, the central 
government can approve or disapprove, but 
also replace the outcome. The Central 
government controls the overall budget, this 
sets a limit to what the HIF and Providers can 
negotiate. It has, in the past, reduced the fees 
negotiated among the HIFs and the Providers 
unilaterally. 
Canada 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Provincial governments and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
Subsidies from the federal government to the 
provincial government are negotiated 
between the Federal and Provincial 
Governments. The provincial fee schedules 
are negotiated between the provider 
associations and the provincial Ministries of 
health, and differ among provinces. Hospital 
budgets are negotiated among hospitals and 
the RHA/ Provincial Governments. 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Provincial governments and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
Subsidies from the federal government to the 
provincial government are negotiated between 
the Federal and Provincial Governments. The 
provincial fee schedules are negotiated 
between the provider associations and the 
provincial Ministries of health, and differ 
among provinces. Hospital budgets are 
negotiated among hospitals and the RHA/ 
Provincial Governments. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
Remuneration is negotiated among providers 
and each HIF. The Central Government 
supervises the negotiations. Outcomes need 
governmental approval and have to be in 
accordance with the public interest. The 
central government has further influence by 
controlling the largest HIF and by being 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
Remuneration is negotiated among providers 
and each HIF. The Central Government 
supervises the negotiations. Outcomes need 
governmental approval and have to be in 
accordance with the public interest. The 
central government has further influence by 
controlling the largest HIF and by being 
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represented in the Executive Boards of the 
other HIF. The government controlled GHIF 
sets a benchmark for the negotiations of other 
HIF. If results are not in the public interest, 
the government can unilaterally change the 
results. It can set results unilaterally, if 
negotiations fail to reach an outcome. Most 
negotiations are among individual HIF and 
providers / provider associations. 
represented in the Executive Boards of the 
other HIF. The government controlled GHIF 
sets a benchmark for the negotiations of other 
HIF. If results are not in the public interest, 
the government can unilaterally change the 
results. It can set results unilaterally, if 
negotiations fail to reach an outcome. Most 
negotiations are among individual HIF and 
providers / provider associations. 
Denmark 1995:  
Negotiations among Amter, county 
government and the Providers of medical 
services. The Central government has to 
approve. 
2004:  
Negotiations among Amter, county 
government and the Providers of medical 
services. The Central government has to 
approve. 
Finland 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the Municipal 
Government 
Remark: 
Some elements are negotiated among the 
Municipal Government and the providers of 
medical care; in particular with the Hospital 
Districts. 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the Municipal 
Government;  
Remark: 
Some elements are negotiated among the 
Municipal Government and the providers of 
medical care 
France 1995: 
Negotiations among State, Purchaser 
(Mandatory Health Insurance Funds) and the 
Providers of medical services.  
The Purchasers and the Providers negotiate a 
convention, which sets a tariff for each 
medical service listed in the nomenclature, as 
a list of service. The tariff is identical for the 
whole country and all Insurance Funds  
2004: 
Negotiations among State, Purchaser 
(Mandatory Health Insurance Funds) and the 
Providers of medical services 
Germany 1995: 
Negotiations among Purchasers 
(Krankenkassen) and Associations of 
Medical Providers 
2004: 
Negotiations among Purchasers 
(Krankenkassen) and Associations of Medical 
Providers 
Greece 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
The Government can set the per diems, the 
salaries and the budget of the ESY. The 
largest HIF are under close control of the 
government. However, there is a private 
system operating parallel to the public 
system of ESY and HIF. 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
The Government can set the per diems, the 
salaries and the budget of the ESY. The 
largest HIF are under close control of the 
government. However, there is a private 
system operating parallel to the public system 
of ESY and HIF. 
Hungary 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
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The Central government sets the overall and 
sectorial budgets. The NHIFA then sets 
remuneration levels in order to met the 
budget restrictions set.  
The Central government sets the overall and 
sectorial budgets. The NHIFA then sets 
remuneration levels in order to met the budget 
restrictions set. 
Ireland 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
Some elements – the level of the capitation, 
the budgets and the fees -  are negotiated, but 
the role of the government is strongest 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
Some elements – the level of the capitation, 
the budgets and the fees -  are negotiated, but 
the role of the government is strongest 
Italy 1995. 
The state 
Remark: 
The central government sets the overall 
budget of the SSN, which is however usually 
exceeded. The distribution of the overall 
budget to the regions is then negotiated 
among the central and the regional 
governments. Salaries of the medical staff 
employed in the SSN is negotiated between 
the trade unions and the Ministry of Health at 
a national level. Budgets of the hospital trusts 
are negotiated between the Hospital and the 
regional government. The budget of an ASL 
is negotiated between the ASL and the 
Regional government. The ASL as the lowest 
level negotiates contracts with independent 
providers of medical services 
2004: 
The state 
Remark: 
The central government sets the overall 
budget of the SSN, which is however usually 
exceeded. The distribution of the overall 
budget to the regions is then negotiated 
among the central and the regional 
governments. Salaries of the medical staff 
employed in the SSN is negotiated between 
the trade unions and the Ministry of Health at 
a national level. Budgets of the hospital trusts 
are negotiated between the Hospital and the 
regional government. The budget of an ASL 
is negotiated between the ASL and the 
Regional government. The ASL as the lowest 
level negotiates contracts with independent 
providers of medical services 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Negotiations among the Health Insurance 
Funds Association, UCM, and the Providers 
of Medical Services but subject to approval 
of the Central Government 
Remark: 
The nomenclature lists all services and sets 
the level of the fee for each service with 
reference to a standard fee, which is 
negotiated among the providers and the 
UCM. While the standard fee is formally 
negotiated between the medical providers 
and the UCM, the decision of the UCM 
needs the approval of the Ministry of Health 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Health Insurance 
Funds Association, UCM, and the Providers 
of Medical Services but subject to approval of 
the Central Government 
Remark: 
The nomenclature lists all services and sets 
the level of the fee for each service with 
reference to a standard fee, which is 
negotiated among the providers and the UCM. 
While the standard fee is formally negotiated 
between the medical providers and the UCM, 
the decision of the UCM needs the approval 
of the Ministry of Health  
Netherlands 1995:  
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The central government ensures via a 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The central government ensures via a 
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commission, that the tariffs are set in a way 
that expenditure targets are met  
commission, that the tariffs are set in a way 
that expenditure targets are met 
New Zealand 1995: 
The state 
Remark: 
The Central government sets the overall 
budget for Health Care – the amount of 
money going into health services. This is the 
overall limit for all other actors involved, but 
not the overall limit to health expenditure. 
This budget is then distributed to the 
Regional Health Authorities in negotiations 
among the Central Government and the 
RHA. The RHA had to negotiated contracts, 
usually price-volume contracts based on 
DRGs, with the providers. The GPs can 
charge higher prices to the patients 
2004: 
The state 
Remark:  
The Central government sets the overall 
budget for Health Care – the amount of 
money going into subsidizing health services. 
This budget is then distributed to the District 
Health Boards in negotiations among the 
Central Government and the District Health 
Boards. The Providers, in particular the GPs, 
can charge higher prices to the patients 
Norway 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government 
and the County Councils / Municipalities 
Remark: 
This refers to the overall budget available for 
health care. In a second step, remuneration is 
negotiated with the providers: For GPs, the 
levels of the fixed grants from the 
Municipalities are mostly set by the 
Municipalities. The fees, which are paid for 
by the NIS, are negotiated between the 
Norwegian Medical Association and the NIS.
The budgets for hospitals were negotiated 
between the Hospital and the county.  
Salaries are negotiated among the provider 
association and the State, represented by the 
“State Negotiation Body”. 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government 
and the County Councils / Municipalities 
Remark: 
This still refers to the overall budget available 
for health care. Formally, the government sets 
an overall budget. The exact levels are then 
negotiated with the providers. 
Salaries are negotiated among the provider 
association and the State, represented by the 
“State Negotiation Body”. 
Portugal 1995: 
The overall budget for health care is set 
unilaterally by the Central Government 
/Ministry of Finance, based on historical 
expenditure  
Remark:  
Remuneration and wages of NHS staff is 
negotiated between the Central Government 
and the Civil Service Unions. 
Budgets of the RHA and the Health Center 
budgets are negotiated between them, the 
Regional Health Administration and the 
Ministry of Health, the budgeting is done 
with little leeway for negotiations. Hospital 
budgets are usually negotiated between the 
2004: 
The overall budget for health care is set 
unilaterally by the Central Government / 
Ministry of Finance, based on historical 
expenditure  
 
Remark:  
Remuneration and wages of NHS staff is 
negotiated between the Central Government 
and the Civil Service Unions. 
Budgets of the RHA and the Health Center 
budgets are negotiated between them, the 
Regional Health Administration and the 
Ministry of Health, the budgeting is done with 
little leeway for negotiations. Hospital 
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Ministry of Health and the Hospital itself, 
according to set rules. 
Providers operating outside of the NHS have 
substantial leeway in setting their own fees 
budgets are usually negotiated between the 
Ministry of Health and the Hospital itself, 
according to set rules. 
Providers operating outside of the NHS have 
substantial leeway in setting their own fees 
Poland 1995: 
The central government set an overall budget 
for health, which was then allocated to the 
lower tiers of government, 
municipalities/gminas and regions/voivodas, 
which then purchased and provided medical 
services to their population.  
2004: 
Negotiations among the National Health Fund 
and the Providers. 
Remark: 
The negotiations are basically a tendering of a 
contract: the NHF publicly offers a specified 
task (a cost volume contract, containing a 
certain volume of serivices for which the 
NHF is willing to pay a certain amount), and 
providers can apply for it. Negotiations take 
place within the framework. The NHF has a 
strong position as the only purchaser of 
services.  
Spain 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government  
Remark: 
The Central Government sets the overall 
budget for the INSALUD and the budgets for 
those Regions, to which the organization of 
health care was already devolved. The 
regions can raise additional funding. Up to 
2002, the funds were allocated from the 
central government to the Autonomous 
Communities by an unadjusted capitation 
formula. 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government  
Remark: 
The Central Government sets the overall 
budget for the health system, from which the 
regional budgets are funded. The regions can 
raise additional funding. 
Since 2002, the funds are allocated from the 
central government to the Autonomous 
Communities by an adjusted capitation 
formula, which takes into account population 
and demographics, but no health indicators. 
Sweden 1995: 
Unilateral Decision by the Landstings, which 
stet budgets for Hospitals and negotiates 
salaries 
2004:  
Unilateral Decision by the Landstings, which 
stet budgets for Hospitals and negotiates 
salaries 
Switzerland 1995: 
Negotiations among Purchasers (Health 
Insurance Funds) and Providers of medical 
services, usually at cantonal level 
Remark: 
The Regional Governments can approve or 
disapprove of the outcomes. 
2004: 
Negotiations among Purchasers (Health 
Insurance Funds) and Providers of medical 
services, usually at cantonal level 
Remark: 
The Regional Governments can approve or 
disapprove of the outcomes. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
The state. 
Remark: 
The department of health sets the overall 
budget for the services provided by the NHS 
in a period. This sets a limit. The actual 
remuneration levels (hospital budgets, level 
2004: 
The state. 
Remark: 
The department of health sets the overall 
budget for the services provided by the NHS 
in a period. This sets a limit. The actual 
remuneration levels (hospital budgets, level of 
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of capitation and fees for GPs) is negotiated 
within in this limit, either by the Department 
of Health or the District Health Authority 
capitation and fees for GPs) is negotiated 
within in this limit, either by the Department 
of Health or the District Health Authority 
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Austria 1995:  
Negotiations among Purchasers, HIF, and 
Providers of medical services, with some 
influence of the central government, which 
sets limits 
2004:  
Negotiations among Purchasers, HIF, and 
Providers of medical services, with some 
influence of the central government, which 
sets limits 
Belgium 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The basic modes of remuneration (fee for 
service for GPs and Specialists, the funding 
of Hospitals) are set by law. The HIF 
Association and the Provider negotiate fees 
and services, the central government can 
approve or disapprove, but also replace the 
outcome.  
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
The basic modes of remuneration (fee for 
service for GPs and Specialists, the funding of 
Hospitals) are set by law. The HIF 
Association and the Provider negotiate fees 
and services, the central government can 
approve or disapprove, but also replace the 
outcome.  
Canada 1995: 
Negotiations among the Provincial 
Governments and the Providers of Medical 
Services 
Remark: 
The provincial governments negotiate the fee 
schedules with providers. The RHA have 
leeway on in which mode contracted 
providers are remunerated. Usually the mode 
is not subject to change: its fee for service for 
physicians and budgets for hospitals.  
2004: 
Negotiations among the Provincial 
Governments and the Providers of Medical 
Services 
Remark: 
The provincial governments negotiate the fee 
schedules with providers. The RHA have 
leeway on in which mode contracted 
providers are remunerated. Usually the mode 
is not subject to change: its fee for service for 
physicians and budgets for hospitals. 
Czech Republic 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
Remuneration mode is set by the government 
but the exact terms and the shares 
remunerated using each mode (fee for service 
vs. Capitation) are negotiated among 
providers and the HIF. The government has 
further influence by controlling the largest 
HIF and by being represented in the 
Executive Boards of the HIF. 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
Remark: 
Remuneration mode is set by the government 
but the exact terms and the shares 
remunerated using each mode (fee for service 
vs. Capitation) are negotiated among 
providers and the HIF. The government has 
further influence by controlling the largest 
HIF and by being represented in the 
Executive Boards of the HIF. 
Denmark 1995:  
Negotiations among the  Purchaser (Amter)  
and the Providers of medical services, the 
results are subject to approval by the central 
Government 
2004:  
Negotiations among the  Purchaser (Amter)  
and the Providers of medical services, the 
results are subject to approval by the central 
Government 
Finland 1995: 2004: 
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Negotiations among the Municipal 
Government and the providers of medical 
care 
Unilateral decision by the Municipal 
Government;  
Some elements are negotiated among the 
Municipal Government and the providers of 
medical care 
France 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
Purchaser (Mandatory Health Insurance 
Funds) and the Providers of medical services 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
Purchaser (Mandatory Health Insurance 
Funds) and the Providers of medical services 
Germany 1995: 
Negotiations among Purchasers 
(Krankenkassen) and Associations of 
Medical Providers; albeit within loose limits 
set by the State by law 
2004: 
Negotiations among Purchasers 
(Krankenkassen) and Associations of Medical 
Providers; albeit within loose limits set by the 
State by law 
Greece 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
Some of the more independent HIF have 
leeway to negotiate with providers, the 
largest HIF are under close control of the 
government. 
2004:  
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Remark: 
Some of the more independent HIF have 
leeway to negotiate with providers, the largest 
HIF are under close control of the 
government. 
Hungary 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
2004:  
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Ireland 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State (e.g. by law 
or decree). The mode of remuneration is not 
part of negotiations but set unilaterally.  
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State (e.g. by law or 
decree). The mode of remuneration is not part 
of negotiations but set unilaterally 
Italy 1995: 
The state by law 
Remark: 
The remuneration by capitation for GPs as 
well as the DRG system for hospitals was set 
by the national government. The ASL and 
the independent providers of medical 
services negotiate contracts 
2004: 
The state by law 
Remark: 
The remuneration by capitation for GPs as 
well as the DRG system for hospitals was set 
by the national government. The ASL and the 
independent providers of medical services 
negotiate contracts 
Luxembourg 1994: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree.  
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the State, Central 
Government, by law or decree 
Netherlands 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the Health Insurance Funds and the Providers 
of Medical Services 
New Zealand 1995: 
Negotiations among the Health Authorities 
and the Providers of Medical Services  
Remark: 
2004:  
Negotiations among the Central Government, 
the District Health Boards and the Providers 
of medical services 
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N3   The Remuneration Mode in which a provider of is remunerated can differ. Medical 
services can be remunerated for instance by fee for service, by capitation, budgets etc.   
What describes best the Way in which the Remuneration Mode is determined? 
The state decides by law for primary care, 
which was fee for service by default. There 
were negotiations among the Regional Health 
Authorities and the Hospitals for medical 
services provided in Hospitals. The RHA had 
leeway to decide on the remuneration mode 
set in the contract with the provider. The GPs 
continued to be remunerated on a fee for 
service basis, since the development of 
contracts took very long 
 
Norway 1995: 
Negotiations among the Central Government 
and the County Councils / Municipalities 
2004: 
Negotiations among the Central Government 
and the County Councils / Municipalities 
Portugal 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the State; Central 
Government 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the state; Central 
Government 
Poland 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government 
Remark: 
The central government sets a frame, but the 
municipalities and regional governments 
which do the actual contracting, have some 
leeway on how to remunerate. 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the National Health 
Fund, which has most influence on the 
contracts with the providers. 
Remark: 
The NHF tenders packages of services and 
costs, the modes of remuneration are specified 
in the contract which is negotiated among the 
NHF and the providers which apply for the 
contract. 
Spain 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government 
The regions to which the organization of 
health care was already devolved, have some 
leeway 
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government 
The Regional Governments have substantial 
leeway, e.g. by determining how budgets of 
hospitals are calculated 
Sweden 1995: 
The Landsting 
2004: 
The Landsting 
Switzerland 1995: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government 
Remark: 
The remuneration mode itself is a given fact 
in the negotiations among the HIF and the 
providers of services.  
2004: 
Unilateral decision by the Central 
Government 
Remark: 
The remuneration mode itself is a given fact 
in the negotiations among the HIF and the 
providers of services. 
United Kingdom 1995: 
Negotiations among the state and Providers 
of medical services 
Remark: 
The District Health Authorities negotiate the 
way hospitals are remunerated, e.g. a budget 
or case-based remuneration. The department 
2004: 
Negotiations among the state and Providers of 
medical services 
Remark: 
The District Health Authorities negotiate the 
way hospitals are remunerated, e.g. a budget 
or case-based remuneration. The department 
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N3   The Remuneration Mode in which a provider of is remunerated can differ. Medical 
services can be remunerated for instance by fee for service, by capitation, budgets etc.   
What describes best the Way in which the Remuneration Mode is determined? 
of Health negotiates the remuneration of fees 
and other forms of remuneration in addition 
to the capitation which is the basic 
remuneration mode  
of Health negotiates the remuneration of fees 
and other forms of remuneration in addition to 
the capitation which is the basic remuneration 
mode 
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C. Contributors and Sources 
1 Gathering the Data and Disclaimer 
The institutional information was gathered in two ways.  
 
First, by sending out standardized, while slightly tailored versions of the HCSI to respondents 
– either academics e.g. who have conducted case studies on a certain HCS or persons working 
in the health system respectively its administration. The adaptation of the HCSI concerned the 
names of actors, governmental levels, not the content of the questions. The main problems of 
completing the inventories for is, that available data is imprecise, the issues the HCSI covers 
are not covered and the time, for which a description given in a case study is not exact.  
 
Second, I supplemented and completed the inventories for the cases by using the available 
HiT reports and the case study literature on the HCS.  
 
Some of the information obtained from the different sources was contradictory or did not fit 
the categories. In this case, I had to make a decision and give an answer. To do this, I checked 
up the issue in the available descriptions of the HCS, literature but also in the internet. I also 
supplemented the information provided by respondents by information based on the case 
literature available for a country.  
 
 
2. Background Sources: A Selected Bibliography on Health Care Systems 
 
Austria              
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (2001): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Austria. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (Highlights on Health: Austria. 
Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory/European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems/Observatory (2006): Health Care Systems in Transition: Austria. 
Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
Theurl, Engelbert (1999): Health care and cost control in Austria. in: Mossialos, Elias/Le 
Grand, Julian, (eds.): Health care and cost containment in the European Union. 
Aldershot et al.: Ashgate: 605-634 
--- (1999): Some aspects of the reform of the health care systems in Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland. Health Care Analysis; vol. 7: 331–354. 
Wild, Claudia/Gibis, Bernhard (2003): Evaluations of health interventions in social insurance-
based countries: Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria. Health Policy; vol. 63: 187-
196. 
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Belgium              
Crainich, David/Closon, Marie-Christine (1999): Cost containment and health care reform in 
Belgium. in: Mossialos, Elias/Le Grand, Julian, (eds.): Health care and cost 
containment in the European Union. Aldershot et al.: Ashgate: 219-266 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (2000): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Belgium. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
Maarse, Hans/Paulus, Aggie/Kuiper, Gerard (2005): Supervision in social health insurance: a 
four country study. Health Policy;  vol 71:  333-346 . 
Schepers, Rita (1995): The Belgian medical profession since the 1980s. in: Johnson, 
Terry/Larkin, Gerry/Saks, Mike/(eds.): Health professions and the state in Europe. 
London/New York: Routledge: 162-177 
Schut, Frederik T./Doorslaer, Eddy K. A. van (1999): Towards a reinforced agency role of 
health insurers in Belgium and the Netherlands. Health Policy; vol. 48: 47-67. 
 
Canada               
Böcken, Jan/Butzlaff, Martin/Esche, Andreas/(eds.) (2000): Reformen im Gesundheitswesen. 
Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Charles, Catherine A./Badgley, Robin F. (1999): Canadian national health insurance: 
evolution and unresolved policy issues. in: Powell, Francis D./Wessen, Albert F., 
(eds.): Health care systems in transition. London et al.: Sage: 115-150 
Danzon, Patricia M. (1992): Hidden overhead costs: is Canada's system  really less 
expensive? Health Affairs; vol. 11: 21-43. 
Denis, Jean-Louis (2002): Governance and management of change in Canada's health system. 
Montreal: Commission on the Future of Health Care Canada Discussion Paper 36. 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (1996): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Canada. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
--- (2005): Health Care Systems in Transition: Canada. Kopenhagen: European Observatory 
on Health Care Systems. 
Fooks, Catherine (1999): Will power, cost control, and health reform in Canada, 1987-1992. 
in: Powell, Francis D./Wessen, Albert F., (eds.): Health care systems in transition. 
London et al.: Sage: 151-172 
Hacker, Jacob S. (2004): Dismantling the health care state? Political institutions, public 
policies and the comparative politics of health reform. British Journal of Political 
Science; vol. 34: 693–724. 
Hacker, Jacob S. (1998): The historical logic of national health insurance: structure and 
sequence in the development of British, Canadian, and U.S. medical policy. Studies in 
American Political Development; vol. 12: 57–130. 
Leatt, Peggy/Williams, A. Paul (1997): Canada. in: Raffel, Marshall W., (ed.): Health care 
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and reform in industrialized countries. Pennsylvania : The Pennsylvania State 
University Press: 1-28 
Maioni, Antonia (1999): Market incentives and health reform in Canada.  European 
University Institute Working Paper EUF Nr. 99/12. 
--- (1997): Parting at crossroads. The development of health insurance in Canada and the 
United States. Comparative Politics; vol. 29: 411-431. 
Tuohy, Carolyn H. (1999): Accidental logics: the dynamics of change in the health care arena 
in the United States, Britain and Canada. Oxford : Oxford University Press . 
 
Czech Republic       
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (1996): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Czech Republic. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care 
Systems. 
--- (2000): Health Care Systems in Transition: Czech Republic. Kopenhagen: European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
--- (2005): Health Care Systems in Transition: Czech Republic. Kopenhagen: European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
 
Denmark              
Böcken, Jan/Butzlaff, Martin/Esche, Andreas/(eds.) (2000): Reformen im Gesundheitswesen. 
Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Christiansen, Terkel/Enemark, Ulrika/Clausen, Jorgen/Poulsen, Peter Bo (1999): Health care 
and cost containment in Denmark. in: Mossialos, Elias/Le Grand, Julian, (eds.): Health 
care and cost containment in the European Union. Aldershot et al.: Ashgate: 267-302 
Dixon, Anna/Mossialos, Elias (2002): Health care systems in eight countries: trends and 
challenges. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (2001): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Denmark. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
Greenwood, Justin/Ronit, Karsten (1991): Pharmaceutical regulation in Denmark and the UK. 
European Journal of Political Research; vol. 19: 327-359. 
Krasnik, Allan/Vallgarda, Signild (1997): Denmark. in: Raffel, Marshall W., (ed.): Health 
care and reform in industrialized countries. Pennsylvania : The Pennsylvania State 
University Press: 29-48 
Pedersen, Kjeld M./Christiansen, Terkel/Bech, Mickael (2005): The Danish health care 
system: evolution - not revolution - in a decentralized system. Health Economics; vol. 
14: S41 - S57. 
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Finland              
Böcken, Jan/Butzlaff, Martin/Esche, Andreas/(eds.) (2000): Reformen im Gesundheitswesen. 
Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (1996): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Finland. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
--- (2002): Health Care Systems in Transition: Finland. Kopenhagen: European Observatory 
on Health Care Systems. 
Häkkinen, Unto (1999): Cost containment in Finnish health care. in: Mossialos, Elias/Le 
Grand, Julian, (eds.): Health care and cost containment in the European Union. 
Aldershot et al.: Ashgate: 661-700 
Sinkkonen, Sirkka/Hornetz, Klaus J./(eds.) (1995): Kranken- und Gesundheitspflege in 
Finnland und Deutschland. Frankfurt /Main: Mabuse. 
Sinkkonen, Sirkka/Kinnunen, Juha (1995): Das finnische Gesundheitssystem. in: Sinkkonen, 
Sirkka/Hornetz, Klaus J., (eds.): Kranken- und Gesundheitspflege in Finnland und 
Deutschland. Frankfurt /Main: Mabuse: 17-56 
 
France               
Delattre, Eric/Dormont, Brigitte (2003): Fixed fees and physician-induced demand: a panel 
data study on French physicians. Health Economics; vol. 12: 741-754. 
Dixon, Anna/Mossialos, Elias (2002): Health care systems in eight countries: trends and 
challenges. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (2004): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: France. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
Hassenteufel, Patrick (1996): The medical profession and health insurance policies: a franco-
german comparison. Journal of European Public Policy; vol.3: 461-480. 
Immergut, Ellen M. (1992 ): Health politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
--- (1990): Institutions, veto points, and policy results: a comparative analysis of health care. 
Journal of Public Policy; vol. 10: 391-416. 
Lancry, Pierre-Jean/Sandier, Simone (1999): Twenty years of cures for the French health care 
system. in: Mossialos, Elias/Le Grand, Julian, (eds.): Health care and cost containment 
in the European Union. Aldershot et al.: Ashgate: 443-470 
Pomey, Marie-Pascal/Poullier, Jean Pierre (1997): France. in: Raffel, Marshall W., (ed.): 
Health care and reform in industrialized countries. Pennsylvania : The Pennsylvania 
State University Press: 49-76 
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Germany              
Alber, Jens (1992): Das Gesundheitswesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Frankfurt/New York: Campus. 
Augurzky, Boris et al. (2004): Strukturreformen im deutschen Gesundheitswesen. Essen: 
RWI. 
Beske, Fritz/Brecht, Josef Georg/Reinkemeier, Andrea-Marina (1993): Das 
Gesundheitswesen in Deutschland. Köln: Deutscher Ärzte Verlag. 
Busse, Reinhard/Howorth, Chris (1999): Cost containment in Germany: twenty years 
experience. in: Mossialos, Elias/Le Grand, Julian, (eds.): Health care and cost 
containment in the European Union. Aldershot et al.: Ashgate: 303-340 
Böcken, Jan/Butzlaff, Martin/Esche, Andreas (eds.) (2000): Reformen im Gesundheitswesen. 
Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Börsch-Supan, Axel (2000): Incentive effects of social security on labor force participation: 
evidence in Germany and across Europe. Journal of Public Policy; vol. 78: 25-49. 
Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (2000): Actor constellation, opportunity structure and concept feasibility 
in German and British public sector reforms. in: Wollmann, Helmut/Schröter, 
Eckhard, (eds.): Comparing public sector reform in Britain and Germany. Aldershot et 
al.: Ashgate: 150-170 
Dröge, Jürgen (1991): Steuerungsinstrumente im Gesundheitswesen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Regensburg : Transfer-Verlag. 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (2000): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Germany. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
--- (2005): Health Care Systems in Transition: Germany. Kopenhagen: European Observatory 
on Health Care Systems. 
Kirkman-Liff, Bradford (1999): Health care cost containment in Germany. in: Powell, Francis 
D./Wessen, Albert F., (eds.): Health care systems in transition. London et al.: Sage: 
89-100 
Klusen, Norbert (ed.) (2000): Chancen und Risiken auf dem europäischen Gesundheitsmarkt. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Knappe, Eckhard (2001): Öffnung des deutschen Gesundheitssystems zum gemeinsamen 
Markt . in:  Schmähl, Winfried (ed.): Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer nationalen 
Sozialpolitik. Berlin: Duncker&Humblot: 137-181 
Knappe, Eckhard/Laine, Vesa/Schmitz, Stefan/Winkler, Adalbert (1989): Theoretische und 
empirische Analyse der Steuerungskapazität des Honorarverhandlungssystems im 
Gesundheitssektor. Stuttgart: Bleicher Verlag. 
Manow, Philip (1994): Gesundheitspolitik im Einigungsprozeß. Frankfurt: Campus. 
Nagel, Eckhard/Beske, Fritz (2007): Das Gesundheitswesen in Deutschland. Köln: Deutscher 
Ärzte Verlag. 
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Perschke-Hartmann, Chistiane (1994): Die doppelte Reform. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 
Pfaff, Anita B./Busch, Susanne/Rindsfüßer, Christian (1994): Kostendämpfung in der 
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. 
Rosewitz, Bernd/Webber, Douglas (1990): Reformversuche und Reformblockaden im 
deutschen Gesundheitswesen. Frankfurt: Campus. 
Röttgers, Hanns R. (1999): Probleme der Gesundheitsreform . Aachen: Shaker Verlag. 
Saltman, Richard B. (1997): The context of health reform in the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Germany, and the United States. Health Policy; vol. 41: 9-26. 
Sauerland, Dirk (2002): Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland: Reformbedarf und 
Entwicklungsperspektiven. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann-Stiftung. 
Scharf, Bradley (1999): German unity and health care reform. in: Powell, Francis D./Wessen, 
Albert F., (eds.): Health care systems in transition. London et al.: Sage: 101-112 
Schwabe, Ulrich/Paffrath, Dieter (1995): Arzneiverordnungsreport 1995. Stuttgart: Fischer. 
Webber, Douglas  (1988): Krankheit, Geld und Politik: Zur Geschichte der 
Gesundheitsreformen in Deutschland. Leviathan; 16: 158-203. 
--- (1989): Zur Geschichte der Gesundheitsreformen in Deutschland II. Leviathan; vol. 17: 
262-300. 
Wille, Eberhard/Albring, Manfred (eds.) (1998): Reformoptionen im Gesundheitswesen. 
Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang. 
 
Greece               
Carpenter, Mick (2003): On the edge: the fate of progressive modernization in Greek health 
policy. International Political Science Review ; vol. 24: 257-272. 
Davaki, Konstantina/Mossialos, Elias (2006): Financing and delivering health care in Greece.  
in: Petmesidou Maria/Mossialos, Elias, (eds.): Social policy developments in Greece. 
Aldershot: Ashgate: 286-318 
Liaropoulos, Lycurgus/Tragakes, Ellie (1998): Public/private financing in the Greek health 
care system: implications for equity. Health Policy; vol. 43: 153-169. 
Mossialos, Elias/Allin, Sara (2005): Interest groups and health system reform in Greece. West 
European Politics; vol.  28: 420-444. 
Sissouras, Aris/Karokis, Anthony/Mossialos, Elias (1999): Health care and cost containment 
in Greece. in: Mossialos, Elias/Le Grand, Julian, (eds.): Health care and cost 
containment in the European Union. Aldershot et al.: Ashgate: 341-400 
Tountas, Yannis/Karnaki, Panagiota/Pavi, Elpida (2002): Reforming the reform: the Greek 
national health system in transition. Health Policy; vol. 62: 15-29. 
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Tragakes, Ellie/Polyzos, Nicholas (1998): The Evolution of Health Care Reforms in Greece: 
Charting a Course of Change. International Journal of Health Planning and 
Management; vol. 13: 107-130. 
 
Hungary              
European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (1999): Health Care Systems in 
Transition: Hungary. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems. 
--- (2004): Health Care Systems in Transition: Hungary. Kopenhagen: European Observatory 
on Health Care Systems. 
Kroneman, Madelon/Nagy, Julia (2001): Introducing DRG-based financing in Hungary: a 
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changing institutional circumstances. Health Policy; vol. 55: 19–36. 
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European Observatory on Health Care Systems/Observatory (forthcoming): Health Care 
Systems in Transition: Ireland. Kopenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care 
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